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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
JULIAN GARCIA-CARDONA 
DPHIL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
VALUE-ADDED INITIATIVES: DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS ON THE GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAIN FOR COLOMBIA’S COFFEE 
SUMMARY 
 
This thesis discusses whether participation in two voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) has improved 
the capacity of coffee producers to upgrade, and the extent to which it has brought economic benefits 
and reduced their exposure to risk and vulnerability. These debates are addressed using the Global Value 
Chain (GVC) perspective, including recent contributions that integrate poverty considerations, to assess 
the implications for coffee growers of participating in the specialty coffee value chain. In this analysis, 
particular emphasis is given to differences according to farm size.  
 
The study focuses on the Nespresso AAA Sustainable QualityTM programme and Fairtrade certification in 
Colombia, comparing the two treatment groups with a control sample of similar conventional producers. 
In addition to this, a comparison between two groups of AAA producers was carried out. The data comes 
from three rounds of surveys and two periods of field work. To assess differences over time and construct 
a robust counterfactual this thesis combines Propensity Score Matching (PSM) with the difference-in-
difference (DID) analytic approach. 
 
VSS initiatives have been promoted as a way of improving the livelihoods of small producers, with 
extensive implementation in coffee production. The analysis shows that interventions to facilitate 
upgrading and support the involvement of producers in VSS do not produce consistent improvements 
over time for most of the indicators analysed. Therefore, the potential of VSS to generate significant 
improvements in livelihoods for certified producers, could take both a longer time and require greater 
institutional efforts to build capacities. This finding needs to be considered in light of strong institutional 
support for all coffee producers in Colombia, which could offset the impact of VSS support.  
 
In terms of livelihood-related variables, the analysis shows that participating producers became more 
dependent on coffee revenues (as there was no significant expansion of cash production), reduced their 
share of haired labour during the period of study and paid these workers less than the minimum wage. 
These trends are similar to those of the conventional producers, since the analysis did not find significant 
differences over time.  
 
The outcomes of the analysis by farm size draws a bleak picture for smallholders below one hectare. The 
main conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that the farm size constrained both the potential 
upgrading opportunities from VSS and their chances of gaining sustainable incomes. The political economy 
effects of these disappointing results, both for certified producers and producers thinking about 
certification, must be analysed carefully, as growers’ expectations of improving their economic and social 
viability through the adoption VSS are lower than expected. As such, VSS initiatives cannot be the only 
strategy for helping very small coffee producers to overcome the structural restrictions and limitations 
they have faced for decades. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
Colombia, the world’s third largest coffee exporting country, became the first coffee 
exporter to embark on an active strategy of differentiating and marketing its product in 
the coffee world (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002, Reina, Silva et al. 2007, WIPO 2007, 
Hughes 2009, Juglar 2009, The Economist 2010). Since 1960 Colombia’s unified 
marketing campaign and brand development of coffee was conducted through a 
differentiation strategy, in which the “100 % Colombian coffee” programme was the 
basic strategy, and the Juan Valdez® character1 as the image to promote Colombian 
coffee as the best in the world. This strategy, perhaps the most successful campaign for 
a product from a developing country to promote the authenticity of origin (Deshpande 
2001), resulted in higher prices for Colombian coffee compared to other coffees of 
similar quality during four decades. However, the success of this strategy has diminished 
since 1989 with the collapse of the economic clauses of the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA), which regulated export quantities and meant that higher revenues for 
coffee producers could only be obtained through higher green coffee prices. 
 
As with other agribusiness industries following the break-up of regulation through 
international commodity agreements, during the last two decades the coffee industry 
has experienced structural changes which have had negative distributional impacts 
affecting producer’s long term real returns (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Ataman and 
Beghin 2005, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, Daviron and Ponte 2005). Along with a greater 
policy emphasis on the role of markets and the private sector in agriculture (Potts 2007, 
World Bank 2007) there has been a significant process of concentration and accelerated 
vertical coordination along the coffee value chain (Pizano 2001, Ponte 2004). Under this 
complex business environment, coffee producers have viewed product differentiation 
and adding value to their products and processes as the potential tool for supporting 
rural development (Humphrey 2008). These strategies based upon claims of quality, 
environmental impact, origin and community development among others, are part of a 
broader trend towards the increasing importance of credence2 goods in the food 
                                                          
1
  The triangular symbol of “Cafe de Colombia” represents the archetypal Colombian coffee 
grower. Juan Valdez and his faithful mule represent the characteristics of the humble farmer in the Andes 
mountains where Colombian coffee is grown (Reina et al. 2007).  
2 As will be explained below, Jaffee et al. (2011) pointed out that credence characteristics are attributes 
predominantly associated with how products are produced (process characteristics), which are not 
verifiable through inspection or consumption. They require verifiable information accompanying the 
product on which attributes is or is not present.  
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industry (Reardon, Codron et al. 2001, Anholt 2003, Dolan and Humphrey 2004, 
Humphrey 2005, Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Humphrey 2006a, Potts 2007).  
 
The coffee sector is one of the most important agrifood industries, both in terms of the 
number and frequency use of such claims, with between one and two million farms 
participating in different programmes in nearly 30 countries around the world 
(Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 
2011). In particular, those based on third party inspection and certification of suppliers 
through environmental and socio-economic standards (Voluntary Sustainability 
Standards – VSS hereafter), those linked to authenticity of origin (geographical 
indication), and more recently those authored by mayor branded coffee companies and 
retailers (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Giovannucci, Josling et 
al. 2009, OXFAM 2009, Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011, 
Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012, Panhuysen and 
VanReenen 2012, Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of 
Standards and Certification 2012). These different strategies for adding value and 
differentiating coffee products can be initiated by different actors in the value chain: (i) 
by producers' linked to authenticity of origin or relating to the social and environmental 
impact; (ii) by trading partnerships between Alternative Trade Organizations or NGOs; 
and (iii) corporate and industrial firm initiatives. 
 
Until now, there has been little agreement on the question of whether the multiplication 
of private standards, certifications and labels, including the indirect costs associated 
with their adoption, facilitates or hinders farmer participation in agri-food value chains 
and end markets (Ponte and Ewert 2009, Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014). Likewise, there is 
no consensus on whether this trend is harming producers and local communities (Ponte 
and Gibbon 2005), or whether it has opened new opportunities for small farmers to 
increase their incomes, helped them fulfil their basic needs and improved their welfare 
and livelihood (Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Potts, Lynch 
et al. 2014). 
 
With the coffee sector case in particular, several researchers agree that there is an 
increasing demand for effective impact evaluation on the outcomes and possibilities for 
these initiatives (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, Potts 
2007, Teuber 2007, Linton 2008, Neilson 2008, Raynolds 2009, Beuchelt and Zeller 2011, 
Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011). Despite an extensive literature review on the impact of 
VSS (most of them on the Fairtrade certification) that suggests that producers have 
received both direct and indirect benefits from adopting VSS, a growing body of 
researchers argues that a common limitation in these studies is the absence of long-
term impact assessments using statistically valid data. Without this type of analysis, it is 
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not possible to accurately determine if participation in different forms of GVC 
governance [throughout the adoption of different kind of certification standards] has 
progressively improved the producers’ ability to innovate in different spheres of 
economic upgrading to increase their incomes and improve the livelihood and well-
being of coffee growers as a result (Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011).    
 
The relative merits of each differentiating strategy, and whether or not they generate 
sustainable incomes for coffee producers, has not been systematically analysed. While 
the general merits of differentiation have been examined, and the impacts of some of 
these initiatives have been studied in isolation, there is no evidence of a systematic 
comparison of the different approaches to differentiation. Notwithstanding, from the 
literature review, some concerns arise on each type of strategy: 
 
 There has been extensive debate on consolidation in global coffee value chains 
and the increasing dominance of coffee companies based in developed 
countries. Differentiation along the lines of Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality 
Program, the sustainable division from Nestlé, raises such concerns. As a 
competitive strategy to participate in the new segments of the market, lead 
firms have created their own private standards and certifications in terms of 
sustainability. In this sense, there is concern on the profitability of these 
initiatives for the upstream value chain participants, in particular for small 
producers (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci and Potts 2008, Neilson 2008, 
Raynolds 2009, Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010).  
 The growth of Fairtrade coffee sales has increased revenues for some coffee 
farmers. Nevertheless, doubts remain on the extent that small producers 
actually benefit. In particular, various analysts have suggested that they only 
manage to sell a limited proportion of their production as Fairtrade, thus 
reducing the impact of benefits (Ponte and Kawuma 2003, Potts, Van der Meer 
et al. 2010, Lebel 2012). 
 With the development of the “100 % Colombian coffee” programme, regional 
coffees and later geographical indications of origin could put more power into 
the hands of producers, and in Colombia the National Federation of Coffee 
Growers (FNC) is particularly experienced in developing the Colombia brand and 
marketing coffee. Nevertheless, developing global or national brands is 
particularly challenging and expensive. It remains to be seen whether or not the 
introduction of a new market-oriented strategy generates increased revenues 
for farmers (Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009, Giovannucci and Samper 2009, 
Hughes 2009, Juglar 2009, Lozano, Samper et al. 2012).  
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In the case of all three types of differentiation, two further concerns remain. First, that 
compliance with VSS requires considerable financial, informational, technical, 
managerial skills, and network resources – such as improved farming practices, greater 
concern with quality, investments in equipment, the costs of certification, etc., that tend 
cost small farmers more than their larger counterparts with economies of scale. Second, 
little is known about the security of farmers incorporated into such schemes. How 
dependent do small producers become on the performance of these differentiated 
coffee value chains and the strategies of the lead firms and key actors in these chains? 
 
This thesis addresses these issues through a comparison of three rounds of survey data 
of the production and trade of conventional coffee which is destined for external market 
labelled as “100 % Colombian coffee” programme or being part of the strategy of 
regional coffees and geographical indications with two different Voluntary Sustainability 
Standards (VSS) – Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA. The advantages and disadvantages of 
these schemes for producers will be examined through a case study of Colombia’s value 
chain structures and institutions. Global value chain analysis will be used to study the 
most important changes between the coffee producers and buyer relationships across 
two producing regions in Colombia and to explain what kind of changes have taken place 
and the effects on producers and their organizations. 
 
In consequence, the main focus of this study is to evaluate how participation in the 
specialty coffee value chain by Colombian coffee producers have facilitated their 
upgrading strategies, and the extent to which have resulted in economic benefits and 
reduced exposure to risk and vulnerability for them.  
 
This line of inquiry leads to the formulation of two key questions: First, how has the 
participation in distinct types of differentiated channels, such as private standards, 
certification schemes, and labels etc., affected the upgrading strategies of coffee 
producers in the specialty coffee value chain? Secondly, how have these new value 
added initiatives affected the pattern of revenues for producers, and their exposure to 
risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee value chain?    
 
The first question focuses on understanding if the dynamics of participation in the 
specialty coffee value chain, has facilitated farmers’ upgrading strategies, small and 
medium sized coffee producers in particular. Adopting the stricter requirements of 
voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) entails implement significant upgrading 
strategies. However, upgrading in the coffee sector demand to overcome serious 
constraints that limited farmers’ ability to participate competitively (Bamber and 
Fernández-Stark 2014), but particularly require institutions to help producers to develop 
competences for further upgrading (Humphrey 2008, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). 
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The second question focuses, not only on the issue of farm level returns, but also on the 
analysis of livelihoods risk to which farmers are exposed. In other words, whether the 
farmers participating in specialty coffee value chains, not only benefit from increased 
income and profitability, and a higher share of the revenues from the value chains in 
which they participate, but also improved farmer livelihoods. Even if incomes increase, 
the security and reliability of these incomes has an impact on overall welfare, for 
example, not only cash income or greater income stability, but also broader societal and 
environmental benefits (Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). As these questions are addressed, 
special attention is paid to the differences between big and small coffee growers.  
 
This study used quantitative data from three rounds of surveys during a four year 
interval, employed impact analysis methods, and qualitative data from two periods of 
fieldwork in Colombia.  This study’s aims to contribute to the debate on the impact of 
the adoption of VSS on the upgrading strategies of coffee growers, with particular 
emphasis on the role that institutions can play to help producers overcome serious 
constrains that limit their ability to develop competences for further upgrading and 
participate competitively in developing countries. In addition, this thesis seeks to 
contribute to current research exploring to what extent VSS fulfil their original purpose 
of improving farmer’s livelihoods. 
 
1.1. Main theoretical issues 
 
This thesis will address these debates using the Global Value Chain (GVC) perspective, 
including recent contributions in which vertical and horizontal dimensions of GVC 
analysis are integrated to assess the implications for coffee growers of participating in 
the Colombian specialty coffee value chain (Bolwig, Gibbon et al. 2009, Bolwig, Ponte et 
al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). Particularly notable in the agri-food sector, the 
GVC methodology has been used in a variety of studies to examine how global buyers 
and different patterns of value chain governance [throughout the adoption of different 
kind of certification standards] affect the scope of farmers’ upgrading strategies in 
developing countries (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002a, Humphrey 2006a, Humphrey 
2006b, Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012, Bamber and Fernández-Stark 2014, Ponte, Kelling et al. 
2014). 
 
This study will use empirical material from the global value chain for certified Fairtrade 
coffee, and the Nespresso AAA Sustainable QualityTM Programme in Colombia, to reflect 
upon the prospects for value adding strategies in the global coffee industry, and the 
extent to which these strategies actually increase the incomes of coffee producers and 
redistribute incomes along the coffee value chain.  
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Not without its critics, GVC analysis has “been polemical rather than scholar” (Gilbert 
2008). Nonetheless, it has contributed to a more systematic understanding of the 
political economy of contemporary global production systems (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 
2001, Humphrey 2005, Petkova 2006, Humphrey 2006a, Humphrey 2006b, Neilson 
2008, Ponte 2008, Bair 2009, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011) As a result, during the last 
decade, the GVC approach has expanded considerably, both empirically and 
conceptually, and its key elements have been extensively discussed. There is not only an 
emergent literature analysing the links between value chains, and standards and 
ethical/sustainable trade issues in general and the coffee sector in particular (Talbot 
1997, Ponte 2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005, Petkova 2006, Neilson 2007, Raynolds, 
Murray et al. 2007, Bitzer, Francken et al. 2008, Neilson 2008, Raynolds 2009, Riisgaard, 
Bolwig et al. 2010), but also new commodity policies  that are being supported by a 
burgeoning literature arising from the value chain perspective (Ronchi 2006, ECLAC 
2008, Sexsmith and Potts 2009, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011). 
 
The fieldwork used in this study took place in Colombia during two phases, between 
October 2009 and December 2010; and between August 2012 and April 2013. To test 
the research questions, primary data was gathered through three different surveys to 
collect information on Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA producers for the harvest years of 
2008, 2009 and 2011. In-depth interviews and focus groups interviews with key 
stakeholders of the coffee chain in Colombia were also carried out. This thesis combines 
impact evaluation techniques to construct statistical comparison groups. Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) was implemented in combination with Difference in Difference 
approach (DID). This allowed for control of selection bias and the influence of 
independent factors. 
 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the main theoretical issues that this thesis will adopt to study recent 
developments in the coffee market and its implications for the competitiveness of small 
farmers, in particular. The chapter uses the GVC perspective to study current 
developments in the coffee market, their impact on the competitiveness of coffee 
growers and on a set of specific livelihood-related variables. The chapter explores the 
concepts of governance and upgrading, as well as recent developments in the global 
value chain analysis, that integrate poverty considerations into this framework. The 
chapter also describes current trends in agri-food value chains, highlighting the 
increasing importance of product differentiation based on credence and the increased 
proliferation of private standards, labels and certifications systems, both in private and 
public spheres characteristics. This chapter describes recent trends in agri-food 
standards and how these initiatives have affected upgrading opportunities for 
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agricultural producers, and have contributed to improve farmer livelihoods in 
developing countries. Finally, the chapter looks at the importance of mobilizing 
resources to support producers’ upgrading strategies to participate in agri-food value 
chains. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the methods used, with an initial restatement of the research 
questions and the rationale behind the selection of the case study. The chapter then 
discusses the main features of the research methods used to test the two key questions 
mentioned above. It also discusses how this thesis operationalised the key questions 
examined in this study. The methodological perspective chosen is presented. It goes on 
to explain the different methodologies designed for data gathering that include data 
surveys through structured household questionnaires and the procedures for the 
creation of valid comparison groups. In doing so, this thesis combines impact evaluation 
techniques as the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) in combination with Difference in 
Difference approach (DID). This allowed to control selection bias and the influence of 
independent factors. The chapter also details the interviews that targeted various types 
of respondents during the two phases of fieldwork carried out in Colombia: coffee 
growers, local buyers at cooperative level, exporters, support and donor organisations, 
and extension personnel. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the most important changes in the coffee industry during the last 
thirty years. The chapter describes how new forms of governance in the global value 
chain for coffee emerged. First, it discusses how most producing countries have 
experienced a deregulation process, added to a substantial increase in production and 
high volatility of nominal prices. Second, it describes how the governance of 
international coffee trade has moved to corporate strategies adopted by large 
international traders, roasters and retailers (Pizano 2001, Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001a, 
Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, Ponte 2004, Reina, Silva et al. 2007).  
 
The chapter then highlights the higher demand at consumer level for differentiated and 
higher-value coffee products, which has occurred during the last decade. It shows that 
this segment of the market, at the top level of the quality pyramid, is led by an intense 
search for high quality coffee, careful evaluation of coffee attributes, and the 
development of close business relationships between producers and buyers, in 
particular, towards codes of conduct for social and environmental impact (Humphrey 
2005). Then, from the supplier perspective, the chapter explains how, a growing group 
of producers are pursuing strategies that are independent from commodity pricing at 
the exchanges, in order to capture more of the downstream margins in the coffee chain 
and increase returns by earning premiums. These strategies include certified and 
speciality coffee for at least a portion of their production. Finally, the chapter describes 
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the market evolution, the main features of sustainable coffee certifications and 
verifications. Finally, this chapter raises concerns about current trends of oversupply in 
specialty and VSS coffees in this market, as this could affect the upgrading opportunities 
of coffee growers. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the most important changes in the Colombian coffee industry, 
particularly, during the last two decades. It starts by providing a description of the local 
context and main macro trends of the sector, then discusses how Colombia’s coffee 
institutions operate and its regulatory framework, as well as the structure and trends in 
domestic and external marketing. In particular, the chapter discusses the new market-
oriented strategy of value-added launched by Colombian coffee institutions at the 
beginning of the century. At this stage, the chapter emphasises the recent evolution of 
the trade of sustainable and speciality coffee in Colombia. As such, it presents a 
complete picture of this segment of the market. In particular, the chapter raised issues 
dealing with oversupply in the speciality and sustainable coffee segment, erosion in the 
price premiums for certification paid to coffee growers, and changes in the internal 
market at the expense of the share held by the initiatives created by the coffee growers 
and the benefits of those created by the corporate sector.  
 
Chapter 6 addresses the first research question on how participation in two distinct 
Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS), such as Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA 
compared to similar producers, affected the upgrading strategies of coffee producers in 
the specialty coffee value chain. This chapter contributes to the debate on the impact of 
the adoption of VSS on the upgrading strategies of coffee growers, particularly small 
farmers, in a four-year period. In addition, it explores whether coffee growers, who 
adopted voluntary standards, were more likely to receive institutional support to help 
them overcome their most important limitations to further upgrading. This thesis 
proposes a model with two development areas that are determinant for producers to 
build their competences and upgrade: (i) Institutional arrangements to facilitate 
upgrading; and ii) investments and adoption of good agricultural practices to improve 
upgrading trajectories. This approach allows us to better understand whether the 
affiliation of coffee producers to VSS, compared with their respective control group of 
producers, have resulted in significant differences in differences for a set of matched 
indicators which shed light on farmers’ capacity to innovate in different spheres of 
economic upgrading in the markets governed by private standards.  
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the question of whether the adoption of specific upgrading 
strategies, depicted in Chapter 6, has achieved its purpose of improving socio-economic 
conditions for producers. This Chapter, quantitatively assesses whether farmers benefit, 
not only in terms of increased cash incomes and profitability, or the distribution of 
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wealth towards a higher share of the revenues in the value chain, but also in terms of 
the evolution of important livelihood-related variables. As these concerns are 
addressed, special attention is paid to the differences between larger and smaller coffee 
growers. 
 
The Chapter 8 presents the discussion and conclusions related to the new empirical 
evidence presented in the chapters 6 and 7 to understand how the compliance with the 
competitive requirements of two VSS (Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality 
programme) impacted on the upgrading opportunities of coffee growers, and achieved 
its original purpose of improving the welfare and livelihoods of producers, smallholders 
in particular. This chapter identifies opportunities for future research, and for policies 
aimed at supporting economic upgrading in developing countries. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Prospects for economic upgrading in agri-food value chains: background 
for the analysis of specialty coffee value chains 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There is a renewed interest in the potential contribution on economic development of 
the various differentiation strategies recently employed by agricultural and livestock 
producers in developing countries. In many countries, producers, supported by a 
synergy between public and private initiatives, have sought to differentiate and add 
value to their products and processes, in order to improve their access to global agri-
food chains, positioning themselves “outside the commodity box” (Lewin, Giovannucci 
et al. 2004), supporting rural development (Humphrey 2008) and promoting social or 
political economy objectives (Menaplace, Gregory et al. 2009). 
 
Although there is no single driver of this trend, these strategies towards differentiation 
are affected by two major developments: a broader shift towards the increasing 
importance of credence3 goods in the food industry (Reardon, Codron et al. 2001, 
Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005, Ponte and Gibbon 2005) and the dramatic transformation 
in the agricultural private standards landscape, both nationally and internationally, and 
also within specific global agri-food chains (Ponte 2004, Henson and Reardon 2005, 
Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Henson and Jaffee 2006, Henson and Humphrey 2012). These 
trends have been particularly evident in the coffee industry and will be further discussed 
in this dissertation. 
 
Product differentiation, through credence claims and private standards, have emerged 
as an important element of governance to coordinate supplier activities (Kaplinsky 2004, 
Ponte and Gibbon 2005) that has significant implications for the capacity of producers 
to innovate in different spheres of economic upgrading (Giuliani, Pietrobelli et al. 2005, 
Neilson 2007, Kaplinsky and Morris 2008, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). As such, 
differentiation can have profound repercussions on the livelihoods of farmers located in 
developing countries, particularly smaller and vulnerable producers, who depend 
almost exclusively on the production and sale of agri-food crops (Ponte and Ewert 2009, 
Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010, Ruben 2014). However, there is 
little agreement on the question of how the proliferation of standards and credence 
claims has affected the upgrading strategies of agricultural producers in developing 
                                                          
3 As will be explained below, Jaffee et al. (2011) pointed out that credence characteristics are attributes 
predominantly associated with how products are produced (process characteristics), which are not 
verifiable through inspection or consumption. They require that verifiable information accompanies the 
product on which of these attributes is or is not present.  
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countries. Nor is agreement on the socio-economic benefits to farmers that arise from 
the introduction of different types of standards and the product differentiation they 
create. 
 
There is still debate on whether the multiplication of private standards, certifications 
and labels, including the indirect costs associated with their adoption, is facilitating or 
hindering farmer participation in agri-food value chains and end markets (Ponte and 
Ewert 2009, Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014). Likewise, there is no consensus on whether this 
trend is harming producers and local communities (Ponte and Gibbon 2005), or if it has 
opened new opportunities for small farmers to increase their incomes, helped them 
fulfil their basic needs and improved their welfare and livelihood (Alvarez and Von Hagen 
2011, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Potts, Lynch et al. 2014). 
 
This thesis will address these debates using the Global Value Chain (GVC) perspective. 
As a result, this chapter explores the concepts of governance and upgrading, as well as 
recent contributions in which the vertical and horizontal dimensions of value chain 
analysis are integrated as a framework to assess the implications for coffee growers of 
participating in the specialty coffee value chain in Colombia (Bolwig, Gibbon et al. 2009, 
Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). Particularly notable in the agri-
food sector, the GVC methodology has been used in a variety of studies to examine how 
global buyers and different patterns of value chain governance [throughout the 
adoption of different kinds of certification standards] affect the scope of farmers’ 
upgrading strategies in developing countries (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002a, Humphrey 
2006a, Humphrey 2006b, Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012, Bamber and Fernández-Stark 2014, 
Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014).  
 
However, a general limitation of these studies is the absence of long-term impact 
assessments using statistically valid data to address if participation in different forms of 
GVC governance in agri-food value chains have progressively contributed to the ability 
of producers to innovate in different spheres of economic upgrading to increase their 
incomes and improve the livelihood and well-being of coffee growers as a result (Von 
Hagen and Alvarez 2011). Most of the available knowledge today lacks of a convincing 
methodology and research designs, that makes difficult to attribute outcomes directly 
to the adoption of the competitive requirements of standards and certifications systems 
(Giovannucci and Potts 2008, Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011, 
Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012). 
 
This chapter is structured both to provide a review of the relevant literature on GVC 
analysis and recent trends in product differentiation as well as to explain how credence 
claims and the increased proliferation of VSS not only have affected the upgrading 
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opportunities for agricultural producers, but also how if these initiatives have 
contributed to transform farmer livelihoods in developing countries. Thus, the two key 
questions that will be addressed in this chapter are: 
 
 How has the participation in distinct types of differentiated channels, such as 
private standards, certification schemes, and labels etc., affected the upgrading 
strategies of coffee producers in the specialty coffee value chain?  
 How have these new value added initiatives affected the pattern of revenues for 
producers, and their exposure to risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee 
value chain? 
 
The first question focuses on understanding if the dynamics of participation in the 
specialty coffee value chain, has facilitated farmers’ upgrading strategies, small and 
medium sized coffee producers in particular. Adopting the stricter requirements of 
Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS) entails implement significant upgrading 
strategies. However, upgrading in the coffee sector demands to overcome serious 
constraints that limited farmers´ ability to participate competitively (Bamber and 
Fernández-Stark 2014), but particularly requires institutions to help producers to 
develop competences for further upgrading (Humphrey 2008, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 
2010). 
 
The second question focuses, not only on the issue of farm level returns, but also on the 
analysis of livelihoods risk to which farmers are exposed. In other words, whether the 
farmers participating in specialty coffee value chains, not only benefit from increased 
income and profitability, and a higher share of the revenues from the value chains in 
which they participate, but also improved farmer livelihoods. Even if incomes increase, 
the security and reliability of these incomes has an impact on the overall welfare, for 
example, not only cash income or greater income stability, but also broader societal and 
environmental benefits (Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). As these questions are addressed, 
special attention is paid to the differences between large and small coffee growers. 
 
This chapter is structured into six sections. After this introduction, the second section 
introduces the recent developments in the global value chain analysis, including the 
concepts of governance and upgrading. Section Three describes the recent trends in 
agri-food value chains. The fourth section reviews the literature exploring current 
debates on private standards. The fifth section looks at the importance of mobilizing 
resources in supporting producers upgrading strategies to participate in agri-food value 
chains, followed by the main conclusions presented in section six. 
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2.2 Global value chain analysis applied to the agri-food sector  
 
This thesis will adopt a Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis to study recent developments 
in the coffee market in Colombia and their implications for the competitiveness of coffee 
growers and for a set of specific livelihood-related variables. An important body of 
literature on GVC analysis has emerged in the last fifteen years, and its key elements 
have been treated extensively. The theoretical focus of the analysis of GVCs, which 
provides an analytical framework for the examination of the interrelations between 
actors in value chains, was initially formulated by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994), 
building on previous work by Wallerstein on global commodity chains (Sturgeon 2009), 
and developed further in different directions by Gereffi et al. (2005) and by Gibbon and 
Ponte (2005).  
 
The GVC approach focuses on how value is created and captured in global value chains 
(Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). It looks closely at the vertical coordination of different 
enterprises along the value chain of activities involved from conception through, 
production, processing, delivery and final disposal after use (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 
2001, Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, Humphrey 2005). 
 
GVC analysis is increasingly acknowledged as a valuable analytical tool for policy 
development analysis (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, Kaplinsky and Morris 2008, Kaplinsky 
2010). In this regard, GVC Analysis has been used in a variety of case studies in sectors 
such as manufacturing, footwear, high technology and agro-food commodities,4 and its 
outcomes have been instrumental to a more systematic comprehension of the political 
economy of contemporary agri-food value chains (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2001, 
Humphrey 2005, Petkova 2006, Humphrey 2006a, Humphrey 2006b, Neilson 2008, 
Ponte 2008, Bair 2009, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011). 
 
Value chain analysis has contributed to the understanding of the obstacles faced by 
those who seek to transform their organizational structure in order to participate in 
global value chains (Schmitz, 2005). Given that GVC analysis explicitly addresses the 
question of power inequalities (Humphrey, 2005), development and inequality (Petkova, 
2006), it enables a comprehension of how enterprises in developing countries, such as 
farms, are integrated into global markets (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; Ponte, 2008), and 
recognises the obstacles and opportunities that arise when they try to move up the 
value chain (Gereffi et al., 2005).5 
 
                                                          
4 Such as fruit (fresh and processed), horticulture, bananas, coffee and cocoa, among others. 
5 This is an area of research where the analysis can be developed further, as this dissertation aims to do. 
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The following section expands on the current debates on the relationship between the 
typologies of GVC governance and the possibilities for successful economic upgrading, 
which serve as the basis for the fundamental questions that this dissertation addresses 
on the specialty coffee value chains. In the last section of this Chapter, the role that 
institutions play in facilitating upgrading is highlighted. 
 
2.2.1 Governance and upgrading  
 
According to Fernandez-Stark et al. (2014) and Sturgeon (2009), who build on previous 
developments from Gereffi, GVC analysis has a fourfold framework: an input-output 
structure, geographic coverage, a governance structure and a local institutional context. 
The first two elements of the GVC framework are mainly descriptive and the last two are 
causal (Sturgeon 2009). 
 
 The input-output structure describes the sequence of value added activities to 
transform raw materials in a set of products and services 
 Territoriality identifies the geographical distribution of the chain 
 The form of governance structure explains how access to upgrading is controlled 
in the value chain 
 Local institutions play a role in supporting and shaping value chains in the 
countries in which they are located. 
 
With differences in the streams of theory building, research, terminology and emphasis 
going on under the GVC (Bair 2009, Sturgeon 2009) in the last fifteen years, research on 
GVC analysis has grown and diversified considerably, both empirically and conceptually, 
and its key elements have been discussed at length (see, among others, Ponte 2004, 
Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008, Ponte 2008, Bair 2009). From these 
four dimensions, governance and the links between economic and social upgrading have 
received the most attention as the centrepiece of GVC analysis (Sturgeon 2009, Gereffi 
2014, Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014). Meanwhile the consideration of the institutional 
context (both seen from the perspective of domestic regulation and public sector), 
initially absent in the original work from Gereffi (1994), has been incorporated to the 
analysis of how institutions relate to GVC governance and upgrading (Neilson and 
Pritchard 2009, Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014). 
 
An important development area of research is the increased interest in the analysis of 
the effects of a particular chain´s governance structure on the upgrading strategies of 
suppliers within global chains, with particular reference to farms and firms in developing 
countries (Ponte 2002, Ponte and Ewert 2009, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, 
Bolwig et al. 2010, Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012, Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014).  
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One particular issue that is closely related to governance is the literature analysing the 
role of public and voluntary sustainability standards in agri-food value chains to change 
upgrading opportunities. These have role in determining the distribution of income and 
margins from trade between segments of the chain (Ponte 2004, Ponte and Gibbon 
2005). Moreover, as a response to criticism of GVC´s vertical analysis (Bair 2009), more 
recent literature have integrated poverty considerations in value-chain analysis (Bolwig, 
Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). This perspective requires an 
understanding of the outcomes of upgrading strategies not only from the financial 
perspective of the incomes of participants or even at the distribution of profits and risk 
in an industry, but also requires the analysis of livelihood activities and networks on 
which participants depend (Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). 
Includes, for example, issues such as poverty alleviation, gender equality, employment 
outcomes and environment impact (Ponte 2008, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, 
Bolwig et al. 2010). 
 
In order to explore these issues, this thesis explores two different concepts from GVC 
analysis that are central for its development: the governance of GVCs, and how firms 
(such as enterprises or farms) adopt strategies of economic upgrading to maintain or 
improve their positions in the global economy (Gereffi 2014). 
 
GVC governance in this study refers to how economic activities at two different points 
in the chain are coordinated through non-market relationships and the various ways in 
which the leading firms exercise control over activities all along the chain (Gereffi, 
Humphrey et al. 2001, Humphrey and Schmitz 2002a, Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005). 
Governance analysis examines closely where along the chain, and by whom, decisions 
are taken, such as what goods should be produced, how and by whom (Gereffi, 
Humphrey et al. 2005), when and in what quantities, and at what price they are to be 
sold (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001). This examination highlights power inequalities, and 
the capacity of some more dominant businesses [lead firms or buyers] to shape the 
activities, capability requirements, opportunities and incomes of others [producers]. 
 
In the GVC analysis, economic upgrading refers to either, the capacity of firms and 
producers to innovate, to make products or processes with more value added, or to shift 
to more skilled activities in new functional positions than can provide better returns 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2002a). Through upgrading, which depends both on the 
characteristics of suppliers and the competitive requirements of the firms (Fernández-
Stark, Bamber et al. 2014), farmers can improve their competitive position and modify 
their relationships within the governance structure of the value chain (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2001, Kaplinsky 2004, Petkova 2006, ECLAC 2008, Bair 2009). Equally, however, 
upgrading and the opening up of increased opportunities that require greater 
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capabilities and resources on the part of suppliers has been associated with exclusion, 
particularly of small farmers, and this point will be discussed further below. 
 
In order to study the nature of the relationships between the buyers and suppliers 
participating in a global value chain, it is paramount to identify its underlying governance 
structure (Giuliani, Pietrobelli et al. 2005, ECLAC 2008, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010). In this 
particular, different governance patterns imposed by global buyers that operate in the 
value chains, have important consequences, not just on producer’s sales, but also on the 
type of upgrading strategies within their reach (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002a, Kaplinsky 
and Morris 2008). 
 
In order to determine the governance structure of a value chain, 6 GVC analysis relies on 
the classification developed by Gereffi et al. (2005: 84) and is determined by the value 
of three main explanatory variables: (i) the level of complexity of information required 
in a transactions (ii) the codifiability and ease of transactions; and (iii) the level of 
supplier competence in meeting transaction requirements (Humphrey 2005, Humphrey 
2006b). Following this combination of variables, there are five distinct categories of GVC 
governance between buying firms and their immediate suppliers, ranging from low to 
higher levels of explicit coordination and power asymmetry (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 
2005): 
 
 Market relations are dominant when transactions are easily codified, and suppliers 
have the capability to produce with little input from buyers. Because the complexity 
of the information exchanged is relatively low, transactions can be governed with 
little explicit coordination. Costs of switching to new partners remains low and the 
market linkages do not have to be completely transitory, such as in spot markets, 
and can persist over time, with repeated transactions. 
 Modular value relationships arise when the ability to codify specifications extends 
to complex products, and when the suppliers have higher capabilities to supply a 
full-range of services, and are more specialized with little explicit monitoring and 
control. Because of the ease of codification, complex information can be exchanged 
with little explicit coordination, and so, the cost of switching to new partners 
remains low. 
                                                          
6 Initially, in the literature on value chains, chain governance models were divided between producer-
driven chains and buyer-driven chains (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). However, as Gereffi pointed out 
(2014: 13), as the empirical and theoretical studies proliferated these categories “were too broad to 
capture the full complexity of the GVC governance structures that were emerging in the world”. About 
this respect, some studies pointed out that this categories “did not adequately capture the range of 
governance forms observed in actual chains, leading to a proliferation of variations on the original theme 
of drivenness” (Bair 2009: 20). 
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 Relational value chain transactions occur when the product specifications cannot 
be codified, there are complex interactions between buyers and sellers, and 
supplier capabilities are high. The cost of switching to new suppliers is high, because 
the interaction between firms is frequent and interpersonal communications 
important, due to the exchange of complex information. The capability 
requirements of both buyer and seller transactions are also high in relational 
transactions. 
 Captive (quasi-hierarchical) value relationships arise when the ability to codify and 
the complexity of product specifications are both high, but the capability of 
suppliers is low. Therefore small suppliers are dependent on large buyers, who exert 
a high degree of monitoring and control. 
 Hierarchal value chains occur when product specifications cannot be codified, 
products are complex, and competent suppliers cannot be found. This form of 
governance is characterized by vertical integration within a single enterprise. The 
dominant form of governance is managerial control, flowing from managers to 
subordinates or from headquarters to subsidiaries and affiliates. 
 
A great deal of GVC analyses draw a link between different forms of chain governance 
and the upgrading opportunities, particularly in relation to the upgrading trajectories for 
firms and farmers in developing countries. Early literature on GVC analysis has 
highlighted four types of upgrading that a specific actor can implement by improving its 
capabilities, or acquiring new functions, in the production, processing and the marketing 
of their product (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2001, Humphrey and Schmitz 2002a, 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2002b). As such, upgrading opportunities in global value chains 
may derive from a variety of sources: 
 
 The upgrading of processes, under which the productive process is reorganized 
through the introduction of new technologies, transforming inputs into outputs 
with increased efficiency. 
 The upgrading of products, linked to the addition of value to more sophisticated 
products, and the application of science to generate lower unit values as a result 
of increases in productivity and efficiency or lower production costs. 
 The functional upgrading, or “upgrading within chains”, which has enabled 
producers to seek price increases resulting from the acquisition of new functions 
in the chain, such as design or marketing, or by abandoning existing low-value 
added functions to focus on higher value added activities. 
18 
 
 
 
 Intersectoral upgrading, which involves the possibility of using skills acquired in 
one chain in another sector upgrading7 (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2001, Kaplinsky 
and Morris 2008, Kaplinsky 2010). 
 
The literature then associates different types of upgrading with different governance 
relationships. It is argued that product and process upgrading is more likely to take place 
in the captive (quasi-hierarchical) form of chain governance, in particular if competent 
suppliers could not be found (Sturgeon 2009). In this case, buyers may provide support 
to local producers to comply with the requirements and performance imposed by the 
buyer, although these buyers may have little interest in promoting the acquisition of 
capabilities for functional upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002b, Giuliani, Pietrobelli 
et al. 2005). Support from the buyers to enable suppliers to engage in product and 
process upgrading is particularly likely to happen if the quality of the product depends 
of the skill and competences of local producers, or when the producers are in the first 
stage of integration into the GVC. In this situation, buyers will have an interest in 
promoting the fast acquisition of production capacities of their suppliers. In contrast, 
buyers may have little interest in transferring functions to suppliers if these are already 
being carried out by other businesses within the chain. However, the development of 
supplier competence for upgrading, combined with developments in codification may 
prepare the ground for modular governance (Sturgeon 2009). 
 
Acquiring new functions in the chain, and shifting to a more rewarding functional 
position (i.e. by moving from production to design or areas related to branding, logistic 
and marketing) more often occurs in market-based and relational value chains (Giuliani, 
Pietrobelli et al. 2005, Ponte and Ewert 2009). For example, Giuliani et al. (2005) 
mentioned that functional upgrading was achieved by selling to buyers located in 
regional and domestic markets instead of global markets. 
 
More recent literature has challenged this four-type classification of upgrading and has 
identified additional upgrading trajectories within agri-food value chains (Ponte and 
Ewert 2009, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010, Ponte, Kelling et al. 
2014). By matching some of the categories above, and even going beyond them, recent 
empirical evidence suggests that upgrading trajectories can be grouped into two broad 
categories: (i) improving products, processes, volumes, and/or variety in the same value 
chain node; and (ii) changing and/or adding functions (up or down-stream) in several 
value chain nodes (Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014). Producers can deliver larger production 
volumes (in some cases at a lower quality), comply with standards and certifications, 
successfully deliver on logistics and lead times, and obtain a better price for the same 
                                                          
7 This type of upgrading is not really relevant to this dissertation as has not been used by the coffee-
growers in Colombia. 
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product, as is the case with fair trade (Gibbon, 2001; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Ponte, 
2009). Specifically, ‘functional downgrading’, combined with economies of scale, can 
also be successfully employed to maximise returns or to remain in an increasingly 
demanding value chain (Ponte 2008, Ponte and Ewert 2009). 
 
Ponte et al. (2014) argue that product upgrading does not necessarily lead to products 
with increased unit value, since benefits can be accrued to farms by delivering larger 
volumes of the product without shifting into more sophisticated products (even of lower 
quality) (Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014). Meanwhile, process upgrading could suggest 
improved production procedures which do not necessarily make production more 
efficient, but improve farmers’ position in the value chain nonetheless. 
 
Recent contributions in value chain studies have suggested that assessing the 
implications of any upgrading strategy must integrate vertical and horizontal elements 
of value chain analysis (Bolwig, Gibbon et al. 2009, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, 
Bolwig et al. 2010). This proposition implies a broader definition of upgrading that goes 
beyond both incomes and effects of participation, or power relations within the chain. 
The contemplation of a ‘horizontal’ analysis of value chains, requires an understanding 
of upgrading strategies not only from the financial perception of rewards and risk, but 
also in relation to broader issues of local development such as poverty alleviation, 
gender equality, labour and environment impact. Thus, notwithstanding potential 
increases in income, derived from upgrading strategies, improved security and reliability 
of these incomes will enhance overall welfare, such as broader societal and 
environmental benefits (Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). A detailed quantitative 
examination of these broader issues in the Colombian context are the main focus of 
chapters 6 and 7. 
 
2.3 Trends in agri-food value chains  
 
Over the past two decades, the growing trade of agricultural and food products has been 
accompanied by a dramatic transformation in the agricultural standards landscape both 
internationally, nationally, and within individual value chains.  
 
Economic globalization has given birth to a generation of new business strategies that 
have transformed relationships in terms of the production, processing, marketing and 
sale of commodities (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2001, Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, ECLAC 
2008, Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008, Bair 2009). Producers are facing/meeting increasing 
market demands from both consumers and buyers, in order to avoid exclusion from the 
most lucrative markets. These trends in agri-food value chains compel producers to 
develop their labour force and improve their capabilities for upgrading in terms of 
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management, technology and organization, which was not the case when the products 
on the market were homogenous (ECLAC 2008). 
 
Consumer awareness of food, including the growing importance of “conscious 
consumption”, has pushed consumers to spend more of their money in a socially and 
environmentally responsible way (Ponte 2002, Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005). This is reflected in increased concern with food safety standards, social 
and environmental process standards (Ataman and Beghin 2005, Bain, Deaton et al. 
2005, Jaffee and Henson 2005, World Bank 2005, WTO 2005). 
 
In order to respond to changes in consumer patterns, and increased government 
pressure to improve food safety and public standards (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et al. 
2001, Humphrey 2005), buyers are placing more complex demands on producers, in 
order to attain “product variety, improved quality, reliability of delivery, new product 
differentiators and greater control of risk relating to product safety” (Humphrey 2006b: 
588, World Bank 2007). These standards have been established by companies either to 
differentiate their product from those of competitors (Humphrey 2005), to indicate 
superior quality features (Henson and Humphrey 2010) or by motives of defensive brand 
management (Neilson 2007, Neilson 2008, Neilson and Pritchard 2009).  
 
The characteristics of these trends that are of most relevance to the coffee value chains, 
are: (i) the increasing importance of product differentiation based on credence 
characteristics (authenticity of origin, sustainable and environmental production 
processes, fair trade attributes, etc.) (Reardon, Codron et al. 2001, Anholt 2003, Dolan 
and Humphrey 2004, Humphrey 2005, Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Humphrey 2006a, Potts 
2007), and (ii) the increased proliferation of private standards, labels and certifications 
systems, both in private and public spheres, which has been remarked by several 
authors (Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, Humphrey 2005, Humphrey 2006a, Humphrey 
2006b, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Humphrey 2008, Henson and Humphrey 2010, 
Courville 2011). 
 
2.3.1 Credence claims 
 
A “credence” good is one whose characteristics cannot be verified by inspection prior to 
purchase (a “search” good) or through consumption (an “experience” good) (Reardon, 
Codron et al. 2001, Jaffee, Henson et al. 2011). A search good is one for which the 
attributes that matter to potential consumers can be verified through direct inspection. 
A consumer might, for example, be able to verify whether a product is fresh or not 
through direct inspection. Credence claims about origin, environmental impact, social 
impact, etc., cannot be verified through inspection or consumption (Reardon, Codron et 
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al. 2001). Therefore, the consumer’s belief in these characteristics, and the product’s 
intrinsic quality, relies on a more complex work process, as these characteristics cannot 
be “objectively verified and are based on trust” (Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 2). Among the 
attributes that constitute credence claims, are the production and process methods 
related to claims about safety (e.g. pesticide residues), food quality, environmental and 
socio-economic impact (e.g. Fairtrade, Organic or Rainforest Alliance) or authenticity of 
origin (such as regional branding or geographical indications) (Reardon, Codron et al. 
2001, Anholt 2003, Dolan and Humphrey 2004, Humphrey 2005, Ponte and Gibbon 
2005, Humphrey 2006a, Potts 2007).  
 
Credence claims can modify and reorganise the GVC governance structures between 
buyers and suppliers in agri-food value chains (Duguid 2003), as well as the terms of 
trade faced by producers (Potts, Fernandez et al. 2007). Humphrey (2005, 2006b) argues 
that “these claims act as a form of product branding, identifying particular labels with 
particular characteristics that may be valued by consumers” (Humphrey 2005: 6, 
Humphrey 2006b).  
 
Depending on the point in the value chain at which the credence good is defined 
(Humphrey 2005), there are the economic benefits accruing to those controlling the 
intellectual property rights of the credence claim (Duguid 2003).  
 
For example, if the credence attributes are linked to a specific origin, the goods 
produced by farmers have an identity in the world markets, and create barriers to entry, 
allowing them to increase their bargaining power and incomes (Duguid 2003, Humphrey 
2005, Humphrey 2006a). Therefore, credence claims’ attributes can be used not only as 
a form of brand identity that distinguishes the goods from their competitors in the eyes 
of the consumers (Henson and Reardon 2005), but also as a mean of creating a 
countervailing power that can alter power relations and shape the distribution of wealth 
within global value chains.  
 
2.3.2 Global standards 
 
The emergence of standards, as an mechanism of GVC governance to coordinate 
supplier activities in global agri-food chains, have reshaped and transformed power 
relations among actors from the local, national and international levels of the global 
agri-food sector (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et al. 2001, Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, Higgins 
and Lawrence 2005). While the main function of standards is still to provide information 
to stakeholders, recent trends in the agri-food sector has changed the nature, function, 
purpose and scope of this regulation and verification mechanism (Humphrey 2005, 
World Bank 2005, WTO 2005, Humphrey 2006a). The fast evolution and multiplication 
22 
 
 
 
of different type of agri-food standards has deep repercussions, not only in economic 
and financial terms, but also in relation to poverty, labour and environmental relations 
within agricultural and food systems (Henson and Reardon 2005, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 
2010).  
 
As a consequence, the current standards environment has led the agri-food sector to a 
new policy-regulatory environment with growing complexity (Humphrey 2006a, 
Humphrey 2006b), that has profound repercussions for the competitiveness of 
individual producers and institutions in developing countries (Henson and Reardon 
2005). Today, a farmer who wants to participate in the most dynamic value chains, must 
meet stringent, complex and un-harmonized agri-food standard requirements 
demanded by several types of buyers, and their product has to be certified to one or 
more standards (Jaffee and Henson 2005, World Bank 2005, Humphrey 2008, Kaplinsky 
and Morris 2008, Henson and Humphrey 2010).  
 
When discussing global standards in food and agriculture, a distinction between public 
regulation and private standards can be made (Humphrey 2005, WTO 2005, 
Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Henson and Humphrey 2010, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011). 
It is often argued that public standards (or regulations) are mandatory, and private 
standards are voluntary, although Henson and Humphrey (2010) point to cases where 
public standards are voluntary (where governments provide standards that firms may 
choose to follow or not) and private standards become mandatory because 
governments adopt them and oblige companies to conform to them.  
 
A second important distinction is between baseline and premium standards (Kirk-Wilson 
2002). While baseline standards are designed to ensure that products meet certain 
minimum standards, premium standards are designed to differentiate products, 
showing that they are in some way superior to “normal” products. There are two 
reasons why this distinction is important. First, the dynamics of exclusion may be 
different in the two types of standards. The same applies for benefits. The argument 
that standards increase obligations without giving much in return may well apply to 
baseline standards, but not necessarily to premium standards in the same way. Second, 
the types of organisations and coalitions that support these different standards are not 
necessarily the same.  
 
Private agri-food standards, which are central in this study, are developed by a variety 
of actors and for a variety of reasons, such as a means of establishing the basis for 
making claims about credence characteristics. Some standards have been created by 
commercial companies (or coalitions of firms), others by non-commercial private bodies, 
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such as non-governmental organizations or industry organizations (WTO 2005, Henson 
and Humphrey 2010).  
 
One critical element in a standardised the scheme that checks compliance and restrict 
use of the standard to those establishments (farms, firms, etc.) whose practices have 
been verified to be in accordance with the standard. In order to develop this voluntary 
governance mechanisms (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et al. 2001) private standards setters 
have used certification bodies and labelling schemes to ensure these standards are 
enforced (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et al. 2001, Busch and Bain 2004, Bain, Deaton et al. 
2005, Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007). In some cases, these 
standards are developed by companies that impose their own requirements to 
coordinate supplier activities and implement value chain governance (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2001, Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011). In other cases, 
businesses adopt standards developed by independent organisations, which reduces 
the costs of developing and enforcing the standard. 
 
In sum, private buyers are increasingly using private standards as a strategic business 
tool (Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005) for a number of reasons: 1) to verify compliance and 
the conditions under which the goods were produced and traded; 2) as a way to transfer 
the cost of compliance onto their suppliers (Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, Humphrey 2006a); 
3) to reduce the cost of information about product attributes reaching final consumers 
(Muradian and Pelupessy 2005); 4) to meet value chain management needs; and 5) to 
gain credibility among consumers and reduce their exposure to the risk of loss in 
reputation (Byers, Giovannucci et al. 2008).  
 
2.3.3 Trends in agri-food standards 
 
Humphrey (2006a) highlights four main trends in the recent evolution of standards in 
agri-food value chains, two of which are relevant to the discussion of coffee value chains: 
1) the shift from product standards to process standards; and 2) the increasing scope of 
standards. An additional trend needs to be highlighted at this point, since it is 
particularly relevant to the coffee sector, which is the emergence of the so-called third 
party certification organizations (TPCs) for the certifications of suppliers (Gereffi, Garcia-
Johnson et al. 2001, Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007).  
 
One of the most important trends in global agri-food chains is the shift from product 
standards to process standards,8 both public and private (Busch and Bain 2004, Bain, 
                                                          
8 Sustainable standards dealing with socio-economic and environmental standards are two examples 
where the value of the goal to be achieved lies in the processes themselves. Process standards cannot be 
verified by examining the final product (Reynolds, Murray et al. 2007). 
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Deaton et al. 2005, Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, Higgins and Lawrence 2005, Humphrey 
2006a, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Giovannucci 2008, Neilson 2008). Standards have 
evolved from simply specifying the physical characteristics of a product, to those 
specifying the characteristics of the production and handling process (WTO 2005, 
Humphrey 2006a). There are two reasons for this shift. First, whereas the first one 
merely defines the nature and quality of a product exchanged between anonymous 
economic agents, the second involves a set of rules, principles, or production guidelines 
that are designed to achieve quality, cost and delivery more efficiently (WTO 2005, 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2008). The second reason for the shift to process standards is the 
fact that certain processes (for example, environmentally responsible production) 
themselves have value for companies and consumers and need to be specified, 
monitored and enforced.  
 
The development of these private standards to control processes involves five different 
elements that may be carried out by different actors. According to Henson and 
Humphrey, the operationalization of a private standard involves: (1) setting the 
standard; (2) adoption of the standard; (3) implementation of the standard by the 
organization that is conforming the standard; (4) verification of its implementation 
through the conformity assessment; and (5) enforcement to avoid non-compliance 
(Henson and Humphrey 2012). 
 
This transition from product controls to process controls is evident in many areas 
(Humphrey 2005, Humphrey 2006a). Labour and environmental standards are two 
examples where the value of the standard to be achieved lies in the process itself 
(Humphrey 2005). The coffee sector, in particular is one of the most important agri-food 
industries in terms of both the number and frequency of use of process standards 
related to quality and conditions under which coffee is produced (Muradian and 
Pelupessy 2005, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008). These 
process standards as help to specify which parameters other producers would have to 
conform to, how strictly they should be followed, and what audits would be necessary. 
 
Another significant characteristic in trends in the standards for the agri-food sector deals 
with the increasing array of concerns that are addressed by private standards promoted 
by individual businesses, groups of businesses, and a variety of alliances involving 
businesses, NGOs. (Humphrey 2006a). Growing consumer concerns, which have already 
been discussed, have pushed retailers to broaden the scope of standards, to 
differentiate and add value to their products (Humphrey 2006a).  
 
In the specific case of the coffee value chain, a wide of actors have developed and 
implemented a plethora of private standards to address growing consumer concern 
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about issues related to production methods (for example, Organic certification), ethical 
trade and poverty alleviation (e.g. the Fairtrade standard), environmental protection 
(e.g. Rainforest Alliance). Additionally, companies have set private standards to 
differentiate their product from those of their competitors and to indicate superior 
quality features for example, C.A.F.E. Practices from Starbucks or Nespresso AAA from 
Nestlé (Henson and Humphrey 2010). 
 
Perhaps the most significant trend in agri-food value chains, in relation to the coffee 
sector, is the move by global buyers and coalitions of private firms, from first and second 
party certification, to independent and external certification institutions, known as third 
party certification (TPC) bodies (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et al. 2001, Busch and Bain 
2004, Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, Humphrey 2006a). Likewise, 
as Hatanaka (2005) mentioned, plenty of NGOs have launched “their own labelling 
programs and TPC schemes to distinguish ‛alternative’ agricultural products from 
products produced using ‛conventional’ practices” (Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005: 354). 
Examples of such NGOs include, the four major coffee production standards: Fairtrade 
Labelling Organizations International (FLO), the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), the UTZ Certified and the Rainforest Alliance (RA) 
(Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012), as well as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in other agri-food and forest sectors (Hatanaka, 
Bain et al. 2005, Giovannucci 2008).  
 
In this shift, from second party certification (by the buyer) to third-party certification (by 
an independent organisation not involved in the transaction), responsibility for 
monitoring compliance to a standard is transferred to independent companies (known 
as Certification Bodies). Alternatively, an agent who initially developed a standard, may 
abandon it altogether in favour of an independently-created standard, which will be 
designed and managed by one organisation and certified by others. 
 
What has led to the development and proliferation of these standards-setting 
organisations and certification bodies? Their advantages lie in their supposed credibility 
given their independence from other participants involved in food or agricultural 
production - including producers, governments and corporate coordination bodies 
(Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007). Other qualities that 
distinguish TPCs are their claims of transparency, impartiality and objectivity (Hatanaka, 
Bain et al. 2005: 355, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007). In the same vein, Bain et al. (2005) 
pointed that TPCs help “overcome the potential failures that may emerge in uncertain 
situations characterized by asymmetric distribution of information” (Bain, Deaton et al. 
2005: 76). As a result, TPC institutions have emerged as an leading regulatory 
mechanism that governs agricultural and food chains that is “transforming traditional 
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power relations in the global arena” (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et al. 2001: 64) since it is 
responsible for accessing, evaluating and certifying food safety, food quality and 
alternative production systems that claim a wider social and environmental impact 
(Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005).  
 
This move towards third party certification offers important benefits for buyers that first 
or second party certification do not. Hatanaka highlights at least five such advantages 
(Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005): (i) the transfer of responsibilities to third-party certifiers to 
assure product safety and quality; (ii) the reduction of the costs of monitoring for food 
safety and quality, as the cost of auditing is transferred downstream in the chain (Bain, 
Deaton et al. 2005, Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, Humphrey 2006a). Buyers are free to 
reallocate these financial resources to other areas, such as “investments in R&D” 
(Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005: 360); (iii) when effective, third-party certification may 
minimize legal liability for outbreaks of foodborne illnesses, since buyers can claim that 
they are taking adequate precautions by adopting TPC – in other words, exercising due 
diligence; (iv) the use of TPC as a marketing tool to add value, capture market value and 
increase their profits (Bain, Deaton et al. 2005); and (v) reduction of transaction costs 
and increase efficiency for buyers, by assuring the coordination of their supply chains 
and reducing the risk of product failure. 
 
This trend, of moving from first or second party verification to TPC institutions is evident 
in the coffee sector. For example, Utz Certified (formerly Utz Kapeh) programme moved 
to a TPC in 2005, while Nestle-Nespresso announced in 2009 that farms supplying to the 
Nespresso AAA Programme, will have to certify their coffee with Rainforest Alliance 
Certification and comply with the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) standards 
(Nestlé-Nespresso 2009b, Nestlé-Nespresso 2009c, Nestlé-Nespresso 2011b). 
 
2.4 Private standards: upgrading and farmer livelihoods 
 
There has been a great deal of discussion, yet little agreement, on the question of how 
the adoption an increasing number of private agri-food standards and credence claims 
has affected the upgrading opportunities of agricultural producers, and how these 
initiatives have contributed to improve farmer livelihoods in developing countries. 
Current research on the effects of the propagation of private standards on the value 
chain organisation, and distribution of income and margins between segments, is not 
conclusive (Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Henson and Humphrey 2010). Moreover, it is not 
clear if the use private standards in agri-food value chains, actually guarantees economic 
benefits for participating producers through higher price premiums, improved yields, 
lower production cost at farm level or reduced price volatility at farm gate (Giovannucci, 
Josling et al. 2009).  
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Recent literature on value chain research has paid little attention to the understanding 
of the risk and rewards small producers face when upgrading through the adoption of 
private agri-food standards (Ponte and Ewert 2009, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, 
Bolwig et al. 2010). To correct for this, these authors suggest that the assessment of the 
implications of upgrading should focus on the full range of risks and/or rewards that 
participation in these chains provides to small and vulnerable producers. In this sense, 
the analysis should look beyond the incomes of participants, or even the direct effects 
on income distribution, and concentrate “both in financial terms and with regard to 
outcomes related to poverty, gender, labour and the environment” (Bolwig, Ponte et al. 
2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). 
 
By meeting standards and obtaining certifications, farmers can achieve two types of 
benefits: direct and indirect benefits. In the first case, insertion into some types of value 
chains may lead to increasing the value added to their products through higher prices 
once farmers gain access to new and more profitable market segments (Hatanaka, Bain 
et al. 2005, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Giovannucci and Purcell 2008). In the second 
case, producers can achieve export growth, sustainable income growth, and economic 
development (Navas-Alemán and Bazan 2005) by implementing long-term buyer-seller 
relationships that facilitate greater access to financing and safe working conditions for 
producers (COSA 2013) or taking part of new niche markets (Raynolds, Murray et al. 
2007). 
 
Actors in the agricultural sectors of developing countries saw the emergence of private 
standards, as a tool to improve the welfare and livelihoods of producers (Alvarez and 
Von Hagen 2011, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Potts, Lynch et al. 2014). 
Notwithstanding this, producers face costs in adapting to standards: new and more 
demanding skills must be developed, and this requires time, if not investment 
(Humphrey 2006a, Humphrey 2006b). Additionally, the necessary investment for 
completing the process associated with standard compliance is expensive, elaborate, 
difficult and may take years (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008). 
Suppliers must have access to technical assistance and training to develop the 
knowledge and managerial skills needed to comply with standards and certifications 
(Daviron and Ponte 2005, Fulponi 2006, Humphrey 2006a). 
 
Additionally, farmers need time and access to economic resources to afford the direct 
and indirect costs of meeting standards (transition costs that include investments in 
production facilities, physical equipment, buildings and improving farming practices, 
and certification costs), added to the recurrent cost of standards maintenance (costs of 
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inspections, certification and monitoring, among others),9 and the opportunity cost 
(Jaffee and Henson 2005, Humphrey 2006a, Potts, Opitz et al. 2007, Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2008, Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009). It is worth mentioning, however, that in some 
cases, buyers may contribute to offsetting costs and increasing capabilities to assist 
producers compliance to a new standard. 
 
Two differing views exist in the literature as a response to this balance of potential 
benefits and required expenditures and capabilities. The dominant discourse, asserts 
that the proliferation of standards excludes smaller-scale participants from competitive 
markets and drives them to less profitable markets (Dolan and Humphrey 2004, 
Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, FAO 2006, Fulponi 2006), since they are unable to meet the 
requirements of the new chains or the costs of accessing them. Conversely, others argue 
that the compliance process can help small farmers to build competitive advantages that 
lead to a long-term and profitable trade relationship with buyers (Auld 2010), with 
benefits in terms of enhanced livelihoods (Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009).  
 
Research supporting the exclusionary effects of standards on small scale producers, 
points to the growing body of qualitative evidence that shows that compliance to new 
and more complex coordination requirements (Giovannucci and Purcell 2008), imposed 
by the standards and certifications systems, is difficult for many small and medium sized 
producers (Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, Humphrey 2006a, 
Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Giovannucci and Purcell 2008, Neilson 2008, Kaplinsky 
2010).  
 
Indeed, many scholars support the argument that private agri-food standards and 
certifications systems act as barriers that “create a race to the bottom” (Muradian and 
Pelupessy 2005: 2038). They argue that, while new standard-oriented markets can be 
lucrative, small and vulnerable producers are more likely to be excluded and lose their 
market share since they lack the necessary competences and resources, and face deeper 
infrastructure constraints (Dolan and Humphrey 2004, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, 
Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, Humphrey 2006a, Giovannucci and 
Purcell 2008, Kaplinsky and Morris 2008, Ponte 2008, Raynolds 2009). 
 
In contrast, other scholars have contributed to the debate claiming that standards are 
not exclusionary for small producers, since the compliance process could help them 
build competitive advantages, so that they  can preserve or even improve their role in 
agri-food chains (Maertens and Swinnen 2008, Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009). In fact, it is 
argued that, in certain circumstances, smallholders can benefit significantly, if they 
                                                          
9 In this regards, Potts et al. (2007) pointed out that the cost per unit for reaching compliance may vary 
inversely with farm size. 
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become suppliers to a buyer who is determined to purchase their product, even when 
this implies additional assistance for standard compliance (Maertens and Swinnen 2008, 
Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009). 
 
Recent studies have provided qualitative evidence that shows that some private 
standards, specifically those oriented toward sustainability, have made significant 
efforts to engage small producers (Lebel 2012) to improve their competence and equity 
in value chains (Fontaine et al., 2008; Swinnen, 2007 cited by Ruben and Zuñiga 2011). 
Supporting this argument, other authors sustain that some labels, such as Organic or 
Fair Trade standards, could favour small holders, as they were designed specifically for 
them (Giovannucci and Purcell 2008, Lebel 2012). This is different from labels such as 
GlobalGAP which tends to exclude small producers with its stringent standards (Lebel 
2012). For example, the fact that under the Fair Trade standards, producers could 
receive a minimum price for their harvest, or receive pre-financing for their production, 
ensures that small producers can obtain welfare benefits by meeting private standards 
and achieving certifications (Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment 
of Standards and Certification 2012). 
 
However, several researchers agree that there is an increasing demand for effective 
impact evaluation on the outcomes and possibilities for these initiatives over time 
(Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, Potts 2007, Teuber 2007, 
Linton 2008, Neilson 2008, Raynolds 2009, Beuchelt and Zeller 2011, Von Hagen and 
Alvarez 2011). Despite an extensive literature review on the impact of VSS [almost 
exclusively on Fairtrade] that suggests that producers have received both direct and 
indirect benefits from adopting VSS, a growing body of researchers argues that a 
common limitation in these studies is the absence of long-term impact assessments 
using statistically valid data.  
 
Without this type of empirical evidence, it is not possible to accurately determine 
whether participation in different forms of GVC governance [throughout the adoption 
of different kinds of VSS] has progressively improved the producers’ ability to innovate 
in different spheres of economic upgrading to increase their incomes and improve the 
livelihood and well-being of farmers as a result (Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011). More 
recently, cross-country surveys used in rigorous impact studies involving at least two 
rounds of surveys to assess differences over time, have showed that the involvement in 
VSS leads to modest increases in farmers’ incomes and improvements in farm 
production methods (Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014) and its impact in addressing poverty 
and livelihoods is limited and “should not be overestimated” (Ruben 2014, p. 41)  as 
certified production cannot be the only tool to boost producers´ socioeconomic status 
(PCS 2015).  
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2.5 Role of local institutions in supporting small farmers’ in standards compliance  
 
The evidence underlining the difficulties small farmers face, when complying with 
increasingly complex agri-food private standards, has facilitated a general consensus on 
the need to support small farmers’ ability to meet standards’ requirements. As a result, 
a variety of actors, such as private sector companies, and NGOs, governments and 
development agencies, also known as donors, are offering this type of support and 
assistance to small farmers, and in certain contexts may do so collaboratively. 
 
The central issue for donors is to “combine technical assistance with connectivity” 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2001: 24) and to reduce poverty and to achieve the MDG 
poverty reduction goals (Humphrey 2008). Meanwhile, for international traders, 
exporters and mayor branded companies, these partnerships are important not only to 
because this helps them to increase scale (Jenkins, Akhalkatsi et al. 2007), or to dictate 
production and trade conditions, but also to “greenwash” their image (Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005, Fulponi 2006, Neilson 2008) through different strategies of corporate 
social responsibility (Porter and Kramer 2006) or creating shared value (Porter and 
Kramer 2011).  
 
In this sense, farmer support might be directed to three main areas: First, capacity 
building to reach certification, such as access to extension services, training (literacy and 
IT literacy), technical assistance, follow-ups to improvements plans, process 
verifications, and among others. Second, to compensate or alleviate the costs for the 
conversion process and certification, as well as the necessary investments and the 
recurrent and non-recurrent cost of compliance. Third, to promote sectorial 
development (Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009: 7) compensating for the “lack [of] 
administrative, technical and scientific capacities” in many developing countries (Jaffee 
and Henson 2005: 92), for example, by bolstering “industry organizations, certification 
and accreditation systems, laboratory services, etc.” (Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009: 7). 
 
These collaborative efforts may work best together (Auld 2010), only if there is 
considerable inter-agency coordination and collaboration, and donors take into account 
that getting a certification is not a “necessary condition of access” and integration of 
small farmer and farmer groups into agri-food chains is absolutely necessary condition 
of success for producers (Humphrey 2008: 49). 
 
Based on the extensive fieldwork of the author, it is evident that in the specialty coffee 
value chain, donors and buyers have provided significant support to small producers to 
ensure they meet the requirements of the many standards and certifications operating 
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in the industry. This role of donors and buyers in the specialty coffee value chain will be 
further examined in chapter five. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
There has been little agreement on the question of how the adoption of VSS in the coffee 
industry initiated at various levels, has affected the upgrading opportunities of the 
coffee growers. For producing countries, in particular, there is considerable interest in 
its potential to add value at the farm level, as well as its impact on providing an 
alternative development approach for rural regions and shaping governance structures 
within global value chains. Additionally, it is necessary to know if the adoption of VSS 
has contributed to the ability of producers to innovate in different spheres of economic 
upgrading to increase their incomes and improve the livelihood and well-being of coffee 
growers as a result. 
 
Research into the role of more recent VSS in developing countries is very limited and has 
received less attention than in developed countries (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005, 
Giovannucci and Purcell 2008). Most of the information is anecdotal and data analysis is 
scarce or non-existent as few studies have quantified the overall outcomes and impacts 
of these initiatives (COSA 2006, COSA 2008, Giovannucci and Potts 2008, Giovannucci, 
Liu et al. 2008a, Blackman and Rivera 2010, Leibovich, García et al. 2010, Alvarez and 
Von Hagen 2011, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011, Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012, 
Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and 
Certification 2012). The analysis of the impacts between the most important 
certifications and verifications’ systems are scarce and do not include the most recent 
value added initiatives (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci and Ponte 2005, Muradian 
and Pelupessy 2005, Potts, Fernandez et al. 2007, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Auld 
2010, Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010). 
 
This situation has been confirmed in a recent study commissioned by the International 
Trade Centre (ITC), a joint agency of the World Trade Organisation and the United 
Nations (Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011), and more recently by Ruben (2014), and Hoebink 
et al. (2014). After applying a systematic literature review on the impact of private 
standards on global value chains, the main conclusion is that there is limited empirical 
evidence about the question of whether VSS enhance upgrading opportunities. 
Additionally, a growing body of researchers considers that the available information 
does not provide compelling evidence that VSS are achieving their purported 
socioeconomic and environmental benefits (Giovannucci and Potts 2008, Blackman and 
Rivera 2010, Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Steering 
Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012).  
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The main methodological conclusion is that the available knowledge today lack of a 
convincing methodology and research designs that makes difficult to attribute outcomes 
directly to the adoption of the competitive requirements of standards and certifications 
systems (Giovannucci and Potts 2008, Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011, Von Hagen and 
Alvarez 2011, Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012). According to Von Hagen and Alvarez 
(2011), not only “a systematic analysis of value chain impacts across standards and 
products providing quantitative, statistically valid data is lacking”, and that the available 
“data is not comprehensive enough to make standard or product specific conclusions,” 
but also “future research particularly needs to foster the definition of widely agreed 
upon indicators that allow a comparison of results. At the same time quantitative 
measures of impact are a precondition for comparability across standards, value chains 
and countries” (Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011: ix-x). 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative comparisons have been carried out among the most 
important coffee certification and labelling initiatives which have shown critical and 
significant differences between certifications related to their governance structures, 
socio-economic and environmental standards, or their market relationships (Muradian 
and Pelupessy 2005, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Neilson 2008, OXFAM 2009, 
Leibovich, García et al. 2010, SCAA 2010, García, Ochoa et al. 2011). Therefore, a 
comparison of VSS is required because they are likely to have different impacts. 
 
However, to enrich global value chain analysis more studies are needed to address the 
effects at household level of the adoption of VSS initiated by the corporate sector, NGOs, 
and producers at various levels. Till present, there has been little agreement on the 
question of how the adoption of VSS have affected the upgrading opportunities of 
agricultural producers. Nor is agreement on the socio-economic benefits to farmers that 
arise from the introduction of different types of standards and the product 
differentiation they create. This dissertation fills this gap in knowledge through a 
detailed quantitative and comparative study of different VSS in the coffee sector. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The overall concern of this thesis is to evaluate how participation in Voluntary 
Sustainability Standards (VSS) adopted by Colombian coffee producers has affected their 
upgrading strategies, and the extent to which its adoption has resulted not only in 
economic benefits but has also improved rural livelihoods for them. The main purpose 
of this chapter is to explain how this study went about answering the two interrelated 
research questions discussed in the previous chapter: 
 
 How has participation in distinct types of differentiated channels, such as private 
standards, certification schemes, and labels etc., affected the upgrading 
strategies of coffee producers in the specialty coffee value chain?  
 How have these new value added initiatives affected the pattern of revenues for 
producers, and their exposure to risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee 
value chain?  
 
In order to answers these questions, this study employs impact evaluation 
methodologies to conduct an assessment to compare the performance of selected 
outcome indicators between a group of producers affiliated to Fairtrade and Nespresso 
AAA, and their respective control group which operates as a counterfactual. The study 
is based upon a quantitative quasi-experimental approach using panel data with a four-
year time interval from three rounds of surveys for the same group of coffee producers, 
with information from the harvest seasons of 2008, 2009 and 2011. 
 
In order to construct statistical comparison groups, and address self-selection bias as 
much as possible, in addition to controlling for independent factors that may affect 
many of the observed changes, a combination of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) with 
Difference in Differences (DID) analysis was implemented. Therefore, this study 
combines a “with and without” assessment, with a “before and after” analysis, which 
implied, on the one hand, the construction of a credible counterfactual, to ensure that 
the certified group of farmers are matched with their ‘closest neighbour’ (the control 
farmer that is most similar), and on the other hand, the possibility to assess differences 
over time (a baseline, a follow up, and the evaluation).  
 
Additional information was obtained during two periods of field work in Colombia. This 
includes information from focus groups with farmers, and interviews with coffee value 
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chain actors. Secondary data were gathered through archived documents and extensive 
documentation provided by different organisations and those available on the internet.  
 
Counting on the comparable data, a model is proposed to identify whether the affiliation 
of coffee producers to Fairtrade and Nespresso, compared with their respective control 
group of producers, could catalyse farmers´ capacity to innovate in different spheres of 
economic upgrading, change returns from coffee and improve key livelihood variables.  
 
This chapter is structured into eight sections. After this introduction, the second section 
justifies why coffee and Colombia were selected for this study, the third section 
discusses why the author selected two specific VSS to represent value added strategies. 
The fourth section describes the research methods used and highlights the fact that a 
mixed methods approach is used to answer the main questions. The fifth presents a pre-
treatment comparison of the sample of producers. The sixth and seventh sections 
explain the analytical approach and how the key concepts used in this thesis were 
operationalised. The eighth section deals with the details of the fieldwork carried out in 
Colombia. 
 
3.2 Why the adoption of voluntary sustainable standards in the Colombia coffee sector 
was studied? 
 
Coffee is one of the most valuable export crops in the world market and maybe the most 
important certified commodity using VSS in all sectors including agriculture and food 
(Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012, Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge 
Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012). Millions of producers are adopting 
these initiatives and it was expected that by 2015, nearly 40% of the global exports 
would cover aspects of speciality markets and aspects related to sustainability issues 
(Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012, ITC 2012). However, producers are participating in 
these initiatives without certainty about their outcomes and impacts or durability of 
impacts. 
 
The Colombian case study was chosen for five reasons: (i) it became the first coffee 
producing country to embark on an active strategy of differentiation and marketing its 
product in the coffee world (Deshpande 2001, Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002, Reina, 
Silva et al. 2007, WIPO 2007, Hughes 2009, Juglar 2009, The Economist 2010). Since 
1960, Colombia’s unified marketing campaign and brand development of coffee was 
conducted through a differentiation strategy, from which the “100% Colombian coffee” 
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programme was the basic strategy and the Juan Valdez® character10 was the image to 
promote Colombian coffee as the best in the world; (ii) currently, Colombia is the world´s 
third largest coffee exporting country and the biggest producer and exporter of Mild 
washed Arabicas; (iii) additionally, not only is Colombia one of the main producers of 
speciality and sustainable coffee, but also a pioneer in successfully embarking on an 
active strategy of differentiation and marketing its products in the coffee world using 
regional identities (ITC 2002, Teuber 2007, Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009, Hughes 
2009); (iv) recently, in order to protect the Colombian origin, Colombian coffee 
authorities have been supporting efforts to get unique regional coffee into the market 
place through the implementation strategy of Geographical Indication in the European 
Union, Denomination of Origin in the Andean Community Countries and Certification 
Marks in the United States and Canada, as well as a trademark in over 140 countries 
worldwide (Giovannucci and Samper 2009, Lozano, Samper et al. 2012, Samper 2012); 
and (v) the  important role that regulation and public sector support have played in 
facilitating upgrading for coffee growers11 (Bates 1997, Thorp 2000, Deshpande 2001, 
Lozano 2011). Most of the research was found to focus on a relatively limited number 
of countries like Nicaragua, Peru or Uganda without the institutions, the regulatory 
framework and marketing regimes that exist in Colombia.  
 
3.3 Why Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA were selected as value-added initiatives to 
study in this thesis? 
 
The coffee sector is one of the most important agri-food industries in terms of both the 
number and frequency use of VSS (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a). These strategies for 
adding value and differentiating coffee products can be initiated by different actors in 
the coffee value chain. In general, three VSS initiatives prevail in the market, some 
created by non-commercial private bodies, such as non-governmental organizations or 
industry organizations, other by commercial companies (or coalitions of firms), and 
other by producers. However, up to now there has been little agreement among 
scholars on the question of how the adoption of VSS has affected the upgrading 
opportunities of coffee growers and, in this way, increase their incomes and improved 
their livelihood and well-being. 
 
                                                          
10
 The triangular symbol of “Cafe de Colombia” represents the archetypal Colombian coffee grower. Juan 
Valdez and his faithful mule represent the characteristics of the humble farmer in the Andes mountains 
where Colombian coffee is grown (Reina et al. 2007). 
11 As will be explained in Chapter 5, the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation (FNC) has sought to 
organise and represent coffee producers, promote the efficient production of consistent good quality of 
coffee beans, support the internal and external coffee market, promote social development in coffee 
growing areas, and develop Colombia’s national coffee public policy. 
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Two VSS were chosen to answer the questions raised in section 3.1. The first one is the 
initiative created by the Fairtrade Labelling Organisations International - FLO, the 
earliest labelling scheme, most recognized and studied in the coffee sector, founded in 
1988 under the Max Havelaar label. Fairtrade is third party independently monitored 
and certified as are the other three major collective coffee sustainable standards.12  
 
The extensive literature review of the impact of Fairtrade suggested that producers have 
received both direct and indirect benefits of adopting this sustainable scheme. For 
example, studies have signalled that Fairtrade has provided a favourable economic 
opportunity for smallholder farming families, in particular during the coffee crisis at the 
beginning of the century (Raynolds 2009). However, more recent research, using 
rigorous impact studies, concluded that the involvement in Fairtrade lead to modest 
increases in farmer incomes and farm production methods. Comparison studies indicate 
that although there is greater productivity and better prices on farms producing coffee 
with the Fairtrade label, these differences were not large enough to generate a clear 
effect, in particular because producers could not sell all their harvest as certified and 
effectively receive a price premium (Fort and Ruben 2008, Beuchelt and Zeller 2011, 
Ruben and Fort 2012).  
 
However, as Hoebink et al. (2014) have signalled, until now there are few rigorous 
impact studies that relies on balanced panel data involving at least two round of surveys 
to assess differences over time.  
 
The second VSS selected is the initiative launched by the sustainable division of Nestlé, 
the so-called Nespresso and its Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality Programme that was 
publicly introduced in 2005 in collaboration with the Rainforest Alliance. This initiative 
has incorporated a set of basic socio-economic and environmental standards with the 
main aim of improving livelihoods, along with complex coordination, quality 
requirements and parameters. Although Nespresso AAA is not a certification scheme as 
it is not third party certified, this initiative as such is exerting a greater influence on value 
chain structures and has reached dominant market positions in Colombia and other 
producing countries. This initiative now competes in the coffee market with 
certifications schemes created and settled by Alternative Trade Organisations, Non-
Governmental Organisations and other kinds of civil society organisations as well as with 
those differentiation initiatives created by producers’ programmes linked to 
authenticity of origin. 
                                                          
12 The other three are the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) – the 
coffee standard launched in 1995, the Rainforest Alliance (RA) – the coffee standard launched in 1995, 
and the recently emerged Utz Certified, and benchmarked to the GlobalGAP food safety certification 
programme since 2005. 
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In the particular case of the Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality programme, there is not 
a systematic analysis of value chain available or studies about its effects on living 
conditions and farmers’ livelihoods. Most of the information accessible has been 
published by Nestle-Nespresso at its web page with the exception of a couple of 
unpublished studies (INCAE 2011, CRECE 2013).  
 
In Colombia, this scheme has had the fastest growth over the last ten years. Between 
2006 and 2012, Nespresso AAA purchases increased by 260% and its share of the total 
coffee bought rose from 4.7% to 24.3%.13 This extraordinary growth rate is partially 
explained by Nespresso’s initial expansion from one geographical cluster in partnership 
with one supplier (Expocafé) and 5,000 coffee growers in 2005 to operating in three 
clusters, grouping 35,000 farmers and working with three suppliers—FNC, Expocafé and 
SKN Caribecafe (Nestlé-Nespresso 2012b). 
 
3.4 Research methods 
 
A mixed methods approach has been used in this thesis in order to test the research 
questions raised above. As such, both quantitative comparative and qualitative 
comparative research methods were employed. Primary data were gathered at farm 
level through three surveys for the same group of coffee producers with information 
taken from the harvest seasons of 2008, 2009 and 2011.  
 
To address the question of what would have happened to a coffee grower without the 
participation in a particular VSS, impact evaluation methods were used. These 
techniques allow to infer if participation in VSS has facilitated producers´ upgrading 
strategies, and the extent to which it has brought economic benefits and reduced their 
exposure to risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee value chain. The methods 
suggested by impact evaluation literature (Leeuw and Vaessen 2009, Khandker, Koolwal 
et al. 2010) are Randomized Control Trial (RCT), Instrumental Variable estimation, 
Regression Discontinuity, Propensity Score Matching, and Difference-in-Difference. All 
of which requires a counterfactual comparison group, as will be described in sections 
3.5 and 3.6. 
 
However, some of these techniques could not be estimated for the purpose of this 
research. Randomized Control Trial (RCT) could not be employed as the implementation 
design of the VSS in Colombia relied on farmer’s decisions and institutional interest. 
                                                          
13 This information was obtained using data from 10 cooperatives of coffee growers located in four 
different regions in Colombia (its acquisitions were around 2.1 million bags of 60 kg in 2006 and 1.6 million 
bags in 2012). These cooperatives buy nearly 50% of the coffee purchased by 35 cooperatives of coffee 
growers operating in Colombia. Therefore, this data is representative. 
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Similarly, in absence of a variable score that determines the participation in the VSS, the 
Regression Discontinuity could not be applied as an impact evaluation method in this 
thesis. 
 
Conversely, the analytical approach of difference-in-difference (DID) could be applied 
given that the database used in this study corresponds to a longitudinal panel data with 
information of farmers enrolled in VSS and a group with no intervention (the control 
group) for the same time frame. Additionally, the power of the DID can be augmented 
by the Propensity Score Matching analysis (PSM) as this technique develops a statically 
counterfactual or control group that is as similar to the participation group as possible 
in terms of observed characteristics (Fort and Ruben 2008, Ruben and Fort 2012). In 
consequence, these analytical approaches have been employed to address the 
questions raised in this thesis (please see subsections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2).  
 
It is important to mention that the assessment was developed in the context of a 
decreasing harvest between 2008 and 2012 (the lowest crops levels since the 1970s) 
and the highest farm gate prices in a decade, including a substantial price differential for 
the Colombian Milds against its main substitutes in the market (Other Milds and Natural 
Arabicas). Meanwhile, coffee authorities, with the support of the national government 
and several donors, took policy actions in order to help producers to recoup the output 
seen at the beginning of the century. These policies influenced both certified and control 
group farmers (see Chapter 5). 
 
The survey information was complemented by a set of in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders of the coffee chain in Colombia. Additionally, primary quantitative 
information was obtained from 10 cooperatives of coffee growers that provided the 
volume purchased (kg) and farm gate prices (COP/kg) for seven of the main voluntary 
sustainability standards, regional and conventional coffees between 2006 and 2012. The 
ShymphonyIRI Group (ShymphonyIRI Group 2013) provided the data for retail prices in 
different distribution channels for Fairtrade, conventional and regional coffee from 
Colombia in the United States. Retail prices for Nespresso were provided by the 
Nespresso Boutique in Selfridges - London (Nespresso Boutique Selfridges London 
2013).  
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3.4.1. The survey data 
 
The data set for this study comes from a broader research study developed in Colombia 
since 2008 by CRECE14 in collaboration with COSA.15 The CRECE-COSA project conducted 
a monitoring and evaluation study with data from the harvest seasons of 2008, 2009 
and 2011 to compare changes in socioeconomic and environmental performance in 
seven voluntary sustainability standards of the coffee industry (Fairtrade, Organic, 
Rainforest Alliance, UTZ Certified, C.A.F.E. Practice, Nespresso AAA and 4C) and their 
respective control groups formed by conventional coffee farmers. Information was 
gathered in four coffee regions and five departments of Colombia (Caldas – Centre of 
Colombia, Cauca and Nariño – South-West, Huila – South Central, and Santander - North) 
directly from a sample of 3,372 coffee growers, from which 2,632 were treated 
producers and 740 producers were operating as a control. 
 
The sampling frame was built from a list of more than 20,000 coffee farms for the 
initiatives of interest, obtained from the Coffee Information System of the Colombian 
Coffee Growers Federation. A probabilistic sampling process was carried out considering 
initiatives and regions as strata, confidence levels of 95% and errors of less than 7%. The 
regions in the sample represented more than 60% of the certified farmers in the country.  
 
Sample selection for control groups was done in two steps. First, the Departmental 
Committees of Coffee Growers helped to identify sub-regions or municipalities in which 
the production systems were similar to those selling specialty coffees (treatment 
groups) - with comparable climate, geographical, and growing conditions, such as 
altitude, and similar infrastructure and distances to markets. These farmers were not 
willing to participate in certification initiatives, and their prospects towards certification 
                                                          
14 The Centre for Regional Entrepreneurial and Coffee Studies (CRECE) is a non-profit organisation based 
in Colombia, with 26 years of experience in socio-economic research and consulting. Its work has been 
oriented to support decision-making processes for development by designing, collecting, processing and 
analysing good quality information. The main research topics in regional development are coffee and 
agricultural economics, social and institutional development and education studies. During the last 
decade, the Centre has been dedicated to the M&E of development programmes and measuring 
sustainability initiatives in the agricultural and coffee sector. 
15 The Committee on Sustainability Assessment (COSA) is a neutral global consortium whose mission is to 
accelerate sustainability in agriculture via partnerships and assessment tools that advance the 
understanding of the social, economic, and environmental impacts of voluntary sustainability standards 
in the coffee and cocoa sectors. COSA advises and works together with important institutions and world-
leading companies to accelerate the use of sound metrics and the effective management of sustainability 
efforts. In Colombia, the study is funded by the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation (FNC), Nestlé - 
Nespresso S.A, USAID - ACDI / VOCA and CRECE. According to its promoters, the COSA project is working 
in twelve coffee and cocoa producing countries. It is part of the Sustainable Commodity Initiative 
(www.sustainablecommodities.org) which is a joint initiative managed by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), among other organisations. 
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were particularly low. However, they were comparable as they participate in the FNC 
programmes, receive training and technical assistance and their coffee is sold both as 
part of the “100% Colombian Coffee Program”, as well as regional coffee and with the 
status of Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) in the European Union, Switzerland, 
Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. As such, these different types of coffee effectively receive a 
price premium in the international market as Colombian Milds (see Figure 4.1 and 5.3). 
 
Afterwards, the universe of farmers was restricted to having similar or average sized 
farms, the size of their coffee plantations and coffee specialisation (ration between 
coffee area and farm size) within the range of the treatments groups sample, and then 
a random sampling from this group was made.  
 
The methodological perspective chosen corresponds to longitudinal research which 
includes a panel design for data gathering through a questionnaire that covers three 
surveys: a baseline study carried out from July 2009 to January 2010, intermediate 
monitoring carried out from November 2010 to March 2011, and an impact evaluation 
carried out from December 2011 to May 2012. The data collected corresponds to the 
previous year, the harvest seasons of 2008, 2009 and 2011 respectively, and it was 
obtained through structured household questionnaires to the same group of producers 
over three years in direct interviews at the farms. 
 
However, COSA reports (Giovannucci and Potts 2008, COSA 2013) have some general 
limitations so far: (a) they have not compared any particular VSS or singled out a 
particular standard (Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014); (b) COSA reports do not give 
particular attention to those producers of conventional coffee which are the potential 
producers of value added coffees in the future and the gaps against certified producers; 
(c) COSA does not separate its analysis between the origins of standards, for example, 
between business certifications and third party sustainable initiatives; (d) although it 
mentions in its discourse the hurdles of small farmers to participate in the sustainability 
coffee value chain, COSA indicators do not take into account the farm size; (e) for most 
of cases, COSA does not consider net household incomes, including on/off farm activities 
to appreciate changes in the share of household income generated by coffee sales; and 
(f) most of the reports using data from COSA concentrate their economic analysis on the 
unit of production (UDS per kilogram) instead of on the unit of area (USD by farm or 
hectare) which impedes important welfare aspects as changes in expenditures patterns, 
and trends in use of labour and inputs, among others.  
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3.4.2 The database for this study 
 
The database for this study is a subsample of the CRECE-COSA study, representative for 
Huila and Nariño departments. Three surveys covered data from the Fairtrade and 
Nespresso producers and their respective control groups for the harvest seasons of 
2008, 2009 and 2011. As some producers made the decision to drop out of the 
certification programme during 2009 and 2011, a decision was made to eliminate these 
observations from the sample, therefore the sample covers the same number of 
producers over the three years. This decision avoids the potential problem of selective 
attrition and potential bias in the outcomes. 
 
The first survey with data from 2008 covered 625 coffee producers: 170 farmers 
operated as a control group for Fairtrade and 218 farmers as a control group for 
Nespresso. For the certified group, 105 farmers were labelled as Nespresso AAA_1, and 
157 certified as Fairtrade producers. The same sample of producers was surveyed to get 
data from the harvest seasons of 2009 and 2011. Additionally, during the second survey 
a new group of 202 farmers of Nespresso AAA were included in the sample (Nespresso 
AAA_2 hereafter) to be compared against the Nespresso AAA_1 in 2009 and 2011, see 
Table 3.1.  
 
The main motivation to separately analyse two strands of Nespresso AAA producers’ 
rests on the following reasoning: this is an opportunity to track and compare the impact 
on small producers of the strategic changes adopted by the Nespresso AAA Programme 
since its creation in one specific region (Nariño – Colombia). In this sense, this 
information could help us to learn about the internal trajectories of upgrading and 
farmers “learning curves” among actors operating within the same standard instead of 
just a certified vs. noncertified alternative. This will help to identify the factors that help 
to participate in specialty coffee value chains and those that do not. 
 
Concerning the agrarian structure of the sample frame, farms were divided into three 
groups for further analysis: small farms under one hectare; medium size farms between 
one and five hectares; and large farms over five hectares. This classification is based on 
previous work by the author about the agrarian structure of the coffee sector in 
Colombia (García and Ramírez 2002, García 2003).  
 
Overall, there are contrasting differences between treatment groups due to regional 
differences. For example, in the Nespresso AAA sample located in Nariño – South of 
Colombia, the agrarian structure is characterised by the predominance of small and 
medium-sized producers, both for the control group and the farmers labelled as AAA_1 
and AAA_2 (97%; 94% and 88% respectively). Meanwhile, for the Fairtrade sample, 
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medium and large farmers were the largest share of the sample of both the control 
group and the Fairtrade farmers (90% and 92% respectively). Regarding Colombia´s size 
distribution of coffee farms, predominantly medium and small farms were 79% of the 
sample. 
 
Table 3.1 Sample frame and agrarian structure before matching procedures  
 
 
3.4.3 The questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire16 format used for the field data collection gathered both quantitative 
and qualitative information to assess both the direct and indirect welfare effects at farm 
level of the adoption of different voluntary sustainability standards, compared to 
producers of conventional coffee. The survey design allowed the construction of a set 
of economic, social and environmental indicators and indices to carry out a cost/benefit 
analysis that would enable comparisons between producers of conventional and value 
added coffees to allow the hypothesis to be tested at a farm level. 
 
The questionnaire has four sections including basic information and measures along 
with economic, environmental and social parameters: (i) Section one asks about the 
characteristics of the farmer and the farm; (ii) Section two inquiries about the economic 
dimension of the farm household, which contains information regarding production 
costs, farm assets, market access, credit access, premiums, and income from coffee, 
among others. (iii) Section three is focused on the social dimension, and asks for 
household composition, household assets, education, training, medical care and 
workers’ conditions; and (iv) Section four deals with the environmental outcomes of 
sustainable initiatives. This final section was designed to measure farms’ environmental 
status and performance including measures of the use and management of water, 
                                                          
16 Appendix 1 provides a full overview of the survey questionnaire. 
2008 2009 2011
Fairtrade 132     132         132       Fairtrade 8% 58% 34%
Control 170     170         170       Control 10% 51% 39%
AAA_1 105     105         105       AAA_1 45% 50% 6%
Control 218     218         218       Control 55% 42% 2%
AAA_2 202         202       AAA_2 21% 67% 12%
AAA_1 105         105       
Total 625     932         932       
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
≥5Initiative
Sample frame before PSM Farm size 
(Ha.)
<1 ≥1 and <5
 FairTrade 
Nespresso
Colombia 50% 21%29%
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energy and soil resource, as well as pollution reduction, recycling, carbon sequestration, 
the application of agrochemicals and fertilisers and the adoption of environmental-
friendly practices. 
 
The questionnaire gathers information about who controls the initiatives in which the 
farmers are engaged, their reasons to be involved in these initiatives, their cost incurred 
during the inspections, audits, transactions and getting the certification, their 
expectations or difficulties in the certification process, their main reasons to get the 
certification, or their expectations, difficulties and perceptions about sustainable 
initiatives. In addition to these standard measures, the survey tried to detect other 
behavioural responses such as the changes in attitudes regarding risk, willingness to 
invest, strength and bargaining power of farmers and their organisations. 
 
3.5 Producers' comparison by initiatives  
 
Table 3.2 shows the basic characteristics and pre-treatment variables for Fairtrade, the 
two strands of Nespresso producers and their respective control group during the 
harvest seasons of 2008, 2009 and 2011 respectively. Overall, the household 
characteristics between certified and conventional producers are comparable, though 
the analysis reveals some statistically significant differences for some key variables 
before the matching procedures that could account for differences in income and 
profits.  
 
In this sense, the comparison of the age of the producers and years of experience in the 
business reveals that coffee producing households are headed by men in their late 
forties and fifties, who have between 25 and 35 years of experience producing and 
trading coffee. The majority of producers barely finished primary school, the mean for 
years of schooling approved for those producers who sell certified coffee was 4.8 years 
compared to 3.6 years in the control group. Due to the initiatives, the general certified 
producers have statistically significant higher levels of schooling than their respective 
control group. Without any doubt, this lower level of education is a very complex 
situation for standards' setters with a view to increasing the competitiveness of the 
coffee producers, in particular, if they do not invest in alphabetisation among those 
producers who need access to literacy.  
 
The survey also revealed that, on average, in the three surveys, 60% to 70% of the 
family's worked in coffee activities. Data revealed that there was a trend to reduce the 
proportion of the family members who are self-employed in coffee activities both 
among certified producers and their respective control groups. Notwithstanding, there 
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was a significantly lower share of family labour for those certified producers working on 
the farm compared with their respective control group. 
 
On average, among the farmers surveyed, coffee producers have a large economic 
dependency on income generated from coffee, as there is almost no access to non-farm 
rural employment and other types of income coming from agricultural activities.17 In 
particular, the study found that certified producers had a statistically and significantly 
higher proportion of family income generated from coffee earnings compared to the 
control group selling to the conventional market. On average, the survey revealed that 
around 70% of the household earnings of certified farmers came from coffee compared 
to around 60% of producers operating as a control. In terms of trends, as will be shown 
below in chapter 7, while Fairtrade producers increased the proportion of family income 
generated from coffee, for both groups of Nespresso producers this proportion 
decreased, see Table 3.2.  
 
Interestingly, the study found statistically significant evidence in producers’ efforts to 
branch out into other cash crops to reduce their dependency on coffee earnings. The 
study indicated that Fairtrade farmers’ have statistically significant lower levels of crop 
diversification with cash crops compared to the control group. In contrast, the 
Nespresso producers presented higher levels of diversification with cash crops than their 
respective counterpart selling to the conventional market.  
 
Referring to the coffee growers’ efforts to produce food staples to improve food 
consumption at the household level and increase their levels of food security, evidence 
revealed that among 90% and 95% of both certified and control farmers indicated that 
they produced food staples to improve food consumption in the households and 
increase their levels of food security. 
 
Concerning the average size of the farms and the coffee plots, there were some 
differences among certifications. While there were statistical significant differences 
among those farmers affiliated to Nespresso and their respective control groups, the 
test did not find significant differences between Fairtrade and conventional producers.
                                                          
17 Substitution effects were not considered as the amount of income from activities other than coffee 
production (cash crops, cattle and non-farm income) was not included in the survey. 
45 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Characteristics of coffee producers by group  
 
AAA_1 Ctrl P-value Fairtrade Ctrl P-value AAA_2 AAA_1 P-value
Household characteristics
Ages head of household (mean) 51.8 49.0 0.118 44.2 48.0 0.008 *** 52.0 53.3 0.521
Producers´ experience (years) 30.7 28.3 0.087 * 25.3 25.6 0.942 31.3 25.6 0.000 ***
Education head of household (years approbed) 4.3 3.7 0.138 5.3 3.8 0.000 *** 5.6 3.8 0.000 ***
% of family labor in coffee activities 71% 73% 0.353 78% 74% 0.183 59% 50% 0.004 ***
Family size 4.3 4.2 0.372 4.6 4.5 0.170 4.3 4.3 0.970
Income characteristics
% of family income coming from coffee 70.5% 60.1% 0.007 *** 83% 74% 0.002 *** 71% 66% 0.045 **
% of farms with cash crops 41.9% 24.3% 0.001 *** 32% 62% 0.000 *** 84% 91% 0.110
% of farms with food crops 94.3% 92.7% 0.588 99% 95% 0.083 * 99% 99% 0.703
Land characteristics
Farm size (ha.) 1.5 1.5 0.070 * 4.6 5.6 0.418 2.7 1.8 0.000 ***
Coffee area (ha) 0.9 0.7 0.012 ** 2.1 2.3 0.860 1.9 1.1 0.000 ***
% of the farm area planted in coffee 77% 74% 0.382 65% 62% 0.641 83% 80% 0.341
Trees per Ha. 5,580    5,476  0.489 5,463        5,112   0.136 5,217 5,340   0.217
Average age of the trees 5.0        5.2       0.808 3.9 4.2 0.798 4.9 4.8 0.482
Sythetic Fertilizers applied (kg/ha) 839       641      0.097 * 1,083.3    838.7   0.000 *** 956 957 0.862
Yield of parchment coffee (@/ha)§ 90.7 58.9 0.000 *** 104.7 78.2 0.000 *** 102.4 93.4      0.129
Accessibility
Time from farm to coffee point of sale (minutes) 30.8 41.0 0.000 *** 52.9 53.1 0.538 22.0 29.7 0.092 *
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
§
 @=12.5 kg
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008 and 2009
20092008 2008
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Among those producers labelled as Nespresso AAA_1, farms were of around 1.6 
hectares with coffee plots of around 1.0 hectares, compared to areas of 1.4 and 0.8 
hectares for conventional producers respectively. Surprisingly, the test revealed that 
AAA_2 farmers have farms and coffee plots significantly larger than AAA_1 farmers. 
Regarding Fairtrade producers, farm areas were around 4.9 ha with coffee plots of 
around 2.3 ha. 
 
Were considered a set of variables that reflect the characteristics of the coffee plot and 
the adoption of good agricultural practices: (i) the ratio between coffee-growing area 
and farm size (specialisation rate); (ii) number of trees per hectare; (iii) the average age 
of the trees; (iv) the amount of chemical fertilisers applied to the soil yearly; and (v) the 
yield of coffee per hectare harvested yearly.  
 
Concerning the rate of specialisation, two important facts should be highlighted. Firstly, 
higher rates of specialisation among certified and conventional producers reinforce a 
higher dependence on coffee earnings. Secondly, it seems that the higher specialisation 
is not a result of participation in certification programmes. Similarly, there were not 
differences among certified and conventional producers regarding the number of trees 
per hectare and the average age of the trees. In this sense, as will be explained below in 
Chapter 5, the role of the institutional support to help farmers to renovate their coffee 
trees has benefited both certified and non-certified producers. 
 
Finally, regarding the amount of chemical fertilisers applied to the soil during the harvest 
season of 2008, and the yield of coffee per hectare, the study found statistically 
significant evidence favouring certified producers. As such, certified producers, 
compared to control producers, not only applied significantly higher levels of 
fertilisation but also obtained significantly higher levels of coffee per hectare.  
 
3.6 Analytical/Assessment approach 
 
In order to construct statistical comparison groups or credible counterfactual, it is 
important to address self-selection bias as much as possible, and mitigate the impact of 
independent factors that may have affected many of the observed changes, therefore 
two steps were taken: (i) a “with and without” assessment by implementing a Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) for a selected group of variables with data from the harvest 
seasons of 2008, 2009 and 2011, and (ii) a “before and after” analysis employing a 
Difference in Differences (DID) analysis. It accounts for the differences between the 
years for both certified and control producers as well as the differences within the years 
between the certified and controls. This procedure looks to resolve one of the 
fundamental problems of the impact evaluation, which is to observe what would have 
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happened to a coffee grower without the participation in a particular scheme or 
intervention (White and Bamberber 2008, Leeuw and Vaessen 2009).  
 
Long-term impact assessments during the several harvest seasons is an important way 
to overcome the selection bias (Crosse, Newsom et al. 2012, Steering Committee of the 
State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012). On the one hand, 
this allows an opportunity to measure the effects at a socioeconomic and environmental 
level after the adoption of the set of good agricultural practices instead of the mere 
compliance of task and requirements (ISEAL 2010, Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011). On the 
other hand, this helps to articulate a theory of change, the desired impacts, and tuning 
the performance indicators needed to monitor the effectiveness of the certification 
(Lebel 2012, Newsom, Kennedy et al. 2012). 
 
3.6.1 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Method to address selection bias 
 
The PSM tries to replicate a controlled experiment by identifying a matched group of 
uncertified farmers (control farmers or counterfactual) that are very similar to the 
farmers participating in the VSS in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics (in term of 
observable characteristics) (Fort and Ruben 2008, Ruben and Zuñiga 2011, Ruben and 
Fort 2012). If this goal is accomplished, then differences in outcomes after the treatment 
between the control group and those farmers participating in the voluntary 
sustainability standards can be attributed to their participation in one particular 
programme. 
 
The main goal is to measure the programme´s impact as the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT), which refers to the average effect of the affiliation to Nespresso 
and Fairtrade certifications on the performance of farm level indicators dealing with 
factors facilitating participation in the programme, and livelihood-related variables that 
could be affected by the dynamics of participation, added to indicators related to coffee 
production, prices and revenues.  
 
However, in order to attribute changes in outcomes and impacts directly to those 
activities or interventions associated with VSS per se, it is necessary to construct a 
credible counterfactual that is very similar to the certified producer in terms of 
observable characteristics. It is necessary to control this statistically for a potential 
source of bias, including sampling, spill-over and selection bias (Leeuw and Vaessen 
2009, Blackman and Naranjo 2010, Bennet, Francesconi et al. 2012, Crosse, Newsom et 
al. 2012). A straight comparison between farms participating in the VSS and non-
participating farms may introduce the risk of a selection bias, since these types of 
individuals may differ even in the absence of the institutional intervention.  
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For example, evidence from several field interviews and data from the workshops 
carried out during fieldwork suggests that the more advanced producers, in terms of 
training and GAP adoption, were initially selected to participate in the certification 
programmes. The selection strategy adopted by producers’ organisations and VSS 
initiatives was focused on involving those participants with potential to adopt the 
practices early on and consequently achieve better results. These differential criteria 
meant that high yielding, larger, more trained and capable farmers were on average 
chosen. These contextual factors may have caused a selection bias, in addition to the 
long-term development interventions of the FNC among certified and non-certified 
producers, who were more likely to have influenced the intended outcomes and impacts 
(i.e., sustainability objectives) of the VSS. In contrast to the previous situation, there is 
also the case that a particular programme (i.e. Nespresso AAA) chooses those farmers 
who were concentrated on specific geographical zones where the coffee profile meets 
specific quality requirements needed for its blends, while their socio-economic situation 
and the agronomic characteristics of the farm do not matter.  
 
The possibility of doing PSM relies on having a rich dataset able to support the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which means that differences in outcomes 
between farms with the same pre-treatment characteristics are caused by the 
treatment. Taking into account the CIA should do the selection of variables for the 
construction of the propensity score. Therefore only exogenous variables that are non-
affected by the engagement within a particular voluntary sustainability standard and 
that simultaneously influence the participation decision should be included in the model 
(Fort and Ruben 2008, Leeuw and Vaessen 2009, Khandker, Koolwal et al. 2010, Ruben 
and Zuñiga 2011). 
 
3.6.1.1 Probit model, matching certified and conventional producers 
 
For the purpose of controlling the selection effects, a Probit model was developed to 
estimate the propensity score or predicted probability of participating in a voluntary 
sustainability standard of each farm in the complete sample. The propensity score, to 
construct the control group with average characteristics similar to those of the 
treatment, was estimated by using the PSMATCH2 STATA command, implementing a 
Probit regression for a set of 10 pre-treatment variables influencing the likelihood of 
certification. Three vectors of variables were considered: (i) the characteristics of the 
household; (ii) location data; and (iii) the characteristics of the land used for agriculture. 
 
The first vector is defined as 𝐻𝑖 in the equation (1). It includes variables such as the 
farmers´ age, average year of education in the family, average family size, years of 
experience in coffee production, gender, family size and average number of children per 
family. The second vector is defined as 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑖 in the equation (1). It includes the distance 
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from the farm to the market. The third vector considered the characteristics of the farm, 
and is defined in the equation (1) as 𝐶𝑖 including the coffee area, average age of the 
coffee trees, and the farm size. 
 
The estimated model is presented in equation (1) 
 
𝑃(𝑋) = Pr⁡(𝑇 = 1|⁡𝐻𝑖⁡𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑖⁡𝐶𝑖)    (1) 
 
Equation 1 means that the probability of participating in a particular voluntary 
sustainability standard, and in this case Nespresso and Fairtrade is conditional on some 
variables. 
 
The probability model was estimated for the baseline year of 2008, the year in which 
these initiatives were implemented in the departments of Nariño and Huila. It was 
considered that this decision was the best alternative to estimate the propensity score, 
as estimating a propensity score for 2009 and 2011 could include the effects of 
certifications. This method permits constructing a matched control sample of uncertified 
or non-certified farms that are very similar to the certified farms in terms of the 10 pre-
treatment variables outlined above.  
 
Table 3.3 presents the results from the Probit regression used to generate propensity 
scores. The probability model for AAA_1 producers and conventional producers 
revealed significant differences in the size of the coffee plot, the gender of the farmer, 
the natural logarithm of the distance of the farm to the market, the number of kids in 
the household and the family´s average years of education. This latter effect was 
maintained for Fairtrade producers which has also shown a significant difference in 
terms of the farmer experience in coffee cultivation and age of the coffee farmer. These 
latter two effects were maintained for AAA_2 farmers that also showed effects in the 
size of their coffee plot and the family´s years of education.  
 
This model presents an overall explanatory power (according to the Psedo R2 reported) 
of around 14% for the comparison of AAA_1 with conventional producers, 6% for the 
comparison of Fairtrade and conventional producers, and 16% for the sample of AAA_2 
and AAA_1.  
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Table 3.3 Factors influencing the likelihood of participation - Probit analysis for 
Nespresso AAA_1, Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA_2 
 
 
3.6.1.2 Calculation of the propensity score (Pscore) and selection from the common 
support area 
 
Based on the results of the regressions obtained from the survey with data from the 
harvest season of 2008, the propensity score was estimated (the predicted probability 
of having a certification - AAA_1, Fairtrade, and AAA_2) to match the certified and 
conventional coffee producers on the basis of the propensity score to identify the 
regions of common support, defined as the values of propensity scores where both 
certified and conventional producers are found. 
 
Probit AAA_2
Farmer Age 0.00216 -0.0120*** -0.0113***
(0.00290)
§
(0.00385) (0.00304)
Farmer experience in coffee -0.000586 0.00936*** 0.0119***
(0.00253) (0.00361) (0.00269)
Coffee land area 0.139** -0.0142 0.128**
(0.0689) (0.0237) (0.0503)
Average coffee tree age -0.00694 0.00169 0.00203
(0.00814) (0.0135) (0.00833)
Family Size 0.0344 -0.00731 0.00837
(0.0210) (0.0281) (0.0213)
Farmer gender 0.281*** -0.0763 0.0874
(0.0517) (0.0919) (0.0738)
LN distance from market (Time) -0.130*** 0.0278 -0.0691
(0.0397) (0.0427) (0.0434)
LN Farm size -0.0314 -0.0147 -0.0150
(0.0451) (0.0390) (0.0578)
Family average education years 0.0208* 0.0359*** 0.0275**
(0.0123) (0.0132) (0.0111)
Number of kids in the household -0.0663** 0.0415 -0.0219
(0.0321) (0.0381) (0.0358)
Observations 316 290 307
LR chi2(10) 55.63 25.3 65.5
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0048 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1400 0.0634 0.1661
§Estandar errors in parentheses
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 
2008
AAA_1 Fairtrade
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For each one of the certifications, the regions of common support were set up after 
eliminating some observations in the group of conventional producers with a p-score 
lower than the minimum p-score in the certified group, and eliminating the observations 
in the group of certified producers with a p-score higher than the maximum p-score in 
the conventional group of producers (Fort and Ruben 2008, Ruben and Zuñiga 2011, 
Bennet, Francesconi et al. 2012, Ruben and Fort 2012). This method ensures maximum 
comparability between certified and non-certified farms as the sample used for 
matching in the PSM model and is restricted to the common support region, defined as 
the values of propensity scores where both certified and conventional producers are 
found. Table 3.4 presents the value of the regions of common support for the two 
strands of Nespresso and Fairtrade. 
 
Table 3.4 Regions of common support 
 
 
3.6.1.3 Matching participants and nonparticipants  
 
If Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) holds, the PSM for the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) can be specified as is presented in equation 2:   
 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 =
1
𝑁
[∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑇
𝑖 − ∑ 𝑤(𝑖𝑗)𝑌𝑗
𝐶
𝑗 ]                                               (2) 
where N is the number of participants I, ω(I, j) is the weight used to aggregate the 
outcomes for the matched controls producers j, and 𝑌𝑖
𝑇represents the potential 
outcomes for certified producers.  
 
The matching estimators contrast the outcome of each certified farms with the 
outcomes of each control farm based on propensity scores, and this process can be done 
through different matching algorithms with some consequences in the results of the 
treatment effect (Leeuw and Vaessen 2009, Khandker, Koolwal et al. 2010). These 
matching algorithms differ not only in the way the neighbourhood for each treated 
individual is defined but also with respect to the weights assigned to these neighbours 
(Fort and Ruben 2008).  
 
In general, the various options introduced a trade-off between different degrees of the 
bias and the variance obtained in the results (Caliendo and Kopeing 2005). For example, 
Lower bound Upper bound
AAA_1 0.047 0.865
Fairtrade 0.164 0.828
AAA_2 0.126 1.000
Source: Author’s own calculations based on 
CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008
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an option can be chosen that increases the number of counterfactuals for each treated 
unit, thereby reducing the variance and increasing the precision of the estimates. 
However, this option may increase the bias by the use of less accurate matches.  
 
For the analysis of the effects both at farm level and key livelihood related variables, 
four different matching algorithms were tested to assure the robustness of the results 
to the method applied: 
i. Kernel matching, a non-parametric matching estimator that uses weighted 
averages of all farms in the control group to construct the counterfactual 
outcome. 
ii. Nearest neighbour (one-to-one) matching that chooses for each certified farm 
the observation in the control group that is closest in terms of propensity score;  
iii. Three nearest neighbours, which uses the weighted average of the three closest 
neighbours. 
iv. Caliper or radios matching tries to resolve very high differences in the propensity 
scores between certified and control producers. This procedure therefore 
involves matching within a certain range and a higher number of dropped 
nonparticipants is likely, potentially increasing the chance of sampling bias 
(Khandker, Koolwal et al. 2010). 
 
For the analysis of the main findings of this thesis the decision was to use the results 
from the kernel matching. Nonparametrics matching methods such as kernel matching 
use a weighted average of all control farmers to construct the counterfactual match for 
each certified farmer. This is a very important fact if the sample size is small (the certified 
group labelled as Nespresso AAA_1 in particular) as one risk with the methods just 
described is that a small subset of control producers will ultimately satisfy the criteria to 
fall within the common support and thus construct the counterfactual outcome 
(Khandker, Koolwal et al. 2010). The weights for kernel matching are given by equation 
3: 
 
𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝐾(
𝑃𝑗−𝑃𝑖
𝑎𝑛
)
∑ (
𝑃𝑘−𝑃𝑖
𝑎𝑛
)𝑘⁡𝜖𝐶
                                 (3) 
 
where K(·) is a kernel function and an is a bandwidth parameter, Pj is the propensity score 
estimated for the group of control producers, Pi is the propensity score for the certified 
producers.  
 
Figures 3.1; 3.2; and 3.3 show how the matching methods such as Kernel matching 
reduce the estimated bias significantly. A similar exercise was carried out with Nearest 
Neighbour matching and Caliper matching, but the estimated bias diminished at a lower 
magnitude. For each one of the certifications, Figures show the changes in the behaviour 
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of the set of 10 pre-treatment variables influencing the likelihood of certification before 
and after the matching procedure employing kernel marching. After the matching there 
was a massive reduction from bias distribution across covariates. Therefore, a bias 
percentage closer to zero after matching is a better scenario for statistically analysis of 
impact variables. 
 
Figure 3.1 Bias distribution before and after kernel matching selection for AAA_1 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s survey from 2008 
 
Figure 3.2 Bias distribution before and after kernel matching selection for Fairtrade 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s survey from 2008 
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Figure 3.3 Bias distribution before and after kernel matching selection for AAA_2 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s survey from 2008 
 
3.6.1.4 Final sample after PSM with kernel 
 
Next, the matching estimation was performed only on common-support observations 
for each one of the certifications and its respective control groups for the three harvest 
seasons evaluated in this study. The Table 3.5 presents the final distribution of the 
sample after the matching procedures. The sample frame lost 44, 60 and 60 farmers 
during the surveys in 2009, 2010 and 2012 respectively. From Fairtrade, the Kernel 
procedure dropped five producers from the treated group (4%) and 18 from the control 
group (11%). Meanwhile, from Nespresso AAA_1, the Kernel procedure dropped eight 
producers from the control group (4%), and 13 from the treated group (12%). Finally, for 
the Nespresso AAA_2, the Kernel procedure dropped 13 producers from the treated 
group (6%) and 3 from the control group (3%).  
 
Only variables that were significant in explaining the propensity of being part of the 
certification and that could meet the relevant criteria to perform good matching quality 
were taken into account. Appendix 2, 3 and 4 present the outcomes of the Kernel 
procedure. 
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Table 3.5 Sample frame and agrarian structure after the PSM  
 
 
3.6.2 Difference-in-difference or double difference 
 
The main purpose of the analytical approach called double-difference (DD) or 
difference-in-difference (DID) is to solve the potential bias that results from the omission 
of non-observed differences that the PSM technique does not necessarily solve (Leeuw 
and Vaessen 2009). The DID approach compares the results  before and after de 
involvement in the certification with the change in the control group for the same 
timeframe (Leeuw and Vaessen 2009, Khandker, Koolwal et al. 2010). Furthermore, the 
analysis  allows to conclude that the changes are due to the intervention of the VSS 
(Bennet, Giovannucci et al. 2013).  
 
The DID method consist in a panel regression model with at least a baseline and a follow 
up, in which the number of observations are bigger than the number of periods, three 
years in this case: the harvest seasons of 2008, 2009, and 2011. Following Khandker et 
al. 2010, the equation 1 specified what the DID procedure represents in econometric 
terms. 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is each of the expected impacts, even outcomes, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of controlling 
variables, 𝑇𝑖𝑡 is a dichotomous variable reflecting treatment, 𝑡 is a binary representation 
of the time, and (𝑇 ∗ 𝑡) is a combination of treatment and time. Therefore, its estimated 
coefficient represents the DID effect of either Nespresso or Fairtrade. Finally, 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑡 + 𝛿2(𝑇 ∗ 𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡               [1] 
 
Although the estimation of all the parameters is important, the main focus relies on the 
estimation of  𝛿2, because it shows the ‘treatment’ effect. Therefore, the main interest 
relies in knew its size, and whether it is statistically significant or not. 
 
2008 2009 2011
Fairtrade 127     127         127       Control 8% 65% 28%
Control 152     152         152       FT 10% 48% 42%
AAA_1 92       92           92         AAA_1 42% 51% 7%
Control 210     210         210       Control 57% 40% 3%
AAA_2 189         189       AAA_2 26% 63% 10%
AAA_1 102         102       AAA_1 38% 54% 8%
Total 581     872         872       Colombia 29% 50% 21%
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
FairTrade
Nespresso 
AAA
Initiative
Sample frame after PSM Farm size 
(Ha.)
<1 ≥1 and <5 ≥5
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One advantage of DID as a panel data regression is that because of N dimension is larger 
than time dimension, we could run a fixed effects model, meaning that regressors are 
allowed to be endogenous because they are correlated only with a time invariant 
component of the error, and model error is assumed to be independent over individuals. 
Consequently, that correlation that is invariant can be dropped by fixed effect.  
 
Knowing that PSM previously have had solve for observable differences between 
treatment and control groups, DID solve non-observable time invariant differences 
between treatment and control groups; letting us with a pure effect of the Nespresso 
and Fairtrade interventions. 
 
In order to be sure about panel regression procedure employed for the DID analysis, it 
was performed a sensibility analysis of estimations. For the sake, there were estimated 
several auxiliary regressions of panel data by replacing the treatment variable with a 
random generated dichotomous variable instead. As a result of not statistical 
significance in those auxiliary regressions it was concluded that initial 𝛿2 unbiased 
represents time effects of certifications on every Y_ij variable defined. 
 
Given that, in the data base there were available an intermediate follow up, DID 
estimation were run as follows in equation 2: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑡3 + 𝛿2(𝑇 ∗ 𝑡3) + 𝛿3𝑡2 + 𝛿4(𝑇 ∗ 𝑡2) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
[2] 
First of all, is a vector of farmer’s characteristics such as: kids in the household, family 
members, average family years, education, farmer’s age, farmer’s gender, and farmer’s 
work experience in coffee production. Also this vector contains variables of the farm 
area and location: log Nat Distance from sale market, average age coffee trees, farm 
land size, coffee area in the farm, coffee specialization area, and trees per hectare. These 
variables were included mainly to control the regression estimations. 
 
Secondly, several 𝛿𝑘 parameters were included in order to capture into the model the 
time effect of the three years available in the data set. Just for notation it was used 𝑡3 
to express the final year or evaluation; while 𝑡2 represents the intermediate year or 
follow up. Then, 𝛿2 still represents the DID estimator or impact estimator. Finally, the 
analysis in chapters 6 and 7 relies on  𝛿2 value for each of the factors were thought to 
have an impact or an effect caused by Nespresso or Fairtrade. 
 
3.7 Operationalisation of key concepts 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections to discuss how this thesis operationalised 
the two key questions set out in section 3.1. The first focuses on understanding if the 
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dynamics of participation in the specialty coffee value chain have facilitated farmers’ 
upgrading strategies. There is little agreement on the question of how the participation 
in the specialty coffee value chain has affected the upgrading strategies of agricultural 
producers in developing countries, small coffee producers in particular.  
 
The second focuses on elucidating whether farmers participating in specialty coffee 
value chains not only benefit from increased income and profitability, and a higher share 
of the revenues from the value chains in which they participate, but also improve their 
welfare and livelihood. Recent contributions in value chain studies have suggested that 
the assessment of the implications of any upgrading strategy should focus on the full 
range of risks and/or rewards that participation in these chains provides to small and 
vulnerable producers. 
 
This study contributes to the recent theoretical debates regarding the impact of VSS on 
the upgrading strategies of coffee growers and its potential to provide a different 
sustainable development approach for rural regions.  
 
3.7.1 How participation in voluntary sustainability standards has affected the 
upgrading strategies of producers in the specialty coffee value chain? 
 
On the basis of the extensive research detailed in Chapter 2, and the findings of two 
periods of fieldwork in Colombia, a model is proposed with two main development areas 
or principles that are determinants for producers to build their competences on, and to 
upgrade and participate in the specialty coffee value chain: (i) institutional 
arrangements to facilitate farmers´ upgrading efforts; and (ii) investments and adoption 
of good agricultural practices (GAP) needed for improving upgrading trajectories.  
 
The first area of development tests a group of seven key indicators from two criteria. Its 
performance could facilitate or hinder upgrading strategies for those farmers 
participating in the specialty coffee value chain governed by two VSS. As has been 
mentioned in the thesis, small producers face deeper constraints and restrictions that 
limits their capacity to innovate in different spheres of upgrading. Therefore, 
institutional structures and local organisations play a role in supporting farmers’ 
upgrading strategies in order to help them to participate competitively in the specialty 
coffee value chain.  
 
The second area of development contains a catalogue of eight indicators from four 
criteria. For producers to be competitive and have market access, they have to achieve 
product, process, and volume (yield) upgrading. Investments are needed to supply good 
quality coffee in a consistent way, and increase land productivity which assures lower 
unit production cost – and increases value and volume. If producers cannot achieve at 
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least the basic quality requirements imposed by buyers, they risk being excluded from 
high-value markets. 
 
For the purposes of the study, two groups of producers were analysed: (a) the first group 
considered the farm as the basic unit of analysis to compare the statistical differences 
in the means between certified and control coffee producers; and (b) the second carried 
out an analysis of the statistical differences between certified farms above five hectares 
compared to certified and control farms below one hectare.18  
 
The selection of the base indicators, both discrete and continuous variables, was based 
on a process of iteration which excluded redundant variables and those that generated 
correlation problems between the selected indicators, and then included those capable 
of being tested. 
 
3.7.1.1 Institutional arrangements to facilitate upgrading strategies 
 
The literature highlights that the potential upgrading strategies in agri-food chains 
provided by VSS is marked by severe constraints at farm level that limited farmers ability 
to participate competitively in these chains (Bamber and Fernández-Stark 2014). In 
particular, small and less advanced producers whose competitiveness bottlenecks could 
contribute to their further marginalization and exclusion (Potts, Opitz et al. 2007, Jaffee, 
Henson et al. 2011, Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012, Ruben 2014). Constraints for implementing 
upgrading strategies include, inter alia, lack of appropriate managerial skills, limited 
access to capital and finance to invest for completing the process associated with 
standard compliance, infrastructural barriers, lack of economic incentives, and 
institutional weaknesses.  
 
In order to overcome these limitations and comply with the increasing number of 
functions and stricter performance requirements imposed by VSS, local institutions, the 
public and the private sector should play a key role  supporting the most  vulnerable 
producers by leveraging resources to provide training and assistance services needed to 
help them to close the gaps quickly and upgrade (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001, 
Giovannucci and Purcell 2008, Humphrey 2008, Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009). As it is 
mentioned throughout the thesis, there is some understanding among stakeholders 
about the fact that small farmers involvement in modern agri-food chains must be 
supported by a synergy between public and private efforts to improve small farmers’ 
ability to meet standards’ and facilitate the investments needed to implement their 
upgrading strategies (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001, Jaffee and Henson 2005, Humphrey 
2008, Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009, Auld 2010, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010). 
                                                          
18 Due the fact that the sample of Nespresso AA to AAA coffee producers above five hectares was too 
short, the comparisons were based on those farms between one and five hectares. 
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Based on this discussion, two main criteria have been taken into account as they are key 
to assist producers in their attempt to reach process, product and volume upgrading. 
The principles and criteria for selection are as follow (also outlined in Table 3.6 below):  
 
a) Facilitate access to credit and compensate the costs related to certification, 
inspection, paperwork, and the conversion process. Producers need to finance 
several types of direct and indirect costs associated with standards’ compliance 
and meeting certifications’ requirements. Although in most cases the cost of 
certification and the annual audits are afforded by export companies, 
cooperatives (if producers sell their production afterwards), NGOs and aid 
agencies, producers need to cope not only with the transition cost, the star-up 
cost and those expenses incurred in order to keep the status of certified within 
one or another programme, but also the recurrent and non-recurrent cost of 
compliance. This criterion includes three main indicators: (i) the percentage of 
producers that received credit during the surveys capturing data from 2008, 
2009 and 2011; (ii) the level of subsidies and/or cash transfers; and (iii) aid in 
kind, received by each farmer in the surveys with data from 2009 and 2011.19 
 
b) Provide free-of-cost services such as training and technical extension services in 
different areas of coffee production and processing, to help farmers not only to 
acquire knowledge about standards and certifications but also to reach its 
competitive requirements. This implies a clear role for institutions to support the 
processes of capacity building. The indicators for this criterion are: (i) the average 
hours of training received in Good Agricultural Practices (GAP)20 by each farmer 
in the one year surveys of 2008, 2009 and 2011; (ii) the proportion of total 
producers who were trained to improve the quality of coffee; (iii) the proportion 
of producers who participated in coffee tasting trials (coffee cupping) in order to 
become familiar with the organoleptic properties or defects of the coffee 
produced on their farms; and (iv) the proportion of producers who received 
technical recommendations or assistance to fertilise the coffee trees.  
 
                                                          
19 Questions about these issues were included just after the survey of 2009 following a request by the 
author of this thesis. 
20 Concerning the training topics’ distribution, on average in the three surveys, around one third to one 
fifth of the time per year dedicated to training was dedicated to farm management practices and 
environmental topics respectively, while almost no time was designated to literacy programmes, around 
2% or the total time per year. Time dedicated to traceability and commercialisation issues reached around 
one third of the whole training time, both for noncertified and certified producers. Meanwhile, training 
on certification topics covered around 15% of the treated producers and around 6% of noncertified 
producers. 
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3.7.1.2 Investments and adoption of good agricultural practices needed for improving 
upgrading trajectories 
 
At farm level, adopting the competitive requirements of VSS entails improving farming 
techniques, making significant investments in proper post-harvesting processing 
facilities such as buildings and physical equipment, and covering the cost of the 
conversion process and the adjustment of the production systems. For example, 
attempting the process of upgrading to improve coffee quality, demands investing in 
better milling and drying infrastructure. Added to this, producers have to acquire 
knowledge about standards and certifications, as well as receive the training and 
assistance to gain the skills for adopting new production techniques needed to make use 
of physical equipment and to adjust to the production systems and production facilities. 
 
As will be shown in Chapter 5 and described in Section 3.3 of this chapter, one of the 
main bottlenecks for coffee growers to connect to high value markets refers to the lack 
of infrastructure to process the coffee.  
 
Based on this discussion, four main criteria key to assisting producers in their attempt 
to reach process, product and volume upgrading have been taken into account that are. 
The principles and criteria for the selection are outlined in Table 3.3 below:  
 
a) Guarantee the availability of post-harvest infrastructure to assure process 
upgrading and the supply of dry parchment with the very high quality standards 
required by buyers to participate in the specialty coffee value chain. This 
criterion includes three main indicators tested during the surveys of 2008, 2009 
and 2011: (i) the proportion of coffee producers who have a milling (de-pulping) 
machine at the farm; (ii) the proportion of producers who have adequate sun-
drying infrastructure at farm level; and (iii) the proportion of the harvest sold of 
dry parchment coffee offered at the market. These variables are closely 
associated to the changes or investment (or through financial aid) in improved 
post-harvesting infrastructure21. 
 
b) The adoption of good agricultural practices – GAP (counting the extra-cost that 
new management practices involve) implying a better use of the technology 
available that should result in improving the process, product and volume at 
farmer level. Meanwhile, record keeping of activity inputs, outputs, depots, 
volume, unit cost and prices, provides some evidence that GAP has been 
implemented. This criterion includes four main indicators tested during the 
                                                          
21 The main outcome of investment (or financial aid) in improved post-harvesting infrastructure, should 
be both an increased amount of dry parchment coffee offered on the market and a significant decrease 
of pasillas (low quality coffee berries). 
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surveys of 2008, 2009 and 2011: (i) the proportion of coffee trees renovated 
yearly; (ii) the percentage of farms with rust-resistant varieties; (iii) the 
proportion of coffee growers performing soil analysis; (iv) kilos of synthetic 
fertilisers applied to hectares annually; and (vi) the proportion of producers 
keeping records.  
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Table 3.6 Principles and criteria to participate in specialty coffee value chains 
Development Area Criteria Indicators Questionnaire survey Definition and significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Institutional 
arrangements to 
facilitate upgrading 
strategies 
 
 
Access to financial resources to comply with 
standards competitive requirements and 
upgrading [mainly product, process and volume 
upgrading].  
 
Institutional support could compensate or 
alleviate the costs of the conversion process 
and certification, as well as the investments 
and recurrent and non-recurrent costs 
associated with compliance. Institutional 
weaknesses could contribute to the further 
marginalisation of weaker producers. 
 
 % of producers who 
received credit  
 
t11a_Do you have 
credits? 
Level of credit received by the 
farmers is a good indicator of the 
assistance provided to meet 
standards requirements 
 % of producers who 
received subsidies and 
cash transfers 
T13A_pay_Subsidies  
+ t13A_b_Cash_transfers 
 
 
Several types of costs are involved in 
the adoption of standards. These 
two indicators are quantified in 
terms of the percentage of farmers 
that received some kind of aid 
 % of producers who 
received aid in kind 
 
t13A_c_aid_in_kind 
 
 
 
Provision of training and technical assistance 
not only to obtain knowledge about standards 
and certification, but also to increase the 
competitiveness of coffee producers from 
different farms size is paramount. Quality must 
be assured through the implementation of 
training and technical assistance towards 
coffee improvement processes.  
 
 
 Average hours of 
training in GAP per year 
 
t19_training 
Learning process takes both time 
and consistent training.  
 % of producers who 
were trained to 
improve the quality of 
coffee 
t15_participatedg  
These two indicators reflect a 
commitment to quality 
improvement. The higher the value 
the greater the probability of 
improving coffee quality 
 % of producers that 
participated in coffee 
tasting trials 
t15a_participation_in-
cupping_trials 
 % of producers who 
fertilise according to 
technical 
recommendations 
t26d_techsupp This indicator reveals the existence 
of technical extension services and 
training.  
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Development Area Criteria Indicators Questionnaire survey Definition and significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Investments and 
adoption of good 
agricultural practices 
for improving 
upgrading 
trajectories 
 
 
 
 
High quality and consistent supply must be 
assured through good post-harvest practices 
 Infrastructure to mill 
(de-pulping) coffee 
beans (share of 
producers) 
 
T16b5_Without milling 
machine 
 
These three indicators reflect that 
the harvest may meet the very high 
quality standards required by buyers. 
The higher the value of these 
indicators, the lower the chance of 
meeting buyers’ quality standards 
 % of producers 
making use of 
efficient sun drying 
facilities 
 
T16m2_2 covered 
patio/marquee 
 % of harvest sold as 
parchment 
P.18c_Share of coffee 
solving parchment state 
 
Increasing yield must be assured through 
higher tree densities and use of quality inputs 
such as improved varieties  
 % of renovated trees   
T6a/T15d 
 
These two indicators reflect changes 
in strategies to increase coffee yield  
 
 % of trees resistant to 
coffee rust  
 
P.16b+f 
 
Consistent supply and increasing yield must be 
assured by application of the right amount of 
chemical and organic fertilisers  
 % of farmers who 
perform soil analysis  
 
T26b 
These two indicators reflect 
improvement in management and 
use of available technology  Synthetic fertilizers 
applied (kg/ha) 
 
T2a 
 
Improvement management at different levels 
encompasses interventions at multiple levels to 
achieve process, product and volume upgrading  
 % of producers that 
keep records  
 
 
p_16f 
This indicator reflects a commitment 
to increase yield and quality of 
coffee through management and 
use of new technology  
Source: the author 
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3.7.2 How adopting VSS affected the pattern of revenues for producers, and their 
exposure to risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee value chain? 
 
Recent contributions in value chain studies have suggested that the assessment of the 
implications of upgrading in a given value chain should not only focus on incomes and 
direct effects of participation, or power relations within the chain, but also considered 
how upgrading affects livelihood activities related to issues such as poverty, gender, role 
of labour and environment implications of the agri-food value chain dynamics (Bolwig, 
Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). Based on this, the analysis is divided 
into three sub-sections: (i) test if the adoption of value added initiatives promotes 
greater returns and profitability; (ii) test if there have been changes in the distribution 
of the value added; and (iii) test the evolution of important livelihood-related variables 
to evaluate changes in exposure to risk and vulnerability. 
 
The first sub-section tests three core economic measures per hectare: gross revenue, 
production cost and gross margin (as depreciation costs were not included). Within the 
gross revenue, coffee yield per hectare and farm gate prices per kilogram constitutes 
the main variables. The analysis will consider both the farm as the basic unit of analysis 
to compare the statistical differences of the means against certified and control coffee 
producers, as well as the analysis by farm size, comparing the economic measures 
between certified farms over five hectares and certified and control farms under one 
hectare.22 
 
The second sub-section tests if there have been changes in the distribution of the value 
added by presenting the evolution and the differences of the ratio of the price paid to 
the coffee growers and the retail prices at consumer level for Fairtrade, Nespresso AAA 
and conventional producers selling Colombian coffee.  
 
The third sub-section incorporates horizontal concerns of GVC analysis and include 
changes in variables related to working conditions, salaries, income diversification, food 
security, dependency from coffee, gain and/or loss of household and farm assets, job 
security, and worker participation, among others. 
 
3.7.2.1 Returns and profitability 
 
In order to assess the profitability of value added coffee production for the producer, 
total revenues from coffee sales, as well as the production costs were considered 
together. The total revenue for the coffee grower is composed of the sale of the whole 
harvest that receives at least three types of prices according to its quality or grade of 
                                                          
22 Due the fact that the sample of Nespresso AA to AAA coffee producers above five hectares was too 
short, then the comparisons were based on those farms between one and five hectares. 
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differentiation. Meanwhile, the production costs include both the labour cost for the 
maintenance of the coffee trees and the coffee picking during the harvest season as well 
as the variable input cost. The gross margin will be used as a proxy of the economic profit 
per hectare. A similar methodology to measure returns from the production and trade 
of speciality coffee has been followed by other authors (Kilian, Jones et al. 2006, 
Beuchelt and Zeller 2011)  
 
The first type of revenue comprises those parts of the harvest sold at the value added 
market, both to the cooperatives in the municipalities and independent intermediaries 
or private agents sponsored or backed by large traders. This coffee always receives a 
price premium or differential as a function of both quality and/or certification. According 
to the data collected during the surveys, this share of the harvest has been growing for 
the majority of the coffee growers over the last five years as they were getting multiple 
standards and certification systems (double or triple) in order to improve their chances 
to satisfy diverse markets and buyers and, in this way, to reduce the risk of relying on a 
single scheme and assuring a higher income through price premiums for all their coffee. 
This situation is currently happening in Colombia for those labels which have a big gap 
between the supply and the volume which is effectively purchased by the buyers, as is 
the particular case for Fairtrade or 4C (Figures 5.15 and 5.16 describes this situation in 
Colombia). 
 
The second type of revenue is represented by that fraction of the harvest sold in the 
spot market at conventional coffee prices. This segment of the harvest is composed not 
only of that coffee, which does not meet the quality requirements criteria imposed by 
the buyers and must be sold as conventional, but also by the fraction of certified coffee 
that is not purchased as a consequence of the oversupply and as a consequence does 
not receive any value added, or premium. This coffee usually follows the same two 
marketing channels mentioned above. The third one is represented by that coffee of 
inferior quality (pasilla) which is sold for local consumption. Thus, the total coffee 
revenue can be described generally as follow: 
 
𝑅𝑖 = ∑ [(𝑃𝑠 ⁡× ⁡𝑄𝑠) + (𝑃𝑐 × 𝑄𝑐) + (𝑃𝑠𝑞 + 𝑄𝑠𝑞)]⁡
𝑛
𝑡=1
     (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖= the total revenue from coffee production; 𝑖 the producers index (𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁); 𝑃𝑠, 𝑃𝑐 ⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑃𝑠𝑞  the sustainable, conventional and second quality market coffee 
price for the respective market channel; 𝑄𝑠, 𝑄𝑐⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑄𝑠𝑞 for the coffee quantity sold to 
the sustainable, conventional and second quality market respectively.  
 
If the value coffee production is profitable and offers an improved economic perspective 
for coffee growers then the gross margin per hectare should be positive and given by 
the equation: 
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𝐺𝑀𝑖 =
1
𝐻𝑎𝑖
(𝑅𝑖 −⁡∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑎𝑐𝑡8
𝑗=1 )           (2) 
 
where 𝐺𝑀𝑖= the gross margin of one hectare of coffee; 𝑅𝑖 = the total revenue from 
coffee production (Equation 1); 𝐻𝑎𝑖 = the coffee area in hectares; 𝐶𝑖
𝑎𝑐𝑡  the variable that 
includes eight different activities of coffee production including hired labour for coffee 
picking (as payment in per quantity), the hired labour cost for chemical fertilisation, 
milling, renewal of old trees, management, as well as pest, disease and weed control; 
the input cost (chemical fertilisation as well as pest, disease and weed control) and 𝑖 the 
producer index (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁).  
 
Here, it is important to note that nearly 100% of producers participating in Fairtrade did 
not have to pay for the certification cost and fees which are required to maintain the 
certified status within the programme. Interviews during fieldwork, as well data from 
the surveys, revealed that the main explanation for this is that different actors, including 
NGOs, development agencies, government, buyers and producers’ organisations have 
been involved in the conversion process, and they usually subsidise the cost of 
certification. In the case of the Nespresso AAA programme, producers do not have to 
pay any fee or certification costs, although by 2013, producers will start to migrate to 
the Rainforest Alliance and farmers will have to meet the requirements to be certified 
and pay for audits as well as for their certification (Nestlé-Nespresso 2011d).  
 
In order to gain a better understanding of how the value added initiatives influence 
producers’ prices, Equation (1) is then used to derive the average farm gate price that 
each coffee grower has received across the three marketing channels mentioned above, 
given the equation: 
 
 𝑃𝑛 =
𝑅𝑖
∑ [𝑄𝑠+𝑄𝑐⁡+𝑄𝑠𝑞]⁡
𝑛
𝑡=1
      (3) 
 
3.7.2.2 Distribution of value added in the global value chain 
 
Finally, changes in the proportion of the retail price flowing to farmers are addressed by 
analysing the evolution and the differences of the ratio of the price paid to the coffee 
growers and the retail prices for three different value added strategies compared to 
conventional Colombian coffee.  
 
Changes in the governance patterns on the value chain for coffee will be addressed by 
analysing the evolution and the differences in the ratio of the price paid to the coffee 
growers and the retail prices for three different value added strategies compared to 
conventional Colombian coffee, see Section 5.3.1.  
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Data of the retail prices for the years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 was obtained for 
Fairtrade coffee, single origin 100% Colombian coffee, and regular Colombian coffee in 
different distribution channels in United Stated market. These data were provided by 
the SymphonyIRI Group (ShymphonyIRI Group 2013). Data at retail level from Nespresso 
AAA were obtained from 17 invoices (five from 2009; three from 2010; five from 2011 and four 
from 2012) from the Nespresso Boutique located at Selfridges – London. These include the retail 
prices for different types of Nespresso’s single dose preparations including the “Rosabaya de 
Colombia”, which includes Colombia’s grains in its blend and its price will be the reference to 
calculate the ratio. There are no consistent sources of accurate information from this label and 
the company was unwilling to share this information with the author.  
 
Meanwhile, farm gate prices for regional, conventional and Fairtrade coffees were 
provided by ten cooperatives of coffee growers, meanwhile data from Nespresso were 
provided by seven cooperatives. These cooperatives are located in four different regions 
in Colombia and purchased around 2.1 million bags of 60 kg in 2006 and 1.6 million bags 
in 2012. These represent nearly one fifth of the total harvest in Colombia. Data covered 
transactions between 2006 and 2012. 
 
 Data of prices at farm level covered transactions between 2006 and 2012 and was 
provided by ten cooperatives of coffee growers23 located in four different regions in 
Colombia and were part of the field work of this thesis (its acquisitions were around 2.1 
million bags of 60 kg in 2006 and 1.6 million bags in 2012). These cooperatives buy nearly 
50% of the coffee purchased by 35 cooperatives of coffee growers operating in Colombia 
– see Figure 5.7 on the cooperatives coffee purchases. As such, this data analysed in this 
section is representative. 
 
3.7.2.3 Measuring if participation in global coffee value chains affects risk and 
vulnerability  
 
This section tests the evolution of a set of nine selected livelihood-related variables that 
could be affected by the dynamics of participation in the specialty coffee value chain in 
Colombia. These variables are related to five issues of: (i) income diversification through 
food and cash-crop farming to increase income stability and reduce dependency on 
coffee; (ii) changes of remuneration and salary levels based on labour legislation; (iii) 
changes in the number of household and farm assets24; (iv) increases in production costs 
                                                          
23 Cooperatives from: Occidente de Nariño, Norte de Nariño, Cauca, Risaralda, Coocentral, Cadefihuila, Alto 
Occidente, Norte de Caldas, Anserma and Aguadas.  
24 Household assets include appliances such as televisions sets, fridges, stoves, washing machines, 
computers, internet access, cell phones, and working animals) and farm assets (including constructions 
and infrastructure, vehicles, motorcycles, dryer-silo, pulping machines, becolsub, engines, chainsaws, 
scythes, toasters, bascules, electric generators, water pumps, computers, and others). 
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and cuts in prices. In particular, key variables that expose farmers to livelihood risk and 
insecurity.  
 
3.8 Field work 
 
The field work aimed first to illustrate and then to analyse and compare two different 
value-added strategies adopted by Colombian coffee producers. Data was collected in 
three of the major growing regions in Colombia including the southern department of 
Nariño and Cauca, the southeast department of Huila and the Central department of 
Caldas. See Figure 3.1 below for an approximate location of these departments. 
 
The information presented in this work was collected in two stages of fieldwork in 
Colombia. First, from October 2009 to December 2010, the second, from August 2012 
to April 2013. The first phase of fieldwork in Colombia was self-funded, while the second 
phase was financed by the Centre for Regional Entrepreneurial and Coffee Studies 
(CRECE).  
 
During the field work, the author was affiliated as a visiting researcher at the CRECE, the 
main purpose of this partnership was undertaking collaborative research with its work 
on the Committee on Sustainable Assessment (COSA) initiative, in particular, monitoring 
the performance and assessing the impact of the seven aforementioned sustainable 
initiatives. In addition, the author contributed to the articulation of an updated theory 
of change on the sustainable initiatives in the coffee sector in Colombia, the refinement 
of the questionnaire, and participation from several forums, among other activities.  
 
Meanwhile they agreed to provide me with the databases of the three surveys collected 
over a span of three years for those farmers affiliated to Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA, 
and their respective control groups. Additionally, they agreed to introduce a set of 
questions in the questionnaire survey from 2009 and 2011 dealing with how much 
coffee producers know about the production of regional or origin coffees, and the 
second set of questions dealing with the kind of aid received by producers (cash 
transfers, aid in kind and subsidies). Finally, I was able to participate in the focus groups 
among producers of sustainable initiatives carried out by the CRECE.  
 
During these two periods of field work I was able to visit 19 municipalities at the 
departments of Caldas, Huila, Cauca and Nariño to collect both quantitative and 
qualitative data. During these visits, I was able to complement the survey information 
through both access to archived documents and extensive documentation facilitated by 
different organisations. In addition, qualitative data was collected from 130 in-depth 
interviews with cooperatives and producers associations’ staff, exporters, coffee 
producers, NGOs members´, local traders, Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA´s 
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representatives, extension service representatives as well as governmental and non-
governmental organisations working with coffee production and trade.  
 
Figure 3.4 Locations of the field work and data collection 
 
Source: FNC 
 
In-depth interviews were carried out throughout the length of the fieldwork. When 
initial interviews could be extended in the light of findings that were starting to appear 
during the data collection, a return visit would be requested and in most cases, was 
granted. The average length of the interviews was one and a half hours, as most of them 
did not allow for a recorder to be used. The notes taken during those interviews 
provided a rich source of primary qualitative information without which the answers to 
the questionnaire would have been insufficient to explain the issues that this research 
set out to study. The list of key informants is presented below in Table 3.4. 
 
Additional to the key informants listed in Table 3.7, six focus group discussions were 
carried out. Two focus groups were carried out among producers of conventional coffee 
in 2010 with an average group size of eight participants respectively, and four focus 
Field work 
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groups in 2012 among Nespresso AAAA’s producers, with an average group size of ten 
participants. Meanwhile, five meetings were sustained with the representatives of 
producers associations affiliated to Fairtrade: the Grupo Asociativo San Isidro located in 
the municipality of Acevedo in the Huila department; the group San Roque located in 
the municipality of Oporapa in the same department, the group Occicafé at the 
municipality of La Plata-Huila; and the group “Asprocafé Ingruma” located in Riosucio – 
Caldas. 
 
This information was useful in gaining an overview of the coffee industry and the market 
of sustainable schemes in the coffee industry. Once finished, the author’s fieldwork 
input suppliers continued to provide information, in particular, ten coffee growers’ 
cooperatives, from a total of 35 in Colombia, provided data on coffee farm gate prices 
and the volume purchased in initiatives from 2006 to 2012. Also the National Federation 
of Coffee Growers – FNC, the greatest Colombian exporter and non-profit organisation, 
provided data on the volume, price received and premiums of coffee exports in 
initiatives for the same period.  
 
71 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 List of key Informants during field work 
 
Source: the author  
Type of informants Key informant’s main affiliation
Number of 
interviews
Coffee growers From 4 departments and 17 municipalities 48
AsproUnión - La Unión (Nariño) 1
Asprocap - La Unión (Nariño) 1
Grupo Asociativo San Isidro - Pitalito (Huila) 3
Occicafe - La Plata (Huila) 1
Asociación San Roque - Oporapa (Huila) 3
Asprocafe Ingruma- Riosucio (Caldas) 1
Cooperativa de Caficultores del Norte de Nariño - La Unión -Nariño 1
Cooperativa de Caficultores del Occidente de Nariño - Pasto - Nariño 1
CadefiHuila - Neiva -Huila 2
Coocentral - Garzón - Huila 3
Cooperativa de Caficultores del  Norte de Caldas - Salamina (Caldas) 2
Cooperativa de Caficultores de Agudas - Aguadas (Caldas) 1
Cooperativa de Caficultores de Alto Occidente - Riosucio (Caldas) 1
CafiCauca - Popayán (Cauca) 2
Cooperativa Cafetera de Colombia 1
Cafecol 2
SKN Caribecafe 2
EXPOCAFE 2
Virmax Cafe 1
FNC 1
Cafexport 1
Hacienda Venecia 1
Nespresso-Nestlé representative Colombia representative 4
FLO representatives Colombia representatives 2
USAID 1
ACDI/VOCA 3
MIDAS/ADAM 3
Federación Nacionald de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC) Bogotá 12
Almacafé - Pasto (Nariño) 1
Alcamacafé - Neiva (Huila) 1
Almacafé - Manizales (Caldas) 1
Almacafé - Bogotá (Cundinamarca) 2
Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Nariño (Pasto) 2
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros de Sandoná  (Nariño) 2
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros de La Unión (Nariño) 2
Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Huila (Neiva) 1
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros de Pitalito (Huila) 2
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros de La Plata  (Huila) 1
Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas (Manizales) 2
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros de Aguadas (Caldas) 1
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros de Riosucio  (Caldas) 1
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros de Pensilvania - Caldas 2
Comité Municipal de Cafeteros de Neira (Caldas) 1
Comité Departamental de Cafeteros de Risaralda (Pereira) 1
Certifiers Natura & Rainforest All iance Representatives 1
Exporters 
Aid Agencies
Producers associations
Cooperatives of coffee growers  
Local traders 
Coffee institutions; Almacafé 
and extension service 
committees
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The coffee Industry 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Structural changes in the coffee industry from the supply and demand side during the 
last 25 years have greatly impacted the welfare and livelihood of more than 25 million 
coffee growers in around 70 tropical and sub-tropical countries – most of them small 
coffee growers. The collapse in 1989 of the economic clauses of the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA) that regulated the exports for most coffee producing countries for four 
decades, led at the beginning of this century to a worldwide glut that plunged coffee 
prices in real terms to their lowest levels in decades. The causes, extent and impacts of 
the so-called Coffee Crisis’ have been documented extensively.  
 
At the same time, however, since the turn of the century coffee producers have seen 
the changes in the patterns of consumption as a window of opportunity for achieving 
product differentiation, innovating in different spheres of upgrading and moving up the 
value chain. Along with their production that goes into mainstream or conventional 
markets, producers today have the chance to add value to their best high quality coffees 
based on credence attributes as are the adoption of private standards (as discussed in 
chapter 2) or programmes linked to authenticity of origin. In the mature markets of 
developed countries consumer preferences have turned to both socially and 
environmentally produced coffees as well as coffees produced from beans from unique 
origins that have reached a high intrinsic value with a fine or unique cup profile. These 
specialty and differentiated coffees are at the very top of the quality coffee pyramid and 
are priced accordingly. Alternatively, for the mainstream market, the consumption of 
some emerging non-traditional markets has been growing steadily as a result of 
improving income distribution and relative economic growth (particularly in new 
middle-income country markets), as well as from the availability of cheap coffees in 
soluble form. 
 
As in other agri-food value chains, product differentiation through the adoption of 
different kind of standards and credence claims in the coffee sector could have 
significant political economy implications for producers. Particularly, not only because 
different patterns of value chain governance limits and shapes the capacity of producers 
to innovate in different spheres of economic upgrading but also because differentiation 
can have profound repercussions on the livelihoods of farmers located in developing 
countries. Product differentiation can be initiated at least by three different actors in 
the coffee value chain: First, by corporate and industrial firm initiatives implementing 
commercial strategies through the development of firm-specific corporate codes of 
conduct or private voluntary standards - "differentiation from above"; second, by local 
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producers and their institutions through marketing and branding strategies linked both 
to the authenticity of origin or relating to the social and environmental impact - 
“differentiation from below”; and third by trading partnerships between Alternative 
Trade Organisations and producer-driven labelling and certification initiatives -
“differentiation from the middle” (Humphrey 2006a, Humphrey 2006b). 
 
Therefore, it is expected that the adoption of specific upgrading strategies in compliance 
with the competitive requirements of VSS should achieved its purpose of improve the 
socio-economic conditions for producers. Not only in terms of increased cash incomes 
and profitability, or the distribution of wealth towards a higher share of the revenues 
from the value chains in which they participate, but also in terms of the evolution of 
important livelihood-related variables. Up to now, it is unknown if participation in 
multiple forms of governance structures through the implementation of VSS have 
progressively contributed to the ability of producers to innovate in different spheres of 
economic upgrading to increase their incomes and improve the livelihood and well-
being of coffee growers as a result.    
 
This chapter is structured to provide a review of the relevant literature on the global 
coffee industry through addressing two key questions: 
 
 How has the participation in distinct types of differentiated channels, such as 
private standards, certification schemes, and labels etc., affected the upgrading 
strategies of coffee producers in the specialty coffee value chain?  
 How have these new value added initiatives affected the pattern of revenues for 
producers, and their exposure to risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee 
value chain?  
 
This chapter presents the most important changes that have taken place in the industry 
in the past 25 years. It is divided into seven sections. After this introduction, the second 
section focus on the global coffee value chain. The third section deals with the main 
features and recent trends in the global coffee chain. The fourth and fifth sections 
present the main characteristics of the specialty coffee market and the main 
characteristics of the three strategies for adding value and differentiating coffee 
products mentioned above. The sixth section mention some applications of GVC analysis 
to the contemporary coffee market. Finally, in the seventh, the main conclusions are 
stated. 
 
4.2 Governance and value-added in the specialty coffee value chain 
 
Coffee is produced in more than 70 tropical and sub-tropical countries (Fitter and 
Kaplinsky 2001b, Potts 2007), and about 25 million families are dependent on coffee for 
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their livelihoods – mostly small coffee farmers with less than five hectares of land 
(Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004) and another 125 million people depend wholly or in 
part on coffee production, processing and marketing (May, Macarenhas et al. 2004). The 
coffee global retail sales is a USD 75-billion industry (Euromonitor 2013), making it the 
second highest traded commodity behind oil (Byers, Giovannucci et al. 2008, UN 2009) 
and one of the most valuable commodities exported from developing countries located 
in the tropics (Bates 1997). 
 
The production of coffee has had a significant impact on the economic and social 
development of the producing areas (OXFAM 2009), 90% of which are located in 
developing countries (Bates 1997). Historically, coffee exports have been linked to 
several development ‘success stories:’ Brazil, at the end of the 19th century, Colombia 
and Costa Rica in the 1920s, Kenya and Ivory Coast in the 1960s and early 1970s (Topic 
and Clarence-Smith 2003, Daviron and Ponte 2005). In this sense, coffee marketing is 
the principal contributor to foreign exchange as well as the source of income for millions 
of farmers and farm workers (Bates 1997), in particular, a number of African and Central 
American countries, which derive a high share of their total merchandise exports from 
coffee (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001b, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005). For that reason, the 
governments of producing countries have treated coffee as a strategic commodity and 
have converted coffee as one of the first regulated commodities (Ponte 2002). In fact, 
as Ponte (2002) pointed out “the analysis of the coffee-marketing chain is particularly 
important in understanding the political economy of development” (Ponte 2002: 1101).  
 
The international coffee market has been subject to substantial political interference 
(Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005). The difficult circumstances of the world coffee market, supply 
demand imbalances and low prices in particular, meant that for most of the 20th century, 
the majority of the producer countries and several of the consumer nations entered into 
market-regulating agreements or supply-control schemes (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 
2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, Reina, Silva et al. 2007). The most influential and 
important scheme was the export quota system under the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA) administered by the International Coffee Organization (ICO) from 1962 
to its collapse in 1989. Under the ICA, it was possible to keep coffee prices stable through 
mandatory export quotas for most coffee-producing countries individually (accounting 
for 90% of global output). Surpluses above the quotas were held as stocks in producing 
countries or sold to non-member quota importing countries mainly in Eastern Europe 
and Asia. Although there were problems with this system, it was successful in raising 
and stabilising coffee prices (Bates 1997, Ponte 2002, Daviron and Ponte 2005) and 
guaranteeing a survival income to growers (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005).  
 
However, with the end of the Cold War, public support for quotas declined in consuming 
countries, in particular in the United States, which realised that the Left no longer posed 
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a political threat to Latin America (Bates 1997, Ponte 2002, Daviron and Ponte 2005). 
Additionally, the rigidity on the supply side worried the roasters, who feared that 
competitors could get access to cheaper coffee from non-member countries. This 
undermined their cooperation within the ICA system. As a result, the ICA came to an end 
in 1989 as the United States and other consuming members announced their intention 
to withdraw from the ICA (Bates 1997, Ponte 2002, Daviron and Ponte 2005). 
 
The dissolution of the ICO export quota system agreement generated an oversupply in 
the market, which predictably and negatively affected international coffee prices. Since 
the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) ceased to operate in 1989 there have been 
structural changes in the global value chain for coffee that altered the landscape of the 
market (Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005) and gave space to new forms of governance (Talbot 
1997, Ponte 2002, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, Daviron and 
Ponte 2005, Ronchi 2006). In the absence of any international supply control mechanism 
for the regulation of coffee production and exports, the coffee policy, led by political 
negotiations, turned to free market-oriented solutions (Ponte 2002, Daviron and Ponte 
2005, Ronchi 2006, Reina, Silva et al. 2007).  
 
These changing patterns in the global coffee chain at the beginning of the 21st century 
triggered an unprecedented drop in the international prices that dominated the first five 
years of this century (Osorio 2010), and gave a rise to the so-called coffee crisis that 
affected millions of coffee farmers around the world. The sources, extent and the real 
and dramatic social impacts of the coffee crisis have been documented by a number of 
researchers (Gresser and Tickell 2002, Castro, Montes et al. 2004, Perfetti 2004). 
 
This period of declining prices and price volatility was just one of the impacts of the 
changing nature of the global coffee sector. Later in this chapter, the questions of power 
shifts in the global coffee industry, the impact on the distribution of copyrighted news 
along the chain and changes in supply and demand will be discussed in more detail. 
 
One of the most discussed outcomes of this process has been a general shift of power 
in the international coffee trade towards to a pull of large roasters located in consuming 
countries (Pizano 2001, Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001a, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, Ponte 
2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005, Potts, Fernandez et al. 2007, Reina, Silva et al. 2007). As 
in other industries, in which food retailers have become more oligopolistic and have 
exerted their power over upstream actors within the commodity chain (Hatanaka, Bain 
et al. 2005), as will be discussed below the governance of international coffee trade now 
is linked to the corporate strategies of roasters who have become more concentrated 
and consolidated (Ponte 2002, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, OXFAM 2009).  
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Under this complex business context, during the last decade different forms of value 
chain governance have emerged with significant implications for coffee producers. Not 
only with regard to the capacity and possibilities of the coffee growers to upgrade and 
move up the coffee value chain, or dealing with the configuration of power relationships 
within the coffee value chains, but also the trade-off between rewards and risk resulting 
from their participation in the specialty coffee value chain.  
 
Changes in demand have given space to the development of new product segments that 
focus on product differentiation based on credence characteristics. These include buyer-
driven strategies such as the VSS adopting economic, social and environmental concerns 
in their sourcing practices and producers-driven initiatives both linked to the 
authenticity of origin or related to the social and environmental impact and which has 
represented new possibilities for thousands of growers to innovate in different spheres 
of upgrading and move up the value chain (Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, Reina, Silva et al. 
2007) .25 The nature of these standards and differentiation strategies were discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
 
4.3 The global coffee chain 1989 – 2014 
 
According to the International Coffee Organization (ICO), the total world production for 
2010 was estimated at 132.5 million bags of 60 kg., while exports of green coffee 
amounted to approximately 96.6 million bags, valued at approximately USD 16.5 billion 
(ICO 2010a, ICO 2011d) - a substantial recovery from the low of USD 5.4 billion that 
producing countries received in 2001 for its production of 90.2 million bags and the 
lowest level since the 1970s (ICO 2003, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004). For the present 
decade (2010-2020) ICO expects a growth of production of 2.4%, up to a total of 150 
million bags of 60 kilos, while regarding consumption, a 2% growth is expected, up to 
163 million bags (FAIRTRADE 2010c). 
 
Although there are more than 25 different species of Coffea, essentially two varieties of 
commercial coffee currently exist - Coffea Arabica and Coffea robusta (ICO 2011b). 
Among these, the ICO divides coffee exports into four major groups, see Table 4.1. There 
are two groups for washed arabicas: Colombian Milds that in normal supply 
circumstances receive the highest prices, and Other Milds that get the second highest 
                                                          
25 As the main goal of this work is to know how the adoption of these different strategies of adding value 
and product differentiation of coffee products have affected the upgrading opportunities of agricultural 
producers, the four and fifth section of this chapter will describe more deeply the basic features of the 
differentiated industry. Particular emphasis will be directed both on the main characteristics and trends 
of the sustainable coffee market, including the evolution of the foremost environmental and socio-
economic certifications, as well as the speciality segment, in particular those strategies linked to the 
authenticity of origin (geographical indications). Appendix 5 and 6 describe the main characteristics of 
differentiated and conventional markets, as well as the main features of selected sustainable coffee 
certifications and verifications. 
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prices. The first one comprises coffee produced in Colombia, Kenya and Tanzania, while 
the main players in the second category are Guatemala, Mexico and India. The third 
group consists of hard arabicas from Brazil and Ethiopia known as Brazilian Naturals (or 
unwashed Arabica) which get the third highest price. The four groups include Robusta 
coffees from all origins which receive the cheapest prices in the market. Here, Vietnam 
is by far the main producer, but the Ivory Coast, Indonesia and Uganda are also major 
players (Ponte 2002, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Reina, Silva et al. 2007). 
 
The main differences between these two varieties and categories rely on the quality, 
chemical composition and intrinsic characteristics of the beans as well as the beans' 
processing during the post-harvest activities. Robusta plants produce low quality beans 
with a higher caffeine content and stringent taste, but can be grown at lower altitudes 
and are more resistant to disease. Meanwhile, Arabica plants produce the best tasting 
and aromatic beans, and is grown best at higher altitudes over 1000m and occupies the 
higher end of the markets (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001b, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004). 
Additionally, other variables might influence the organoleptic characteristics – taste and 
aroma – of the drink as the regions of origin, their production environment, and the 
practices used for their harvesting and processing (Reina, Silva et al. 2007). 
 
Table 4.1 Coffee producing countries by quality group  
 
Source: (Reina, Silva et al. 2007), * countries with the biggest production 
 
Price levels of coffee in 2001, 2002 and 2003 fell to an average of between 56 and 65 US 
cents per lb. in nominal terms for Colombian Milds. Figure 4.1 shows, the evolution of 
Colombia’s coffee exports prices, and other origins since 1989. Since 2002, coffee prices 
Coffee 
specie
ICO 
category
Origin Producing countries
Robustas American Robustas Brazi l ,* Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago
Robustas As ian Robustas
Phi l ippines , India , Indones ia , Laos , Malays ia ,
Sri  Lanka, Thai land and Vietnam*
Robustas African Robustas
Angola , Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Equatoria l , Gabon,
Liberia , Madagascar, Nigeria , Centra l African
Republ ic, Sierra  Leone, Togo, and Uganda*
Brazi l ian Natura ls Brazi l ,* Ethiopia  and Paraguay
Other Natura ls Ecuador and Yemen
Colombian 
Milds
Colombian Mi lds Colombia,* Kenya and Tanzania
American Mi lds
Bol ivia , Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Sa lvador,
United States (Puerto Rico and Hawai i ),
Guatemala, Haiti , Honduras , Jamaica, Mexico*,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republ ic
and Venezuela  
African Mi lds
Burundi ,* Cameroon, Congo, Madagascar,
Malawi , Nigeria , Ruanda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe  
As ian Mi lds India ,* Indones ia  and Papua New Guinea
Robustas
Arabicas
Natural
Other Milds
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witnessed a continuing ascending trend that came to an end during mid-2011. There 
was an upward trend without serious obstructions since 2002 with the result that during 
2010 and the half of 2011, green coffee price levels reached historic highs, unseen since 
June 1997, of around 225 US cents per lb in 2010 and 284 US cents per lb in 2011 for 
Colombian Milds (ICO 2010b, ICO 2011e).  
 
The origin of this price recovery was attributable to a combination of different variables. 
In the production sector there was a significant reduction in supply as a result of the 
unprecedented cycle of low prices that dominated the first five years of this century 
which lead to a reduction in the investment in coffee trees. Added to this, climate 
problems in a number of producing countries meant that pests and diseases spread, 
reducing coffee crops in some of the major growing countries as Kenya, Brazil, Vietnam, 
Colombia and Central America, and external factors such as the continuing depreciation 
of the US dollar and the high cost of labour and fertilisers that decreased the real value 
of coffee incomes (Osorio 2010, ICO 2011c) contributed to this situation.  
 
 
On the demand side meanwhile, there has been a dynamic and steady growth in world 
consumption, an average annual growth rate around 2.6% since 2000. This increase in 
consumption is in part due to dynamic performance and innovation of the industry; 
booming demand for coffee in the emerging economies like China and India, in 
particular the preference for premium washed Arabicas coffee beans, and the growth 
of the domestic market in producing countries like Brazil, which is the world’s second 
largest consuming country after the United States (ICO 2011b). World consumption in 
calendar years evolved from 104 million bags of 60 kg in 2000, to 115 million bags in 
2005, and 142 million bags in 2012 (Osorio 2010, ICO 2011c, ICO 2012b, ICO 2014a).  
 
Additionally, tight supplies of certain origins, not only favoured higher prices but also 
impacted stock levels. In this sense, the levels of certified stocks reaching the lowest 
levels for many years both in producers and consumer hands (Osorio 2010, TransFair 
USA 2010, ICO 2011a).  
 
Added to the rise in coffee prices, as will be explained in the following chapter, the 
drastic reduction of Colombian Milds in particular, moved traders and roasters to 
compete for coffee of certain origins which propelled an upward pressure on the price 
differentials for Colombia’s arabicas. The sharp reduction in the Colombian crop, 
combined with a smaller harvest across Central America, Mexico and Peru had an 
upward effect on cash market differentials (TransFair USA 2010) that contributed to the 
widening of the differences between the indicator price of the Colombian Milds and its 
main substitutes including Other Milds and Brazilian Naturals. As a consequence, for 
example, the price difference between Colombian Milds and the Other Milds increased 
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to 34 US cents and 30 US cents in 2009 and 2010 respectively compared to its 2008 level 
of 5 US cents. Since 2011 the differential between Colombian Milds and Other Milds has 
decreased significantly due to a sharper increases in the price of the Other Milds, due 
not only to the continued increase in demand to offset the reduced supplies of 
Colombian Milds (ICO 2010b), but also the supply from Colombia has increased while 
the availability from Central America has been reduced (ICO 2011f). As such, the 
differential between Colombian Milds and Other Milds narrowed down in 2011 to 12 US 
cents, 15 US cents during 2012 and 8 US cents in 2013 (ICO 2011d, ICO 2012a, ICO 2012b, 
ICO 2013).  
 
Figure 4.1 Price of International coffee USD/lb. by category, 1989 – 2014 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on ICO database statistics 
 
Since May 2011 to November 2013 there was a continuing decline in coffee prices. 
Although all coffee groups have lost value, price falls have been highest among the three 
Arabicas groups, reaching in May 2013, the lowest levels in over two years (ICO 2013). 
This cycle of lower prices described in Figure 4.1, is not only due to an oversupply of 
green beans (Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014) but also due to the speculative processes in 
the international financial markets, the global macroeconomic turbulence and the 
political situation in some major importing countries (ICO 2012a, ICO 2012b). The hedge 
funds and their investment activity on the commodities futures market have been 
affected negatively as a result of the uncertainty about the world economic situation. 
As a consequence, founds have changed their positions to become more secure and less 
volatile assets. This is despite the fact that the balance between supply and demand has 
remained tight, and consumption has maintained buoyancy, see Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.2 Coffee balance millions bags of 60 kg - crop year 1989-2013 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on ICO database statistics 
 
4.3.1 Features from the supply side 
 
On the supply side, Robusta’s participation has gained terrain against Colombian Milds, 
as such, the coffee market has seen the emergence of competitors that have enjoyed 
high levels of productivity and low production costs, meanwhile this has become more 
concentrated. Since 1989, the world production has increased form 93 million bags to 
about 147 million in 2013. ICO data shows that four countries – Brazil, Vietnam, 
Colombia and Indonesia produced 68% of the world’s production in 2013, from 54% in 
1990 (ICO 2011a, ICO 2011b, ICO 2012a, ICO 2014b). Meanwhile, growing demand has 
given space to the development of new production segments that focuses on product 
differentiation which has represented new possibilities for advancing along the value 
chain for thousands of growers (Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, Reina, Silva et al. 2007). In 
general, three important dynamics have been characterised since the ICA ceased to 
operate in 1899 and particularly once the so called coffee crisis comes to the end at the 
beginning of the 2000´s.  
 
In this sense, the compound annual growth rate for domestic consumption in exporting 
or producing countries was around 2.4% in the 1990´s and 4.0% after 2000, meanwhile 
for traditional importing countries the compound annual growth for the two periods 
mentioned were 0.9% and 2.2% respectively. 
 
In first place, the fast and consistent growth and market success of the differentiated 
coffee industry in the coffee value chain in the early 2000s. This segment, added 
additional value to the producers’ coffee as it commanded a premium price which paid 
for quality over conventional coffees (ITC 2002, ITC 2012), and comprises the specialty 
coffee sector, and within this, the increasing recognition and growing market value for 
81 
 
 
 
the sustainable industry. While specialty coffee covers exemplary and higher quality 
coffee that includes those linked to a single origin (geographical indications) and blends 
with a unique of good cup, and coffee with a story behind it (ITC 2002, Lewin, 
Giovannucci et al. 2004, ITC 2012).  
 
Sustainable coffee revolves mainly around the competitive requirements imposed by 
non-profit standard settlers and market leading firms certifications’ systems that include 
environmental and socio-economic aspects in their considerations of quality (Ponte and 
Kawuma 2003, Kaplinsky 2004, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004). Sustainable coffee is sold as 
certified by independent third parties, while others are verification-based schemes sold 
under initiatives that are designed by private companies without third party monitoring 
and the cost of a certification process (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 
2008). The most popular sustainable standards have captured a significant market share 
and greater value comparable to agricultural food commodities (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 
2008, Giovannucci and Potts 2008, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012).  
 
In second place, the growing supply explained by the explosion of Vietnamese coffee 
production, in particular during the 1990s when the production witnessed a compound 
annual growth rate of around 24% compared to a rate of 4.5% after 2000. This country 
has become the major robust producer replacing Colombia as the world’s second largest 
producer – a consequence of static supply in the context of rising global production 
(Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001b, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, 
Daviron and Ponte 2005). Vietnam’s coffee production rose from 1 million 60kg bags in 
1990 – around 1.5% of world production, to almost 28 million bags in 2013 – almost 19% 
of world production – a dramatic 1,878% Robusta production increase in 24 years. This 
situation permanently altered the scene of the coffee market (Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005) 
and also represented the biggest change in country market share, see Figure 4.3.  
 
This situation, in particular, has reconfigured the supply between Arabicas and Robustas. 
From a historical distribution of approximately 70% and 30% of the market respectively, 
Robusta´s participation rose in recent years and reached around 40% of total worldwide 
production in 2013 (ICO 2003, ICO 2010a, ICO 2011a, ICO 2012a, ICO 2014b). As the 
production of washed Arabicas (Other Milds and Colombian Milds in particular) have 
been almost stagnant, even decreasing. This situation has generated an important 
substitution effect in the market and has increased the proportion of Robustas and 
Naturals used in most industrial blends of roasted and instant coffee against Colombian 
Milds and Other Milds, in particular (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004), whose 
participation in the global production supply decreased by around 16 percentage points 
among 1989 and 2013. As will be discussed below, roasters have taken advantage of this 
situation as they have been able to be less dependent on any type of origin by adopting 
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new techniques that enables then to reach the same level of quality with less expensive 
coffee as Robustas and some Naturals.  
 
Figure 4.3 Coffee production by country (million bags of 60 kg) - crop year 1989-2013 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on ICO database statistics 
 
Third, the productivity transformation of Brazilian coffee production in terms of volume, 
productivity and quality, has expanded its market share as the first global exporter. That 
transformation augmented its position as the largest producer of around one-third of 
the market, as a result of moving its plantations to the north to reduce the effect of frost 
and the introduction of irrigation to avoid droughts (Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, Reina, 
Silva et al. 2007). These two countries, Vietnam and Brazil, injected nearly 48 million 
bags into the market in 24 years, augmenting global production to around 41% since 
1990 to reach 146 million bags in 2013 (ICO 2014b, ICO 2015), an expansion in volume 
at the beginning of the century that was significantly larger than the growth of demand 
and opened the space to offer attractive options to acquire coffee at low prices, ideal 
for the blend market. 
 
4.3.2 Features form the demand side 
 
World consumption evolved from 73 million bags in 1989, to 79 million bags in 2000 and 
reached about 146 million bags in 2013. A compound annual growth rate in aggregate 
demand in the period of around 1.8%. From this volume six countries account for nearly 
55% of world consumption: the United States accounts for about 16%, followed by Brazil 
(14%), Germany (7%), Japan (5%), and France and Italy (4% each). However, growth of 
demand hides important differences, not only between the 1990´s and the 2000´s, but 
also between the mature markets of Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Sweden, the United 
States or Japan, and the emerging markets of Russia, Ukraine, Korea or China and 
producing or exporting markets as Brazil, Costa Rica, India and Ethiopia where there is a 
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long and well established tradition of coffee drinking (Reina, Silva et al. 2007, ITC 2012, 
ICO 2012a, ICO 2012b).  
 
During the 1990´s the compound annual growth rate in aggregate demand was 1.2%, 
while during this century the growth rate has been around 2.3%. However, this trend 
differ between consuming and producing countries. In this sense, the compound annual 
growth rate for domestic consumption in exporting or producing countries was around 
2.4% in the 1990´s and 4.0% after 2000, meanwhile for traditional importing countries 
the compound annual growth for the two periods mentioned were 0.9% and 2.2% 
respectively. This differences in demand both between periods of time and countries 
have implied that the share in world consumption for producing countries changed from 
21% in 1989 to 31% in 2013. Figure 4.4 clearly depicts this trend comparing consumption 
between consuming and producing countries. 
 
Figure 4.4 Trends in consumption by producers and consumers (1989=100)  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on ICO database statistics 
 
Regarding this situation, consumption volumes have stagnated or have been growing 
slowly particularly in mature markets which together account for nearly 69% of total 
global demand (ICO 2015). In mature markets located in developed countries, for 
example, while the consumption of conventional coffee actually declined, specific niches 
or segments have demonstrated significant dynamism (Reina, Silva et al. 2007, 
Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008) within which speciality and sustainable certified coffee has 
shown the highest rates of growth. Wealthy consumers in mature markets, in particular, 
are increasingly making choices not only based considerations on quality and origin but 
also on the basis of social, economic and environmental impact concerns (Humphrey 
2005, Ponte and Gibbon 2005, OXFAM 2009).  
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Contrastingly, consumption has been growing steadily during the last 20 years in some 
emerging non-traditional markets such as China, Korea, India and Eastern Europe (Russia 
and Ukraine) as a result of improving income distribution and relative economic growth 
as well as from the availability of cheap coffee in soluble form – Robustas in particular, 
that have allowed the roasters to offer reasonable prices. Although with a small 
participation in global demand, this new dynamic has opened additional space for future 
market expansion and has generated incentives to satisfy such demand with unique and 
credible products (Reina, Silva et al. 2007).  
 
Meanwhile, exporting countries have been carrying out promotion programmes 
designed to increase domestic consumption and reduce dependency from buyers 
located in developed countries (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004). The outcome of this 
strategy has been a higher growth trend on consumption compared with consumers 
located in developed countries depicted on Figure 4.4. Brazil, the biggest consumer 
among the producing countries, has been experiencing a notable growth in demand 
(Castro, Montes et al. 2004, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005) as 
a result of a vigorous campaign to improve local consumption based on affordable prices 
and improving quality (Reina, Silva et al. 2007). This strategy has recently been followed 
by producing countries like Colombia (FNCc 2011). 
 
One possible way to visualise the current market characteristics and understand both 
the roasters and blender demand strategies as well as consumers’ decisions is imagining 
the coffee market as a pyramid (Figure 4.5), with the most economical presentations of 
coffee at the bottom, such as soluble and instant coffees; then come the standard 
commercial blends, some of which are of better quality and are somewhat more 
expensive, and then the differentiated market at the top (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, 
Reina, Silva et al. 2007). As such, the market expansion in coffee demand has taken place 
at the two end segments of the quality coffee pyramid. These two markets have 
demonstrated significant dynamism and there are positive predictions signalling a 
tremendous possibility for a future market (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Reina, Silva 
et al. 2007, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012). The bottom 
segment of the pyramid is led by the economic presentation of soluble and instant 
coffee produced with lower-quality beans of Arabica and some Robustas whose quality 
could be improved through a technological process. This segment has been growing 
promisingly in the producing countries and the emerging markets such as China, India 
and Eastern Europe. 
 
Meanwhile, the stagnant middle section is composed of the sales of conventional coffee, 
that represents the great majority of the total demand and comprises typical industrial 
grades and standard commercial blends (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Reina, Silva et 
al. 2007, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008). According to Lewin et al (2004, p. 11), this section 
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represents the great majority of the total volume demanded and its stagnation presents 
a challenge to sustainable growth for the many producers of average quality coffee who 
supply it. This situation, predominantly for those in the Arabica Milds category, poses 
enormous pressure in the fight for a relatively static market share. This is particularly 
true for those producers that are neither able to significantly lower their costs nor 
improve their quality or otherwise differentiate themselves. 
 
Figure 4.5 The quality coffee pyramid  
 
Source: adapted from Reina et al. (2007) 
Note: The areas of the pyramid do not represent the actual size of each market segment. 
*Ready-to-drink; **Filter packets for individualized consumption; ***Protected Geographical Indication 
(PGI) 
 
The top level of the coffee quality pyramid is constituted by the differentiated market. 
This segment of the coffee value chain is constituted mainly by that coffee labelled as 
sustainable which includes environmental and socio-economic aspects for their 
considerations of quality (Reina, Silva et al. 2007, ITC 2012) and the speciality coffee 
which includes highly intrinsic quality coffee with a unique cup (ITC 2012) both of a single 
origin and blends that receive a substantial premium price due to its limited availability. 
In this segment high quality coffees with good cupping can be found as well as such 
flavoured, espresso-based, ready-to-drink coffee and filter packets for individual 
consumption.  
 
4.3.3 International traders, coffee processors, and major branding companies 
 
Companies at the buying and retailing end of the coffee value chain have seen a new 
opportunity to gain power along the coffee value chain with the renewed emergence of 
new consumption patterns, the growing importance of conscious consumption, single 
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origin coffee, the proliferation of coffee chains and speciality shops and out home 
consumption (Ponte 2002, Muradian and Pelupessy 2005). By taking advantage of a 
variety of features, during the last fifteen to twenty years – roasters, in particular, have 
had the ability to introduce new forms of governance and coordination in the global 
value chain for coffee and in this way have affected power relationships and the balance 
of power along the coffee value chain (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, Lewin et 
al. 2005, Daviron and Ponte 2005).  
 
In the case of roasters, they have increased their influence on the upstream actors of 
the value chain changing the balance of power in the coffee value chain, including 
international traders, by taking advantage of the oversupply and the market 
concentration, but overall as a result of at least three specific situations. First, roasters 
have been able to increase flexibility in blending by substituting traditional coffee origins 
in most industrial blends (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002) by making use of 
technological solutions that enable them to use less expensive coffee in order to be less 
dependent on any type of origin of coffee, implying that the premiums commanded by 
certain types of coffee cannot be retained for long (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004).  
 
Second, roasters have learned to work with lower working stocks (Castro, Montes et al. 
2004, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005) and have been able to 
set the terms of coffee supply for traders in order to guarantee a continuous supply of 
a variety of origins and coffee types (Daviron and Ponte 2005) and managing quality 
along the chain (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005).  
 
Third, roasters have created their own private standards and certifications’ systems, 
often in partnership with nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (Steering Committee 
of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012). In this way, 
they not only coordinate supplier activities and implement value chain governance 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2001, Bain, Deaton et al. 2005) and represent a tool of defensive 
brand management (Neilson 2008, Neilson and Pritchard 2009), but also differentiate 
their products from those of their competitors (Humphrey 2005), to indicate superior 
quality features (Henson and Humphrey 2010) and to show to their customers that they 
are also concerned with food safety and the environmental, economic and social impact 
of food production and processing (Humphrey 2005). 
 
About these three situations, roasters have responded to the increase in supply of lower 
cost and inferior quality of natural and Robustas coffees as was seen in Figure 4.3 by 
learning to increase its use in their blends and be less dependent on any type of origin 
of coffee (Ponte 2002, TransFair USA 2010). Traditionally, Robusta have been in blends 
to reduce its price as it is used as a filler. Added to the fact that the quality of less 
expensive coffee is improving steadily, roasters have adopted new techniques such as 
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steaming that enables them to remove some of the defects and reduce the harshness 
of taste of some Robustas and reach the same level of quality with cheap beans (Castro, 
Montes et al. 2004, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, 
Lewin et al. 2005, Daviron and Ponte 2005). 
 
This situation has allowed roasters and blenders to substitute coffees more easily from 
different origins in their blends and take advantage of lower prices. As a result 
processors are less vulnerable to shortages of particular types of coffee (due to 
environmental or political factors), poor quality crops in particular years and, critically, 
from price variations (Castro, Montes et al. 2004, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, Lewin, 
Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, Daviron and Ponte 2005). This is a very 
strategic move from the major roaster and blender companies that have made them 
less dependent on certain key origins as this development lets them take advantage of 
bean availability and minimises costs (Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005) by replacing their 
blends’ high-cost (i.e. Colombian Milds and other Milds) for low-cost beans (i.e. 
Robustas or Brazilian Naturals) (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004). These trends, subsequently, 
have affected producing countries differently as demands for different types of varieties 
of coffee have changed drastically (Castro, Montes et al. 2004, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 
2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005). 
 
One example of this case can be seen in the evolution of the coffee market in Germany, 
the largest coffee consumer in Europe with a market share of 23% (ICO 2011d) and 
nearly 19 million bags of 60 kilogram imported in 2012, where the composition of green 
coffee imports have varied significantly during the last two decades (Reina, Silva et al. 
2007). In 1989, 64% of the green coffee imported to this market were washed Arabica 
(36% Colombian Milds and 28% Other Milds); in 2003, 42% of imports were washed 
Arabicas (15% Colombian Milds and 27% Other Milds), finally in 2012, nearly 38% of the 
green coffee imported were washed Arabica (4% Colombian Milds and 34% Other 
Milds). These types of coffee have been replaced by increased purchases from Brazilian 
Naturals and Robustas of lower quality and price that represented nearly 63% of German 
imports in 2012, while Colombian Milds in particular have been squeezed from the 
market. This substitution effect in the market can be seen in Figure 4.6 and has been 
also exposed in Figure 4.3. 
 
Branding companies use blending formula of beans of different types of origin for three 
key reasons: (a) in order to be able to balance or stabilise the taste of different types of 
beans as well as for obtaining a specific aroma in the roasted coffee and a specific flavour 
and body when it is brewed. Consumers might prefer a different spectrum of taste and 
coffee branders are interested in satisfying these needs managing the variability of 
coffee by achieving the same profile (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001b, Kaplinsky and Fitter 
2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005), (b) in order to take advantage of lower prices, (c) by 
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blending, the roaster is free from a particular origin and avoids consumers making a 
connection with growers and recognising a specific coffee bean instead of brands 
(Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004). In this way, “blending is the most important operation for a 
roaster” as this operation allows the branders to assemble a product from a portfolio of 
substitutable beans (Daviron and Ponte 2005).  
 
Figure 4.6 Germany´s composition of imports by type of green coffee, 1989 - 2012 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on ICO database statistics 
 
The second strategy through which the roaster has changed the balance of power in the 
coffee value chain has been through their capacity to work with lower levels of stock, in 
particular the implementation of “supplier managed inventory” - SMI (Ponte 2002, 
Castro, Montes et al. 2004, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005, 
Daviron and Ponte 2005). The aim of this strategy not only has to do with the roasters´ 
interest concentrating more on marketing and branding (Ponte 2002, Daviron and Ponte 
2005), but also to increase the logistical demands on suppliers as international traders 
and local exporters and be less dependent on any actor (Ponte 2002, Castro, Montes et 
al. 2004, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004). This situation of out-sourcing stock 
management (Daviron and Ponte 2005) has led to more demands on the logistical 
capabilities of suppliers (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004) in order to satisfy the needs of 
major roasters (Daviron and Ponte 2005). As a result, there has been a process of 
consolidation of the supply chain in fewer major international trading companies with 
the capacity to diversify upstream into the producing countries through the 
development of close working relationships with local exporters (Gibbon 2001, Castro, 
Montes et al. 2004, Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004) in order to compete for strategic 
origins (Ponte 2002). During the last decade, for example, in order to enforce power 
over their respective supply chains, international traders, as well as their representatives 
in producing countries, are intensifying their supply chain relationships with growers 
(Gibbon 2001).  
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In third place, the market authority of roasters is evidenced by the increasing 
importance and proliferation of private standards, labels and certifications’ systems that 
have incorporated a set of basic socio-economic and environmental standards along 
with complex coordination, competitive requirements and parameters (Daviron and 
Ponte 2005, OXFAM 2009). Mainstream roasters, normally embedded in the selling of 
conventional coffee through different brands, have shown an interest in capturing a 
bigger market share of the rapid growth of the speciality industry and growing sales of 
differentiated and sustainable coffee (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Ponte and Gibbon 2005, 
TransFair USA 2010).  
 
As such, an increasing number of major coffee roasters with considerable buying power 
and retailers have been involved in the development and establishment of firm-specific 
codes of conduct and sourcing standards for quality and sustainable coffee production. 
Although these codes of conduct or verifications are not a certification scheme as are 
they are not third party certified, these initiatives as such are exerting a greater influence 
on value chain structures and have reached dominant market positions in several 
producing countries. These initiatives now compete in the coffee market both with 
standards and certifications’ schemes created and settled by Alternative Trade 
Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and other kinds of civil society 
organisations as well as with those differentiation initiatives created by producers’ 
programmes linked to authenticity of origin.  
 
Regarding this fact, for example, the available statistics have indicated that there was a 
process of concentration and vertical coordination in the coffee industry at the 
beginning of the century (Daviron and Ponte 2005), in which the corporate strategies 
adopted by large roasters, blenders and international traders behaviour changed 
radically in order to gain power and benefit from the value added along the value chain 
(Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005). 
 
In 2011, for example, six roasters controlled 50% of this activity, see Figure 4.7, while 
the level of concentration in the market for the international coffee trade was even 
higher as only three traders, Neumann, Volcafe and ECOM controlled almost 50% of the 
market (OXFAM 2009). About this situation, some authors have emphasised that before 
the commodity agreement, the international coffee trade was not driven by any actor, 
during the post-ICA regime the higher levels of concentration in the roaster segment 
have led to labelling the coffee supply chain as being “roaster driven” (Ponte 2004, 
Daviron and Ponte 2005, Potts, Fernandez et al. 2007).  
 
90 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Green coffee market share by roasting and instant manufacturing 
companies in 2011 
 
Source: Euromonitor 2011 
 
The repercussions of this market trend are disputed. On one hand, a group of scholars 
based on the analytical tool of global value chain analysis sustain that producing 
countries are receiving a decreasing share of the “total amount of money spent by 
consumers to purchase products for final consumption” (Talbot 1997: p. 63), and the 
value added along the chain has mostly benefited consuming countries (Talbot 1997, 
Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001a, Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, 
Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Ponte 2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005, Gibbon 2005, 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2008). They argue that that concentration along the retail end of 
the coffee value chain has affected the distribution of total income generated along the 
coffee chain and has reduced the share of the retail price accruing to the producers 
while roasters, retailers and coffee bar processors have been enjoying a growing 
prosperity thanks to the accumulation of economic power. 
 
As such, the share of the total income retained by producers has dropped in time, not 
only due to the oversupply and low prices for green coffee, but also due to the facility 
of roasters to maintain retail prices at relatively stable levels (Ponte 2004), and create 
brands and well distribution chains, added to the fact that in many cases, roasters do 
not carry out particularly complex industrial processes, or processes requiring high levels 
of cutting edge technology (Kaplinsky and Morris 2008).  
 
During the ICA years, consumers spent about USD 30 billion, approximately one third of 
which went to the exporting countries. This share more than halved to 15% at the 
beginning of the century, although there has been an increase in recent years of around 
USD 18.4 billion reaching producers in 2012 (ICO 2015) of the USD 76 billion spent on 
consumption (Euromonitor 2013) despite the increase in coffee production volume and 
exports over the last 15 years, Figure 4.8 
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Figure 4.8 Trends in production and value of all kind of coffee exports – coffee year 
1970 – 2013 – USD constant term of 2013. 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on ICO and BLS database statistics 
 
On the other hand, however, other authors sustain that global value chain analysis offers 
an incomplete account of value determination as the gains at one node or stage of the 
chain cannot be seen as being at the expense of value at another (Gilbert 2008). They 
argue that the decline in the coffee growers share of the retail prices is not entirely due 
to the growth in concentration in the industry (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Gilbert 
2008) as certain brands and distributors have had the ability to capture the majority of 
the added value of coffee through the control of symbolic or abstract aspects of 
production, such as services or the atmosphere in coffee shops (Daviron and Ponte 
2005). In this respect, Gilbert (2008, p. 7) pointed out that the decline in the producer 
share of the retail price is “due to the fact than only around half of the cost underlying 
retail coffee prices are attributable to the FOB [freight on board] price of coffee.” As 
such, the relative coffee content of the final consumption fell as new and increased value 
was being added to the products in the consuming countries through processing, 
marketing and transformation at the retail level (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Gilbert 
2008).  
 
4.4 Basic features of the specialty coffee market 
 
Maybe the most important event in the early 2000s in the coffee industry has been the 
fast growth and market success of the differentiated industry which comprised the 
specialty coffee sector and within this the increasing recognition and growing market 
value for the sustainable industry (Ponte and Kawuma 2003, Kaplinsky 2004, Kaplinsky 
and Fitter 2004).  
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This industry emerged from almost negligible quantities in the late 1990s to become a 
significant portion of today’s coffee exports26 (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Giovannucci, 
Liu et al. 2008a, Giovannucci 2010). The sales of which have been labelled speciality 
coffees and certified sustainable coffees, compared with conventional coffee, which 
have demonstrated significant dynamism and market penetration (Giovannucci, Liu et 
al. 2008, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012).  
 
Several authors agree that the emergence of the specialty coffee industry was a reaction 
to the supply of identical, anonymous and standardised blends of regular-to-poor quality 
produced by commercial roasters and available through mainstream brands of coffee in 
supermarkets and other retail outlets, in North America, in particular, and to a lesser 
degree, in Europe or Japan (ITC 2002, Ponte 2002, Ponte and Kawuma 2003, Kaplinsky 
and Fitter 2004, Ponte 2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci and Ponte 2005, 
Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011). 
Meanwhile, markets have moved to satisfy “consumer awareness” of third world 
poverty or environmental conditions in coffee growing regions (Neilson 2008: 1608) by 
using voluntary standards and certifications in a way not foreseen a decade ago.  
 
As mentioned above the generic term specialty includes both coffee linked to 
authenticity of origin (geographical indications), as well as products with high unit prices 
among others: flavoured and espresso-based coffees and those coffees with a story or 
narrative behind them such as those labelled as gourmet, exotic or regional (ITC 2002, 
Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, ITC 2012) available both at sophisticated coffee shops 
and on the shelves of supermarkets. In the particular case of the concept of 
sustainability in the context of the speciality coffee industry, it refers to coffee that is 
grown and is viable economically for farmers, following the criteria of environmental 
protection and socio-economic fairness (Ponte and Kawuma 2003, Ponte 2004, Daviron 
and Ponte 2005). Sustainable coffee is sold as certified by independent third parties, 
while others use verification-based schemes sold under initiatives that are designed by 
private companies without third party monitoring (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 
Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008). Appendix 5 describes the main characteristics of 
differentiated and conventional markets. 
 
The coffee sector is one of the most important agri-food industries in terms of both the 
number and frequency use of such differentiation strategies (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 
2008a). In the case of sustainable coffee, for instance, there is some agreement on the 
fact that no other segment of the global coffee industry has grown as consistently and 
as fast as the one for coffee which is certified as sustainable (Giovannucci and Potts 
                                                          
26 There is a vast array of literature about these tendencies and anecdotal evidence about the effects of 
the adoption of sustainable production practices. See, Giovanucci and Koekoek (2003), Giovannucci and 
Ponte (2005), Daviron and Ponte (2005), Ponte (2004), Bacon (2005), Lewin et al. (2004), Neilson (2007). 
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2008, Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011). Over the past 
ten years the production and sales of green coffee that has adapted to any type of 
economic, social and environmental certifications and verifications has been increasing 
with common annual growth rates of about 30-50% and millions of producers have been 
adopting sustainable standards both led by private initiatives as well as by trading 
partnerships between ATOs and other type of organisations (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 
2008, OXFAM 2009, TransFair USA 2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011, Nestlé-
Nespresso 2011d). From this production of sustainable coffee, around 75% of all of it 
comes from Latin America countries, mostly from countries like Colombia, Brazil and 
Peru (Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010).  
 
Two interrelated reasons could explain the phenomenon. First, from the farmer’s side 
the low prices at the beginning of the century presented the specialty industry as a 
contra-cyclic business that offered substantial increases in income, price differentials 
and potential future markets for suppliers. As a result, coffee policy in producing 
countries were redirected and hence a growing group of producers started to pursue 
strategies that were independent from commodity pricing at the exchanges,27 in order 
to capture more of the downstream margins in the coffee chain and increase returns by 
earnings premiums (Reina, Silva et al. 2007). Second, from the demand side, there were 
substantial changes in the consumption patterns, including new ideas about quality and 
conscious consumption (Ponte and Gibbon 2005). As occurred in the wine industry more 
than 20 years ago (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001b, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004), the drinker 
wanted to know where the coffee came from (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004), the intrinsic 
and intangible qualities in relation to coffee origin (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005, Neilson 2007, Neilson 2008), as well as the attributes of production and 
process methods which include both environmental and socio-economic aspects in their 
consideration of quality (Ponte 2002, Neilson 2008, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, Alvarez 
2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding, the situation of the specialty market has changed substantially during 
the last five years with still unknown effects on coffee producers’ livelihoods. In first 
place, producers and consumers have witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of 
labels and initiatives created either by market leading firms which have made 
commitments to source coffee from sustainable suppliers or non-profit standards-
settlers. In second place, the growing imbalance between the certified production 
compliant with the requirements of voluntary standards systems/voluntary sustainable 
initiatives and the volume of coffee effectively sold as standards compliant or 
                                                          
27 Most of the standard or mainstream coffee is traded following the norms of the “C” contract (The ICE 
Futures U.S. in New York) and the LIFFE Contract (London International Financial and Future Exchange). 
The first contract set the benchmark for Arabica coffee being traded while the second one was for Robusta 
coffee (May, 2004). 
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sustainable (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, OXFAM 2009, Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010, 
Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012, Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014, Potts, Lynch et al. 2014); 
and third there was an upward trend in conventional coffee prices (depicted above) 
which reduced the overall price differences for specialty coffee as well the economic 
incentives to differentiate and improve the quality. The following three sections make 
an effort to describe these changes both from the demand and supply side as well as 
the main features of the specialty market. However, the main consequences of this 
situation will be dealt with in the Colombian case in the next chapter based on field work 
experience.  
 
4.4.1 Features from the demand side of the specialty industry 
 
During the last fifteen years the specialties and differentiates coffees jumped from a 
niche to a segment of the coffee market. By the end of 2012 the coffee production 
complying with the requirements of voluntary sustainability standards reached about 
72 million bags of 60 kg, a share in global production of 50% (Panhuysen and Pierrot 
2014, ICO 2015) and it is expected that by 2015, nearly 40% of the global exports will 
cover aspects of speciality markets and aspects related to sustainability issues 
(Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012, ITC 2012).  
 
Although there are important discrepancies about the size and value of the specialty and 
sustainable market in world coffee consumption, it is a fact that it has been growing 
many times more than that of conventional coffee at around 2.5%. Based on 
Giovannucci et al. in 2006, exports to all destinations of green coffee amounted to 91.6 
million 60 kilo bags, from which differentiated type of coffee included certified 
sustainable and speciality coffee comprising 4% and 6% respectively (Giovannucci, Liu 
et al. 2008).  
 
By the end of 2010, the export of green coffee amounted to 96.6 million 60 kilo bags, 
which after adjusting for multiple certification, 9% of coffee sales globally were certified 
(Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012, Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge 
Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012) and around 13% had some specific 
characteristics or differences on its physical quality that are appreciated by consumers, 
see Figure 4.9. As sustainable labels proliferated and consumers linked certain quality 
characteristics to specific locations, large corporations have been committed to source 
its coffee both from sustainable sources (OXFAM 2009, Panhuysen and VanReenen 
2012) as well as from particular locations that are preferred by consumers. If the current 
trends continue, it is expected that by 2015, nearly 40% of the global exports will cover 
aspects of speciality markets and aspects related to sustainability issues (Giovannucci, 
Scherr et al. 2012, ITC 2012). 
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Figure 4.9 Growth of sales of sustainable certifications and specialty coffee 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 
2012, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012, Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of 
Standards and Certification 2012). 
 
Almost all the worldwide sustainable coffee production and sales quantified is labelled 
by seven key initiatives (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, OXFAM 2009, Potts, Van der Meer 
et al. 2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012). Including, 
in first place, the four major collective coffee sustainable standards that are third party 
independently monitored and certified: as are the Fairtrade Labelling Organisations 
International - FLO, the earliest labelling schemes in the coffee sector (founded in 1988 
under the Max Havelaar label), the International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements (IFOAM) – the coffee standard launched in 1995, the Rainforest Alliance 
(RA) – the coffee standard launched in 1995, and the recently emerged Utz Certified, 
outlined above and benchmarked to the GlobalGAP food safety certification programme 
since 2005 (Courville 2008). Fairtrade is dominant in the United Kingdom and France, 
and now in the USA. Rainforest Alliance is a leader in Japan and also important in 
Western Europe. Utz Certified coffee is dominant in the Netherlands and holds a strong 
position in several northern European markets. Organic coffee is more important in 
Germany, Canada, Australia, Italy and the USA (Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011).  
 
Added to this group, there are three verification systems of which codes of conduct have 
been developed by coffee market leaders. The first one is the multi-stakeholder 
initiative named the Association of the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C). 
This initiative was founded in 2006 by stakeholders from coffee producers, trade and 
industry, NGOs, trade unions, research institutes and other experts, with the main aim 
of improving livelihoods across conventional coffee supply end embed sustainability 
principles in the mainstream coffee industry (Neilson and Pritchard 2007). The 
emergence of this initiative has been subject of debate as the sustainability strategies 
of their members differs substantially (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, Panhuysen and 
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VanReenen 2012) and the validity of this initiative remains questionable (Neilson and 
Pritchard 2007).Then are other two important private sector initiatives that have 
developed firm-specific codes of conduct or verification systems, which have 
incorporated a set of basic socio-economic and environmental standards along with 
quality requirements and parameters. These are Starbucks’ Coffee and the Farmer 
Equity Practices Programme (C.A.F.E. Practices) created in 2004 in collaboration with 
Conservation International and other stakeholders, and the initiative from the 
sustainable division of Nestlé, the so-called Nespresso and its Nespresso AAA 
Sustainable Quality Programme that was publicly introduced in 2005 in collaboration 
with the Rainforest Alliance. Along with these main initiatives, there has been a 
proliferation on private labels of which the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI) 
Platform Guidelines on Coffee deserves a mention, “a collaboration between major food 
processors and traders, which aims to share learning and establish industry benchmarks 
for sustainable production in agriculture” (Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010: 67) and the 
Neumann Coffee group’s sustainable standards (Courville 2008). The last section of this 
chapter and Appendix 6 describes the main features of sustainable coffee certifications 
and verifications.  
 
Figure 4.10 below illustrates the worldwide share of purchases of coffee certified or 
verified as sustainable for each one of the most important initiatives for the period 
between 2006 and 2010. Based on data from several sources and extrapolations from 
data sales, this segment has been growing consistently and has experienced significant 
market penetration (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, OXFAM 2009, Potts, Van der Meer et 
al. 2010, TransFair USA 2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011, Nestlé-Nespresso 2011d). 
In the first group of fast growth are those initiatives authored by major branded coffee 
companies and prominent companies of retailers who adopt sustainable sourcing 
guidelines, such as are 4C and Nestle with Nespresso including its so called Nespresso 
AAA Sustainable Quality Programme – 321% and 878% respectively. In the second group 
were those labels such as Utz Certified and Rainforest Alliance – 239% and 324% 
respectively. The third group are composed both by more stringent and traditional 
standards such as Organic and Fairtrade – 57% and 52% respectively, and the initiative 
created by Starbucks, C.A.F.E. Practices with a growth rate of about 34%. 
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Figure 4.10 Worldwide shares of sustainable coffee sales by seal, 2006-2010 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations.28 
 
The fast-growing demand of sustainable coffee that addresses social, environmental and 
economic issues at farm level could be explained using two reasons. In the first place, 
by the interest and stronger involvement of larger commercial actors as retail food 
service chains, mainstream supermarkets and most of the large roasters and retailers to 
source their mainstream product lines from producers linked to the market of third 
party certified sustainable coffee. (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, OXFAM 2009, Potts, 
Van der Meer et al. 2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011, Panhuysen and VanReenen 
2012)  
 
In this sense, for example, as certifications’ systems such as Rainforest Alliance and Utz 
certified have gained credibility and acceptability, they have increased their 
participation to around one third of the market of sustainable coffee thanks to their 
ability to negotiate supply arrangements with very large transnationals in the roasting 
market such as Douwe Egberts, Kraft and Sara Lee, food chains as McDonalds, Dunkin 
Donalds or IKEA’s restaurants. Meanwhile, and despite the establishment of some 
strategic alliances, traditional standards such as Fairtrade and Organic have shown lower 
growth rates compared to the new generation of sustainable coffee certifications and 
their market share has been diminishing since 2006 to reach in 2010 from almost one 
half to around one fourth of the market of sustainable coffee, Figure 4.10 above.  
 
                                                          
28 Data from Fairtrade, Organic, Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified (Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011); 
(OXFAM 2009); (Panhuysen and van Reenen 2012). Data from Nespresso and Nespressso AAA Quality 
Program come from several sources: data from 2006 (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a); data from 2008 
(OXFAM 2009) and data from 2009 and 2010 were extrapolated from data sales (Nestlé-Nespresso 2009e; 
Nestlé-Nespresso 2011d; Nestlé-Nespresso 2012). Data from the C.A.F.E. Practices programme from 
Starbucks (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a) and (Starbucks 2012).  
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In second place, propelled by the growing demand for quality coffee, it is necessary to 
mention the growing participation of private company initiatives such as the Starbucks’ 
programme C.A.F.E. Practices – despite its fall in participation in 2010, and the the 
Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality Programme from Nestlé. Purchases from these two 
company verification schemes have been growing steadily and have reached a dominant 
market position in several producing countries as represented by over one third of 
sustainable coffee trade worldwide in 2010, Figure 4.10. 
 
4.4.2 Features from the supply side of the specialty industry 
 
The overall picture of the global supply of sustainable certified coffee has changed 
radically in one decade, from scarcity to an increasing oversupply (Potts, Van der Meer 
et al. 2010, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012, Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014, Potts, Lynch 
et al. 2014). Data revealed that in 2008 around 49% of the standard compliant 
production within the seven most important initiatives was effectively sold as compliant 
on the coffee market, this share was 45% in 2010 and 31% in 2012 (OXFAM 2009, 
Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012, Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014). Additionally, certified 
and verified production represent a significant portion of global production, in 2010, 
standard compliant production was around 22% of global production and there was 
almost a 2:1 relationship between the coffee produced as certified sustainable and the 
coffee that was sold under a sustainable seal – 16 million bags of 60 kilograms against 
9.1 million bags respectively. Meanwhile, in 2012 the production of verified and certified 
coffees share in global production was 50% and the relationship between produced and 
sold was 3:1 – 73 million bags of 60 kilograms produced against 22.4 million bags sold 
(Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012, Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014, ICO 2014a). This 
situation has been already reported in a local context for Uganda’s Fairtrade coffee 
market (Ponte and Kawuma 2003, Daviron and Ponte 2005), Mexico’s and Central 
America’s certified market (Mendez et al. 2010, cited by Ruben and Fort 2012), for 
Colombia’s sustainable coffee market (Flórez 2010, González 2010) and Peru’s market 
(Ruben and Fort 2012). 
 
The main reason to explain this situation relates to the millions of coffee growers that 
have entered sustainable production during the last decade, motivated by the farmers’ 
expectations of improving their economic and social viability by obtaining substantial 
price differentials, higher incomes and potential future markets.  
 
Additional to this, there is the fact that not all the harvest meets the quality requirement 
criteria imposed by the buyers, and therefore a portion of a farm’s harvest must be sold 
as conventional. Also, buyers may require purchasing only one fraction of the coffee 
production as certified, even though the entire farm is certified (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 
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2008a). In some cases, also, buyers can purchase certified coffee for its attributes, but 
can sell it without the identity of the certification (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a).  
 
However, there are important differences in the relationship between the coffee 
produced and that sold among the most important sustainable initiatives, see Figure 
4.11. For example, in 2008, only one tenth of the coffee produced under the verification 
of the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C) was actually sold under this label, 
one fourth of the coffee UTZ Certified, and 50% of the coffee produced under the 
Fairtrade certification was sold as certified (OXFAM 2009). By contrast almost all the 
coffee that met the quality requirements for the Nespresso AAA Quality Programme, 
C.A.F.E. Practices and Organic was sold as verified and certified.  
 
The same trends continued during 2010 and 2012 (Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010, 
Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012, Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014, Potts, Lynch et al. 2014) 
as the available production volume of certified and verified coffees continued growing 
and the gap between the coffee purchased has become even greater for some 
initiatives. For example, in the case of the 4C, only 7% and 20% of the certified 
production was sold as such in 2010 and 2012, respectively – in terms of bags of 60 
kilograms produced and sold a ratio of 13:1 and 5:1 respectively. This imbalance 
between produced but not sold also grew for Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance 
certifications. Only 36% and 33% of the Fairtrade certified coffee was sold as such and 
53% and 37% of Rainforest Alliance in 2010 and 2012 respectively (Panhuysen and 
VanReenen 2012, Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014). In this sense, although the sales of most 
common sustainable initiatives has witnessing growth well beyond the average annual 
growth rate of conventional coffees, this rate is below the annual growth in production.  
 
Evidence has signalled that oversupply is good for exporters and importers as they can 
choose between many different kinds of coffee, creating more demand for quality, 
tastes and certain origins (Ponte and Kawuma 2003, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012) 
while ensuring an adequate level of security in order to comply with the buyers demands 
(Flórez 2010, González 2010).  
 
However, this situation is not good for producers as it could imply a decline in producers’ 
rents. If producers cannot sell their entire production as certified even though the whole 
farm is certified, and receive a premium, they have to sell their remaining production to 
the conventional market without adding any value or premium to their coffee. As such, 
the contribution of sustainable standards and certifications to improve the livelihoods 
of coffee producers could be limited (Ruben and Fort 2012).  
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Figure 4.11 Relationship between certified supply and certified sales 2008; 2010 and 
2012 
  
Source: Author’s own calculations based on (OXFAM 2009, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012, Panhuysen 
and Pierrot 2014) 
 
Additionally, oversupply in the medium term exerts a downward pressure over the farm 
gate prices of sustainable coffees (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Muradian and 
Pelupessy 2005, Neilson 2008), which recently happened with the sustainable prices in 
the Colombian market (see Figure 5.13 at the next chapter). In this regard, although 
there is a fact that one of the main motivations for coffee growers participating in these 
programmes refers to the possibility of guaranteeing higher prices for their coffee, for 
the current oversupply it’s prudent to de-emphasise price premiums as a reason for 
entering these markets (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004) as this can do little to improve 
the farmers’ economic situation (Kilian, Jones et al. 2006).  
 
In this sense, under the current situation of oversupply, lower price premiums and 
significant higher production costs per hectare associated with the sustainable 
production and compared with conventional production (see Chapter 7), means that 
producers will only improve their rents through gains in efficiency, improved crop 
quality, increase in production and controlling farm costs (Kilian, Jones et al. 2006). In 
the opposite situation, as described above, it is clear that the markets for these products 
should be approached with caution since they are still limited and could affect the 
producers´ relationships with the market as well as the type of coffee (parchments, wet 
or cherry) they sold to the market.  
 
One additional option for farmers to sell their coffee and recoup both the production 
and certification costs and get some profits is to adopt multiple certifications. Evidence 
indicates that the adoption of multiple standards and certifications’ system at the farm 
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level (double and triple certification) has been one of the strategies that producers have 
followed to overcome the gap between sales and production of certified coffees. 
Multiple standards’ compliance could be seen as a strategic issue, not only to reduce the 
risk of relying on a single scheme but also assuring a higher income through price 
premiums and access to new and more developed markets. Hence, by selling more of 
their coffee to the sustainable segment farms, they look for assuring higher price 
premiums in order to recoup the production and certification costs and make some 
profits (Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010). 
 
According to global statistics, the most common cases are found in Fairtrade and organic 
double certification (Ponte and Kawuma 2003, Ponte 2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005). In 
this sense, Potts et al. (2010) have estimated that 48% of the total sustainable sales of 
organic in 2009 was also Fairtrade (Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010, based on estimates 
from Pierrot, Giovannucci and Kasterine, 2010, the CBI Monitor, TCC Coffee Barometer 
and personal communications with standards bodies). This combination is broadly 
accepted by consumers, roasters and major retailers in North America as well as Europe 
as they have been demanding this double certification (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a). 
Double certification during 2009 for other initiatives was estimated in the following way: 
for Organic and UTZ, the estimate was 5%; Organic and Rainforest, 15%; and 4C with all 
of the other initiatives, 25%. 
 
The economic implications of meeting multiple standards and certifications are 
contested. On one hand, some evidence has noted that this trend, although implying 
higher costs and additional financial resources, seems either to build some economies 
of scale and gain some efficiencies at farm level or expand farmers’ opportunities by 
improving access to new markets (Ponte and Kawuma 2003, Ponte 2004, Giovannucci, 
Liu et al. 2008a, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011). Additionally, some producers find it 
easier to sell their coffee to certain cooperatives or private buyers if they are certified 
with some label in particular. However, evidence also revealed that producers do not 
have to pay either the certifications or audit cost as private exporters and producers’ 
organisations not only can afford these costs but also give them significant levels of aid 
in kind.  
 
However, on the other hand, multiple certification could create incentive distortions and 
market inefficiencies as this practice could privilege more advanced producers and 
deviate resources that could be directed towards farmers seeking first certification 
(Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012). This situation can 
exclude the most vulnerable producers, in particular, small farmers who face many 
challenges and difficulties in meeting the demands or coordination requirements of 
private standards for a start (Neilson 2008, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a). This is not only 
because the costs associated with its adoption are substantial for any producer, but it 
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varies inversely with the size of the farm and the expected revenue could not 
compensate for the cost of meeting the standards in the smaller farms due the size of 
the operations (Potts, Opitz et al. 2007) but also because downstream actors could 
favour those producers who can meet their demands for standards, large volumes, and 
year-round consistency (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci 2008). 
 
Although most common requirements are shared among the different certifications and 
verifications programmes, such as keeping records, traceability and good agricultural 
practices, individual requirements of the different standards implies carrying out 
different practices and also keeping separate sets of records (Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 
2011, Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012). Multiple certification (double or triple) not only 
implies additional costs and the highest levels of complexity for farmers (Fairtrade, 
SAN/Rainforest Alliance et al. 2011) that have led them to wasting resources, money 
and time but also have made it more difficult for government agencies to track 
production and trade (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a) and for consumers to take decisions 
about sustainability issues (Courville 2011). Additionally, it makes it more difficult for 
policy makers, other decision-makers and researchers to attribute the outcomes and 
impact of the adoption of one sustainable initiative in particular (Potts, Van der Meer et 
al. 2010).  
 
This situation has motivated the ethical trade initiative, the International Social and 
Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL), to promote either 
harmonisation and cooperation between various certifications programmes 
(Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, ISEAL 2011) and work with the most important third party 
certifications’ organisations to counteract the vast amount of trade that is uncertified 
(ISEAL 2011). The outcome of this effort is a joint statement signed by representatives 
of Fairtrade, the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN)/Rainforest Alliance and UTZ 
CERTIFIED, that publicly acknowledge their aligned mission to work “together to reduce 
the level of complexity and costs for farmers” and “to create more efficiencies and clarity 
for producers” (Fairtrade, SAN/Rainforest Alliance et al. 2011, ISEAL 2011). However, 
there is still a long way to go as these “umbrella initiatives” can exclude other 
sustainable labels that are developed in different ways (Courville 2011). In terms of the 
coffee producers´ point of view, field work interviews revealed that harmonization 
across the proliferation of standards systems would help to achieve a more sustainable 
production and clearer market conditions. However, in the short run the success of this 
initiative in unlikely as certifications systems represent a form of governance for those 
actors downstream the coffee value chain. 
 
One example of how difficult would be the way towards harmonization in represented 
by the decision of Fair Trade USA (previously known as TRANFAIR USA) to separate and 
resign to the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) at the end of 2011, just a couple of 
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months after it signed the aforementioned joint statement to promote harmonisation. 
According to the Latin American and Caribbean Network of Small Fair Trade Producers 
(CLAC) the main idea from Fair Trade USA now is to pursue other visions of sustainable 
business with space for the certifications of plantations and contract production of 
certified products. CLAC claims that Fair Trade USA´s decision not only excluded 
producer organizations from the decision-making process but also its expansion towards 
plantations and producers who do not form part of organisations, would lead to an 
oversupply and the threaten of the small organized producers (CLAC 2011).  
 
4.4.3 Main features of sustainable coffee certifications and verifications 
 
While the mainstream model is associated with procurement practices in which coffee 
firms procure in bulk, seek to minimise costs and disclose as little information as possible 
to consumers (Daviron and Ponte 2005), in contrast, procurement in the differentiated 
coffee business model means a closer and sometimes direct relationship with a roaster 
or buyers rather than being traded in bulk or via the commodity markets. Appendix 6 
describes the main features of sustainable coffee certifications and verifications.  
 
An important feature of sustainable coffee certifications’ and verifications’ programmes 
refers to its main objectives and scopes. While some are looking to find a balance 
between the fulfilment of social, environmental and economic benefit to farmers, other 
have incorporated parameters of quality and origin in its requirements. In particular, it 
is supposed that each standard-setters is intended to contribute in a different manner 
to worldwide socio-economic and environmental sustainability (Steering Committee of 
the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012). However, the 
degree to which a certification standard and its associated set of practices impact social 
sustainability at the household level could be notably different across certification 
programmes, and as a such, all areas of impact among initiatives cannot be weighted 
equally (ISEAL 2010).  
 
It is known that programmes have put emphasis on social issues in varying degrees 
according to its mission, market focus and scope (Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Potts, 
Van der Meer et al. 2010, SCAA 2010, Lebel 2012). In fact, while social and economic 
standards are important for schemes such as Fairtrade (Lebel 2012) and cover only basic 
environmental criteria (Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007), other certifications such as 
Organic and Rainforest Alliance have paid more attention to environment standards 
while social standards “are in fact weak and voluntary” (Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007: p. 
154). Meanwhile, certifications such as Utz Certified put emphasis on management 
aspects of the farm in order to increase economic sustainability.  
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Authors have mentioned that social criteria in sustainable schemes tend to focus mainly 
on the compliance with key International Labour Organization (ILO), labour conventions 
and national labour legislation, regarding fair treatment and good conditions for 
temporary workers as well as those criteria and conditions dealing with health and 
safety, no forced or child labour, minimum social and labour conditions, and the rights 
to safe and healthy working conditions, among others (Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, 
Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010, Lebel 2012).  
 
Regarding this fact, in a qualitative comparative analysis of five third party sustainable 
initiatives in the coffee sector - Fairtrade, Organic, Utz Certified, Rainforest Alliance and 
Bird Friendly, Reynolds et al. (2007, p. 157) emphasised that in the “social arena’ there 
are business friendly certifications driven by the retailers’ interest and its corporate 
responsibility approaches (Lebel 2012). Here, for example, in the case of the social 
conditions of the coffee growers, some standards just want to hold the bar, meanwhile 
there are other initiatives that are raising the bar as these follow an increase in social 
standards going beyond ILO conventions and existing labour and safety laws by 
supporting both price and contract requirements as well as producer organisations. 
 
In general terms for all the programmes, producers should bear several types of direct 
and indirect costs involved with standards compliance and meeting certifications 
requirements, see Table 4.2 (Jaffee and Henson 2005, Humphrey 2006a, Potts, Opitz et 
al. 2007, Kaplinsky and Morris 2008, Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009). These costs can be 
divided into at least four categories (Potts, Opitz et al. 2007). Firstly, there are transition 
costs, which in turn can be broken into three sub-categories: a) the costs associated with 
the conversion process such as the training costs to obtain knowledge about standards 
and certifications; b) the capital cost for adjusting the production systems and investing 
in production facilities, buildings and physical equipment, among others; and c) the 
management systems implementation cost needed to assure quality assurance and 
traceability (Humphrey 2006a, Giovannucci and Purcell 2008, Humphrey 2008). 
Secondly, there are the certification costs and fees which are expended in order to keep 
the status of certified within one or another programme (Potts, Opitz et al. 2007). 
Thirdly, there are the maintenance expenses which include the recurrent and non-
recurrent costs of compliance such as the cost of inspections and independent 
verification, and certifications and monitoring, as well as the investment in protective 
clothing and gear for agrochemical use, among others (Potts, Opitz et al. 2007). Fourthly, 
there is the opportunity and intangible cost, which are represented by those associated 
with the confusion about the types of standards and their specific requirements. 
 
In some cases, the cost of certification and the annual audits can be afforded by export 
companies, some cooperatives (if producers sell their production afterwards), as well as 
some NGOs and aid agencies are implicated not only in helping farmers to get the 
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certification, paying the cost (even if they are double or triple certified) as well as the 
annual audits, also give aid in kind in order to help farmers to meet the competitive 
requirements imposed by the certifications and verifications programmes. Although this 
situation does not operate for coffee farmers selling to the Nespresso AAA Sustainable 
Quality Programme from Nestlé and Starbucks’ Coffee or the Farmer Equity Practices 
Programme (C.A.F.E. Practices), who currently do not have to pay for verification and 
adherence to the programme, they have funded and leveraged resources for providing 
both training, extra technical assistance and equipment to help farmers to meet the 
challenge of conforming their standards. 
 
About the price premium paid by buyers, Oxfam (2009) have pointed out that the 
premium received from selling Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified depends on market 
fundamentals, which implies a strategic balance between supply and demand. In the 
case of the Fairtrade certification, all coffee purchased under this initiative has a 
Fairtrade price floor, and receives the social premium set by FLO. This is despite the fact 
that a social premium is guaranteed as well as an obligation from the buyers to pre-
finance the costs of production (Potts et al., 2007). 
 
Table 4.2 Cost related to the implementation of standards 
Transition 
cost  
Training cost  
Cost of acquiring the technical know-how, 
managerial skills and knowledge about 
standards and certifications 
Capital investment cost 
Cost for adjusting the production systems 
and investing in production facilities, 
investments in technology and better 
infrastructure and physical equipment,  
Management System 
Implementation Costs 
Costs are associated with the 
documentation and management of 
criteria fulfilment  
Certification 
cost and fees 
Expenses incurred in order to keep the status of certified within one 
or another programme  
Maintenance 
cost 
Expenses include the recurrent and non-recurrent cost of compliance 
for the cost of inspections and independent verification, and 
certifications and monitoring, as well as the investment in protective 
clothing and gear for agrochemical use, among others 
Opportunity 
and 
intangible 
cost 
Confusion about the types of standards and their specific 
requirements are an intangible cost 
Source: Author’s adaptation from (Humphrey 2006a, Potts, Opitz et al. 2007) 
 
Different factors are taken into account regarding the requirements for implementing 
each one of the certifications and verifications. While in the case of producers of 
Fairtrade certification, Oxfam ensures that the entry requirement for new producer 
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groups are difficult, it stresses that there are low entry levels to producers who want to 
sell their coffee to the Starbucks’ C.A.F.E. Practices Programme (OXFAM 2009). 
However, regarding the Nespresso AAA Programme it indicates that being part of this 
programme is possible only if producers are located in specific regions in which coffee 
qualities offer specific characteristics. This situation, based on field work interviews, has 
made it possible to build significant long-term relationships between producers and 
buyers who also are interested in the implementation of programmes to improve coffee 
quality and assure loyalty from farmers through higher price premiums and helping 
them to comply with more difficult requirements.  
 
An additional factor corresponds to the traceability systems and supply chain coverage 
that each of these schemes have implemented along the value chain. While labels such 
as Rainforest Alliance focus its activities in assure compliance with sustainability 
standards on the part of producers, others such as Fairtrade, Utz Certified Nespresso 
AAA also work to ensure that the entire supply chain follow rigorous monitoring 
protocols, based primarily on sophisticated traceability and chain of custody.  
 
4.5 Value-added initiatives in coffee Global Value Chains 
 
Adding value and differentiating through credence claims can be initiated by three 
different actors at least in the coffee value chain: First, by corporate and industrial firm 
initiatives implementing commercial strategies through the development of firm-
specific corporate codes of conduct or private voluntary standards - "differentiation 
from above"; second, by local producers and their institutions through marketing and 
branding strategies linked both to authenticity of origin or relating to social and 
environmental impact - “differentiation from below”; and third by trading partnerships 
between Alternative Trade Organisations and producer-driven labelling and certification 
initiatives -“differentiation from the middle”, see Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Different types of differentiation in the coffee sector 
Branding or differentiation 
from “above” 
Branding of differentiation 
from the “medium” 
Branding of differentiation 
from “below” 
C.A.F.E. Practices, Starbucks Fairtrade Blue Mountain Coffee, 
Jamaica 
Nespresso AAA Sustainable 
Quality Programme, Nestle 
Organic Antigua Coffee, Guatemala 
 Rainforest Alliance Kona Coffee, Hawaii 
 Utz Certified Café de Nariño, Colombia 
 Bird Friendly Café Veracruz, Mexico 
Source: Author’s adaptation from (Humphrey 2005, Humphrey 2006b) 
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4.5.1 Differentiation from above 
 
The first correspond to those initiatives of product differentiation designed and 
launched by big brands, large international roasters, and retailers and traders located in 
developed countries, which have been called ‘branding [or differentiation] from above’ 
(Humphrey 2006b: 579, Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012). As a competitive strategy to participate 
in the new segments of the market, corporate lead firms have created their own private 
standards, verification, codes of conduct and certifications’ systems in terms of 
sustainability, food safety and quality (Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge 
Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012). These strategies of product 
differentiation through credence claims have been propelled by three facts: to increase 
their power, to improve their brand image against their competitors.  
 
In first place, mainstream roasters normally embedded in the selling of conventional 
coffee through different brands have shown their interest in capturing a bigger market 
share of the rapid growth of the speciality industry and growing sales of differentiated 
coffee in the mature markets of the United States, European Union and Japan. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, NGOs and development agencies have driven certifications such 
as Fairtrade, Organic, Rainforest Alliance or Bird Friendly certification, which have 
gained an important share in the differentiated market against the roaster sector – 
“differentiation from the middle.” As result, at the turn of the century, a more deeply 
corporate engagement with the speciality coffee agenda took place as certification 
systems gained wider acceptability (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Ponte and Gibbon 2005, 
TransFair USA 2010).  
 
In second place, the corporate interest to gain credibility for wealthy consumers 
concerns about the coffee production conditions (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, 
Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007), in particular, environmental and socio-economic 
considerations (Alvarez 2010). As Neilson (2008) pointed out “with the increased 
importance of the symbolic quality of coffee products, leading brands could not afford 
to be associated with allegations that they were perpetuating third-world poverty or 
contributing to serious environmental degradation” (Neilson 2008: 1608).  
 
However, there are differences in the competitive strategies that mainstream and 
differentiated coffee roasters, retailers, processors or traders have designed to 
participate and engage in the new market segments of the specialty coffee industry. 
According to Neilson (2008) there are three intersecting mechanisms about how lead 
firms can be involved in the specialty coffee sector and the sustainable coffee agenda: 
“(i) adoption of NGO-certified fairtrade and ecologically sound coffee as specific ‘‘niche’’ 
product lines; (ii) the development of firm-specific corporate codes of conduct, and (iii) 
an agenda to work towards collective, industry-wide private standards” (Neilson 2008: 
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1608). While the first alternative refers to the corporate use of labels backed by third 
party certification bodies, jointly with their brands, the second process deals with the 
use and appropriation of ethical and environmental credentials by being part of an 
increasing number of major coffee roasters and retailers through the initiation of several 
first and second party certifications and implement defensive branding management 
(Neilson 2008) to “ward off possible negative publicity, and capture a share of the 
growing sustainable coffee market” (Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007: 151). 
 
Regarding the development of company-specific codes of conduct in the coffee industry, 
many coffee corporations have established their own internal code of conduct or 
verifications’ systems related to environmental, social attributes of production and 
quality issues (Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Neilson 2008). The most known and active 
individual private codes are those developed and implemented by bigger players in the 
coffee industry such as Starbucks, the world’s single largest roaster and retailer of 
sustainable coffee (TransFair USA 2010) and Nespresso, the speciality coffee division, 
one of Nestle’s fastest-growing subsidiaries (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, Pierrot, 
Giovannucci et al. 2011). Although both initiatives do not work as a certification scheme 
(it is verification-based) these companies have been adopting their internal codes of 
conduct and sustainable sourcing standards for quality and sustainable coffee 
production for the so-called Coffee and Farmer Equity Practices programme (C.A.F.E. 
Practices) and the Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality Programme (Raynolds, Murray et 
al. 2007, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, OXFAM 2009, Giovannucci 2010, Pierrot, 
Giovannucci et al. 2011). Although these two verifications are not a certification scheme 
as they are not third certified, the verification of compliance and monitoring is done by 
private certifiers approved by the initiative (C.A.F.E. Practices) or by member 
organisations (Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality Programme).  
 
One important fact about these two initiatives relates to its rapid growth, added to its 
considerable buying power (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 
2011), and particularly its impact on several thousands of farmers and cooperatives in 
more than two dozen countries in the case of C.A.F.E. Practices and six countries for 
Nespresso (Giovannucci and Potts 2008). These companies as such are exerting a greater 
influence on value chain structures and have reached dominant market positions in 
several producing countries (Neilson 2008, FNC 2009b, FNCa 2010). The Nespresso 
programme, for example, is Nestlé’s fastest growing division that incorporates brewing 
equipment to its single-cup method, was created during the middle of the 1980s, and 
has been growing an average of 30% since 2000 (Porter and Kramer 2011), until it 
reached overall global sales of USD 3.8 billion in 2010 (Nestlé-Nespresso 2011d). In 2008, 
around 13,000 metric tonnes were sourced through the Nespresso AAA Sustainable 
Quality™ Coffee Programme (OXFAM 2009), which accounted for 40% of the 
Nespresso’s total purchases in 2008 (Nestlé-Nespresso 2011a, Nestlé-Nespresso 2011b, 
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Nestlé-Nespresso 2011d). At the end of 2010, more that 60% of Nespresso’s coffee was 
sourced from around 40,000 AAA programme farms in Costa Rica, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Brazil and Kenya (Nestlé-Nespresso 2009b, Nestlé-Nespresso 2009c, Nestlé-
Nespresso 2011b, Nestlé-Nespresso 2011d). 
 
There are also other fast growing sustainable initiatives such as the Common Code for 
Coffee Commodity (4C). This company code, created and launched in Germany in 2006, 
by the German Coffee Association, got the support of roasting firms and traders, 
including Kraft, Nestle, Sara Lee, Tchibo, Neumann Gruppe, and Volcafe (Neilson 2008, 
Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011). It seeks to verify farm 
practices and encourages good basic agricultural and management methods and 
includes minimum social and environmental standards. It differs from certification in 
that it is a check on the correctness of the self-assessment completed by the farm or 
group and not an independent assessment (Neilson 2008, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, 
OXFAM 2009, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011). Meanwhile other roasters have been 
experimenting with premium products. Sara Lee, Tchibo, Lavazza, Illy Coffee or Procter 
& Gamble have even been involved in cooperation programmes with coffee traders like 
Neuman, Volcafe and Ecom (OXFAM 2009). However, the gross of these corporate 
initiatives promoted as part of the CSR-policy focused on procuring more sustainable 
coffee lacking independent third-party verification systems (OXFAM 2009, Leibovich, 
García et al. 2010).  
 
4.5.2 Differentiation from below  
 
The second strategy for adding value and differentiating coffee products through 
credence claims can be created by developing country producers through programmes 
linked to authenticity of coffee origin and geographic conditions of production, or 
relating to a social and environmental impact, which has been called ‘branding [or 
differentiation] from below’ (Humphrey 2006a, Humphrey 2006b, Lee, Gereffi et al. 
2012). Changing market trends, including new consumer patterns have implied that the 
growing number of consumers are likely to pay higher price premiums not only because 
they want to be socially and environmentally responsible, but also because they derive 
satisfaction for quality brands which warrant that a particular coffee comes from a 
specific geographical origin (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009, 
Lozano, Samper et al. 2012). So, while roasters gain from brands and blends of 
replaceable low-cost beans, coffee producers’ might gain from the ability of consumers 
to recognise and appreciate the varied tastes of a cup profile of coffee provided by the 
origin and the conditions under which coffee is grown (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2008).  
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Under these circumstances, producer-driven options that promote the valuable 
attributes of quality and flavour characteristics of a geographical origin – for example: 
regional branding initiatives, geographical indications, appellations programmes, 
certification schemes, labels or trademarks names (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, Lewin, 
Giovannucci et al. 2004, WIPO 2007), have emerged as an option available to enhance 
producer income (Duguid 2003, Humphrey 2005, Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009, 
Hughes 2009). As certain origins of coffee may be highly prized and attract high 
premiums (ITC 2002, Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009), developing countries can establish 
a brand identity in global markets (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Humphrey 2005, Hughes 
2009) by promoting the “the consumption of place” and the symbolic quality attributes 
linked to a specific location (Daviron and Ponte 2005: 75). And in this way, reaching 
consistent demand, longer-term contracts, reduced price volatility and higher prices 
(Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009), support wider rural development (Neilson 2007) and 
reduces poverty through trade (Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009).  
 
Some anecdotal evidence has indicated that product differentiation through quality 
attributes associated with a place could generate more stable returns and rents 
compared to those economic benefits accruing from certified sustainable coffee (Lewin, 
Giovannucci et al. 2004, Muradian and Pelupessy 2005). The rewards accruing to 
farmers investing in quality improvement through certified sustainable coffee may be 
less than expected in the medium term as the price premiums paid for quality may erode 
over time due to oversupply once competition increases (ITC 2002, Muradian and 
Pelupessy 2005, Neilson 2007, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a), and the compliance cost 
for certifications become higher (Mutersbaugh 2005). In this regard, Anholt (2003) has 
pointed out that efforts towards product branding using regional identities could shape 
the distribution of wealth within value chains and, in this way, work as a tool for 
economic development for local producers and their communities in developing 
countries (Anholt 2003). By launching marketing instruments, in some way, similar to a 
brand name (Daviron and Ponte 2005) like a single origin or Geographical Indications of 
Origin, producers (at various levels - producers associations, traders, NGO, 
intermediaries, exporters, firms, group of firms, regions or countries, etc) can create 
differences in the opinion of the consumers and make it possible to improve their access 
to global markets, while moving “outside the commodity box” and escape away from 
the trap of low commodity prices (Lewin et. al. 2004 cited by Humphrey 2006a, Neilson 
2007).  
 
In this way, producers develop competitive advantages and raise barriers to entry 
against producers who do not have the opportunity to offer a product of the same 
quality since they do not have the conditions that influence the taste of the final product 
(Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004). Additionally, producers are able to increase their bargaining 
power while counteracting and offsetting the effects of market supremacy of the big 
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players in the industry (Humphrey 2005, Humphrey 2006a, Humphrey 2006b) once 
consumers learn to identify or recognise the origin rather than the brands created by 
the mainstream and speciality coffee roasters and blenders. Unlike the case of other 
differentiation strategies, producers are able to gain economic rents which are the 
product of innovation by selling their products with its image and quality linked to place 
(Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, Ponte and Gibbon 2005, 
Neilson 2007). In the case of agricultural producers, these instrument of collective 
differentiation allow communities that produce a good, which have gained recognition 
and reputation linked to their origin, to lessen the need to compete exclusively through 
a strategy of mass production and price reduction (Lozano, Samper et al. 2012).  
 
As such, “differentiation from below” as a form of branding might have the capacity to 
“improve growers position vis-à-vis roasters and traders” (Muradian and Pelupessy 
2005: 2031) and hence alter power relationships and the structure of governance within 
the value chain in the world of agri-business as well as the returns that producers expect 
to obtain (Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, Humphrey 2005). Traditionally, there have been the 
large firms of mainstream roasters or traders who owned the brands and in such a way 
have promoted the quality attributes of the coffee blends. From this perspective, it is 
unlikely that these companies are willing to reveal in their labels the origin or 
composition of the blends they sell (ITC 2002, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, Neilson 2007). 
In this regard, Ponte and Gibbon (2005) pointed out that while “quality attributes are 
owned by branded manufactures or processors”, industry efforts would be directed to 
replace regional geographic appellations or indications by other certified quality systems 
that “partially de-link quality from place.” As such, product differentiation through 
“branding from below” represents a “form of resistance against this trend” (Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005: 13-15) and “a challenge [from developing countries] to their [corporate] 
monopolies and, increasingly, to their use of registered trademarks to secure economic 
rents in their respective markets” (Neilson 2007: 200). Through embarking on an active 
strategy of differentiation and marketing its products in the coffee world, producing 
countries can “take advantage of product rents by promoting the virtues of location-
specific ‛images and taste’ and gain dividends from the product’s image (Kaplinsky and 
Fitter 2004: 18).  
 
Maybe one of the most notable cases from “branding [differentiation] from below” 
refers to Colombia’s active global strategy of differentiation and marketing its product 
in the coffee world based on the recognition and acceptance of the character of Juan 
Valdez and the triangular logo of Café de Colombia (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002, 
Reina, Silva et al. 2007, WIPO 2007, Hughes 2009, Juglar 2009, The Economist 2010). 
Recently, in order to protect the Colombian origin, the Colombian coffee authorities 
have been supporting efforts to get unique regional coffee into the market place 
through the implementation strategy of Geographical Indication in the European Union, 
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Denomination of Origin in the Andean Community Countries and Certification Marks in 
United States and Canada, as well as a trademark in over 140 countries worldwide 
(Giovannucci and Samper 2009, Lozano, Samper et al. 2012, Samper 2012).  
 
Over time, other countries have embarked on an active strategy of differentiation and 
marketing its products in the coffee world using regional identities (ITC 2002, Teuber 
2007, Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009, Hughes 2009). Examples include, Jamaica Blue 
Mountain, Guatemala with the case of Antigua Coffee, the United States and the Hawaii 
Kona Coffee, Mexico with the Veracruz coffee and the top Kenya AA, and Nariño coffee, 
from Colombia, among others. Anecdotal evidence has shown that farmers producing 
these types of coffee have achieved significant and considerable price premiums that 
were achieved by other growths in the same country (Giovannucci and Easton-Smith 
2009, Giovannucci and Samper 2009, Oosterom and Deve 2009, Schroeder and Guevara 
2009). For example, in the early 2000s, Jamaican Blue Mountain attracted such a large 
premium that the unit value of coffee exported from Jamaica was over 13 times higher 
than the average of all ‘other Milds’ producers and more than 16 times higher than the 
average achieved by all origins (ITC 2002). Although, as Schroeder (2009) pointed out, in 
the case of Blue Mountain coffee from Jamaica, it is also important to have in mind that 
“high prices must be seen in the context of its very high production costs and 
considerable climactic risks” (Oosterom and Deve 2009: 176). 
 
Nevertheless, developing and managing successfully global or national brands through 
producer-driven initiatives such as geographical indications or appellations are 
particularly challenging and its success requires many years of effort, as well as from 
resources and participatory efforts from several stakeholders along all the stages of 
coffee cultivation, processing and sales (Kaplinsky 2004, Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, 
Daviron and Ponte 2005, Neilson 2007, Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009). If the purpose 
of these instruments is contributing to sustainable rural development by guaranteeing 
economic benefits for producers, improving their living conditions and capturing a 
bigger share of the economic benefit of the coffee value chain, at least three 
fundamental conditions must be completed. In first place, it is vital to take into account 
the fact that differentiation from below is based on origin attributes and will not, in 
themselves, lead to an increase in profits and sustainable incomes as long as producers 
get access to the markets for these goods in terms of distribution (Lozano, Samper et al. 
2012). Small producers are limited in their capacity to upgrade within the global value 
chains of the agri-business sector unless they find necessary allies to gain connectivity 
and their goods reach highly concentrated markets (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2001, 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2008, cited by Lozano et al. 2012). 
 
Second, some authors agree that a necessary condition for the success of these 
initiatives is a combination of certain valuable qualities and characteristics that are 
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entirely due to a geographic origin (ITC 2002, Neilson 2007, Oosterom and Deve 2009, 
Schroeder 2009, Schroeder and Guevara 2009). This also implies that the relationship 
between origin and quality must be demonstrated (Lozano, Samper et al. 2012). But this 
is not a sufficient input, for achieving success and gaining a reputation as there are other 
conditions that geographic indications’ programmes must fulfil. These include, among 
others, regular delivery, reliable and consistent grading procedures, strict compliance 
with contractual obligations, long-standing commercial relations, reliable traceability 
systems from sites of production through to consumption and a scale necessary to 
conform to market volume requirements. 
 
In third place, additional to these factors, Daviron and Ponte (2005) mentioned that in 
order to “generate and control [the] extra value for symbolic production” generated by 
the use of geographical indication, it is necessary the creation of a legal framework to 
protect the quality sign “against misleading use and against the dilution of meaning” and 
particularly have “the ability to build vertical alliances with other actors [international 
buyers] in the value chain” (Daviron and Ponte 2005: 73-79) with the interest to support 
the development of such producer-driven initiatives and in this way reducing their 
transaction costs through the information embedded in the geographic indication 
operating as a brand name (Neilson 2007). 
 
As a consequence, these initiatives do not automatically guarantee economic benefit for 
producers (Neilson 2007) and are not open to everyone (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004). The 
cost of achieving all these requirements can be not only substantial but could also 
operate against the poorest farmers and their institutions which can be seen as excluded 
from these differentiation processes (Neilson 2007). For this reason, under some 
circumstances, the promotion of a differentiation strategy for these characteristics “are 
by no means a panacea for the difficulties of rural development” (Giovannucci, Josling 
et al. 2009: xviii). Humphrey (2006) points out that whereas in some cases there have 
been notable success stories of product differentiation and added value to agricultural 
products, in other cases the full potential of some strategies to induce producers to 
move “outside the commodity box” is hard to establish. This situation implies that in 
order to develop a consistent and coherent strategy linking to the origin, it must include, 
not only institutional and legal processes, but also business and competitiveness 
planning processes (Lozano, Samper et al. 2012). Although there are over six million 
trademarks worldwide, there are only around 10,000 GIs, about 144 of which originate 
from developing countries. Therefore, GIs represent barely 1% of the total number of 
trademarks. This enormous gap may be explained by the reasons listed above, as well 
as by the fact that trademarks are more versatile than GIs (Giovannucci, Josling et al. 
2009, cited by Lozano et al. 2012). 
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However, empirical evidence measuring the outcomes and causal impacts of 
geographically differentiated products, both on producers’ perceived economic, social 
and environmental benefits as well as global value chains, are non-existent (Rangnekar 
2004, Barjolle, Paud et al. 2009, Bramley, Biénabe et al. 2009, Giovannucci, Josling et al. 
2009, Jena and Grote 2010, Deppeler, Stamm et al. 2011, Paus and Reviron 2011, 
Bramley 2012, Jena and Grote 2012). In the near future it remains to be seen whether 
or not the introduction of geographical indicators or regional identities for coffee will 
generate increased revenues for farmers (Giovannucci, Josling et al. 2009, Giovannucci 
and Samper 2009, Hughes 2009, Juglar 2009). In the case of Colombia, for example, 
coffee authorities have recognised that one enterprise of this size can be very costly to 
broadly promote a GI directly to consumers unless there are sufficient economies of 
scale (Giovannucci and Samper 2009).  
 
4.5.3 Differentiation from the middle  
 
In third place are those trading partnerships that have been developed by a combination 
of different entities such as Alternative Trade Organisations, Non-Governmental 
Organisations, independent standard setting bodies, industry organisations, consumer 
activists, civil society organisations and producers (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a), which 
have been called ‘branding [or differentiation] from the middle.’ The primary aim of 
these initiatives was to improve livelihoods, trade, or the environment of producers, 
most of them small and in disadvantaged conditions (COSA 2013), and create 
“alternative consumer spaces alongside the mainstream coffee market, offering a 
means of product differentiation for growers which could be translated into farm-gate 
price premiums” (Neilson 2008: 1608). In this sense, producers have witnessed the 
emergence and growing importance not only of corporate voluntary code initiatives – 
differentiation from above, but also broad certification programmes – differentiation 
from the middle. In particular, those based on third party inspection and certification of 
suppliers through environmental and socio-economic standards (Daviron and Ponte 
2005, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008). As in the case of differentiation from above and 
below, producer participation in coffee certification is stimulated mainly via higher farm 
gate price premiums as well as market access and socio-economic and environmental 
benefits (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007). 
 
Examples of such organisations in the coffee sector include the four major collective 
coffee sustainable standards that are independently monitored and certified: the 
Fairtrade Labelling Organisation International (FLO), the International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), the Rainforest Alliance (RA) and Utz Certified 
(OXFAM 2009) – Appendix 6 describes the main features of sustainable coffee 
certifications and verifications. As well as other small initiatives called Bird Friendly 
Certification which was created by the Smithsonian Migratory Bird Centre (SMBC). In 
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order to gain independence, objectivity, transparency and impartiality, these 
organisations created their own standards, certifications’ systems and labelling 
programmes and rely on external verifiers or third party guarantees that are 
independent from the certification process (Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005). Each one of 
these standards’ systems has its label and claims, and all these programmes include, to 
some degree, aspects of economic development for farmers, environmental 
conservation, social improvements and quality requirements (OXFAM 2009).  
 
Some analysts have argued that the fast-growing demand in volume of certified coffee 
backed by TPC bodies is explained by the interest and strong involvement of large-scale 
companies to source their mainstream products lines from producers linked to the 
market of certified sustainable coffee (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, OXFAM 2009, Potts, 
Van der Meer et al. 2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011). As noted earlier, one of the 
three ways lead firms can be involved in the speciality coffee sector and the sustainable 
coffee agenda have implied the adoption of NGO-certified environmental and socio-
economic standards in their quality management strategies (Neilson 2008). During the 
last half-decade, as the certifications’ systems have gained wider credibility and 
acceptability, larger commercial actors in the mainstream market have established 
strategic alliances with the most important sustainability initiatives as part of their 
corporate strategies (Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010, 
Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012).  
 
The main objective is to “seek to both differentiate their offerings and meet emerging 
demands while improving their positioning as socially responsible corporations” 
(Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a: 47, ACDI/VOCA 2009a). In such a way, retail food service 
chains (i.e. Dunkin Donuts, McDonalds or Starbucks), mainstream supermarkets (i.e. 
Wal-Mart, Ikea, among others) and most of the large roasters and retailers (i.e. Kraft 
Foods, Tchibo, Nestle, Lavazza, Folgers and Sara Lee, among others) (Giovannucci, Liu et 
al. 2008a, OXFAM 2009, TransFair USA 2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 2011) have been 
selling and marketing one or more kinds of certified or verified sustainable coffee in 
order to scale-up their business. This situation has implied, for example, that McDonalds 
now offer Rainforest Alliance, Utz Certified and Fairtrade Certified coffees in its British, 
European and the North America outlets. Meanwhile Dunkin Donuts now sells Fairtrade 
coffee in its USA outlets, and IKEA’s restaurants are serving Utz Certified coffee. Also, 
larger roasters such as Kraft Food, Lavazza and Schibo; or retailers such as Wal-Mart 
have been offering Rainforest Alliance certified coffee (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a).  
 
Although the overall political economy implications of this move are far from being 
analysed, the truth is that the proliferation of initiatives, acceptability among consumers 
and scaling of these certification systems have moved these initiatives from a niche 
market system associated with sophisticated consumers towards the mainstream 
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market (Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Raynolds, Murray et al. 2007, Potts, Van der Meer et 
al. 2010). In this regard, while these alliances between roasters, retailer, supermarkets 
and third party certification organisations have not been welcomed at all in certain 
sectors (Raynolds 2009, Reed 2009), others have seen this joining as a win-win synergy 
that can benefit both producers, mainstream corporations and the standard 
certification organisations itself (Jenkins, Akhalkatsi et al. 2007, FAIRTRADE 2009a).  
 
Regarding the first opinion, numerous researchers have raised their concern about the 
commoditisation of sustainability (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci and Ponte 
2005, Humphrey 2008, Raynolds 2009) as the differences between the speciality and 
mainstream coffee market which are “becoming blurred” (Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 12). 
Some have also pointed out that these moves have been seen not only as an opportunity 
to ‘greenwash’ the corporate image and to dictate production and trade conditions 
(Ponte and Gibbon 2005, Fulponi 2006, Neilson 2008) but also to restrict access to 
upscale differentiated markets, and as a way to impose their own traceability initiatives 
and to implement value chain governance (Raynolds 2009). On the contrary, this trend 
towards the mainstream markets has also been seen positively as the fast growing 
consumption of certified sustainable coffee which can represent the best way to scale-
up the business, increase demand significantly and hence a way to support marginalised 
producers and their communities (Jenkins, Akhalkatsi et al. 2007, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 
2008, FAIRTRADE 2009a). The main idea behind these partnerships refers to the effect 
that big corporations’ involvement in the sustainable agenda can have an overall 
demand and market penetration of these initiatives (Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010).  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has reviewed the most important structural changes that the coffee market 
has gone through during the last two decades, both from the supply and the demand 
side. In particular, it has put emphasis on fast growth and the market success of the 
differentiated industry, which is composed of the specialty coffee sector, and within this, 
the increasing recognition and growing market value for the sustainable industry. As 
such, millions of coffee producers have viewed product differentiation and added value 
to their products and processes as the potential tool for supporting rural development. 
Estimates for 2015 forecast that nearly one fifth of the global exports of coffee will meet 
claims of quality, environmental impact, origin and community development among 
others.  
 
Oversupply and the proliferation of initiatives has implied that producers could not sell 
their entire production as certified and, as such, the contribution of sustainable 
standards and certifications to improve the welfare and livelihoods of coffee producers 
could be limited. This situation has raised concerns about how this has affected the 
117 
 
 
 
upgrading opportunities of agricultural producers. There is concern about its effects for 
the value chain organisation. Not only with regard to its implications of access to agri-
food value chains and its effect on rural development but also particularly about the 
returns and redistributive outcomes that producers obtain from participating in these 
chains. Therefore, there is agreement with the fact that there is an increasing demand 
for effective impact evaluation, outcomes and possibilities for these initiatives.  
 
In this sense, although many studies have examine the outcomes and impacts of coffee 
certifications over the socioeconomic and environmental characteristics of farm 
households, most of available information is conceptual and/or theoretical, the 
quantitative evidence available for coffee is case specific as deals almost exclusively on 
Fairtrade and such impede generalizations over other initiatives (Blackman and Rivera 
2010, Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011). However, most the available knowledge today lack 
of a convincing methodology and research designs that makes difficult to attribute 
outcomes directly to the adoption of the competitive requirements of standards and 
certifications systems (Giovannucci and Potts 2008, Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011, Von 
Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012). The main methodological 
conclusion is that only few of the available comparisons have taken the care needed to 
construct a credible and robust counterfactual, and have addressed and corrected for 
all the potential selection bias that account for differences between treated and non-
treated producers (i.e. certified producers could have larger assets, higher education, 
larger farms, better access to services than non-certified producers). 
 
Therefore, more studies are needed to address the effects of different value-added 
strategies in the coffee sector. Up to now, there has been little agreement on the 
question of how the adoption of private food standards and credence claims has 
affected the upgrading opportunities of agricultural producers.  
 
Therefore will important to contribute to the debate about the impact that the adoption 
of different voluntary sustainability standards have on the upgrading strategies of coffee 
growers and the role that institutions can play to help overcome their most important 
limitations to further upgrading.  
 
Today is not yet clear what the specific impacts of adding value and differentiating 
through credence claims initiated by different actors in the coffee value chain on the 
economic viability of small coffee growers are? Even much less clear, which are the 
direct effects of some value added initiatives on the welfare of communities and rural 
workers? And to which extend standards and certifications can be used as a tool for 
sustainable development? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Colombia coffee sector 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Coffee and development are synonymous in Colombia (ICO 1997) as the coffee industry 
has been the principal motor of Colombia´s economic and social development for the 
past 100 years (Bates 1997, Reina, Silva et al. 2007). For four decades, beginning in the 
1960s, the Colombian coffee industry invested heavily in promoting the brand image of 
“Colombian Coffee” (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, WIPO 2007), this meant that not only 
were many brands all over the world being labelled as 100% Colombian (ITC 2002), but 
also gained a premium compared to other Mild Arabicas (Reina, Silva et al. 2007).  
 
However, this strategy was only effective while the ICA economic provisions were in 
effect, since export quantities were regulated and higher revenues for coffee producers 
could only be obtained through higher green coffee prices. As a result, based on the 
recognition and acceptance of the character of Juan Valdez® and the triangular logo of 
Café de Colombia, coffee institutions undertook a new market-oriented strategy after 
2002 aimed at improving Colombia’s competitiveness as a coffee producer and to 
restructure its domestic industry in order to capture more value-added along all links in 
the production chain.  
 
This chapter presents the most important changes of the Colombian coffee industry 
divided into eight sections. After this introduction, the second part deals with the local 
context and the macro trends of the coffee industry in Colombia. The third and fourth 
sections discuss the institutions and its regulatory framework, and the structure and 
trends in domestic and external marketing. The fifth section describe the upgrading 
strategies within the Colombia coffee value chain. The sixth section describes and 
analyses the main features, impacts and challenges of Colombia’s new value added 
strategy. The seventh mentioned the strategies to support coffee growers in Colombia. 
Finally, the main conclusions are stated. 
 
5.2 Local context and macro trends 
 
Commercial coffee growing began in the 1870s, and coffee was soon exported. It was 
responsible for generating and expanding an internal market (by developing national 
industry and other urban activities) and providing the foreign currency needed for 
growth of other productive sectors. Coffee is grown in mountainous regions at altitudes 
ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 metres, where the average temperature is between 18 and 
22 degrees Celsius and rainfall is frequent. There are 18 coffee growing states 
(Departamentos) with over 560 coffee growing municipalities (half of country’s total). 
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Over 2,000,000 people’s livelihoods depend on coffee activity. Coffee has also been a 
major influence in regional development. It has assisted in the creation of an economic 
and social infrastructure within its area of influence.  
 
Topography is one of the most important aspects to be taken into consideration when 
examining the case of Colombian coffee (Lozano, Samper et al. 2011). Coffee plantations 
are cultivated in an area of about 900,000 hectares and the coffee growing zone is 
spread over 3,600,000 hectares across Colombia from the far north in the Sierra Nevada 
de Santa Marta to the southeast in the Nariño Mountains – a region more than 1,000 
km long. Around 88% of the coffee area is planted with improved varieties resistant to 
coffee leaf rust, cultivated using technically advanced production systems, and 12% with 
unimproved varieties cultivated using traditional practices.  
 
Linked to the tropical mountain climate and Colombia’s location under the inter-tropical 
convergent zone, Colombia does not have a specific coffee harvesting period, as is the 
case in many other coffee-producing countries. Depending on the region, coffee is 
harvested throughout the year, with a principal crop between October and December, 
and a secondary crop between April and May. There are, however, some regions in 
which the principal crop is harvested between April and May, and the secondary crop 
between October and December, thus allowing a more even flow of fresh coffee. 
Furthermore, irregular flowering cycles give rise to different ripening cycles for the 
fruits, meaning that it is common for the same branch of a coffee bush to bear flowers 
and fruits which are going through different ripening cycles (FNC 2006, Lozano, Samper 
et al. 2011). For that reason, trees cannot be plucked by machinery – added to the fact 
that coffee is grown on the slopes of the Andes and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta 
mountain range, instead the berries must be picked by hand as the berries do not ripen 
at the same time (ICO 1997, Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002, Reina, Silva et al. 2007) 
and contributes not only to the creation of differentiated quality, but also increases the 
time and effort required during the harvesting stage, as well as the cost in terms of 
manual labour (Lozano, Samper et al. 2011). After harvesting, the coffee is prepared by 
the wet processing method. The coffee undergoes a preparation process which 
transforms the ripe cherries into parchment coffee ready for marketing and industrial 
preparation.29 
 
                                                          
29 After picking the coffee-cherry, on the same day it goes to the de-pulping machine which removes the 
pulp or fruit cover from the seeds that are in the centre of each cherry. Then, the coffee beans, still 
encased in their tough parchment husk, are placed in fermentation tanks where they are allowed to soak 
in water for between 12 and 24 hours – this operation may also be carried out using special equipment. 
This process removes the mucilaginous pulp covering the bean which is of vital importance for the aroma 
of the coffee. When the washing is over and the fermented mucilage is removed, the beans must be dried 
in the sun.  
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There are around 513,000 coffee growers and there are currently some 480,000 families 
who are directly dependent on coffee production. During the last four decades the 
coffee production area has declined 17%, or about 178,000 hectares. Additionally, since 
1970, there has been an increase in the number of coffee farms from 296,830 to 
512,938, and a reduction in the coffee-growing areas from 1.05 million hectares to 
873,659 hectares in 2012. This indicates a reduction in the average size of farms from 
14.8 hectares to 6 hectares, and in the average size of the actual coffee plot, from 3.5 
hectares to 1.7 hectares.  
 
As a result, smallholdings predominate in Colombia (García and Ramírez 2002, García 
2003). Nowadays, 73% of the coffee growers are micro and small-scale producers 
concentrated in farms with less than five hectares and coffee plots even smaller (on 
average, farms form 1.6 hectares and coffee plots from 0.9 hectares) where the family 
is the primary source of labour, see Table 5.1. These households have a clear 
dependence on coffee as around 70% of their income comes from the commercialisation 
of coffee beans (García and Ramírez 2002) in addition to other agricultural activities or 
labour wages at the biggest farms.  
 
Table 5.1 Typology of coffee producers in Colombia 2007 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC databases 
 
Although the smaller farms are more likely to specialise in coffee production, the 
consequence of the reduced size of their farms, is that around one third of the coffee 
producers cannot generate sufficient income to live out of poverty (García and Ramírez 
2002). They face high levels of vulnerability unless they have other sources of additional 
earnings (Forero 2010). In this respect, evidence has shown that in the countryside, 
there are reduced employment opportunities as well as rural diversification options 
(Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002). As a consequence, levels of poverty are above 50% 
in the coffee zone of Colombia, adding to high levels of the land´s concentration 
Farm size (ha)
No. Of 
farms
Total area 
(ha)
Area used for 
coffee 
production 
(ha)
Farms 
size (ha)
Coffee 
plot size 
(ha)
% of land 
used for 
coffee
Share of 
total farms 
(%)
Share of 
total area 
(%)
Share of area 
used for 
coffee 
production (%)
 < 0.50 77,226    20,458       18,818          0.3 0.2 92 15.1          0.7 2.2
 0.51 a 0.9 75,898    51,326       40,265          0.7 0.5 78 14.8          1.7 4.6
 1.0 a 3.0 155,616 270,390     157,422        1.7 1.0 58 30.3          8.9 18.0
 3.1 a 5.0 68,947    258,653     117,929        3.8 1.7 46 13.4          8.5 13.5
 5.1 a 10.0 67,104    461,559     168,889        6.9 2.5 37 13.1          15.1 19.3
 10.1 a 15.0 25,349    303,907     87,332          12.0 3.4 29 4.9            10.0 10.0
 15.1 a 20.0 12,710    217,698     52,402          17.1 4.1 24 2.5            7.1 6.0
 20.1 a 30.0 12,573    303,918     64,582          24.2 5.1 21 2.5            10.0 7.4
 30.1 a 50.0 9,745      368,023     62,962          37.8 6.5 17 1.9            12.1 7.2
 50.1 a 100.0 5,677      383,789     56,077          67.6 9.9 15 1.1            12.6 6.4
 >=100.0 2,093      410,421     46,981          196.1 22.4 11 0.4            13.5 5.4
Total 512,938 3,050,141  873,659        
Average 5.9          1.7         58.7        
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according to the Gini coefficient of the farms which was around 0.74 in 1997 (García 
2003). 
 
For many years, coffee was the principal contributor to export earnings as its value at 
one point reached 80% of total export earnings in the 1950s and levels of around 60% 
in the 1970s (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002). Although its share in total exports 
revenue has declined to about 5% of export income today, there has been an increase 
in exports of other sectors such as oil, coal or non-traditional exports; Colombia´s 
exports of 7.8 million bags in 2010 contributed to almost USD 2.21 billion (FNC 2011a), 
Figure 5.1. Notwithstanding this trend as a result of the diversifications in exports over 
the last 40 years, still nearly 500,000 families depend on coffee for their livelihoods. 
 
Figure 5.1 Coffee in Colombia´s global exports by value and share 1970 - 2010 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the Central Bank’s statistics 
 
Currently, Colombia is the world´s third largest coffee exporting country and the biggest 
producer and exporter of Mild washed Arabicas. Its average coffee production during 
the last ten years was around 11 million bags of 60 kg which represents around 7% of 
the worldwide harvest and around 80% of the Mild Arabicas supply, Figure 5.2. Between 
2008 and 2012 in Colombia, a number of factors severely affected Colombia’s harvest 
which implies. These included severe climate conditions because of the El Niño and La 
Niña weather phenomena with a long and strong rainfall period that affected coffee 
flowering and coffee formation, extreme high fertiliser prices in 2007 and 2008 that 
discouraged growers from applying fertilisers to their trees, added to the recurrence of 
the coffee berry borer (CBB) infestation, a severe outbreak of coffee rust and the 
continuation of the coffee tree rejuvenation programme (USDA 2010, FNC 2010a, FNC 
2011a). 
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As a consequence, Colombian coffee production during the 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 
seasons reached the lowest levels since the 1970s. Despite the FNC´s active coffee 
production policy being implemented in Colombia since 1970 in order to increase 
physical productivity in coffee plantations (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002), it is 
known that Colombia likes behind competitor countries such as Costa Rica, Brazil and 
Vietnam in terms of productivity per hectare (Avellaneda and Ramírez 1995, Reina, Silva 
et al. 2007, Word Bank Group 2015), and the weather conditions worsened this 
situation. Between 2008 and 2012, there was a decline of 26% compared with the 
average of the previous eight years (from 2000 to 2007), from around 11.8 million bags 
to around 8.7 million bags (FNC 2010a, FNC 2011a, FNC 2011c, FNC 2013a, FNC 2013b). 
This situation added to the increase in production from Brazil and Vietnam which 
relegated Colombia in terms of global supply from 13% in the 1990s to around 7% in the 
2000s. 
 
Figure 5.2 Colombia´s harvest (million bags of 60 kg) vs. share in worldwide harvest 
1990 - 2013 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC databases 
 
In order to increase the declining productivity per hectare to the levels seen in recent 
years, improve the competitiveness of the Colombian´s coffee sector, and recoup its 
position as the second largest producing country to supply coffee both mainstream and 
the specialty market, coffee authorities with the support of the national government 
took policy actions in 2008 and 2009 through different activities (FNC 2010a, FNC 2011a, 
FNC 2011c). These comprise helping producers: (a) rejuvenate aging coffee plantations 
by providing seeds from resistant varieties, bags and seedlings; (b) reduce production 
costs, by providing free supplies such as chemical fertilisers and fungicides; (c) extending 
access to credit lines to small farmers that enable them to buy inputs during difficult 
weather periods, and offering opportunities for refinancing previous debts; (d) a price 
subsidy programme that guarantees price support for coffee production if the internal 
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price is under COP 5,200 per kg. (1 US dollar = 2,000 COP). This programme allows 
producers to register a portion of their expected coffee production, protecting them at 
harvest time against a fall in coffee prices below COP 5,200 per kg.; (d) quality standard 
penalties were relaxed if coffee grains were infested with levels of coffee berry borer of 
over 5% for the standard and 3% for speciality coffees coffee; (e) hedging against falling 
coffee prices using coffee futures. 
 
The two main collateral effects from the sharp reduction in the Colombian crop were 
the historical high coffee prices witnessed during 2010 and 2011, not seen since 1997, 
see Figure 4.1 in the previous chapter, and the widening of the differences between the 
indicator prices of the Colombian Milds and its main substitutes in the coffee market. As 
the possibility of substitution by other origins at that time were limited (FAIRTRADE 
2010c) due to shortages in output across Central America, Mexico and Peru (TransFair 
USA 2010), the difference between the indicator price of the Colombian Milds and Other 
Milds and Brazilian Naturals reached all-time highs during 2009 and 2010. Since then, 
the industry has made efforts to substitute the most expensive origins and counteract 
them in the upward pressures on market prices (as discussed in chapter 4) so that the 
differentials between prices of Colombian Milds and the other groups of coffee were 
down (ICO 2010a, ICO 2010b), see Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 Differences between indicator prices of Colombian Milds and Other Milds 
and Brazilian Naturals 1989 - 2013 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on ICO databases 
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the differential against the Other Milds has 
decreased significantly since 2011 due to a sharper increases in the price of the Other 
Milds. Due not only to the continued increase in demand to offset the reduced supplies 
of Colombian Milds (ICO 2010b), but also the supply from Colombia has increased while 
the availability from Central America has been reduced (ICO 2011f). As such, the 
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differential between Colombian Milds and Other Milds narrowed down in 2011 to 12 US 
cents, 15 US cents during 2012 and 8 US cents in 2013, as shown in Figure 5.3 (ICO 2011d, 
ICO 2012a, ICO 2012b, ICO 2013).  
 
As many analysts have observed, price premiums for Colombia´s Milds rose to almost 
$1 per lb. above the futures prices in New York (FNCa 2010, USDA 2010, FNC 2011a). 
Similarly, ICO prices for Robustas, Brazilian Naturals, Other Milds and the indicator ICO 
Composite price jumped after 2008. All this affected the local commercialisation chain, 
but particularly the trade of speciality and sustainable coffee as many buyers were 
unwilling to pay both the premium of certification as well as the high scarcity premium 
associated with the quality premium. This meant that quality premiums tended to 
diminish as overall coffee prices peaked, and the farmers lose their incentives to 
produce specialty coffees. 
 
Additionally, the widening of these differences between origins caused logistical and 
important financial problems due to side-selling. As current coffee prices in 2009 and 
part of 2010 were higher than that of the hedging price, the coffee growers decided to 
sell their coffee to other agents who offered better prices and increased their profits. 
This situation added to the drop in Colombia’s harvest, and also implied that many 
companies did not fulfil their commitments abroad which put Colombia under threat 
due the fact that there was not enough coffee to supply all their customers. 
 
5.3 Institutions and Regulatory framework 
 
Colombia still has regulation and marketing regimes after the breakup of the economic 
clauses of the ICA in 1989 (Baffes, Lewin et al. 2005), and coffee is one of the most 
regulated agricultural sectors within the country (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002). 
Coffee management has been undertaken by the National Coffee Growers Federation 
of Colombia (FNC), a private non-profit organisation established by coffee growers since 
1927 (Bates 1997, Reina, Silva et al. 2007). It executes a wide range of activities and 
programmes which are determined by the National Coffee Committee which is the 
public-private body that acts as the managing board for the National Coffee Fund (FoNC, 
by its acronym in English) established in 1940 (ICO 1997). To accomplish its duties of 
provision of both essential public goods and its role as a buyer as a last resort, FNC 
employs the resources of the coffee “contribution”. This is a tax collected from the 
coffee exporters and indirectly paid by the coffee growers30 of around 4% and 6% for 
each pound exported, which varies according to the level of the Colombian FOB sale 
                                                          
30 The income of the tax is deposited in the National Coffee Fund, which is managed by the Federation. 
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price.31 As a result, all coffee growers end contributing to the Federation in 
correspondence with their amount of production. 
 
With these resources, the FNC has founded a coffee policy whose main functions can be 
resumed in four basic fields: (a) price setting; (b) the transference of a fair market price 
to coffee growers and guaranteeing the purchase of all coffee offered so long as they 
comply with the pre-determined quality standards; (c) the provision of critical services 
such as research, extension, storage facilities and infrastructure; (c) quality control for 
all the coffee exported and (d) sales and marketing overseas for Café de Colombia. As a 
result, FNC´s areas of action includes activities and programmes in a wide range of areas: 
economic, social, scientific, technological, industrial and commercial, all of them 
oriented to maintain the strategic share of the coffee sector of Colombia in the economy 
(Bates 1997, ICO 1997, Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002, Reina, Silva et al. 2007).  
 
One of the world´s best known jobs from FNC undoubtedly is it publicity campaign, 
Figure 5.4. Since 1960, FNC´s unified marketing campaign and brand development of 
coffee was conducted through which Reina et al. (2007) have called a differentiation 
strategy, from which the “100 % Colombian coffee” programme was the basic strategy 
and the Juan Valdez® character was the image to promote Colombian coffee as the best 
in the world.  
 
Figure 5.4 Juan Valdez Trademark 
 
Source: Reina et al. (2007) 
 
Colombia became the first coffee producing country to embark on an active strategy of 
differentiation and marketing its product in the coffee world (Giovannucci, Leibovich et 
al. 2002, Reina, Silva et al. 2007, WIPO 2007, Hughes 2009, Juglar 2009, The Economist 
2010). The triangular symbol of “Cafe de Colombia” represents the archetypal 
Colombian coffee grower. Juan Valdez and his faithful mule represent the characteristics 
of the humble farmer in the Andes mountains where Colombian coffee is grown. The 
main result of this strategy had been favourable growth in the recognition of Colombian 
coffee as a high quality origin, making it the leader of the mainstream segment (Reina, 
Silva et al. 2007). 
                                                          
31 According to the Law 1151 of 2007 a tax of US₵ 6 applies for each pound of green coffee exported unless 
the price falls below US₵ 0.60 per pound of coffee. It is supposed that by means of the market this tax is 
translated to coffee growers. 
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Thanks to the increasing recognition of the quality of the coffee coming from Colombia 
and the increased demand for the product by consumers and roasters, FNC´s brand 
development and unified marketing strategies have ensured that the market is 
constantly paid a premium for the quality and consistency of Colombian coffee (Bates 
1997, Thorp 2000, Deshpande 2001, Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002, Hughes 2009). 
This marketing approach that has been unparalleled in the coffee world created 
opportunities to capture more value in downstream activities (Giovannucci, Leibovich 
et al. 2002). However, this strategy, perhaps the most successful campaign for a product 
from a developing country (Deshpande 2001) was effective while the International 
Coffee Agreement ICA economic provisions were in effect until 1989, since export 
quantities were regulated and higher revenues for coffee producers could only be 
obtained through higher green coffee prices premiums.  
 
Once the last ICO agreement ended, Colombian coffee begin to lost its dominance within 
the quality coffee segment and there was a massification of the Colombian brands at 
the segment of mid-level prices (Reina, Silva et al. 2007). As a result, the premium that 
the market was willing to pay on 100% Colombian coffee compared with other Mild 
Arabicas declined steadily as well as the position of Colombian coffee in the mass market 
segment. Although the market had constantly paid a significant premium for the quality 
and consistency of Colombian coffee it decreased from 28 cents per pound in the period 
of 1960 to 1990, to only 7.9 cents per pound between 1991 and 2006 - in 2006 constant 
US dollars (Reina et al. 2007, p. 213-14). In this sense, there is consensus relating these 
changes to the expansion of the specialty coffee segment, propelled in part by the 
emergence of new consumption patterns. Quality criterions and quality awareness now 
tend to concern more the product’s taste and/or physical attributes, also the growing 
importance of conscious consumption (socioeconomic effects, environmental and 
biodiversity loss), single origin coffees, added to the out home consumption in coffee 
chains and speciality shops (Ponte 2002, Daviron and Ponte 2005, Muradian and 
Pelupessy 2005). This implies that national branding strategies will become less 
effective, while strategies based on quality, and certification of non-intrinsic 
characteristics of particular coffees will become more important. 
 
The answer to this situation, based on the recognition and acceptance of the character 
of Juan Valdez and the triangular logo of Café de Colombia, was the development and 
implementation of a value added strategy. Its goals were to consolidate the position of 
Colombian coffee in the mainstream market as well as to guarantee its presence in the 
new niches markets and high value segments that have been emerging in the last two 
decades. Colombian coffee authorities reframed its differentiation branding strategy to 
expand the sphere of its commercial activities. Through a new value added strategy (see 
section 5.5), which includes market differentiation beyond quality, brands for new 
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products and segments, managing marketing alliances, and selling of coffee directly to 
consumers, the underlying objective of its value added strategy is to offer consistently a 
“relevant 100% Colombian product for each occasion at a consistent price” (Reina, Silva 
et al. 2007: 180). 
 
5.4 Structure and trends in domestic and external marketing 
 
During the last 20 years the private sector, led by intermediaries, backed both by local 
and international traders have been gaining the lion’s share of the local and 
international market against the share of the cooperatives and the FNC. This section 
describes these changes and how the marketing chain operates.  
 
The coffee marketing chain for Colombia is described below in Figure 5.5. Dotted lines 
represent the new market relationships established between producers of 
differentiated coffees and other stakeholders. Traditionally coffee growers have two 
options for selling their parchment or wet coffee (once the process of de-pulping or wet 
milling has been carried out) in the internal market: intermediaries and cooperatives. 
Cooperatives were created in the 1960s, in part, as the purchasing arm or buying agent 
of the FNC but principally to fulfil the basic goal of Colombian coffee policy, which is to 
guarantee the purchase of the whole harvest at a minimum sustenance price (Ramírez, 
Silva et al. 2002). Additionally, the FNC created Almacafé that forms part of the logistical 
chain and plays a key role in the post-harvest commercialization process both 
domestically and externally. It manages a national network of warehouses that collect, 
store, process, inspect, and ship 30%-35% of Colombia's coffee. It is from these 
warehouses that samples are sent and approvals received from overseas buyers. 
Almacafé also manages the collection of the export tax or “contribución”. 
 
Regarding the intermediaries, there are those who purchase coffee at their own risk, 
investing their own financial resources, and those who buy coffee on behalf of exporters 
(financed by local capitals and backed by MNCs), who provide them with funds. Those 
who procure coffee at their own risk sell to anyone who gives them the best price, 
usually exporters or millers who transform the parchment coffee into green coffee and, 
in turn, sell it to traders or roasters. Today, many exporters and cooperatives are also 
vertically integrated with the mills, who expect to make profits off the coffee sub-
products that result from milled parchment coffee as these are sold to the national 
industry as processed coffee. Those exporters without these facilities must buy from 
millers.  
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Figure 5.5 Colombia’s coffee marketing chain  
 
Source: Author’s adaptation from (ICO 1997).  
 
During the last 20 years, as in other producing countries, there has been an increase in 
involvement or international traders at the local markets in developing countries 
(Neilson 2008). Therefore, national intermediaries and local exporters have seen how 
downstream traders have concentrated their participation both in the local markets 
against cooperatives and the export market against the FNC who have been reducing 
their participation in the local and external markets. The trends in exports shows that in 
2012, the FNC exported 26% of the total exports of Colombia – 2 million bags of around 
7.8 million bags of 60 kg, Expocafé, the cooperatives’ own exporting company, 6%, and 
the private sector the remaining 68%. Meanwhile, two decades ago these numbers were 
49%, 4% and 47% respectively (Figure 5.6). This means that the FNC have lost nearly one 
fourth of the market against exporters in two decades.32  
 
In this sense, although there are nearly 60 exporting companies in the market, trade of 
green coffee is concentrated on six companies accounting to nearly 50% of the export 
market. For example, local exporters as Racafé, Espinosa Hermanos, and Expocafé (the 
cooperatives’ own exporting company) have given space to companies as S.K.N. 
Caribecafé, Carcafe, and the Compañía Colombiana Agroindustrial which represents the 
interest of the NeumanKaffee; ED&F Man coffee division; and the ECOM Coffee group 
respectively. Other channels have connected producer directly with roasters and 
international traders, for example through the international cupping named the Cup of 
Excelence (www.cupofexcelence.com) or smalls rosters from EU of UE that buy coffee 
directly from certain producers in certain particular areas of Colombia. Additionally, 
                                                          
32 During the last few years, doubts and questions have arisen about the efficiency of Colombia’s highly 
regulated coffee marketing scheme and its potential to distort the market (Clavijo, Jaramillo et al. 1994). 
In particular, private exporters, as well as the central government have emphasised the dual role of the 
institution as the FNC which at the same time served as a regulatory agency and as a market participant 
purchasing nearly 30% of exports.  
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groups of producers (from Fairtrade in particular) have been selling directly to roasters 
and traders in order to raise their margins. Field interviews revealed that producers can 
substantially raise their margins (but also their risk33) as normally from the purchasing 
price announces daily discount their own margins as well as transportation costs from 
each of their purchasing points.  
 
Figure 5.6 Trends in Colombian exports 1990-2013 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC databases 
 
Meanwhile, at domestic level, historically coffee growers’ cooperatives have bought 
more than 50% of the crop – increasing their share when international prices are falling 
and decreasing it when the price trend is moving upwards. During the last 10 years, 
cooperatives have reduced their participation against intermediaries who are gaining 
this space, Figure 5.7. During the last two decades, the Colombian coffee sector has seen 
how the intermediaries have become the largest market force beyond the FNC and 
Cooperatives. According to several stakeholders interviewed during field work, 
international traders have backed local buyers in order to satisfy the growing demand 
from speciality coffee. In the year 1990, intermediaries purchased 49% of the production 
and the cooperatives purchased the remaining 51% of the total harvest. In 2013, 35 
cooperatives of coffee growers who distributed nationwide with more than 500 
purchasing points, purchased 33% of the production while the intermediaries purchased 
the remaining 67% of the coffee production (FNC 2010b, FNC 2011a). 
 
                                                          
33 Field interviews with several representatives of two associations coffee producers of Fairtrade revealed 
that margin could be substantial. However, if the quality of the coffee is below the standards of the buyer, 
then the coffee could be rejected. This situation have implied even the bankruptcy from some 
associations. 
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Figure 5.7 Cooperatives and Intermediary purchases (as a % of total harvest) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC databases 
 
A study carried out by the cooperatives in Colombia (FNC 2010b) in order to know the 
main weaknesses and strengths, as well as explaining why the intermediaries had been 
gaining space in the local markets, found at least four reasons. According to Figure 5.8, 
the intermediaries not only offered higher farm gate prices, but also because they could 
offer cash in advance, their buying process were more agile and informal, and most 
importantly, they bought coffee in its wet state. This last issue is very important as this 
practice of buying wet coffee has been implemented mainly due to the lack of milling 
infrastructure at the farm level for processing coffee cherries. As such, while 
intermediaries have been offering this facility for a long time, the cooperatives have 
reacted slowly to this problem and just recently have started to supply this service to 
the coffee growers.  
 
The economic impact of selling wet coffee has not been documented so far. However, 
according to the interviews carried out during field work, including private local buyers 
of wet coffee, as well as producers and some members of the extension service, 
producers sell their coffee below 10% and 15% of the market price plus the premium for 
good quality beans. Although this situation will be commented on in Chapter 6, one 
study in 2002 reported that about 60% of coffee growers did not have ready access to 
proper post-harvest processing facilities which implied that they sold their coffee in a 
wet state (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002) with important effects in their gross 
margins. Another study, financed by USAID in order to promote the production of 
speciality coffee in Colombia, pointed to the lack of infrastructure of processing the 
coffee cherries as a bottleneck for coffee growers to connect to high value markets 
(Castro, Ochoa et al. 2009).  
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The study also revealed that the cooperatives´ strengths are their programmes of social 
service, as well as their programmes of credit and agricultural inputs supply, added to 
their activities of promotion of speciality coffees and the hedging of future delivery 
purchases (FNC 2010b). Regarding this issue, interviews carried out during field work 
also highlight the higher transaction and fixed costs that cooperatives must face 
compared to intermediaries – on some occasions propelled by inefficiencies and 
bureaucracy. As such, intermediaries are in a position to offer better prices added to the 
fact that quality requirements at the cooperative level are very high compared to 
intermediaries agents. 
 
Figure 5.8 Stakeholder´s assessments of the performance of cooperatives and 
intermediaries  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on (FNC 2010b) 
 
Regarding the trends in Cooperatives´ sales, - 46% of the total harvest in 2013 as 
depicted in Figure 5.7, data revealed how the cooperatives´ coffee total sales to the FNC 
have been decreasing while being augmented to Expocafé, and intermediaries. During 
2013, 55% of cooperatives´ coffee was sold to the FNC, 28% was sold directly to 
Expocafé, while the remaining 17% was sold to intermediaries to be exported or 
destined to the local market, Figure 5.9. Traditionally the FNC have supplied the 
cooperatives with the financial resources in order to give them the liquidity needed to 
purchase coffee in some of the more remote rural areas and thus guaranteeing crop 
purchase. This cash advance, routed through Almacafe is cost free if the coffee is sold to 
FNC. However, if they sell to Expocafé - their own coffee exporting company founded in 
1985, using the funds provided by the FNC, they are charged 15% simple fees on the 
borrowed funds. They can only sell to intermediaries or private exporters if they use 
their own financial resources for purchasing the coffee (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 
2002). 
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Figure 5.9 Cooperatives´ sales distribution 1990-2013 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC databases 
 
Interviews during the field work revealed that during the last few years, cooperatives 
have had to face a highly competitive market, meaning that the biggest cooperatives 
have preferred to make use of their financial resources in order to reduce its 
dependency from FNC and its high level of requirements to have access to their 
economic resources. So, in the context of a highly differentiated market and the lowest 
crop levels since the 1970s, cooperatives have the chance to sell their coffee to the best 
bidder. In this way, is possible to explain the increase of intermediaries in the coops´ 
sales. However, according to some employees of Cooperatives and the FNC interviewed 
during field work, there are many conflicts in their relationships that have operated in 
favour of private intermediaries. In particular, this occurs in those cooperatives located 
in areas of high demand of speciality coffee or with higher operational costs.  
 
5.5 Upgrading within the Colombia´s coffee value chain 
 
Around 2002 the FNC began implementing a new value added strategy to consolidate 
the position of Colombian coffee in the mainstream market as well as to guarantee its 
presence in the new market niches that had emerged in the past decade (Reina, Silva et 
al. 2007). This strategy, includes various types of upgrading result of innovation both in 
areas of production, processing, marketing and branding of coffee products, as well as 
through the acquisitions of new task in the value chain. The main motivation is the 
collective appropriation of the value generated allowing producers to obtain higher 
rents, reducer risk through higher opportunities for selling coffee and enhance coffee 
growers’ livelihoods (FNC 2007b, FNC 2008).  
 
Chapter 2 mentioned that the literature on value chains analysis refers to four paths of 
upgrading that developing-country farms and firms within value chains might develop: 
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(i) product upgrading; (ii) process upgrading; (iii) functional upgrading; and (iv) Inter-
sectoral (or inter-chain) upgrading (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2001, Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2002a, Humphrey and Schmitz 2002b). The first three of these have been 
implemented by the coffee industry in Colombia. More recent literature has challenged 
this classification and has identified two broad categories of upgrading trajectories 
within agri-food value chains (Ponte and Ewert 2009, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, 
Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010, Ponte, Kelling et al. 2014). In what follows, the author use 
the new two-group of upgrading trajectories: (i) improve product, process, volume and 
variety of products in the same value chain; and (ii) change and/or add functions (Ponte, 
Kelling et al. 2014). 
In this sense, in the Colombia coffee sector have promoted the upgrading of processes 
linked to the development of new technologies in areas related to the cultivation of 
coffee beans and their processing following harvesting. Innovations include, for 
example, the introduction of good practices in terms of cultivation, harvesting of ripe 
beans and wet and dry processing. Include also the application of science to introduce 
new crop varieties resistant to coffee leaf rust that optimize production costs and 
generate lower unit values through increases in yield productivity and efficiency. Today, 
as a result of a policy of promotion and subsidies to the producers, 61% if the coffee 
area in Colombia are cultivated with resistant varieties (FNC 2013b). 
 
Colombia has implemented the Near-Infrared Spectroscopy (NIRs) evaluation at the 
inspection offices in every seaport for verifying the origin of exported coffee; this tool 
provides the bean´s spectral print and confirms coffee origin before it is shipped 
(Berthand, Villareal et al. 2008, Posada, Ferrand et al. 2009, Villareal, Laffargue et al. 
2009, Oberthür, Läderach et al. 2011). This tool is also used to demonstrate the 
differences between regional coffees origins and avoid that growers belonging to non-
origin regions try to benefit from the coffee reputation of other regions without 
contributing to this reputation (i.e. to demonstrate the differences between coffees 
coming from Nariño and those from other neighbouring coffee regions) (Samper 2012).  
 
Secondly, the upgrading of products, under which the productive activities have been 
reorganized through a new branding strategy which includes market differentiation 
throughout the development and promotion of a range of specialized green coffees that 
includes VSS and specialty coffees. This includes the production of coffees with 
distinctive quality attributes embedded in specialty coffees, geographical indications, 
and sustainable labels. In the case of specialty and certified coffee initiatives, its 
exportations increased from 1.2 million bags in 2002 to 2.6 million bags in 2013 (FNC 
2014). Next section will develop more deeply the outcomes of the upgrading of 
processes in Colombia through voluntary sustainability standards and regional coffees.  
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Thirdly, there have been also policies for promoting volume upgrading as is know that 
physical productivity in coffee plantations is behind competitor countries such as Costa 
Rica, Brazil and Vietnam in terms of productivity per hectare. As was mentioned above, 
coffee authorities with the support of the national government took policy actions to 
increase the declining productivity through, inter alia, rejuvenate aging coffee 
plantations, providing free supplies such as chemical fertilisers and fungicides, extending 
access to credit lines, and price subsidy programmes. However, improve product, 
process and volume still face difficult challenges as will be depicted in chapter 6.  
 
Thirdly, there is the functional upgrading or “upgrading within chains”, which has 
enabled coffee institutions to acquire new functions in the chain. This approach has 
involved not only the incorporation of marketing services in the fields of logistics, 
storage, traceability, as well as in the processing segment by commercializing free-dried 
coffee and the segment of roasted coffee covering direct sales of the product in 
supermarkets and coffee shops. Strategies based on segmentation and differentiation, 
in which brands and indications of source play a fundamental role. However, functional 
upgrading at farm level have been mostly discouraged. In this sense, most of the leaders 
of the produced associations interviewed during field work signalled profound 
difficulties and obstacles to “walk alone” in this enterprise.  
 
5.6 Colombia´s new value added strategy 
 
One of the most important changes in Colombia´s coffee marketing during the last 
decade refers to the undertaking, since 2002, of a new market-oriented strategy of value 
added. The main goal was to reframe the differentiation strategy, in order to optimize 
production costs, consolidate the position of Colombian coffee in the mainstream 
market as well as to guarantee its presence in the new market niches that had emerged 
in the past decade (Reina, Silva et al. 2007).  
 
In this regard, Colombia’s differentiation strategy implemented in the 1960s, tied to the 
programmes of Juan Valdez and “100% Colombian Coffee” which was no longer meeting 
the new challenges set forth by the market, was not enough to face the new realities of 
the coffee world and meet the new challenges set forth by the market (Clavijo, Jaramillo 
et al. 1994, Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002). Based in two complementary set of 
instruments and products, Colombia’s coffee institutions undertook a new market-
oriented strategy in order to create new business alternatives to add value to coffee 
along the coffee value chain (Ramírez, Silva et al. 2002).  
 
First, this policy comprised selling coffee at the Juan Valdez Coffee Shops Chain, 
participating in the retail channel with Buendía freeze-dried coffee, licensing ‘100% 
Colombian Coffee’ as an ingredient brand in both mature and emerging markets, the 
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sale of Juan Valdez’s brand coffee in supermarkets and the introduction of lesser known 
products such as the development and commercialization of pods, extracts, ready-to-
drink coffees and the soft drinks made from coffee, known as coffee colas (Reina, Silva 
et al. 2007).  
 
By 2005, there were 21 Juan Valdez coffee shops operating in the main cities of 
Colombia; by the end of 2013 the number of shops had increased to over 180 in 24 cities. 
One of the most important aspects of the Juan Valdez shops are the royalties that the 
use of the brand generates for the FoNC; the accumulated value since the beginning of 
the project through 2013 is over USD19 million (FNC 2013a) The FNC plant that produces 
freeze-dried coffee in Colombia, which has operated since 1973, reached sales in 2013 
by 8.025 tons and earnings by USD 118 million (compared with 7.118 tons and earnings 
by USD 67 million in 2005). Meanwhile, the use of Colombian coffee in brands with the 
logo “Café de Colombia” had increased substantially. By 2008, 674 brands carry the logo 
“Café de Colombia” as an ingredient brand around the world. By 2013, nearly 680 brands 
used the logo as an ingredient brand (FNC 2013a, FNC 2013b). In sum, it can be said that 
the portfolio of projects that employ the Juan Valdez product brand is growing. As was 
pointed in the previous Chapter, this credence claim attributes could bring economic 
benefits to those controlling its intellectual property rights (Duguid 2003). 
 
Second, alongside these policies, there was a parallel strategy to invest in the 
development and promotion of differentiated coffees including the production of coffee 
with distinctive quality attributes embedded in voluntary sustainable standards and 
specialty coffees. Colombian exports amounted to 7.2 million 60 kilo bags in 2012, and 
from this amount, nearly 2.6 million bags received an extra value or 37% or the total 
exports (FNCa 2010, FNCa 2011, FNC 2011b, FNC 2012). A very high portion of this 
growth is concentrated in the increased sales of certified or verified sustainable and 
speciality coffee, which rose from 499,000 bags in 2001 to 2 million bags in 2012, a 299% 
growth rate. This means that the speciality and certified segment’s share in total exports 
from Colombia changed from 5% in 2001 to 28% during 2012, see Figure 5.10. 
 
Also as part of the value-added strategy, during the last decade Colombia has advanced 
in the creation of a legal framework in order to protect the Colombian origin (FNC 2013a, 
FNC 2013b, FNC 2014). The Colombian coffee authorities have been supporting efforts 
to get unique regional Colombian coffees into the market place through the 
implementation of a strategy of Geographical Indication in the European Union, 
Denomination of Origin in the Andean Community Countries and Certification Marks in 
United States and Canada, as well as a developing new trademarks in over 140 countries 
worldwide (Giovannucci and Samper 2009, Lozano, Samper et al. 2012, Samper 2012). 
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Figure 5.10 Volume of Colombia exports million bags of 60 kg. 2000 - 2011 
 
Source: FNC data (FNCa 2010, FNCa 2011, FNCc 2011, FNC 2012, FNC 2013b) 
 
Colombia have reached important advances in this strategy. After a two year process, in 
August 2007, “Café de Colombia” was awarded status as a Protected Geographical 
Indication (PGI) in the European Union (Reina, Silva et al. 2007, Hughes 2009). The first 
non-European food product granted a registered Geographical Indication under 
European Union law (Hughes 2009). Also, the Swiss GI legislation recognized the Café de 
Colombia as a PGI since 2013. This recognition grants special status and protection for 
Colombian coffee in the 27 countries that belong to the European Union. Additionally, 
Since 2011 FNC have registered at least three regional “Denominaciones de Origen” in 
Colombia (e.g. Cauca, Huila, Nariño), that have been also successfully registered in Perú, 
Ecuador and Bolivia (FNC 2013a, FNC 2014). 
 
According to the coffee authorities, the greatest challenge that the coffee sector 
institutions face is to convert the designation of origin of Colombian coffee and the 
regional designations of origin into tools that allow the producers to receive higher 
earnings (Reina, Silva et al. 2007). However, the amount of firms authorized to use the 
PGI is still very low - 22 roasted coffee brands owned by seven European customers (FNC 
2014), and economic benefits received through price premiums are not yet perceived 
by coffee growers interviewed during field work. 
 
5.6.1 Trends in the trade of sustainable and specialty coffee in Colombia34 
 
Producers adhered to various combinations of social, environmental and economic 
certifications such as Fairtrade, Utz Certified, Rainforest Alliance or Organic, which are 
                                                          
34 Data provided in this section were obtained mostly from the FNC as exporters were reluctant to reveal their 
numbers. However, FNC exported nearly 30% of the total coffee exports and nearly 50% of the speciality coffee in 
2011. As such, its figures are representative.  
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independently certified by accredited third party entities. Additionally, producers have 
adopted verification-based schemes created by private company initiatives such as 
Nespresso AAA from Nestlé-Nespresso, C.A.F.E. Practices from Starbucks or 4C which 
does not imply the rigor or cost of a certification process relying on external verifiers or 
third party guarantees.  
 
In the speciality coffee segment, producers sell origin and preparation35 coffee. The 
origin coffee come from a specific region or farm, and possess unique qualities due to 
the fact that they are grown in unique locations. Clients prefer this coffee for its unique 
taste and aroma. This can be broken into three subcategories: (i) regional coffee, 
deriving from a specific region and recognised for their particular conditions, are sold to 
the final consumers without being mixed; (ii) exotic coffee is grown in specific locations 
under exceptional conditions; they possess unique tastes, textures, aromas, and colours; 
(iii) estate coffee is produced on a single estate or farm, from a single harvest, they have 
a single post harvesting process that allows for an outstanding quality product, 
consistent over time.  
 
The interest among coffee growers for the adoption and compliance of sustainable 
standards as well as the mass affiliation of coffee producers by different private 
certification programmes and verifications has experienced substantial growth rates in 
the last few years, although this has been diminishing over the last three years for some 
initiatives in particular. According to the FNC statistics in 2012, there were 130,000 farms 
involved in the production and trade of coffee complying with the competitive 
requirements of voluntary sustainability initiatives occupying an area of 366,000 
hectares, around 25% of the 512,000 Colombian coffee growers and about 37% of the 
total coffee growing area. Without any doubt, the interest for the adoption and 
compliance of sustainable standards and verifications has experienced a substantial 
growth rates in the last decade, as in 2005, there were 4,051 farms with around 15,558 
hectares dedicated to the growth and trade of sustainable coffee, Figure 5.11.  
 
                                                          
35 Preparation coffee is a term that refers to the beans that has a unique appearance in its size and form, which makes 
them desirable by international clients. They are sought after by certain clients that are interested in offering a 
consistent and homogeneous product. 
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Figure 5.11 Evolution in the number of farms verified or certified 2005 - 2012 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC data 
 
In terms of number of certified farms, this growth has been mainly concentrated in three 
labels: 4C, Fairtrade and the Nespresso AAA Quality Program that represented 93% of 
the farms in 2012 (44%; 28% and 21% respectively). According to the same FNC data, 
since 2005, the number of farmers adhering to the certification Fairtrade and the 
verification Nespresso AAA have shown the highest growth rates. Meanwhile the growth 
rates for labels such as Rainforest Alliance, Organic and Utz Certified were considerably 
minor. In fact, the number of farmers affiliated to these programmes have diminished 
during the last years. For example, between 2011 and 2012 these reductions were 13%; 
2% and 12% respectively. In this sense, field interviews revealed that high prices for 
conventional coffee, added to relatively lower price premiums for value added coffee 
compared to conventional, and higher production costs have discouraged producers to 
keep engaged in this market, see the discussion below by Figures 5.14 and 5.16. 
Regarding the 4C initiative, this emerged from virtually nothing in 2007 to accounting 
for 44% of all certified farms in 2012, however, these numbers must be seen with 
caution as the procedure to verify and monitor farms using this corporate business 
model differ greatly from the initiatives mentioned above in Figure 5.11.  
 
There are no available statistics about the number of producers selling origin or regional 
and preparation coffee to the local market. In particular, several field interviews revelled 
that producers do not know that the coffee purchased by the cooperatives is labelled as 
such, or even so that these coffee is sold abroad offering the characteristics of an specific 
origin or region. In this sense, for example, data collected from the CRECE-COSA survey 
(García, Ochoa et al. 2013a) in Colombia during 2009 and 2011 among 3,372 coffee 
growers pointed out that only between 2% and 5% of the coffee growers surveyed 
recognized having sell regional coffees. The remaining producers signalled that they do 
not sell or do not know if their coffee was labelled as Regional.  
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This situation contrasts those producers affiliated to sustainable private certifications 
and verifications, as most of the coffee growers are aware that they are certified, that 
their coffee or at least one share of the harvest is traded under one specific label. Even 
so, most of them are aware of the traceability of their coffee and aware of their coffee’s 
particular intrinsic characteristics. 
 
Regarding the domestic market for conventional, speciality and sustainable coffee, 
intermediaries were reluctant to provide discriminated information about their sales of 
speciality coffee. So the analysis about the current trends in the volume of coffee 
purchased and farm gate prices between 2006 and 2012 were obtained using data from 
10 coffee growers’ cooperatives located in four different regions in Colombia (its 
acquisitions were around 2.1 million bags of 60 kg in 2006 and 1.6 million bags in 2012). 
These cooperatives buy nearly 50% of the coffee purchased by 35 cooperatives of coffee 
growers operating in Colombia.  
 
In this sense, remarkably, producers have systematically been increasing the value 
added to their harvest by adhering to different sustainable initiatives and gaining market 
shares. Figure 5.12 exhibits the percentage distribution of the volume of coffee 
purchased by these cooperatives.  
 
It shows, for example, how the acquisition of Nespresso AAA increased by 260% 
between 2006 and 2012 and its share of the total coffee purchased rose from 5% to 28% 
between 2006 and 2012. Meanwhile, Fairtrade coffee purchases increased by a growth 
rate of 103% and its participation moved from 4% to 12% of the total in the same period. 
Meanwhile, other third party certifications’ systems such as Rainforest Alliance and Utz 
Certified, increased their participation to nearly 3% of the total purchases of coffee. In 
contrast, regional and conventional coffees reduced their participation, the first one 
from 53% to 24% in the same period, a negative growth rate of -68%, and the second 
one from 37% to 21%, a negative growth rate of -58%. Quantitative and qualitative data 
collected at different nodes of the Colombian coffee value chain revealed that within 
the segment of sustainable and speciality coffee there are clear differences in the way 
foreign buyers have modified their sourcing strategies to deal with the scenario of both 
high prices and differentials for Colombian Arabicas compared to other Mild Arabicas 
that the industry witnessed between 2008 and 2011. According to different sources 
interviewed – members of coffee grower cooperatives, the export sector as well as 
representatives from some private initiatives, for example, Nestlé-Nespresso structured 
an aggressive sourcing plan in order to ensure a consistent and reliable supply of coffee 
for its Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality Programme.  
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Figure 5.12 Cooperatives´ coffee acquisitions by initiatives 2006 – 2012 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from 10 coffee growers’ cooperatives36 
 
Based on the available quantitative information, it must be highlighted that the market 
share gained by Nestlé-Nespresso came mostly at the expense of that share held by the 
Regional coffee. In this sense, from the 10 cooperatives that provided data, six 
purchased coffee for the Nespresso AAA programme. While in 2006 the share of regional 
coffee purchased by these six cooperatives was 62% and Nespresso AAA was 22% of the 
total purchases of all types of coffee, during 2012 these shares were to 2% and 61% 
respectively.  
 
This is a very interesting finding. In terms of many representatives of the extension 
services interviewed during the field work, as well as buyers at the cooperative level, the 
trade of regional coffee by the cooperatives was an option before private certifications’ 
initiatives began their operation and once they had begun to offer comparatively higher 
premium prices and additional services to coffee producers. In this sense, pointed out, 
that the producers of regional coffee became the first choice for certifications’ settlers 
to adhere to their programmes. This is due to the fact that producers of regional coffee 
have certain advantages compared to conventional producers, both in terms of the 
quality of the coffee they produce as well as the knowledge regarding the production 
techniques. Therefore, these findings imply that “origin-based ‘trust’ narratives also 
tend to be replaced by ‘certified’ quality systems that partially de-link quality from 
place” (Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 13).  
 
Figure 5.13 shows the evolution of the price premiums for specialty and certified coffee 
paid to the cooperatives to the coffee growers as a percentage of the farm-gate price 
                                                          
36 Cooperatives from: Occidente de Nariño, Norte de Nariño, Cauca, Risaralda, Coocentral, Cadefihuila, 
Alto Occidente, Norte de Caldas, Anserma and Aguadas.  
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for conventional coffee for those selling parchment coffee to Fairtrade, Utz Certified, 
Rainforest Alliance, Nespresso AAA, 4C and regional coffees between 2006 and 2012. 
Field interviews revealed that price premiums that must go the farmer are setting 
between the trader or roaster abroad and the exporters in Colombia. In general, data 
from this figure reveals two contrasting situations. First, that specialty and certified 
producers have been receiving higher farm-gate prices compared to conventional 
producers, and second, that the farm-gate price gap between conventional and 
speciality coffee has been closed continuously as the price premiums for certification 
have been eroding without exception since 2007. 
 
For example, between 2006 and 2011, producers selling Rainforest Alliance, Regional 
coffees, UTZ Certified and Fairtrade coffees suffered higher falls in the price premiums: 
5.9; 5.5; 5.1 and 3.8 times the price premium from 2006. Meanwhile, Nespreso AAA 
premiums dropped 1.6 times. Regarding 4C producers, there was not price premium 
during 2012. For example, during 2012, the price premiums for certification were 
around 5% above the conventional coffee for all the value added initiatives, with the 
exception of those farmers selling to Nespresso AAA whereby the price premium above 
conventional coffee was 7%. According to the coffee growers interviewed at farm level 
and focus groups, their perceptions were that while every year the production costs got 
higher, the rewards for their coffee were less than expected and have diminished over 
time. 
 
Figure 5.13 Price premium pay to specialty coffees as a percentage of the 
conventional coffee price 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC databases 
 
In the case of Fairtrade, for example, for almost three years the farm gate price for 
Colombian conventional coffee were above both the minimum price settled for the 
Fairtrade organisation for certified washed Arabicas of USD 125 cents per pound and a 
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social premium of USD 10 cents. This situation, according to members of the 
cooperatives and the export sector interviewed, discouraged exporter organisations 
who adhered to the programme as these were forced to pay the conventional price 
(above the Fairtrade floor price) plus the social premium, otherwise they would be 
suspended. As a result of this situation, the Fairtrade organisation recognised the need 
to reconfigure its strategy in order to address the challenges that arose during the period 
of high prices (FAIRTRADE 2010a, FAIRTRADE 2011a, FAIRTRADE 2011b, FAIRTRADE 
2011d). As such, Fairtrade International, on March 15th 2011, increased the Fairtrade 
Minimum Price to USD 140 cents per pound, while the Fairtrade Premium increased to 
USD 20 cents per pound (FAIRTRADE 2011b). Despite this change in Fairtrade´s policy, 
the new Fairtrade floor price, as well as its premium, was still below the price in the 
conventional market during 2011.  
 
Changes in coffee prices and price premiums have also affected trends in exports by 
types of initiatives. As a result of the sharp rise in prices, the answer from the industry 
has been to try to substitute Colombian Milds with other origins to contribute to the 
relief of the upward pressures on market prices and high price differentials for 
Colombian Milds and in this way reduce the value of the premiums paid to the 
producers. In this sense, Figure 5.14 shows how exports of some sustainable initiatives 
have grown steadily while farm gate prices remained relatively unchanged until 2008. 
However, once prices began to be rise in 2009, the upward trend in coffee purchases 
ceased – see for example Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified. Contrastingly, data shows 
that total exports commanded by the corporate sector and industrial firm initiatives as 
the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C) and Nespresso AAA have been 
growing without interruption since 2006. In this sense, for details of field work and 
interview material among different exporters, while buyers of Rainforest Alliance and 
Utz Certified coffees moved to Central America to substitute most expensive origins as 
are the Colombian milds (see Figure 5.3 about price differentials), those buyers from 
Nespresso AAA and 4C decide to buy in Colombian due to processor requirements that 
need Colombian coffee for their blends.  
 
As such, for example, while the share in FNC’s total exports in 2006 for these two 
initiatives at the bottom of each column was 1%, in 2011 both reached 44% of the total 
exports of FNC’s value added coffee. These two initiatives surpassed by far both those 
labels relying on external verifiers or third party guarantees as well those initiatives that 
pointed to preserve the origin. Interestingly, Figure 5.14 shows how Organic, Fairtrade, 
Utz Certified and Rainforest Alliance reduced its participation from 24% to 16% in the 
same period. In the particular case of Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified, its 
participation in total sales grew from 12% during 2006, to 28% in 2008, and then 
dropped to 6% during 2011. Meanwhile the share of Fairtrade and Organic reduced its 
participation slightly. Similarly, coffee preparation reduced its share from 64% to 30% in 
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the same period while the origin’s (regional) dropped its share from 15% in 2010 to 10% 
in 2012.  
 
Figure 5.14 FNC´s share of exports by initiatives and trend in farm gate prices 2006 – 
2011 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC data 
 
As such, at least in Colombia, buyers of third party certification initiatives have managed 
the trade of coffee as a contra-cyclic business. Hence, in times of low prices for 
conventional coffee of certain origins and relative low price differentials (i.e. Colombian 
Arabicas), foreign buyers are willing to buy coffee as well as pay a substantial 
certification premium. However, if prices for conventional coffee are high and price 
differentials are substantial, so the incentives to buy some particular origins diminish as 
buyers of certified coffee substitute these types of coffee for cheaper origins while 
reducing the certification premium that has been paid to coffee growers during periods 
of low prices. In the case of Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified, for example, the 
interviews indicated that foreign buyers substituted costlier Colombian Milds with 
cheaper Arabicas from Central America in order to increase their margins, to contribute 
to relief on the upward pressures on price differentials and more importantly to keep 
the fast growing rates in the sales of certified coffees worldwide depicted in the previous 
chapter. 
 
In contrast, as was depicted above, Nestlé–Nespresso has followed an alternative 
strategy to ensure a consistent and reliable supply of quality coffee for its Nespresso 
AAA programme. Regarding regional coffee prices and sales, its evolution is difficult to 
predict as demand is dependent on the buyers´ stocks abroad. As such, producers of 
coffee linked to specific geographic locations do not receive additional benefits 
compared to conventional producers. Although buyers offer higher prices compared to 
Fairtrade and Conventional, they do not provide clear commitments to help producers 
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improve their quality or productivity. Even so, producers are not fully aware of what 
type of coffee they are producing, or what the final market is, as purchasing protocols 
do not differ from regulatory systems operating in the conventional market. In fact, 
according to many of the extension services, representatives interviewed during the 
field work stated that being a regional coffee producer is the first step to joining a 
certified scheme.  
 
One additional issue, regards to the oversupply of the production of coffee compliant 
with the requirements of private sustainable standards and the decreasing share that is 
actually sold as certified and effectively is receiving a price premium. Similarly, as was 
depicted in the previous chapter about the global oversupply of certified coffee and the 
large gap between the sustainable coffee produced and purchased as such, in Colombia 
there is a huge difference between the availability of certified coffee and those which is 
actually purchased of certified for some initiatives in particular, Figure 5.15.  
 
Figure 5.15 Relationship between supply and exports of some sustainable 
certifications and verifications 2004 - 2011 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on FNC databases 
 
It is well know that a portion of a farm’s output may not meet the quality requirements 
of a buyer seeking certified and speciality coffees and must therefore be sold as 
conventional, and also in other situations, the buyer does not need to purchase the 
whole of the supply, and the producer must sell the remainder to other buyers as 
conventional coffee, even though the entire farm may be certified (Giovannucci, Liu et 
al. 2008). However, the increase in the number of farms adhered to the production and 
trade of sustainable coffees, plus the reduction in exports for some initiatives as buyers 
moved to other cheaper origins, has implied that the over-supply of coffee has been 
growing steadily since 2009, and reached unprecedented levels in 2011 for some of the 
most important initiatives, Figure 5.15. For example, according to FNC databases, in the 
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case of the UTZ Certified, production levels were more than 42 times the sales, with a 
total of around 421 thousand bags of 60 kilogram produced in 2011; meanwhile in the 
same year Fairtrade compliant production were 20 times above the sales compliant with 
the standard, for 4C there were a 10:1 supply/sales relationship. In contrast, in the case 
of Nespresso and Organic there is a partial equilibrium which implies that almost all 
coffee which complies with its quality standards is purchased by the exporters. 
 
Interviews revealed that one answer to this situation has been the adoption of other 
certifications (double, triple or even more certifications). Although there are not official 
statistics about the most common cases of double or triple certification, survey 
evaluations have indicated that there are a trend toward multiple certifications at farm 
level in Colombia (double, triple or even more certifications). Figure 5.16 depicts how a 
growing number of farmers are selling a higher share of their harvest adhered to 
voluntary sustainability standards, however the amount of coffee sold under the original 
initiative to which the coffee growers adhered is slightly decreasing (García 2012). 
 
Figure 5.16 Trends towards multi-certification with voluntary sustainability standards 
in Colombia 2008 - 2011 
 
Source: García, C. (2012) 
 
Based on field work interviews this behavioural changes are associated to the 
performance of voluntary sustainability standards at farm level in which more 
sustainable coffee is available that is actually purchased as sustainable. Additionally, this 
was propelled by at least two situations: i) the fact that producers do not have to pay 
for the certifications and audit cost, and have been receiving significant levels of aid in 
kind, training and access to credit and ii) producers’ main motivations of improving their 
economic and social viability. Not only by reducing the risk of relying on a single scheme 
and assuring a higher income through price premiums and accessing new markets, but 
also building economies of scale and gaining some efficiencies at farm level.  
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However, as the previous Chapter highlighted, multi-certification could have important 
political economy implications. This situation can exclude the most vulnerable 
producers, in particular, small farmers who face many challenges and difficulties in 
meeting the demands or coordination requirements of private standards for a start 
(Neilson 2008, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a). 
 
5.7 Supporting small farmers’ in standards compliance 
 
In the coffee sector, during the last decade there has been an important involvement of 
the private sector in order to both ensure coffee quality and growing demand 
requirements as well as the constant sourcing of raw materials. Trading companies, local 
exporters, processors or retailers have showed great capacity establishing public private 
partnerships (PPP) and leveraging resources to assisted producers in meeting the 
required standards, including financial assistance and technical support to adjust 
production systems (Gibbon 2001, Humphrey and Schmitz 2001, Fulponi 2006, Porter 
and Kramer 2006, Humphrey 2008, Neilson 2008, Raynolds 2009, Porter and Kramer 
2011). This fact has been particularly evident in the trade of specialty Arabicas coffees 
(Neilson 2008), where corporate competition for a long term supply of highest quality 
cherry coffee has promoted business linkages and agricultural supply chain 
improvements between different stakeholders (Jenkins, Akhalkatsi et al. 2007, IFC 
2008). Buyers have moved to diversified upstream toward crop production and have 
been becoming involved in smallholder agricultural services (Gibbon 2001, Schroeder 
and Guevara 2009). Additionally, NGOs, multilateral and bilateral donors aid agencies, 
have embarked in different public-partnerships to provide smallholder coffee farmers 
with the skills and capacities needed to increase their incomes and connect to high-value 
markets (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Jenkins, Akhalkatsi et al. 2007, IFC 2008, ACDI/VOCA 
2009a). 
 
Motivations for these initiatives have come, not only as a response to consumers’ 
concerns for sustainable production, quality and social conditions in farming 
communities (Jenkins, Akhalkatsi et al. 2007), or as an opportunity to increase the value 
of the brand and capturing some of the market share controlled by more stringent and 
internationally accepted TPC institutions as Fair Trade or other initiatives led by the 
coffee growers (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005, Courville 2008), but also to attract 
ethically conscious investors or from fear of being the target of negative publicity 
campaigns (Alvarez 2009, Alvarez 2010). To reach these goals corporate companies have 
redesigned their procurement systems, to assure a reliable supply of specialized coffees 
by helping producers to increase productivity, improve quality, reduce environmental 
degradation that limits production volume and, ultimately, to achieve higher prices 
(Porter and Kramer 2011). Of course, buyers benefits from the quality and quantity 
improvements that farmers achieve (Nestlé-Nespresso 2005).  
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However, despite the important role of donor support, doubts arise about its long term 
viability, particularly for the small farmers whose extra cost of meeting the standards – 
such as the costs of labour and of certification, is not compensated by the expected 
revenue achieved due to the size of their operations, either after getting improvements 
in quantity, quality or higher price premiums (Fulponi 2006, Potts, Opitz et al. 2007). For 
that reason, policies aimed to supporting producers and enhancing their upgrading 
capabilities need to be realistic (Humphrey 2005, ECLAC 2008). Moreover, one 
additional concern remains about the fact that donors could choose to work only with 
the most advanced producers, with high chance of success, thereby marginalising the 
poorest of the poor farmers.  
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 
Although statistics from the cooperatives and FNC revealed that producers are selling a 
higher fraction of their whole harvest under different initiatives that add value to their 
coffee, it is also true that oversupply from some initiatives have forced producers to sell 
their remaining certified coffee production to the conventional market without any 
value added or premium. Meanwhile, producers are facing lower price premiums for 
their certified coffee, while those differentiation strategies that link quality to a specific 
geographic location have not led to increased sales profits and sustainable incomes.  
 
This is a critical situation for those producers who have viewed differentiated coffee, 
sustainable coffee in particular, as a potential tool to achieve economic sustainability. 
One of the main motivations for producers to adhere to sustainable initiatives are the 
price premiums and access to new markets that these initiatives offer compared with 
conventional coffee.  
 
Qualitative interviews with the personnel of the extension service, the export sector and 
personnes at cooperative level indicated that this situation is threatening the coffee 
chain and farmers’ economic viability, in particular, for some initiatives whose rewards 
are not good enough to cover the compliance cost. Under the situation depicted above, 
and based on field interviews, value added coffee producers have been losing their 
incentives to adopt social, economic and environmental sustainable production 
practices added to quality requirements, in particular, if their colleagues who are selling 
coffee in the conventional market are receiving a similar price without incurring in 
higher production cost associated with new competitive requirements for value added 
coffee production.  
 
As will be presented in the Chapter 7, production costs for hectare for value added 
initiatives are significantly higher compared to conventional producers, even though 
certification costs and the fees needed to keep the status of certified are been afforded 
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by producers’ associations and coffee exporters or the share of unpaid labour for 
certified producers have been increasing steadily. Money is needed to pay for the costs 
of the conversion process, adjusting the production systems as well as the necessary 
investments in production facilities such as buildings and physical equipment, added to 
other types of recurrent and non-recurrent costs of compliance including the cost of 
obtaining the knowledge about the standards and certifications (Humphrey 2006a, 
Potts, Opitz et al. 2007). These costs are expensive and onerous and may take years and 
a prolonged investment before costs are recouped, particularly without institutional 
support, access to financial resources and credit, and in the same manner, the provision 
of training to obtain the knowledge about standards and certifications.  
 
As a consequence of this situation, not all of the producers can take advantage of these 
programmes. In particular, for smallholders with farms too small to provide a 
sustainable livelihood. As such, targeting specific market niches was an attractive 
alternative for only a portion of Colombian coffee and not all of the coffee growers can 
take advantage of these new trends (Reina, Silva et al. 2007). As such, differentiated 
coffee including speciality and certified markets are a viable solution only for those 
coffee growers with the scale, the microclimate advantages and the necessary skills to 
produce quality certified products.  
 
In this sense, speciality qualities are linked not only to specific geographic locations that 
make it possible to differentiate these indefinitely but also to good practices in the 
production and post-harvesting processes for the coffee produced in those regions. This 
means increased access to basic education and training as well as more organisation at 
the cooperative or association levels for those producers with potential for the 
production of speciality coffees. Taking part in the specialty coffee value chain is not as 
simple as it seems. Such market-oriented developments are all knowledge intensive in 
the production, processing, and marketing chain – particularly the adoption of different 
kinds of VSS. Additionally, costs of compliance with standards can act as an absolute 
barrier to compliance and pose a significant risk of exclusion from markets, especially 
for smaller producers (Henson and Jaffee 2006). As was mentioned above, the costs 
associated with its adoption are substantial for any producer, but it varies inversely with 
the size of the farm and the expected revenue could not compensate for the cost of 
meeting the standards in the smaller farms due the size of the operations (Potts, Opitz 
et al. 2007).  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) in the coffee sector: Does 
participation in differentiation channels affect coffee growers’ upgrading 
strategies? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter will discuss how participation in two distinct VSS, such as Fairtrade and 
Nespresso AAA, affected the upgrading strategies of coffee producers in the specialty 
coffee value chain. 
 
Chapter 2 illustrated to what extent the literature provides answers to these questions, 
and identified knowledge gaps. Chapter 3 explained the methodology used to answer 
the two main questions addressed in this thesis. Chapter 4 and 5 give the global and 
local context respectively, while Chapter 7 will address, not only the issue of farm level 
returns, but also the risk and insecurity to which farmers are exposed.  
 
This chapter will contribute to the debate on the impact of the adoption of VSS on the 
upgrading strategies of coffee growers in a four-year period. In addition, this chapter 
will also explore whether coffee growers who adopted voluntary standards were more 
likely to receive institutional support to help them overcome their most important 
limitations to further upgrading. This thesis proposes a model to ascertain whether the 
affiliation of coffee producers in Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA, compared with their 
respective control group of producers, have resulted in significant difference-in-
difference for a set of 15 matched indicators which shed light on farmers’ capacity to 
innovate in different spheres of economic upgrading in the markets governed by private 
standards.  
 
This model has two development areas that are determinant for producers to build their 
competences and upgrade: (i) Institutional arrangements to facilitate upgrading; and ii) 
investments and adoption of good agricultural practices to improve upgrading 
trajectories.  
 
The source of data to address the central questions of this chapter is the set of results 
from three rounds of field surveys carried out in 2009, 2010 and 2012. The sample is a 
group of Fairtrade producers, two groups of Nepresso AAA producers and a comparable 
control sample. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, this thesis combines impact evaluation 
techniques to construct statistical comparison groups. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
was implemented in combination with Difference in Difference approach (DID). This 
allowed for control of selection bias and the influence of independent factors. 
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This chapter is structured into four sections. After this introduction, the second section 
discusses the main development areas, criteria and indicators to empirically test the first 
research question. This section is divided into two sub-sections to develop each one of 
the areas mentioned above. In the third section, a farm size analysis is carried out for 
the same development areas developed in section two. Finally, in the fourth and final 
section, the main findings and conclusions are stated. 
 
6.2 Development areas 
 
In value chain literature there is scarce research providing statistically valid data with 
reliable designs on the medium to long term impact of participation in different VSS on 
the upgrading strategies of agricultural producers in the developing world (Von Hagen 
and Alvarez 2011, Ruben and Fort 2012, Ruben 2014), and smallholders in particular. 
Additionally, there are gaps in the global value chain literature on the role of institutions 
and organisations play to provide the support farmers need to address their main 
limitations or constraints and comply with the stricter requirements imposed by 
voluntary sustainability standards (Neilson and Pritchard 2009, Ponte, Kelling et al. 
2014).  
 
There is mounting evidence to argue that small producers face deeper constraints and 
restrictions which limit their capacity to participate effectively in value chains governed 
by standards (Jaffee, Henson et al. 2011, Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012, Ruben 2014). Small 
producers face competitiveness bottlenecks to innovate in different spheres of 
upgrading, such as institutional weaknesses, minimal savings and lower levels of 
household wealth, lack of infrastructure and capital, reduced managerial skills and 
minimal levels of literacy, higher transaction cost, limited scale and low productivity 
(Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, World Bank 2007). Moreover, producers who want to adopt 
voluntary sustainability standards must finance several types of direct and indirect costs, 
both recurrent and un-recurrent, involved with standards’ compliance and meeting 
certifications’ requirements (Potts, Opitz et al. 2007). Some of these costs include, the 
time and cost of training to stay updated on the requirements of standards and 
certifications, the start-up and transition costs, and those expenses incurred in order to 
maintain the certified status (Humphrey 2006a, Potts, Opitz et al. 2007). 
 
Therefore, as mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3, in light of the evidence underlining the 
difficulties faced by small farmers, institutions and organisations in the public and 
private sector should play a key role to support producers to close the gaps quickly and 
upgrade (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001, Giovannucci and Purcell 2008, Humphrey 2008, 
Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009). There is a general consensus that collaboration among 
stakeholders is needed to support small farmers’ ability to meet standards and facilitate 
the investments needed to improve their upgrading strategies. This includes the 
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provision of public goods, access to new agricultural technology and R&D, improvement 
of managerial skills and the resources to finance the investments in production facilities, 
which are all necessary to further upgrading trajectories.  
 
Subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 analyse the two development areas or principles that are 
determinant for producers to build their competences and upgrade: (i) Institutional 
arrangements to facilitate upgrading; and ii) investments and adoption of good 
agricultural practices to improve upgrading trajectories.  
 
6.2.1 Institutional arrangements to facilitate upgrading strategies 
 
This section looks at whether certified producers are receiving the institutional support 
needed to overcome four important constraints that limit their ability to meet 
certification’s competitive requirements imposed by voluntary sustainability standards: 
(i) support dealing with costs related to certification, inspection and paperwork; (ii) 
access to finance and credit; (iii) access both to subsidies and/or cash transfers, as well 
as aid in kind; and (vi) access to training and technical assistance.  
 
6.2.1.1 Support dealing with costs related to certification, inspection and paperwork 
 
Table 6.1 below shows evidence that nearly 100% of the producers did not pay for the 
certification costs and fees required to maintain certified status within one or other of 
the programmes, including the paperwork for the certification. As was mentioned in the 
section 3.7.1.1, this is a result of the involvement of different actors, in the conversion 
process who usually subsidise the cost of certification. 
 
This information is consistent with the data collected during field work. Field semi-
structured interviews with both Fairtrade certified farmers, representatives of relevant 
stakeholders, as well as the focus group discussions with Nespresso producers, revealed 
that during the last ten years, there has been important involvement of the private 
sector and other stakeholder to help small farmers meet the challenge of conforming to 
private standards or fulfilling new buyer’s demands. Most of the efforts have been 
directed to finance both the start-up costs and the recurrent costs of certification, as 
well as the training to gain the skills to adopt new production techniques (MIDAS 2009, 
Yamashita 2010, FNC 2011a, FNC 2011b, FNC 2011c). These combinations of efforts have 
been aimed at ensuring both coffee quality as well as increase volume to assure growing 
demand requirements as well as the reliable sourcing of raw materials. However, there 
were no impact evaluation studies on the outcomes of these interventions.  
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Table 6.1 Certification and verification cost among Fairtrade (FLO) and Nespresso 
paid by different stakeholders 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011 
 
As such, these findings do not support the argument that the direct certifications’ cost 
and the fees needed to keep the status of being certified can act as barriers that impede 
small farmer participation in high value markets (Bain, Deaton et al. 2005, Hatanaka, 
Bain et al. 2005, Humphrey 2006a, Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Giovannucci and Purcell 
2008, Neilson 2008, Kaplinsky 2010).  
 
However, some concerns remain about the sustainability of this support in the long 
term, what would happen if donors choose not to support small farmers anymore? 
Particularly those who are certified with more than one voluntary sustainability 
standard. In this sense, based on the interviews carried out during the field work, and 
this research’s findings on the returns and profitability of these initiatives, it is unlikely 
that small and medium sized farmers already involved in this market could afford the 
costs involved in the adoption of standards. 
 
6.2.1.2 Access to credit, subsidies and/or cash transfers, and aid in kind37 
 
An important question is whether coffee producers included in Fairtrade certifications 
and Nespresso schemes, compared with their respective control groups, had better 
access to credit facilities and were able to access higher levels of aid transferred through 
both subsidies and/or cash transfers, as well as aid in kind during the surveys of 2009 
and 2011. This sub-section analyses the outcomes of three key variables: (i) access to 
credit; and (ii) access both to subsidies and/or cash transfers, and aid in kind. 
 
                                                          
37 Questions about these issues were included in the surveys of 2009 and 2011 by request of the author.  
Data 
from
Nespresso 
AAA_1
Nespresso 
AAA_2
Fairtrade
2008 100% 97%
2009 100% 100% 99%
2011 100% 100% 100%
2008 100% 100%
2009 100% 100% 99%
2011 100% 100% 100%
2008 98% 92%
2009 94% 95% 97%
2011 99% 95% 100%
Paid for the 
inspection cost 
Paid for the 
certification cost or 
verification
Paid for the 
certification 
paperwork
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Access to credit 
Limited access to credit or finance is one of the most important restrictions that prevent 
producers from making the necessary investments to innovate in different spheres of 
upgrading and participate competitively in the specialty value chain. In particular, 
literature highlights that smaller producers face the greatest challenge to access to 
credit. If coffee growers want to participate in value chains governed by VSS, then access 
to credit and financial resources is needed to invest in new buildings, physical 
equipment, obtaining certifications and additional inputs required to comply with their 
competitive requirements. As such, limited access to financial resources is a barrier to 
further upgrading trajectories.  
 
In this sense, the survey found that certifications did not lead to more access to credit.38 
Over time there were no statistically significant differences between Nespresso39 and 
Fairtrade (FLO) and their respective control groups. Despite the fact that a statistically 
significant higher proportion of certified farmers has access to credit compared to 
control producers during the surveys, at endline these differences disappear (line 1 and 
4 Table 6.2). For example, despite significant differences favouring producers affiliated 
to AAA_2 compared to AAA_1 producers in 2011, the comparison over time did not 
reveal significant difference in difference (line 7 Table 6.2).  
 
Access both to subsidies and/or cash transfers, and aid in kind 
Table 6.2 reveals that over time the involvement in Nespresso certification negatively 
influences access to subsidies and/or cash transfers compare to conventional producer 
(line 2 Table 6.2). By contrast, the analysis reveals that farmers selling Nespresso AAA_1 
received at endline significantly more aid in kind than their respective control groups 
selling to the conventional market (line 3 Table 6.2). Meanwhile, although the data 
revealed significant differences between Fairtrade and conventional farmers during the 
second and third survey, over time the involvement in the Fairtrade certification 
compared to conventional producers does not generate significant difference in 
difference between the two groups of farmers both for the levels of subsidies or cash 
transfers, as well as for the aid in kid received (line 5 and 6 Table 6.2). Additionally, the 
comparison between the two groups of Nespresso producers in order to capture the 
                                                          
38 To interpret DID results is important take into account the differences between years for both certified 
and controls as well as the differences within years between the target and controls. When such 
differences within a year are significant, then a mark with asterisks appear in the year according to the 
code shown on the base of each table. This between-year significance on the matched sample is a key 
part of the DID analysis. Additionally, only when the difference for the target between in the first and 
second years exceeds the difference between the first and second years for the controls is there potential 
of program-related impact, assuming other factors are accounted for.  
39 As was mentioned in chapter 3, two groups of Nespresso AAA’s producers were analysed as an 
opportunity to track the impact of the strategic changes adopted by the AAA Programme and the impact 
on the internal upgrading strategies implemented by the same programme. The group labelled as AAA_1 
adhered to the Programme in 2008, while the group labelled as AAA_2 adhered to the programme in 
2009. 
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effect of the programme in two different groups of producers, do not generate 
significant differences over time both for the levels of subsidies or cash transfers as well 
as for the aid in kind received.  
 
One important issue that emerges from the data shown in Table 6.2 is the fact that while 
the level of aid received through subsidies and/or cash transfers dropped sharply both 
for certified (Fairtrade in particular) and non-certified producers between 2009 and 
2011, during the same period the level of aid in kind increased for the two group of 
producers, which implied that the control group are not just completely without any 
form of assistance. 
 
In this sense, despite significant differences favouring certified producers in the annual 
analysis (although the difference in the change over time is not significant for Fairtrade 
producers), the control group of producers received an increased amount of aid in kind 
(line 3, 6 and 9 Table 6.2). As such, 60% of the coffee growers in the Fairtrade´s control 
group and 40% of the control group of Nespresso’s received aid in kind through the 
support of different organisations, including NGOs (ACDI/VOCA), Colombia’s 
government, producer organisations (FNC) and buyers among others. According to the 
coffee growers interviewed, aid in kind was given mainly in order to help them to meet 
the requirements imposed by the certifications and verifications programmes and to 
increase their current levels of productivity. This includes the donation of fertilisers as 
well as equipment used for the proper and safe application of agrochemicals, and the 
harvesting and post-harvesting process.
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Table 6.2 Changes in access to credit, subsidies and/or cash transfers, and aid in kind 
 
AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol coef. SE 
1 % of producers who received credit 16.3% 14.5% 39.1% 15.1% *** 38.0% 44.4% -0.040 0.065
2
% of producers who received subsidies 
and/or cash transfers 
42.4% 34.5% 23.9% 21.4% -0.156 0.083 *
3 % of producers who received aid in kind 23.9% 30.1% 54.9% 40.6% ** 0.234 0.082 ***
Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol coef. SE 
4 % of producers who received credit 63.8% 37.3% *** 64.6% 42.8% *** 75.6% 40.4% *** 0.088 0.078
5
% of producers who received subsidies 
and/or cash transfers 
17.3% 28.4% ** 0.8% 8.6% *** 0.091 0.060
6 % of producers who received aid in kind 34.6% 17.0% *** 72.4% 58.1% ** -0.013 0.075
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1 coef. SE 
7 % of producers who received credit 48.7% 45.7% 58.2% 44.7% * 0.090 0.083
8
% of producers who received subsidies 
and/or cash transfers 
27.0% 40.9% * 13.8% 16.4% 0.023 0.077
9 % of producers who received aid in kind 32.3% 16.0% ** 58.5% 58.4% -0.136 0.086
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
2008 2009 2011
Difference in 
differenceIndicator
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                            
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
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6.2.1.3 Access to training and technical assistance 
 
The literature also highlights that producers, particularly small producers, often require 
support from external actors in order to circumvent their lack of appropriate managerial 
and technical skills. This type of producer, requires assistance such as free-of-cost 
services like technical extension services and training in different areas of coffee 
production and processing, in order to comply with the increasing number of functions 
and stricter requirements of voluntary sustainability standards. 
 
This sub-section analyses the outcomes of three key variables: (i) access to training in 
GAP; (ii) access to quality improvement process and coffee tasting trials; and (iii) access 
to technical recommendation to fertilize. 
 
Access to training in GAP  
In this sense, the survey finds that participation in the Nespresso AAA_1 scheme 
positively influences access to more hours of training per year compared to conventional 
farmers. Although AAA_1 producers showed statistically significant lower levels of 
training during 2009, compared to conventional coffee growers, these differences were 
reverted during 2011. As such, over time, this study revealed a significant difference in 
difference between the two groups and AAA_1 farmers received more hours of training. 
In this sense, for example, the difference between the group from Nespresso farmers 
and the control group increased from 8% at 2009 to 88% at 2011 (line 1 Table 6.3). 
 
Regarding the training of Fairtrade (FLO) producers and its respective control group, 
despite the fact that participating producers received significant higher number hours 
of training during the surveys of 2008, 2009 and 2011, these differences disappeared at 
endline and negative significant differences over time were reported (line 3 Table 6.3). 
In this sense, despite of positive differences between treated and control producers 
during the three surveys, the hours of training dropped 82% between the first and the 
third survey for treated producers and 81% for the control group. The causes of this 
situation are unknown are beyond the scope of this work. Nonetheless, a possible 
explanation to this situation, in the case of treated producers, is that training can be 
reduced once the certifications are obtained.  
 
The main reason to explain why the hours of training increased for Nespresso producers, 
while these fell for Fairtrade and conventional producers, could rest in the fact that 
Nespresso has funded and leveraged resources for providing both training and extra 
technical assistance for those farmers affiliated to the programme. In this case, 
interviews during the two phases of fieldwork revealed that Nespresso has been 
financially supporting the training process in order to help farmers improve their  
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Table 6.3 Changes in access to training and technical assistance  
 
AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol coef. SE 
1 Average hours of training in GAP per year 28.4 26.3 10.3 25.9 *** 44.5 23.6 *** 34.5 10.4 ***
2
% of producers who were trained to improve the 
quality of coffee 
63.0% 21.2% *** 2.2% 12.8% *** 48.9% 14.9% *** -0.104 0.079
3
% of producers that participated from coffee 
tasting trials 
26.1% 16.9% * 17.4% 18.3% 15.2% 12.9% -0.067 0.062
4
% of producers who fertilize under technical 
recomendation
29.3% 21.2% 45.7% 35.1% * 45.7% 48.7% -0.033 0.088
Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol coef. SE 
5 Average hours of training in GAP per year 148.3 74.5 *** 63.7 44.2    * 26.9 14.0 *** -52.3 23.1 **
6
% of producers who were trained to improve the 
quality of coffee 
58.7% 8.1% *** 69.3% 20.4% *** 79.5% 28.6% *** 0.054 0.078
7
% of producers that participated from coffee 
tasting trials 
85.8% 16.3% *** 71.7% 9.0% *** 56.7% 2.8% *** -0.164 0.064 **
8
% of producers who fertilize under technical 
recomendation
43.3% 24.2% *** 66.1% 18.7% *** 84.3% 21.6% *** 0.417 0.073 ***
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1 coef. SE 
9 Average hours of training in GAP per year 42.7 9.9 *** 37.7 38.6 -23.1 7.0 ***
10
% of producers who were trained to improve the 
quality of coffee 
49.2% 1.6% *** 77.8% 56.3% *** -0.091 0.072
11
% of producers that participated from coffee 
tasting trials 
36.0% 15.9% *** 24.9% 19.8% -0.033 0.073
12
% of producers who fertilize under technical 
recomendation
58.7% 40.7% ** 72.5% 52.7% ** 0.066 0.092
Indicator
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                                                
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
2008 2009 2011
Difference in 
difference
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upgrading trajectories. Meanwhile these efforts have not operated, at least with the 
same intensity, for Fairtrade and conventional producers. As mentioned above, there is 
certain consensus among interviewers that changes in the coffee policy resulted in a 
drop in subsidies and training, and destined higher levels of resources to credit and aid 
in kind. However, this situation raises questions not only on the future and viability of 
conventional producers with a view to certification, but also about the sustainability of 
schemes that are promoting both the adoption of GAP and certifications programmes. 
If certain practices are not reinforced by subsequent training, then farmers did not retain 
their learning. 
 
Meanwhile, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers, revealed 
significant differences favouring AAA_2 producers in 2009, however at endline the 
difference in difference of hours of training negatively affected AAA producers. In this 
sense, for example, the difference between the group from AAA_2 farmers and AAA_1 
group decreased from 332% at 2009 to -2% at 2011 (line 9 Table 6.3). 
 
Concerning the distribution of training hours per topic, Table 6.4 below shows that there 
are no substantial differences between any of the certification groups and their control 
groups and the content of training is pretty much the same. Around one third and one 
fifth of training hours per year is dedicated to farm management practices and 
environmental topics respectively. Meanwhile, the average time during the surveys 
dedicated to train farmers in record keeping, traceability and financial management 
issues reached around nearly one sixth to the whole training time. Finally, training on 
certification topics covers between one seventh and one tenth on the total time 
dedicated to training.  
 
Table 6.4 Training composition by topic, average from 2008, 2009, and 2011 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011 
 
Interestingly, the area of income diversification in other cash crops different from coffee 
is not even touch in the training. Based on the information provided by the interviewed 
farmers, all the training focuses exclusively on coffee, and the extension service do not 
AAA_1 Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol AAA_2 AAA_1
Improvement of farm activities 30% 36% 40% 47% 24% 26%
Commercialization support 10% 8% 6% 8% 10% 13%
Certification 11% 9% 14% 9% 19% 16%
Health and welfare topics 12% 6% 9% 5% 10% 8%
Environment topics 16% 24% 17% 15% 19% 14%
Records kept, traceability systems 
and financial management
14% 12% 13% 14% 15% 19%
Literacy and others 6% 5% 1% 2% 4% 4%
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promote diversification of production to improve the financial feasibility of the 
certification schemes.  
 
Access to quality improvement processes and coffee tasting trials 
Participating in processes for the improvement of coffee quality is determinant to raise 
quality and a key factor to upgrade. Indications of whether a producer has been 
receiving assistance to ensure that their coffee beans reach the highest quality 
requirements are: i) whether they have participated in processes of quality 
improvement; and ii) whether producers have participated in trials of coffee tasting 
(coffee cupping) in order to know the organoleptic properties or defects in the coffee 
produced in their farms.  
 
Regarding the first variable, and with only one exception of Nespresso AAA_1 in 2009, 
the evidence shows that a significantly higher share of the farmers affiliated to Fairtrade 
and Nespresso have participated in training activities to improve the quality of their 
coffee than their respective counterparts operating as a control (lines 2 and 6 Table 6.3). 
However, at endline, there were no significant difference in difference between certified 
and control producers, mainly as a result of a growing share of control producers 
participated in these activities. This is part of a broader institutional effort to support 
coffee producers improving the quality of their coffee, as part of a long term policy to 
protect the differentiation of Colombian coffee, as mentioned in Chapter 5, but in 
practice this policy tends to benefit larger certified producers as will be show later in 
section 6.3. 
 
Regarding participation of farmers in coffee tasting trials, the study only found 
significant differences between Nespresso AAA_1 and conventional farmers operating 
as a control group regarding this variable for 2008. As such, over time the involvement 
in AAA_1 did not influence the participation in coffee tasting trials. The same holds for 
the comparison between the two strands of Nepsresso producers. Conversely, Fairtrade 
producers showed a higher participation in cupping trials during the three surveys and 
significant difference in difference between the two groups was detected (lines 3, 7 and 
11 from Table 6.3). 
 
It is worth mentioning, however, that the intensity of participation in the coffee tasting 
trails decreased between 2008 and 2011, both for treated and not treated producers, 
who witnessed similar rates of reduction. During the survey of 2008, the participation 
of certified farmers in coffee tasting trials in the sample of Fairtrade, Nespresso AAA_1 
and Nespresso AAA_2 were 86%, 26% and 36% respectively. During the survey of 2011, 
this percentage dropped to 57%, 15% and 25% respectively. Meanwhile for non-certified 
producers operating as a control, only 3% and 13% or the control producers of Fairtrade 
and Nespresso respectively, participated in this practice in the same year.  
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Technical assistance on fertilisation 
Technical extension services focused on adequate fertilisation, not only helps reduce 
production cost, but also to enhance product and volume upgrading. As will be 
mentioned in the next chapter, fertilisation makes up above one third of the production 
cost of coffee, which means that coffee producers often see this activity as a serious 
limitation to further upgrading.  
 
In this sense, overtime the study found that the involvement in the Nespresso AAA_1 
did not influence access to additional technical assistance to fertilise. As such, although 
the data showed significant higher levels of technical assistance to fertilize compared to 
conventional coffee growers during 2009, at endline these effects disappear and no 
significant difference in difference between the two groups was detected. Similarly, the 
comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers did not reveal significant 
difference in difference. Although the analysis found significant differences favouring 
producers affiliated to AAA_2 compared to AAA_1 both for 2009 and 2011, no significant 
differences overtime is reported. Contrastingly, the study reported that a significantly 
higher share of Fairtrade producers fertilizes their trees after receiving technical 
recommendation compared with its respective control group. Therefore, significant 
difference in difference between the two groups was detected (lines 4, 8 and 12 from 
Table 6.3).  
 
6.2.2 Investments and adoption of good agricultural practices (GAP) for improving 
upgrading trajectories  
 
If coffee growers want to participate in certified value chains, they must adopt good 
agricultural practices both during the raise of the trees, the harvest and post-harvest 
process. Additionally, they must invest in post-harvest facilities. All of these, to 
guarantee a higher yield, consistent supply with the highest quality, taste and aroma 
profile required for the buyers. This should imply, after counting the extra-cost that new 
competitive requirements involve, significant increases in gross revenues, financial 
room for manoeuvre, and capacity to withstand adverse shocks and fulfil basic needs 
and improve the rural livelihoods (Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014). 
 
In this sense, this sub-section analyses the outcomes of two main criteria that are key 
for producers in their attempt to improve their upgrading strategies: (i) investments in 
post-harvest processing facilities to increase sales of parchment coffee40; (ii) adoption 
                                                          
40 Traditionally, in Colombia the coffee growers have three options to sell their coffee: (i) as dry parchment 
directly in the cooperative or private buyers; (ii) at farm level once the berries are picked; and (iii) also in 
the farm in “wet state” once the mucilaginous pulp covering the bean has been removed. The last two, 
according with the information obtained during the interviews at fieldwork, implies not only that the 
producer do not possess the infrastructure needed to produce parchment coffee, but also that producers 
receive a lower price for their coffee and lost the quality premium. 
161 
 
 
 
of good agricultural practices – GAP, including investments in coffee tree renovation, 
particularly with rust-resistant varieties; investments in fertilisation and soil analysis to 
optimise fertilizer practices; and keeping record of activities to provide evidence that 
GAP were been implemented.  
 
6.2.2.1 Changes in the post-harvesting infrastructure and sales of parchment coffee 
 
An important question is whether farmers participating in certified chains were able to 
improve their post-harvesting processing facilities to comply with standards’ 
requirements and increase the sales of parchment coffee. 
 
In 2002 only 40% of coffee producers in Colombia had ready access to proper post-
harvest processing facilities (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002). In fact, a further piece 
of research financed by USAID, pointed out that the lack of infrastructure in processing 
the coffee cherries was as a bottleneck for coffee growers to connect with high value 
markets (Castro, Ochoa et al. 2009). For washed Arabicas, two key post-harvest practices 
must be done once the coffee-cherries are harvested and carried out from the field: the 
milling and the drying process.41 Furthermore, the main outcome of invest (or through 
financial aid) in improved post-harvesting infrastructure, should be both an increased 
amount of dry parchment coffee offered at the market and a significant decrease of 
pasillas (low quality coffee berries). 
 
The data shown in the Table 6.5 revealed that over time participation in certified chains 
do not imply a significant higher access to post-harvesting facilities, neither higher 
proportion of parchment sales. In simple terms, the reason of these outcomes hold in 
the fact that the comparison of the difference for certified producers between the first 
and third survey fall behind the difference between the first and third survey for the 
controls (see foot page 38). 
 
For example, the study revealed significant difference favouring Nespresso AAA_1 and 
Fairtrade during some years, however these differences disappear at endline and 
negative significant differences over time were reported (lines 2, 4, and 5 from Table 
6.5). Similarly, for the two strands of Nespresso producers, the study did not detect 
significant differences-in-difference between the group for the availability at farm level 
                                                          
41 After picking the coffee-cherry, on the same day it goes to the de-pulping machine which employ wet 
processing methods to remove the pulp or fruit cover from the seeds that are in the centre of each cherry. 
After that, the coffee beans, still encased in their tough parchment husk, are placed in fermentation tanks 
with clean water where the beans are allowed to soak in water for between 12 and 24 hours – this 
operation may also be carried out using special equipment. This process removes the mucilaginous pulp 
covering the bean which is of vital importance for the aroma of the coffee. When the washing is over and 
the fermented mucilage is removed, then the second practice took place as the beans must be dried using 
direct sunlight making use of various facilities or drying silos.  
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of post-harvesting infrastructure, both milling and drying infrastructure, (lines 7 and 8 
Table 6.5). 
 
The main reason to explain this situation refers to the notorious improvement in the 
milling and drying infrastructure witnessed mainly by those producers labelled as 
Nespresso AAA_1 and those operating as control group. For example, while only 24% 
and 25% of the sample of producers affiliated to Nespresso AAA_1 and the control group 
possessed a de-pulping unit during the survey of 2008, these shares raised to 59% and 
70% respectively during the 2011 survey, an increase of 35 and 45 percentage points 
respectively (line 1 Table 6.5). Regarding Fairtrade and its control group, the increase 
were of 32 and 50 percentage points (line 4 Table 6.5). Interestingly, the producers 
affiliated to Nespresso AAA_1 and Fairtrade did show a small reduction in the availability 
of drying infrastructure, while their respective control groups increased substantially. As 
such, while the certified producers dropped 5 and 3 percentage points respectively 
between the surveys of 2008 and 2011, for the control producers the raise were of 24 
and 22 percentage points respectively (lines 2 and 5 Table 6.5).  
 
One likely reason to explain why this improvement occurred, could rest in the impact of 
the number of policy measures implemented by Colombian coffee authorities, with the 
support of national government and the private sector, that were put in place between 
2008 and 2009 aimed at increasing output and regaining Colombia´s position as the 
second largest producing country (please see previous chapter for a description of these 
measures). Hence, it is likely that this increase has to deal with the fact that a big share 
of aid in kind was mainly concentrated on providing farmers with the infrastructure 
needed to process the coffee cherries. 
 
In fact, during field work, several producers recognised that they have received these 
kinds of units provided by buyer companies (Nespresso-Nestle42 and Starbucks), 
development agencies (USAID and its operators in Colombia as ACDI/VOCA), Colombia’s 
government and regional and national producers’ organisations (National Federation of 
Coffee Growers and Departmental Committees of Coffee Growers). However, up to now 
there is no official statistics or studies about the outcomes of these measures. In this 
respect, the support from coffee institutions that also covered non-certified producers 
could explain a lot of findings. The fact that non-certified producers were also benefiting 
from a range of institutional support programmes could mask the benefits of 
certification. As such, at least in Colombia, it not possible to claim that certifications have 
no, or very limited, positive effects; it can be argued, instead, that positive benefits from
                                                          
42 For example, Nestlé-Nespresso informed that between 2006 and 2012 in the departments of Nariño 
and Cauca the close collaboration with the National Federation of Coffee Growers implied delivering 
14,000 wet milling and sun drying installations, 8.000 water management solutions, 12.000 water 
infrastructures, 20.000 actions for improving farm administration etc.). 
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Table 6.5 Changes in the post-harvesting infrastructure 
 
 
AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol coef. SE 
1 % of producers with milling (de-pulping) machine 23.9% 24.9% 22.8% 12.3% ** 58.7% 70.3% * -0.059 0.072
2
% of producers making use of efficient sun drying 
facilities
85.9% 62.5% *** 66.3% 74.5% 80.4% 86.6% -0.232 0.065 ***
3 % of harvest sold as dry parchment 91.2% 88.3% 77.1% 82.8% 80.9% 78.4% 0.014 0.055
Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol coef. SE 
4 % of producers with milling (de-pulping) machine 44.9% 31.9% ** 51.2% 35.2% *** 77.2% 81.6% -0.133 0.071 *
5
% of producers making use of efficient sun drying 
facilities
84.3% 27.5% *** 79.5% 30.9% *** 81.1% 49.2% *** -0.181 0.062 ***
6 % of harvest sold as dry parchment 70.0% 37.7% *** 66.7% 33.6% *** 66.6% 45.5% *** -0.083 0.061
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1 coef. SE 
7 % of producers with mill (de-pulping) machine 19.6% 20.9% 65.1% 54.0% 0.088 0.078
8
% of producers making use of efficient sun drying 
facilities
81.5% 59.3% *** 86.2% 63.5% *** -0.053 0.065
9 % of harvest sold as dry parchment 84.5% 77.4% 86.6% 84.6% -0.007 0.052
Indicator
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                              
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
2008 2009 2011
Difference in 
difference
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certification was largely offset by positive benefits that were also available to non-
certified farmers. It is possible that in a country where there were no parallel initiatives 
for non-certified farmers, would might be strong positive results for certification. 
 
Changes in the way to sell coffee – proportion of the harvest sold as dry parchment 
Whether coffee growers were able to increase the proportion of their harvest sold as 
dry parchment is a good indicator of improvement in the availability of post-harvesting 
facilities at farm level and that some process upgrading has taken place. In this sense as 
is shown in the Tables 6. 5 below, the comparison of the share of harvest sold as dry 
parchment between certified producers and those producers operating as a control 
group, did not detected significant difference-in-difference over time between the two 
groups. In the case of Fairtrade, for example, the data revealed that certified producers 
sold a statistically significant higher amount of their harvest in parchment during the 
three surveys. However, these effects disappeared at endline (line 6 Table 6.5). The main 
reason to explain this situation rest in the fall in the proportion of the harvest sold in 
parchment between 2008 and 2011 for Fairtrade produces - 3 percentage points, while 
for control producers this share increased 8 percentage points. 
 
6.2.2.2 Changes in the adoption of good agricultural practices  
 
Involvement in production of certified coffee might be expected to promote the 
adoption of agricultural techniques that improve productivity and quality.  
 
This sub-section analyses the outcomes of five key variables tested during the surveys 
of 2008, 2009 and 2011: (i) proportion of coffee trees renovated yearly; (ii) percentage 
of farms with rust-resistant varieties; (iii) the proportion of coffee growers performing 
soil analysis; (iv) kilos of synthetic fertilizers applied by hectare annually; and (v) 
proportion of producers keeping records.  
 
Changes in coffee tree renovation and adoption of resistant varieties to rust infection 
Involvement in production of certified coffee might be expected to promote investment 
in techniques that improve productivity and quality. Investing in coffee tree renovation 
and the use of rust-resistant varieties would be one such investment.  
 
In-depth investments in coffee tree renovation, in particular with rust-resistant varieties 
is key for achieving higher land productivity and coffee quality over time. The data shows 
that although investments in such varieties increased, this was true for both treatment 
and control groups (line 1, 6 and 11 Table 6.6). There were no significant differences 
overtime for either of the Nespresso groups, and the Fairtrade (FLO) comparison that 
only reached a 1% significance level in one of the three years. In the case of Fairtrade, 
for example, the quantitative data revealed that a statistically higher share of the control 
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producers adopted varieties of coffee resistant to rust infection during the three survey, 
although these differences disappear at endline.43 
 
Changes both in the share of farmers performing soil analysis and the levels of 
synthetic fertilization 
Rational fertilisation not only assure higher yields of improved quality and therefore a 
successful path for product and volume upgrading, but also lower production cost from 
cash inputs. However, rational fertilization to increase soil fertility are highly tied to 
technical recommendation to fertilize by the extension service, but particularly to 
perform a soil analysis for each farm in order to apply the right amount of organic and 
synthetic fertilizers.  
 
The analysis of the quantitative data for these two variables revealed important 
differences between initiatives. For example, the involvement in Nespresso AAA_1 do 
not promote the use of soil analysis or higher levels of synthetic fertilizers applied to the 
soil (lines 3 and 4 Table 6.6). Data also revealed that these producers make almost null 
use of the soil analysis.  
 
In the case of Fairtrade (FLO), despite the fact that the data revealed that Fairtrade 
producers performed a statistically significant higher amount of soil analysis during the 
three surveys, data revealed that a significant negative differences overtime were 
reported. Mainly explained by the substantial fall in the proportion of Fairtrade producer 
performing soil analysis between 2008 and 2011 - 24 percentage points against 9 
percentage points of the control producers (line 8 Table 6.6). However, this outcome 
should be analysed carefully as soil analysis could be a one-off investment made at the 
beginning of the process as its information can be used for several years. Interestingly, 
quantitative data revealed that Fairtrade producers systematically applied significant 
higher levels of synthetic fertilizers over time compared to the control group (line 9 
Table 6.6).  
 
Interestingly, the comparison between the change over time for those producers 
labelled as Nespresso AAA_2 and Nespresso AAA_1, revealed statistically significant 
difference-in-difference between the two groups. As such, at endline, a higher share of 
those farmers labelled as AAA_2 not only performed soil analysis compared to AAA_1 
farmers, but also applied higher amount of fertilizers. Quantitative data revealed that 
AAA_2 producers increase between 2009 and 2011 the share of produces performing 
soil analysis and the amount of fertilizers (lines 13 and 14 Table 6.6).  
                                                          
43 As was mentioned earlier, only when the difference for the target between in the first and second 
years exceeds the difference between the first and second years for the controls is there potential of 
program-related impact, assuming other factors are accounted for. 
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Table 6.6 Changes in the adoption of good agricultural practices for Nespresso and Fairtrade (FLO) 
 
 
AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol coef. SE 
1 % of renovated trees 10.8% 14.8% 11.6% 10.4% 25.0% 25.4% -0.015 0.048
2 % of farms with rust-resistant varieties 23.7% 20.4% 30.0% 24.8% 56.0% 54.9% -0.032 0.054
3 % of farmers who perform soil analysis 3.3% 1.8% 4.3% 4.0% 6.5% 4.8% 0.008 0.038
4 Synthetic fertilizers applied (kg/ha) 880.2 568.4 ** 966.0 896.2 969.9 969.0 -207.8 153.9
5 % of producers that keep records 4.3% 5.1% 9.8% 1.0% *** 23.9% 11.7% ** 0.106 0.053 **
FLO Ctrol FLO Ctrol FLO Ctrol coef. SE 
6 % of renovated trees 14.5% 10.9% 10.5% 11.2% 16.1% 16.2% -0.056 0.036
7 % of farms with rust-resistant varieties 16.3% 22.3% * 15.4% 26.0% *** 37.8% 45.2% * -0.046 0.041
8 % of farmers who perform soil analysis 51.2% 16.4%
**
*
52.8% 21.7% *** 26.8% 7.3%
**
*
-0.145 0.070 **
9 Synthetic fertilizers applied (kg/ha) 1,090        858 *** 1,035      859 ** 1,761       951 *** 594.5 119.4 ***
10 % of producers that keep records 27.6% 3.5%
**
*
37.8% 5.7% *** 34.6% 2.7%
**
*
0.083 0.057
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1 coef. SE 
11 % of renovated trees 12.8% 7.9% 24.4% 23.8% -0.043 0.046
12 % of farms with rust-resistant varieties 42.3% 41.7% 69.3% 64.4% -0.053 0.049
13 % of farmers who perform soil analysis 27.5% 5.7% *** 44.4% 9.6%
**
*
0.127 0.064 **
14 Synthetic fertilizers applied (kg/ha) 957.4 959.4 1,223.1    927.8 *** 214 106 **
15 % of producers that keep records 25.4% 6.3% *** 78.8% 20.3%
**
*
0.397 0.070 ***
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Indicator
2008 2009 2011
Difference in 
difference
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                              
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
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Record keeping 
Whether a growing proportion of coffee growers are able of keep detailed record of 
methods and materials used in coffee production for decision making activities indicate 
that they are aware of the benefits of this activity.  
 
In this sense as is shown in the Tables 6.6 above the evidence shows that during the 
surveys capturing data from 2008, 2009 and 2011 a significantly higher share of the 
certified farmers keep records of their activities compare to their respective 
counterparts operating as a control. These differences were keep at endline as there 
were significant difference in difference between certified and control producers. The 
comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers revealed a significant 
difference over time and during the surveys for those producers labelled as AAA_2 (lines 
5, 10, and 15 Table 6.6).  
 
In general, although there was an upward trend in the percentage of producers keeping 
records between the first and third survey, only one fourth and one third of AAA_1 and 
Fairtrade producers respectively keep records during the survey capturing data from 
2011. Interestingly, nearly 80% of AAA_2 producers keep records. 
 
However, despite of it importance as essential component to attain compliance, there 
were not training on record keeping (see Table 6.4). This information was confirmed 
during the field work as most of the farmers interviews had not received training courses 
in record-keeping.  
 
6.3 Dynamics of value chain participation by farm size 
 
The question whether the compliance of the stricter performance requirements of 
private process standards facilitate or hinder small farmers participation in agri-food 
value chains and end markets is still disputed in the literature (Von Hagen and Alvarez 
2011). There are two main positions taken in the literature: some writers assert that the 
proliferation of standards has served to exclude smaller-scale participants from 
competitive markets and have pushed them to less profitable markets (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2004, Hatanaka, Bain et al. 2005, FAO 2006, Fulponi 2006), others argue that 
the compliance process could help small farmers to build competitive advantages that 
can result in a long term and profitable trade relationship with buyers (Auld 2010) with 
benefits in terms of enhanced livelihoods (Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009).  
 
In summary, there is a lack of agreement among scholars about the role that standards 
can play either to catalyse or impede the trade relationships between buyers and small 
farmers. In fact, in the coffee sector up until now there is no evidence based on statistical 
analysis that has proved the assertion that voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) raise 
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barriers to small size coffee growers, or on the contrary, show that VSS do not endanger 
small farmer participation in the specialty coffee value chains.  
 
It became necessary to inquire, from a comparison between large and small coffee 
growers, if small coffee growers can participate from the specialty coffee value chain of 
certified coffees and effectively survive, gain competitive advantages over their large 
competitors, preserve their position as farmers and improve their incomes through 
improved farm productivity and quality enhancement. Or on the contrary, determine if 
small coffee growers are at risk as these initiatives are not open to everyone due to the 
hidden cost of coordination (Jaffee and Henson 2005), higher transaction cost 
associated with their participation (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004) and hence does not 
automatically guarantee economic benefit (Neilson 2007) unless unsuccessful small 
farmers find the institutional and organisational donor support to overcome the most 
important constraints imposed by the standards (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001, 
Giovannucci and Purcell 2008, Humphrey 2008, Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009). 
 
Therefore, a farm size comparison was carried for the same set of variables or indicators 
analysed in the sub-sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.1 which are part of the two main development 
areas or principles that are determinant for producers to build their competences, 
upgrade and participate into the specialty coffee value chain. Base on previous work of 
the author about the agrarian structure of the coffee sector in Colombia (García and 
Ramírez 2002, García 2003) larger farmers are those owned farms above five hectares 
while small farmers are those with farms below one hectare. As such, the statistical 
comparison was carried out between certified large farmers and small farmers from the 
same scheme and small control producers.44 Table 6.7 shows the mean for each variable 
and each type of producers, followed by the mathematical difference among larger and 
smaller producers and the statistical significance.  
 
Access to credit, subsidies and/or cash transfers, and aid in kind 
What emerges from this analysis is that small scale farmers, both treated as not-treated, 
are at a disadvantage compared to certified large scale farmers, even though credit 
opportunities for non-certified producers increased during the three surveys (lines 1, 2 
and 3 Table 6.7).  
 
Quantitative evidence shows that, with one exception, certified larger farmers have 
greater access to credit access compared to smaller farmers - both treated and control 
                                                          
44 For the analysis of Nespresso AAA_1 farms above 5 hectares were excluded due to the small number of 
farms and lack of representativeness. Therefore, for Nespresso AAA_1 producers, the comparison is 
between medium size certified farms above one hectare and below 5 hectares and small farms below one 
hectare - both certified and the control group. For Fairtrade (FLO) producers and Nespresso AAA_2, the 
comparison is between larger certified farmers above five hectares and small farms below one hectare - 
both certified and the control group. 
169 
 
 
 
groups. For example, during the three surveys, medium size producers affiliated to 
Nespresso AAA_1 had statistically greater access to credit service compared to smaller 
farmers - both certified and control producers. Similarly, the same trend holds for the 
Fairtrade (FLO) comparison. Finally, the comparison between the two strands of 
Nespresso producers revealed that involvement in AAA_2 positively influences the 
access to credit for larger producers compared to both AAA_2 and AAA_1 small 
producers. Both in 2009 and 2011 a statistically significant proportion of larger AAA_2 
producers received credit compared to smaller farmers labelled as AAA_1. The same 
trend holds for the comparison against smaller farmers of AAA_2 during 2009, although 
disappeared during 2011. 
 
What emerge from these results, in the particular case of small certified farmers, is that 
lower levels of credit compared to larger certified farmers could make it difficult for 
them to achieve the standard’s competitive requirements and comply with a number of 
investments required by VSS. In terms of the non-certified producers, at some point, this 
situation could be seen as a source of exclusion and marginalization with a view to 
certification. 
 
Meanwhile, taking into consideration the differences in the average amount of subsidies 
and/or cash transfers, and the aid in kind,45 the overall picture that emerges is that while 
support through subsidies or cash transfers favoured small farmers - both certified and 
the control group, aid in kind benefited larger certified farmers.46 For example, for the 
first variable in 2009 and 2011 there were no statistical differences between medium 
size Nespresso AAA_1 producers and small producers, both certified and the control 
group (line 4 Table 6.7). Contrastingly during 2011 were medium size Nespresso AAA_1 
farmers who received a statistically higher amount of aid in kind compared with small-
certified farmers and those operating as a control, 23 and 36 percentage points 
respectively (line 7 Table 6.7). 
 
Similarly, in 2011 larger Fairtrade (FLO) producers received a statistical significant lower 
level of subsidies and/or cash transfers compared to small control producers – 19 
percentage points. Contrastingly, were larger Fairtrade farmers who received 
statistically more aid in kind compared with small certified and farmers operating as a 
control group during 2011, 36 and 49 percentage points respectively (line 5 and 8 Table 
6.7). 
 
                                                          
45 Questions about these issues were included just after the survey of 2009 following a request by the 
author of this thesis. 
46 A negative mathematical difference indicates that smaller farmers received more aid than larger 
producers, and a positive difference indicates the contrary. 
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Finally, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso farmers, revealed the 
same trend mentioned above. While support through subsidies or cash transfers 
favoured statistically small farmers, both AAA_2 and AAA_1 - 15 and 27 percentage 
points respectively, aid in kind benefited statistically larger AAA farmers compared to 
smaller AAA_2 and AAA_1 farmers below one hectare - 32 and 44 percentage points 
respectively (lines 6, and 9 Table 6.7). 
 
Access to training and technical assistance 
Further analysis explored whether the smaller producers below one hectare, both 
treated and non-treated, received similar amounts of hours per year of training in GAP, 
compared to those who are certified and own larger farms, with ambiguous results. 
 
In this sense, for AAA_1 farmers, the evidence signals that certified small producers 
received a statistical significant higher number of hours of training in GAP per year 
during the surveys of 2008 and 2011. Similarly, small control producers received a 
significantly higher amount of hours of training during the survey of 2009 (line 10 Table 
6.7). Meanwhile, in the case of Fairtrade producers, during the three surveys, there is 
no evidence to conclude that larger farmers benefit with higher levels of training. Finally, 
the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers revealed that in 2009, 
AAA_2 larger producers received a statistically significant higher amount of hours of 
training in GAP per year compared to both groups of smaller producers below one 
hectare (AAA_2 and AAA_1). Contrastingly, during 2011, AAA_1 producers below 1 
hectare were those who received a significant higher amount of training compared to 
bigger producers (line 12 Table 6.7). 
 
Access to quality improvement processes and coffee tasting trials 
Taking into consideration the differences in the average participation rates in coffee 
cupping trials and processes of quality improvement. Overall, the evidence shows that 
a statistically significant higher share of larger farmers participated in these two 
activities compared to the share of smaller farmers. 
 
For example, for the producers’ participation in processes to improve the quality of 
coffee, medium Nespresso AAA_1 producers overcame smaller conventional producers 
during the surveys of 2008 and 2011 by 33 and 29 percentage points respectively. A 
similar trend was kept for tasting trials, although with lower differences, 15 and 16 
percentage points respectively during the same two surveys (lines 13 and 16 Table 6.7). 
Statistical differences between the two strands of Nespresso producers of different size 
were also found. For example, a higher share of the large farmers of Nespresso AAA_2 
participated in processes to improve the quality of the coffee compared to smaller 
producers of Nespresso AAA_1 – 55 and 28 percentage points during the surveys of 2009 
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and 2011 respectively. For coffee tasting trials, statistical differences held only during 
the survey of 2009 – 21 percentage points (lines 15, and 18 Table 6.7).  
 
Meanwhile, for Fairtrade (FLO) producers, the differences in the average participation 
rates between larger and smaller producers favoured the larger ones. For example, 
coffee tasting trials and farmers’ participation in processes to improve coffee quality, 
differences reached 53 and 71 percentage points respectively in 2011 (lines 14, and 17 
Table 6.7). 
 
Technical assistance on fertilisation 
A statistically higher proportion of larger farmers received technical assistance to 
fertilize their trees compared to the proportion of smaller farmers. The exception to this 
assertion is the comparison between medium size farmers affiliated to Nespresso AAA_1 
and small farmers, both certified and the control group, as there were no statistical 
differences during 2008 and 2011. Only during 2009 larger treated producers overcome 
statistically the control group.  
 
Contrastingly, a statistically significant share of large Fairtrade (FLO) producers received 
technical recommendations to fertilize compared to those small producers of the 
control group. Notwithstanding, there were no statistical differences between larger 
and small producers affiliated to Fairtrade. The same trend holds for the comparison 
between the two strands of Nespresso producers. A significant higher share of larger 
producers of AAA_2 received technical assistance – 25 and 28 percentage points during 
the surveys of 2009 and 2011 respectively.  
 
Changes in the post-harvesting infrastructure 
One step forward consisted of inquiring about the differences between larger and 
smaller producers, both treated and non-treated, in the availability of post-harvesting 
infrastructure at farm level. As in other variables, the evidence shows that, with few 
exceptions, large and medium certified farms are statistically better equipped with 
milling and sun drying infrastructure to meet the quality demands of the specialty 
market than small farmers.  
 
For example, medium size farmers affiliated to Nespresso AAA_1 possessed a 
statistically significant higher amount of milling machines than small producers – both 
treated and control groups (only with the exception of small Nespresso farmers in 2009). 
However, the same situation does not hold for sun drying facilities, as there were not 
statistical differences between farms of different sizes during the survey of 2009 and 
2011 (lines 22, and 25 Table 6.7). 
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Meanwhile, during 2008, 2009 and 2011 a statistically higher proportion of larger 
Fairtrade producers possessed milling infrastructure at farm compared to small farmers 
- both treated and control groups. The same situation holds for sun drying infrastructure 
(lines 23, and 26 Table 6.7). The same trend holds for the comparison between the two 
strands of Nespresso producers. A significant higher share of larger producers of AAA_2 
possessed milling and sun drying infrastructure compared to smaller producers (lines 
24, and 27 Table 6.7).  
 
As such, efforts must continue among different donors in order to assist and support 
small farmers in achieving material quality improvements. They can do so by either 
improving their processing infrastructure or, when necessary, additional alternatives to 
mill their coffee such as coffee processing centres.  
 
Changes in the way to sell coffee – proportion of the harvest sold as dry parchment 
One step forward consisted in compare whether the smaller producers, both treated 
and non-treated, sold a similar proportion of dry parchment coffee than larger certified 
farmers. In this sense, for AAA_1 farmers the evidence signals that there are not 
statistical significant differences between medium size certified and small farmer – both 
treated and non-treated, for most of the comparisons during the surveys of 2008, 2009, 
and 2011. One exception to this trend appear in 2008 as medium size certified farmers 
sold a statistically higher proportion of their harvest as dry parchment compared to 
smaller producers of the control group. However, these differences disappeared in 2009 
and 2011 (line 28 Table 6.7). 
 
Meanwhile, during 2008, 2009 and 2011 larger Fairtrade producers sold a statistically 
higher proportion of their harvest as dry parchment compared to small farmers - both 
treated and control groups. One exception to this trend appear in 2008 as there were 
not statistical differences between larger and smaller Fairtrade (FLO) producers. 
However, this do not hold during 2009 and 2011 (line 28 Table 6.7).  
 
Finally, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers´ revealed that 
AAA_2 larger producers sold a statistically significant higher share of their harvest as dry 
parchment compared to two groups of smaller producers in 2009. However, this 
difference disappears in 2011.  
 
Changes in coffee tree renovation and adoption of resistant varieties to rust infection 
One step forward consisted in compare whether the smaller producers below one 
hectare, both treated and non-treated, performed the renovation of their coffee trees 
and adopted resistant varieties in the same proportion than larger certified farmers. In 
this sense, for AAA_1 farmers the evidence signals that there are not statistical 
significant differences between medium size certified farmers and small farmer for most 
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of the comparisons. One exception to this trend appear in 2009, as a statistically higher 
proportion of medium size certified farmers renovated their coffee trees compared to 
smaller producers – both treated and non-treated. However, these differences 
disappeared in 2011 (line 31, and 34 Table 6.7).  
 
Meanwhile, for the case of Fairtrade producers, the effects found in the quantitative 
data are contradictory. Regarding the proportion of farmers that renovated their coffee 
trees, the comparison revealed that larger producers statistically overcome smaller 
farmer during 2008 and 2011, while the contrary hold during 2009 (line 32 Table 6.7). 
Regarding the adoption of resistant varieties, smaller control producers overcome 
statistically larger Fairtrade producers in 2011, but no statistical difference were found 
in the same year between larger and smaller Fairtrade farmers (line 35 Table 6.7).  
 
Finally, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers´ revealed that 
in 2009 AAA_2 larger producers renovated a statistically significant share of their trees 
compared to smaller AAA_1 producers. However, this difference disappears in 2011. 
Regarding the proportion of trees resistant to rust infections, no statistical differences 
are reported.  
 
As was explained above, one possible reason to explain this situation relies on the 
number of policy measures implemented by coffee authorities and the national 
government put in place between 2008 and 2009 aimed at increasing output to previous 
average production levels of 11 and 12 million 60 kg bags. However, up to now there is 
no official statistics or studies about the outcomes of these measures.  
 
Changes both in the share of farmers performing soil analysis and the levels of 
synthetic fertilisation 
In most of the comparisons a statistical higher proportion of larger farmers perform soil 
analysis compared to the proportion of smaller farmers – both treated and non-treated. 
For example, in 2011 a statistically higher proportion of medium size farmers affiliated 
to Nespresso AAA_1 performed soil analysis compared to smaller producers– both 
certified and non-certified. For Fairtrade producers there were statistical differences 
during the three surveys favouring larger farmers, with the exception of the comparison 
carried out in 2011 between larger and small Fairtrade producers. Interestingly, the 
comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers´ revealed also significant 
differences favouring larger farmers (lines 37, 38, and 39 Table 6.7). 
 
Finally, regarding the comparison in the amount of fertilizers applied between larger and 
smaller producers, there were not differences for the comparison of medium size 
Nespresso AAA_1 producers and smaller producers (both certified and control 
producers). For Fairtrade, larger producer differed statistically from smaller Fairtrade 
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producers in 2008, and from smaller control producers in 2011. Finally, the quantitative 
data for large AAA_2 producers do not revealed statistical differences against smaller 
AAA_2 producers. Meanwhile the comparison against smaller AAA_1 to larger AAA_2 
producers revealed contradictory effects, as during 2009, the statistical differences 
favouring smaller producers of AAA_1, while during 2011 the differences favouring 
larger farmers of AAA_2.  
 
Record keeping 
In general, what emerges from this analysis is that a lower proportion of small scale 
farmers, both treated as not-treated, keep records compared to certified large scale 
farmers (lines 43, 44 and 45 Table 6.7). In general, although there was an upward trend 
in the percentage of producers keeping records, a lower proportion of producers keep 
detailed record of methods and materials used in coffee production (with the exception 
of AAA_2 producers). 
 
For example, a statistically significant higher share of medium size farmers affiliated to 
Nespresso AAA_1 and large Fairtrade (FLO) farmers keep records compared to small 
producers – both treated and control groups. The comparison between the two strands 
of Nespresso producers´ revealed that a higher proportion of AAA_2 larger producers 
keep records compared to smaller AAA_1 producers (line 45 Table 6.7).  
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Table 6.7 Comparison by farm size for changes in assistance and investments to 
upgrade for Nespresso and Fairtrade (FLO) 
 
Continued…
Mean S.E Diff Mean S.E Diff Mean S.E Diff
AAA_1  medium 25% 6% 45% 7% 51% 8%
AAA_1 small 6% 4% 19% *** 28% 7% 16% * 25% 7% 26% ***
Ctrol small 4% 2% 21% *** 10% 3% 35% *** 27% 4% 24% ***
FLO  larger 71% 7% 83% 6% 77% 7%
FLO small 38% 14% 33% ** 40% 16% 43% *** 40% 16% 37% **
Ctrol small 20% 9% 51% *** 27% 12% 56% *** 19% 10% 58% ***
 AAA_2 larger 79% 10% 53% 12%
     AAA_2 small 34% 7% 45% *** 55% 8% -2%
AAA_1 small 31% 7% 48% *** 27% 7% 26% **
AAA_1  medium 43% 7% 26% 7%
AAA_1 small 46% 8% -4% 25% 7% 1%
Ctrol small 43% 5% 0% 26% 4% -1%
FLO  larger 23% 7% 0% 0%
FLO small 10% 10% 13% 0% 0% 0%
Ctrol small 20% 11% 3% 19% 10% -19% ***
 AAA_2 larger 21% 10% 0% 0%
     AAA_2 small 32% 7% -11% 15% 6% -15% **
AAA_1 small 46% 8% -25% ** 27% 7% -27% ***
AAA_1  medium 32% 7% 67% 7%
AAA_1 small 18% 6% 14% * 43% 8% 23% **
Ctrol small 31% 4% 1% 31% 4% 36% ***
FLO  larger 31% 8% 86% 5%
FLO small 10% 10% 21% * 50% 17% 36% ***
Ctrol small 27% 12% 5% 38% 13% 49% ***
 AAA_2 larger 26% 10% 88% 8%
     AAA_2 small 38% 7% -12% 56% 8% 32% **
AAA_1 small 15% 6% 11% 44% 7% 44% ***
AAA_1  medium 19.9 4.6 11.6 2.8 35.4 6.5
AAA_1 small 41.4 16.6 -21.5 * 8.9 0.8 2.7 53.8 8.1 -18.3 **
Ctrol small 26.1 6.6 -6.2 23.1 3.9 -11.5 ** 30.3 8.7 5.2
FLO  larger 183.1 32.6 73.9 20.8 37.7 10.9
FLO small 172.0 52.3 11.1 64.6 15.0 9.4 17.0 3.9 20.7
Ctrol small 79.0 66.3 104.1 47.4 22.8 26.5 18.4 5.2 19.3
 AAA_2 larger 58.9 22.9 33.2 8.6
     AAA_2 small 24.4 4.3 34.6 ** 53.1 9.1 -19.9 *
AAA_1 small 8.8 0.8 50.1 *** 46.9 6.0 -13.7
AAA_1  medium 54% 7% 2% 2% 47% 8%
AAA_1 small 77% 7% -23% ** 3% 3% 0% 57% 8% -10%
Ctrol small 20% 4% 33% *** 8% 2% -5% * 18% 4% 29% ***
FLO  larger 55% 8% 77% 7% 84% 6%
FLO small 62% 14% -6% 50% 17% 27% ** 70% 15% 14%
Ctrol small 0% 0% 55% *** 20% 11% 57% *** 13% 9% 71% ***
 AAA_2 larger 58% 12% 88% 8%
     AAA_2 small 36% 7% 22% ** 75% 7% 13%
AAA_1 small 3% 3% 55% *** 60% 7% 28% **
AAA_1  medium 27% 6% 21% 6% 23% 7%
AAA_1 small 26% 7% 1% 13% 5% 8% 7% 4% 16% **
Ctrol small 12% 4% 15% ** 14% 3% 7% 8% 2% 16% ***
FLO  larger 97% 3% 80% 7% 53% 8%
FLO small 62% 14% 36% *** 40% 16% 40% *** 50% 17% 3%
Ctrol small 5% 5% 92% *** 0% 0% 80% *** 0% 0% 53% ***
 AAA_2 larger 32% 11% 18% 10%
     AAA_2 small 24% 6% 8% 25% 7% -7%
AAA_1 small 10% 5% 21% ** 9% 4% 9%
§ These two variables were included only in the surveys to obtain data from 2009 and 2011. 
17
18
12
13
14
15
16
% of producers 
that have credit
2008 2009 2011
% of producers 
who were trained 
to improve the 
quality of coffee 
% of producers 
that participated 
from coffee tasting 
trials 
Indicator
Comparison by 
farm size*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
% of producers 
who received 
subsidies and cash 
transfers
§ 
% of producers 
who received aid 
in kind
§ 
Average hours of 
training in GAP per 
year
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Table 6.7 Comparison by farm size for changes in assistance and investments to 
upgrade 
 
Continued… 
 
Mean S.E Diff Mean S.E Diff Mean S.E Diff
AAA_1  medium 29% 6% 45% 7% 51% 8%
AAA_1 small 31% 8% -3% 51% 8% -7% 43% 8% 8%
Ctrol small 29% 5% -1% 30% 4% 15% ** 43% 5% 8%
FLO  larger 50% 8% 74% 7% 88% 5%
FLO small 54% 14% -4% 80% 13% -6% 90% 10% -2%
Ctrol small 20% 9% 30% ** 13% 9% 61% *** 13% 9% 76% ***
 AAA_2 larger 79% 10% 71% 11%
     AAA_2 small 62% 7% 17% * 70% 7% 1%
AAA_1 small 54% 8% 25% ** 42% 7% 28% **
AAA_1  medium 35% 7% 23% 6% 72% 7%
AAA_1 small 11% 5% 23% *** 15% 6% 8% 43% 8% 29% ***
Ctrol small 19% 4% 16% ** 14% 3% 9% * 59% 5% 13% *
FLO  larger 55% 8% 60% 8% 84% 6%
FLO small 15% 10% 40% *** 20% 13% 40% ** 50% 17% 34% **
Ctrol small 15% 8% 40% *** 20% 11% 40% *** 50% 13% 34% ***
 AAA_2 larger 21% 10% 82% 10%
     AAA_2 small 2% 2% 19% *** 53% 8% 30% **
AAA_1 small 15% 6% 6% 42% 7% 40% ***
AAA_1  medium 88% 4% 70% 7% 84% 6%
AAA_1 small 86% 6% 3% 59% 8% 11% 75% 7% 9%
Ctrol small 64% 5% 25% *** 68% 4% 3% 78% 4% 6%
FLO  larger 92% 4% 86% 6% 84% 6%
FLO small 77% 12% 15% * 60% 16% 26% ** 70% 15% 14%
Ctrol small 15% 8% 77% *** 13% 9% 72% *** 44% 13% 40% ***
 AAA_2 larger 89% 7% 94% 6%
     AAA_2 small 68% 7% 21% ** 90% 5% 4%
AAA_1 small 59% 8% 30% *** 71% 7% 23% **
AAA_1  medium 92% 4% 80% 5% 81% 5%
AAA_1 small 91% 5% 1% 71% 7% 9% 84% 5% -3%
Ctrol small 83% 4% 9% * 77% 3% 3% 73% 4% 8%
FLO  larger 66% 5% 61% 6% 67% 5%
FLO small 63% 10% 3% 44% 15% 17% * 47% 16% 20% *
Ctrol small 29% 10% 37% *** 17% 8% 44% *** 37% 12% 30% ***
 AAA_2 larger 89% 3% 88% 6%
     AAA_2 small 75% 5% 13% * 80% 5% 8%
AAA_1 small 71% 7% 18% ** 84% 5% 4%
AAA_1  medium 11% 3% 16% 4% 20% 5%
AAA_1 small 10% 4% 1% 7% 3% 9% ** 30% 6% -10%
Ctrol small 16% 3% -5% 10% 2% 6% * 26% 3% -6%
FLO  larger 12% 3% 6% 2% 17% 3%
FLO small 2% 2% 9% ** 20% 13% -14% ** 0% 0% 17% ***
Ctrol small 11% 7% 1% 7% 7% -1% 23% 10% -6%
 AAA_2 larger 16% 4% 29% 6%
     AAA_2 small 12% 4% 5% 22% 5% 7%
AAA_1 small 7% 3% 9% * 31% 6% -1%
AAA_1  medium 24% 5% 29% 5% 53% 6%
AA to AAA small 26% 7% -2% 33% 6% -4% 59% 6% -5%
Ctrol small 23% 4% 1% 23% 3% 6% 54% 4% 0%
FLO  larger 13% 4% 18% 5% 36% 4%
FLO small 15% 10% -2% 4% 4% 15% * 24% 13% 12%
Ctrol small 14% 7% -1% 10% 5% 9% 59% 11% -23% ***
 AAA_2 larger 40% 7% 72% 6%
     AAA_2 small 38% 6% 2% 66% 6% 6%
AAA_1 small 35% 7% 5% 62% 6% 10%
32
33
34
35
36
27
28
29
30
31
22
23
24
25
26
19
20
21
Indicator
% of producers 
with mill (de-
pulping) machine
% of producers 
employing  cover 
floor or parabolic 
dry to sun-dry 
coffee
 % of harvest sold 
as parchment  
% of renovated 
trees
% of farms with 
rust resistant 
varieties 
Comparison by 
farm size*
2008 2009 2011
% of producers 
who fertilize under 
technical 
recomendation
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Table 6.7 Comparison by farm size for changes in assistance and investments to 
upgrade 
 
 
6.4 Discussion and conclusions 
 
This chapter provides new empirical evidence to understand how VSS impact on the 
upgrading opportunities of coffee growers. Up until now there has been limited 
empirical evidence about the question of whether implementing VSS can be viewed as 
a tool to enhance upgrading trajectories or as a barrier to entry in the specialty coffee 
value chain. Innovate in the different spheres of economic upgrading in the specialty 
coffee value chain governed by VSS demands  overcoming serious constraints that limit 
farmers' ability to participate competitively (Bamber and Fernández-Stark 2014), but 
particularly requires institutions and inputs from the private sector to help producers to 
develop competences for further upgrading (Humphrey 2008, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 
2010). 
 
In the last decade much of the literature exploring current debates on private standards 
has focused on the standard setting, implementation and certification (Ponte 2008) as 
well as the direct and indirect benefits of adopting VSS (Ponte 2002, Lewin, Giovannucci 
Mean S.E Diff Mean S.E Diff Mean S.E Diff
AAA_1  medium 2% 2% 2% 2% 9% 4%
AAA_1 small 3% 3% -1% 3% 3% -1% 2% 2% 7% *
Ctrol small 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 7% **
FLO  larger 68% 8% 68% 8% 23% 7%
FLO small 38% 14% 30% ** 38% 14% 30% ** 20% 13% 3%
Ctrol small 10% 7% 58% *** 10% 7% 58% *** 6% 6% 17% *
 AAA_2 larger 16% 9% 41% 12%
     AAA_2 small 32% 7% -16% * 38% 8% 4%
AAA_1 small 5% 4% 11% * 2% 2% 39% ***
AAA_1  medium 997 235 934 97 913 110
AAA_1 small 733 111 264 984 80 -50 1,069 88 -156
Ctrol small 791 59 205 915 46 19 1,042 76 -128
FLO  larger 1,056 99 1,026 117 1,608 123
FLO small 1,636 202 -580 *** 909 172 117 1,866 353 -258
Ctrol small 853 145 203 1,072 205 -46 854 203 754 ***
 AAA_2 larger 762 85 1,384 188
     AAA_2 small 890 72 -129 1,176 103 208
AAA_1 small 1,005 84 -244 ** 1,079 86 305 **
AAA_1  medium 6% 3% 15% 5% 23% 7%
AAA_1 small 3% 3% 3% 5% 4% 10% * 27% 7% -4%
Ctrol small 2% 2% 3% 1% 1% 14% *** 10% 3% 13% **
FLO  larger 37% 8% 37% 8% 37% 7%
FLO small 15% 10% 21% * 40% 16% -3% 0% 0% 37% **
Ctrol small 0% 0% 37% *** 7% 7% 30% ** 0% 0% 37% ***
 AAA_2 larger 21% 10% 76% 11%
     AAA_2 small 22% 6% -1% 77% 7% -1%
AAA_1 small 8% 4% 13% * 24% 6% 52% ***
* Larger farms are those above 5 ha; medim size farms are those above one hectare and below 5 ha; and small farms 
are those below 1 ha.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Synthetic fertilizers 
applied (kg/ha)
Indicator
Comparison by 
farm size*
2008 2009 2011
% of producers 
who perform soil 
analysis
39
38
37
% of producers 
that keep records
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support 
observations. *** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
43
44
45
40
41
42
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et al. 2004, Ponte 2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci and Ponte 2005, 
Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008a, Blackman and Rivera 2010, Pierrot, Giovannucci et al. 
2011, Brando 2012, Giovannucci, Scherr et al. 2012). However, there is a scarcity of 
information and thus little agreement on the question of how the adoption of the 
requirements of VSS has affected the upgrading strategies of the coffee growers that 
are participating in the specialty coffee value chain, and the role that local institutional 
support can play to mobilize public and private resources and help producers overcome 
serious limitations in their ability to develop competences for further upgrading and 
participate competitively. 
 
Interestingly, the role that public and private sector support can play in facilitating 
upgrading strategies in coffee growers who are participating in the specialty coffee value 
chain has received little attention in the literature on the ‘developmental’ impact of 
standards, labels and certifications. Additionally, few systematic studies have addressed 
whether VSS have affected the investments and adoption of GAPs needed to improve 
upgrading trajectories at farm level, particularly in small farmers. 
 
This chapter proposed a model to ascertain whether the dynamics of value chain 
participation of coffee producers adhered to VSS initiatives, compared with their 
respective control group of producers, resulted in significant differences in differences 
for a set of 15 matched indicators of two main development areas or principles that are 
determinants for producers to build their competences on, and to innovate in different 
spheres of economic upgrading: (i) institutional arrangements to facilitate farmers´ 
upgrading efforts; and (ii) investments and adoption of good agricultural practices (GAP) 
needed for improving upgrading trajectories.   
 
The study compares Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA (AAA_1 hereafter) farmers with two 
groups of similar non-certified farmers during three rounds of surveys over a four-year 
time interval, and compares two groups of Nespresso AAA producers (AAA_2 vs AAA_1 
hereafter), which are at two different stages of certification, during two rounds of 
surveys over a two-year interval.47 The study used a difference analysis with propensity 
score matching techniques that allowed to construct rigorous counterfactual and 
correct for selection bias and the influence of independent factors.  
 
The overall picture that emerges from this research is one where the impact of the public 
and private sector interventions to facilitate upgrading, and the investments and 
adoption of GAP to support the involvement of coffee growers in VSS, are not 
                                                          
47 As was mentioned in chapter 3, two groups of Nespresso AAA’s producers were analysed as an 
opportunity to track the impact of the strategic changes adopted by the AAA Programme and the impact 
on the internal upgrading strategies implemented by the same programme. The group labelled as AAA_1 
adhered to the Programme in 2008, while the group labelled as AAA_2 adhered to the programme in 
2009. 
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permanent or consistent over time for most of the indicators analysed. Therefore, the 
potential of interventions to mobilize financial and human resources for upgrading or to 
accelerate investments and the adoption of GAP needed to improve farmers upgrading 
trajectories, has not yet been materialized at all.  
 
In essence, for long cycle crops such as coffee, it is clear that the potential to generate 
significant changes and differences in certified producers as opposed to conventional 
producers, can take, not only more time, but also calls for greater collaboration and 
coordination efforts among institutional structures, local organizations and private 
buyers to leverage resources and assist producers to close gaps quickly and achieve 
product, process and volume (yield) upgrading and meet the competitive requirements 
of VSS particularly smaller producers who face the greatest disadvantages. 
 
In most of the comparisons, certified farmers witnessed significant statistical differences 
during at least one of the three annual surveys, but at the endline these differences had 
decreased or even disappeared. As a result, significant differences in differences 
overtime were observed only for a few variables. Is important to remember that for 
most of the comparisons, the differences for the certified producers during the first and 
third year did not always exceed the differences for the control group during the first 
and third year, which is a necessary condition to infer impact of the intervention related 
to the treatment (Khandker, Koolwal et al. 2010, Bennet, Giovannucci et al. 2013).  
 
From this evidence an important question arises: is there a coherent strategy among 
downstream actors behind the provision of public goods and support services to 
facilitate upgrading and allow producers to participate competitively in the specialty 
coffee value chain both certified and conventional? In this sense, the quantitative and 
qualitative information collected during two periods of field work did not reveal the 
existence of clear strategies between VSS initiatives and institutions when it comes to 
intervention in different territories or typologies of farmers. The fact that there were no 
clear differences in the composition of training, access to credit to facilitate upgrading, 
technical assistance for key production activities related to coffee quality or changes in 
the post-harvesting infrastructure between any of the certification groups and their 
control groups, indicates that the emphasis among institutions and initiatives to provide 
assistance does not vary significantly. In this regard, interviews also revealed that the 
support services provided by chain stakeholders such as exporters, government and aid 
agencies, among others, are not coordinated or consistent over time, which implies 
duplication of efforts and an inefficient use of time and resources needed to improve 
farmers upgrading trajectories.   
 
In relation to the first area of development proposed, the institutional arrangements to 
innovate in different spheres of economic upgrading, the quantitative data revealed that 
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the participation in the Nespresso AAA_1 certification affected significantly and 
positively in only two of the seven indicators proposed to test the institutional support 
provided to coffee growers. Positive significant differences in differences were observed 
for the levels of aid in kind and the hours of training received. Contrastingly, key 
indicators such as access to credit facilities and technical assistance to fertilize or 
improve the quality of the coffee did not show statistically significant differences 
overtime from their respective control group. In addition, the comparison of the two 
strands of Nespresso, did not reveal positive differences in differences for most of the 
indicators. 
 
These results challenge the impressions collected in the focus groups conducted during 
fieldwork, since the group of producers affiliated to the Nespresso AAA programme 
perceived notable benefits from the programme’s interventions. Likewise, fieldwork 
interviews with producers and local extension specialists, revealed a general perception 
of Nespresso’s skills in establishing public private partnerships (PPP), leveraging 
resources with NGOs, multilateral and donors, and investment of important financial 
resources in order to improve producers’ capabilities, infrastructure for coffee 
production and tree renovation.  
 
Meanwhile, for Fairtrade significant and positive differences in difference estimates 
were observed only in relation to access to technical assistance on fertilisation from 
seven key indicators analysed. In this sense, interviews during two phases of field work 
with representatives from cooperatives and farmers affiliated to Fairtrade revealed that 
farmers received training, information services and market facilitation at the start of the 
certification process but not as part of a long-term strategy.  
 
Interestingly, the affiliation of farmers to certifications negatively influenced the 
performance of some variables compared to the control groups. For example, the 
involvement in the Nespresso AAA_1 certification, negatively influenced access to 
subsidies and/or cash transfers, while participation in Fairtrade negatively affected, over 
time, the hours of training received or their participation in coffee tasting trials. 
Likewise, involvement in Nespresso AAA_2 negatively affected the hours of training in 
GAP, as the quantitative data detected a negative significant difference-in-difference 
between the two groups of producers. 
 
Regarding the second development area, that of investments in infrastructure and 
adoption of GAP to improve upgrading trajectories, there was no clear trend for the 8 
indicators or criteria tested to inquire whether there were differences between certified 
and non-certified producers. In terms of the variables used to test changes in the levels 
of investments in post-harvesting facilities, both milling and drying infrastructure, the 
study did not detect significant differences-in-difference favouring coffee growers 
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participating in certified value chains, both the two strands of Nespresso producers and 
Fairtrade farmers. Meanwhile, in terms of the adoption of agricultural techniques to 
facilitate upgrading trajectories, positive significant differences were observed in those 
variables associated to record keeping in AAA_1 producers. As for Fairtrade (FLO), 
significant and positive difference in difference estimates were observed only in relation 
to the amount of kilos of synthetic fertilizers applied to one hectare annually. 
 
Remarkably, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso data revealed that, 
overtime, a significant higher share of AAA_2 producers invested in soil analysis and 
applied on average a statistically higher amount of synthetic fertilizers at endline, added 
to the fact that a higher share of producers keeps records of methods and materials 
used in coffee production to aid decision making. This is a very interesting finding that 
shows that the upgrading trajectories between two groups of producers selling coffee 
to the same initiative not only could differ but also that these differences could have 
important repercussions in key economic measures as chapter 7 will show. The 
circumstances that motivated this steeper learning curve of GAP´s adoption by 
Nespresso AAA_2 producers cannot be determined on the basis of the data contained 
in the surveys, nor the interviews conducted during fieldwork, and should be subject of 
further research.  
 
There are two likely and interconnected explanations for the lack/scarcity of positive 
impacts in the upgrading trajectories as a result of participation in Fairtrade and 
Nespresso AAA_1: (i) the fact that conventional producers, operating as a control group, 
have been also participating from the policy measures implemented by Colombian 
coffee authorities, with the support of national government and industry organizations, 
focusing on yield improvement and sustainable cultivation (section 5.3 describes these 
measures), and (ii) the budget allocated by donors to assist farmers‘ upgrading 
trajectories, included those inputs leveraged from different stakeholders, are still very 
modest to assure the durability of impacts and make a difference due to the growth in 
total number of coffee growers participating in VSS and the precariousness of the 
economic situation of most of them. 
 
Regarding the first explanation, the support from coffee institutions that also covered 
non-certified producers could explain a lot of findings. This confirms the argument that 
the regulatory structure of the country (Ponte 2008, Neilson and Pritchard 2009) or the 
richness of the local institutional environment (Humphrey 2008) affects the dynamics of 
value chain participation and the upgrading trajectories of the coffee growers. The fact 
that non-certified producers were also benefiting from a range of institutional 
programmes (such as extension services, strategic investments, plant breeding 
programmes, pest and diseases management strategies, among others), could mask the 
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benefits of certification. 48 As such, at least in Colombia, it is not possible to claim that 
certifications have no, or very limited, positive effects; it can be argued, instead, that 
positive benefits from certification were largely offset by positive benefits from 
institutional programmes that were also available to non-certified farmers. It is possible 
that in a country where there were no such programmes for non-certified farmers, 
positive results from certification might be stronger. However, there are no impact 
evaluations on the effect of institutional interventions on upgrading strategies to 
support this argument. Without any doubt the role of government and coffee 
institutions in assisting conventional producers has been determinant to offset the 
effect of the interventions of VSS in Colombia.  
 
Concerning the second explanation, some authors have mentioned that participation in 
VSS may lead to upgrading opportunities (Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012), in particular in value 
chains where coordination between roaster, traders and farmers tends to be stronger 
(Muradian and Pelupessy 2005), such as the sustainable quality programme from 
Nespresso or Fairtrade. However, it has been pointed out that the growing number of 
producers (and the total volume of coffee) that actually participate in these 
commercialization channels is the main limitation for further upgrading as the private 
and public inputs aimed at supporting producers and enhancing their upgrading 
capabilities have been fairly marginal to make a change (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005). 
It is a key consideration for the Colombian coffee sector, as the substantial growth rates 
of affiliation to VSS experienced in the last few years (see Figure 5.11) has increased the 
demands not only for financial and technical assistance to adjust production systems, 
but also for aid in kind to improve access to proper post-harvest processing facilities. In 
a context of lack of coordination among different stakeholders to assign their cash and 
in kind support, of a widespread feeling that the roasters and traders’ contribution is 
very modest compared to their returns, and of declining farmer’s incomes due to the 
drop in Colombia’s harvest, it is possible that the rising production costs from certified 
production and the erosion of the price premiums, might have reduced the producers´ 
incentives to innovate in the different spheres of upgrading. 
 
The analysis becomes even more complex when the indicators were assessed by farm 
size. What emerged from the study is that the size of the farm conditioned the potential 
upgrading opportunities provided by the involvement in VSS. Although evidence has 
shown that smallholders can participate from VSS markets (Henson, Jaffee et al. 2009), 
the fact is that small scale farmers below one hectare, both treated and not-treated, are 
at a disadvantage compared to certified large scale farmers above five hectares in term 
                                                          
48 It is important to remember that each coffee grower in Colombia pays a “contribution” of between 4% 
and 6% for each pound sailed, depending on the level of the Colombian FOB sale price. This money is used 
by the FoNC to fulfil its duties of providing both essential public goods and services, as well as to perform 
its role as a buyer of last resort (please see section 5.3 Institutions and Regulatory framework). 
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of access to institutional arrangements to facilitate upgrading and investments and 
adoption of GAP to improve upgrading trajectories.  
 
In this sense, the outcomes of the analysis for the set of 15 matched indicators by farm 
size were not encouraging and draws a bleak picture for small producers (see Table 6.7). 
In most of the comparisons, quantitative evidence shows that a statistically lower 
proportion of producers below one hectare, particularly those who are not certified, 
received lower levels of support from local organizations and private stakeholders in 
areas related to access to credit, training and technical assistance in GAP. Additionally, 
small farmers carried out a significant lower level of investments needed to supply good 
quality coffee or increase land productivity (yield per hectare) to assure lower unit 
production cost, and higher value and volume.  
 
Evidence, therefore, pointed out that small farmers do not mobilise the same level of 
resources that certification schemes appear to mobilise to support the involvement of 
larger certified farmers. A trend that was corroborated during field work interviews and 
focus groups with key stakeholders of the coffee chain in Colombia, in the sense that 
high yielding, bigger, more trained and capable farmers were on average chosen for the 
certified programmes. This finding was also corroborated by farmers and stakeholders 
affiliated to UTZ Certified in Colombia (García, García et al. 2014) and by Ruben (2014, p 
42) who pointed out that VSS “are not necessarily inclusive” for too small farmers. 
  
In terms of the conventional producers, at some point, this situation could be seen as a 
source of exclusion that contributes to their further marginalization with a view to 
certification. This is an important fact, as it raises questions about the sustainability of 
those schemes that are promoting the adoption of the requirements of VSS among 
farmers who face deeper structural constraints that limited the potential of certified 
production to fulfil basic needs and provide a sustainable livelihood (Ruben 2014). In 
particular, those farmers who live in survival units and do not have the capacities, the 
incentives and assistance to implement upgrading strategies and participate in the 
market of certified coffees.  
 
As will show in the next chapter, not all of the producers can take advantage of VSS 
programmes and for that reason policies aimed at supporting producers and enhancing 
their upgrading capabilities need to be realistic (Humphrey 2005, ECLAC 2008). Even if 
producers improve their upgrading trajectories, the impossibility to modify their scale-
constraints makes impossible to generate sustainable income over time. As has been 
pointed by Ruben (2014, p. 42) in many cases the size of the farm is “too small to provide 
a decent income in the long run”. Under these circumstances, producing and selling 
sustainable coffee is a subsistence economic activity without the potential to become a 
structural solution to take farmers out from the subsistence agriculture and assure 
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outcomes in livelihood activities related to poverty reduction, improving of employment 
conditions, food security, risk and vulnerability, among others.  
 
Therefore, as a way to increase their credibility, a big step from VSS initiatives would be 
to recognize that specialty and certified markets cannot be the unique tool to help very 
small coffee producers to overcome structural constraints faced for decades. The costs 
of certified production are high and may take years and a prolonged investment before 
they are recouped, particularly without institutional support, access to financial 
resources and training about standards and certifications. As such, differentiated coffee 
is a viable solution to generate income in a sustainable way only for those coffee growers 
with the scale, the microclimate advantages and the necessary skills and support to 
innovate in different spheres of economic upgrading to produce quality certified 
products. As Henson and Jaffe (2006) pointed out, significant markets will remain where 
food safety standards are less onerous, at least in the medium term, which offers market 
opportunities for countries (and agribusinesses and producers therein) with lower levels 
of food safety management capacity.  
 
Meanwhile, for countless small producers, complementary measures of market and 
social incorporation should be designed to ensure their access to formal employment 
needed to alleviate their poverty or increase the family income above the poverty line. 
This includes, for example, employment in new productive sectors or access to non-farm 
rural employment and other types of income derived from agricultural activities. 
However, as will be mentioned in the next chapter, this implies a structural 
transformation of the entire economy (Ruben 2014). Until this happens, the options of 
last resort for the smallest farmers are those related to low-productivity services and 
the subsistence agriculture associated to the production of coffee and other cash crops 
that do not provide them the possibility to overcome the problems associated with 
being poor or small through the agricultural production.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
How have two value added initiatives, such as Fairtrade and Nespresso, 
affected the pattern of revenues for producers, and their exposure to 
risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee value chain?  
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter addresses how participation in two Voluntary Sustainable Standards (VSS), 
such as Fairtrade and Nespresso, affected the pattern of revenues for producers, and 
their exposure to risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee value chain  
 
The main goal is to inquire whether the adoption of specific upgrading strategies, 
depicted in Chapter 6, in compliance with the competitive requirements of two VSS has 
achieved its purpose of improving socio-economic conditions for producers. It is 
important to quantitatively assess whether farmers benefit, not only in terms of 
increased cash incomes and profitability, or the distribution of wealth towards a higher 
share of the revenues from the value chains in which they participate, but also in terms 
of the evolution of important livelihood-related variables. As these concerns are 
addressed, special attention is paid to the differences between larger and smaller coffee 
growers. 
 
The rationale behind this question relies on the fact that until now there has been little 
agreement on how the outcomes generated by the adoption of selected voluntary 
sustainability standards (VSS) impact the welfare and livelihoods of coffee producers, 
particularly smallholders. Additionally, and specifically in the coffee sector, several 
researchers agree that there is an increasing demand for effective impact evaluation, 
outcomes and possibilities of these initiatives over time (Blackman and Rivera 2010, Von 
Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of 
Standards and Certification 2012, Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014, Ruben 2014). 
 
Chapter 2 illustrated to what extent the literature provides answers to these questions 
and identifies the knowledge gaps. Chapter 3 explained the methodology used in this 
thesis in order to look for answers to these questions. Chapter 4 and 5 describe the 
global and Colombian coffee industry respectively. Chapter 6 contributed to the debate 
on the impact of the adoption of voluntary sustainability standards on the upgrading 
strategies of coffee growers in a four-year period.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. After this introduction, the second section is 
broken into four sub-sections: (i) the empirical analysis of the gross margins at farm level 
(revenues minus cost); (ii) analysis of the household income by farm size (small, medium 
and large); (iii) the distribution of income and margins between different segments of 
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the coffee global value chain; and (iv) the analysis of key livelihood related variables 
affected by the involvement of producers in VSS. In the third and final section, the main 
conclusions are stated. 
 
7.2 How have the production and trade of Nespresso AAA and Fairtrade affected the 
pattern of producers' revenues, and their exposure to risk and vulnerability in the 
specialty coffee value chain? 
 
This section is broken in four subsections. The first assess the overall economic impact 
at farm level of the production and trade of coffee labelled as Nespresso AAA and 
Fairtrade to test if these schemes have strengthened coffee growers’ economic 
conditions by increasing net incomes and profits. In the second an analysis for three 
different size of farms (small, medium and large) is carried out to test whether the 
participation in VSS have contributed to raise the gross household incomes (income 
coming from coffee, cash crops and off-farm activities) and fulfil their portrayed goal to 
reduce poverty and improve livelihoods. As will mentioned below, none of the studies 
reviewed include information on the respective producers' incomes by farm size as all 
the data is an average of the total sample of producers. The third, carried out an exercise 
to see in these initiatives have promoted differential redistributive outcomes from 
roasters and retailers to the producers.  
 
Finally, the fourth subsection, incorporates horizontal concerns of GVC analysis to 
inquire whether the adoption of specific upgrading strategies to comply with the 
competitive requirements of two VSS have succeeded their goal of improving key 
livelihood-related variables from those producers participating in these schemes, as well 
as their households and their workers. This includes changes in variables related to 
working conditions, salaries, income diversification, food security, dependency from 
coffee, gain and/or loss of household and farm assets (changes in wealth), job security, 
worker participation, among others. Additionally, the study includes changes in 
household perceptions.  
 
As in the previous Chapter, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) was implemented in 
combination with Difference in Difference approach (DID). This allowed for control of 
selection bias and the influence of independent factors. 
 
7.2.1 Economic conditions 
 
Three core economic measures per hectare were considered to identify the pattern of 
returns and profitability:49 (i) the gross margin, which is the difference between the 
                                                          
49 Data is presented in COP (1 USD = ± 2,000 COP) not only to avoid the interference of macroeconomic 
variables in the conversion process, but also because producers are paid in COP for their coffee.  
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gross revenue and the production cost;50 (ii) the gross revenue, where coffee yield per 
hectare and farm gate prices per kilogram constitute the two main variables, including 
the extra income earned from the premium;51 and (iii) production cost, including the 
labour and input cost. The analysis includes key variables, such as changes in the daily 
agricultural wage (which is compared to the daily legal wage in Colombia), the 
percentage of the total labour that is remunerated, and the participation of hand labour 
in total cost. 
 
These measures help probe if coffee production is profitable and helps coffee growers 
fulfil their basic needs and achieve a sustainable livelihood. The costs of certification 
were not included as the survey revealed that nearly 100% of all the producers did not 
pay for the costs and fees required to maintain the certified status within one or other 
of the programmes, see Table 6.1 above.  
 
It is expected that the impact of adoption of GAP on yields and quality, plus the extra 
efforts and additional investments needed to gain certification, pay off in terms of higher 
gross margins over non-certified producers (Ponte 2008). 
 
7.2.1.1 Gross margins, revenues, and production costs per hectare 
 
It is important to question whether the affiliation of coffee growers to Fairtrade and 
Nespresso, compared with similar control producers, resulted in significant differences 
in gross margins over time.52 Is important to know if changes in the income have 
strengthened coffee growers’ socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, whether this 
increase in margins is, not only as a result of higher prices or higher proportions of coffee 
sold as certified, but also due to higher productivity, or due to lower production costs 
after improvements in the management of the main inputs used for coffee production, 
namely labour, chemicals, and machinery. 
 
After an extensive literature review of the impact of Fairtrade, Nelson and Pound (2009) 
suggested that producers have received both direct and indirect benefits of adopting 
this sustainable scheme. In general, the main conclusion from these studies is that 
Fairtrade has provided a favourable economic opportunity for smallholder farming 
families, in particular during the coffee crisis at the beginning of the century (Raynolds 
2009). The statistical results of these works concluded that the impact of sales of 
certified coffee resulted in significantly better prices for farmers (Bacon 2005). Field 
work interviews with representatives of Fairtrade organizations confirmed that during 
                                                          
50 Section 3.7.2.1 describes the operationalization of these concepts.  
51 The survey does not discriminate between the sustainability and quality premium. 
52 The profit per hectare was not calculated, since information about depreciation cost was not included 
in the survey. 
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the first years of this century Fairtrade certification reduced income vulnerability and 
provided benefits through the price premiums, which were then invested in productive 
infrastructure, debt payments, provision of credit, costs of certification and educational 
projects in the communities of producers, among others.  
 
In contrast, more recent research, using rigorous impact studies, conclude that the 
involvement in Fairtrade lead to modest increases in farmer incomes and farm 
production methods. Comparison studies indicate that although there is greater 
productivity and better prices on farms producing coffee with the Fairtrade label, these 
differences were not large enough to generate a clear effect, in particular because 
producers could not sell all their harvest as certified and effectively receive a price 
premium (Fort and Ruben 2008, Beuchelt and Zeller 2011, Ruben and Fort 2012). This is 
explained by the excess supply of Fairtrade coffee and the limited effective demand that 
producers faced for the certified product (this issue was mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5).  
 
In the case of the Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality programme, there is no systematic 
analysis of value chain available, nor any published rigorous impact studies about its 
effects related to revenues, and whether they improve the living conditions and farmers’ 
livelihoods. Most of the information accessible has been published by Nestle-Nespresso 
at its web page with the exception of couple of unpublished studies (INCAE 2011, CRECE 
2013). 
 
As a result, as VSS in the coffee sector have increased, a growing body of researchers 
consider there is no compelling evidence that coffee certifications are achieving their 
purported socioeconomic and environmental benefits. They argue that few of the 
available impact studies are based on rigorous counterfactual comparison. Additionally, 
very few involve at least two rounds of surveys to assess differences over time to 
attempt to measure changes in income, expenditure or assets for participating 
households (Ruben and Fort 2012) and for this reason it is difficult to attribute outcomes 
and impacts directly to certifications (Giovannucci and Potts 2008, Blackman and Rivera 
2010, Alvarez and Von Hagen 2011, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Steering Committee 
of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012, Hoebink, 
Ruben et al. 2014, Ruben 2014).  
 
In order to contribute to this debate, and based on the findings of the three rounds of 
surveys, this section measures changes in gross margins, revenues, and productions 
costs per hectare, as well as trends in key variables related to the farm gate price, the 
quantity of coffee sold to the sustainable market, the daily agricultural wage, and the 
proportion of paid labour.  
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Gross margin (gross revenues minus production cost) 
The overall impact of certification on farmer income is the gross margin per hectare. In 
this sense, although farmers affiliated to Nespresso AAA_1 and Fairtrade obtained 
significantly higher gross margins per hectare during some of the three surveys, these 
differences disappear at endline and no significant differences-in-differences over time 
are reported (line 2 Table 7.1). This result, in the case of Fairtrade certification, confirms 
the findings of Ruben and Fort (2012) and Hoebink et al. (2014: p. 8) in the sense that 
the total gross margin is “modest and fairly limited”.  
 
Interestingly, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers, which 
are in two different stages of certification, revealed that AAA_2 producers obtained 
higher gross margins over time as significant difference-in-difference were reported 
compared to AAA_1 producers (line 10 Table 7.1). As was mentioned in Chapter 6, to 
interpret DID results, it is important to take into account the differences between years 
for both certified and controls as well as the differences within years between the target 
and controls. Only when the difference for the treated group between the first and 
second years exceeds the difference between the first and second years for the controls 
is there potential of program-related impact, assuming other factors are accounted for 
(Bennet, Giovannucci et al. 2013).  
 
In terms of trends, the difference in the gross margins for Nespresso AAA_1 and 
Fairtrade, and their respective control groups,53 narrowed successively. For the former, 
differences decreased from 165% in 2008; to 56% in 2009; to 31% in 2011. Similarly, for 
Fairtrade producers, differences in gross margins decreased – from 70%; to 39% and 
44% compared to conventional producers during the same years. For farmers affiliated 
to Nespresso AAA_2, the gross margins during the surveys of 2009 and 2011 were, on 
average, 11% below, and 102% respectively higher than AAA_1 producers. 
 
Gross revenues (average farm gate price * yield per hectare) 
The quantitative research revealed that AAA_1 producers had significant higher 
revenues compared to their respective control group during the three surveys. Although 
at a decreasing rate compared the control group during the surveys capturing data from 
2008, 2009, and 2011 - 97%, 45% and 24% respectively (line 1 Table 7.1). As a result, the 
data does not reveal significant differences in differences.  
 
Meanwhile, there was significant difference-in-difference detected that shows that, 
over time, the involvement in Fairtrade implies higher revenues compared to 
                                                          
53 Two separate groups of Nespresso at two different stages of certification are analysed in order to 
compare the impact on producers of the strategic changes adopted by the Nespresso AAA Sustainable 
Quality Programme. The first group of producers labelled as AAA_1 adhered to the Programme in 2008, 
while the second group labelled as AAA_2 join to the programme in 2009. 
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conventional farmers (line 5 Table 7.1). During the three surveys Fairtrade producers 
had significantly higher revenues compared to their respective control group 54%, 56% 
and 77% respectively during the three surveys. Interestingly, the data revealed 
significant differences in differences that show that the involvement in Nespresso 
AAA_2 imply higher revenues compared to Nespresso AAA_1 farmers (line 9 Table 7.1).  
 
Average farm gate prices, sales of certified coffee, and production levels  
Although Nespresso AAA_1 and Fairtrade coffee growers received significantly higher 
average farm gate prices for their coffee compared to conventional produces during the 
three surveys, quantitative data revealed that this effect disappeared at endline and no 
significant differences-in-difference between certified and conventional producers were 
detected (line 3 and 7 Table 7.1). In contrast, the comparison between the two strands 
of Nespresso producers revealed significant difference-in-difference between the 
groups as participation in Nespresso AAA_2 influenced higher farm gate prices 
compared to the group labelled as AAA_1 (line 11 from Table 7.1).  
 
From quantitative data, it also emerges that price differentials between certified and 
conventional coffee decreased over time, while the share of the harvest sold as certified 
increased over time, see Table 7.2 (this trend was also mentioned in Chapter 5, Figure 
5.13). For example, for Nespresso AAA_1 the average farm gate price was 12%; 13% and 
9% higher than the group of conventional producers during the three surveys capturing 
data of 2008, 2009 and 2011 respectively, meanwhile the amount of coffee sold as 
certified rose from 78% during the first survey to nearly 90% during the third survey. For 
Fairtrade, while price differential was 14%; 16% and 7% higher compared to the control 
group during the three surveys respectively, the sales of Fairtrade certified coffee 
increased from 3% to 55%54 between the first and the third survey. For those producers 
labelled as Nespresso AAA_2 the share sold as certified coffee rose from 80% during the 
second survey to 92% during the third survey, Table 7.2, while farm gate prices were 3% 
below the farm gate price of Nespresso AAA_1 and 1% above during the second and 
third surveys respectively.  
 
This results contradicts the idea that higher prices should be the more direct measure 
of impact of economic sustainability (Daviron and Ponte 2005) and one of the main 
mechanisms through which sustainability private standards have been thought to 
reduce poverty and improve the livelihood of producers (Panhuysen and VanReenen 
2012, COSA 2013). Data shows how certified farmers’ gross revenues have been hit by 
cyclically low coffee prices that also affects certified coffees. 
                                                          
54 A number of works have mentioned the gap at farm level between the volume of sustainable coffee 
that is produced as certified and actually purchased as certified for most of the sustainable initiatives 
(Giovannucci, Liu et al. 2008, Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010, García, Ochoa et al. 2013a, Potts, Lynch et 
al. 2014). This issue was raised in chapters 4 and 5. 
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Table 7.1 Income variables for Nespresso and Fairtrade certifications – 2008 - 2011 
 
AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol coef. SE 
1 Gross revenue (Thousand COP/ha) 5,999 3,044 *** 8,692 6,008 *** 6,599 5,317 * -1,444 901
2 Gross margin£  (Thousand COP/ha) 2,974 1,124 *** 5,965 3,827 *** 3,802 2,911 -936 848
3 Average farm gate price (Thousand COP/@
§
) 61.4 54.8 *** 83.3 73.5 *** 100.6 92.3 *** 0.8 2.0
4 Yield of dry parchment coffee (@/ha) 92.5 53.5 *** 98.0 79.6 ** 63.4 52.6 -28.0 10.0 ***
Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol coef. SE 
5 Gross revenue (Thousand COP/ha) 5,711     3,714  *** 6,457   4,132 *** 7,794   4,412  *** 1,255  695  *
6 Gross margin - (Thousand COP/ha) 1,537     903     ** 2,438   1,753 ** 3,445   2,399  ** 470     572  
7 Average farm gate price (Thousand COP/@
§
) 54.6       47.7    *** 71.6     61.7   *** 96.9     90.6    *** 0.0 1.7
8 Yield of parchment coffee (@/ha) 103.5 73.8 *** 87.4 65.4 *** 77.8 44.0 *** 10.17 8.89
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1 coef. SE 
9 Gross revenue (Thousand COP/ha) 8,287   8,341 8,829 7,343 * 2,750  870  ***
10 Gross margin - (Thousand COP/ha) 5,031   5,629 5,363 4,039 * 2,699  739  ***
11 Average farm gate price (Thousand COP/@
§
) 79.3     81.9   * 103.6   102.2  5.9 2.1 ***
12 Yield of parchment coffee (@/ha) 102.8 96.7 82.44 69.53 * 21.7    9.2   **
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations 
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p< 0,1; 1 USD = ± 2,000 COP
£
 Gross margin = (Gross revenue - production cost); 
§
 @=12.5 kg;
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
2008 2009 2011
Difference in 
difference
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Table 7.2 Percentage of coffee sold as certified and conventional 
 
 
Surprisingly, the surveys showed that participating coffee growers did not choose to 
adopt multiple certifications at farm level, which is a common trend as described in 
Chapter 5 (Graph 5.17) and has been depicted in plenty of works (Giovannucci, Liu et al. 
2008, Potts, Van der Meer et al. 2010, García, Ochoa et al. 2013a, Potts, Lynch et al. 
2014). For example, for the group of producers affiliated to Fairtrade, the sales of 
certified coffee in other schemes decreased from 5% to 1% between the first and the 
third survey. For the two groups of Nespresso producers, this share was below 2%. As a 
result, the attribution of the effects of certification is simplified, since practically 100% 
of producers in this study only adopted a one VSS.  
 
Meanwhile, looking at the differences over time for the yield of coffee per hectare,55 the 
quantitative data revealed that coffee growers within Nespresso AAA_1 and Fairtrade 
certification do not have more productive farms and do not obtain better yields than 
their counterparts, as the difference-in-difference analysis against conventional 
producers was not significant statistically (Line 4 and 8 Table 7.1). For example, although 
the analysis of Nespresso AAA_1 producers showed significant higher production levels 
during the first and second survey, this effect disappeared by the third survey and 
negative significant differences over time are reported. Similarly, Fairtrade coffee 
growers have more productive farms and obtained better yields during 2008, 2009 and 
2011 compared to control producers, but over time these effects disappear and no 
significant differences-in-difference are reported. 
 
Interestingly, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers revealed 
that the involvement in Nespresso AAA_2 compared to Nespresso AAA_1 positively 
influences higher production volumes per hectare as positive significant difference-in-
difference were found (Line 12 Table 7.3). The yield per hectare from those farmers 
                                                          
55 It is important to mention that the three surveys were carried out in a context of a strong reduction in 
Colombian coffee production. In chapter 5 was mentioned that the primary factor responsible for this 
situation was the long and strong rainfall period affecting coffee flowering and coffee bean formation. 
Rains in 2008 were well above the historic average. The increase in humid conditions caused increased 
outbreaks of leaf rust, which were not limited to lower elevations as normal, but also affected coffee 
production at higher elevations. For example, in 2008 production reached 12,515,000 bags but collapsed 
to 8,664,000 the year after. Additionally, extremely high fertilizer prices in 2007, 2008 and 2009 
discouraged growers from applying fertilizer to their trees. 
2008 2009 2011 2008 2009 2011 2009 2011
Original certification 78% 85% 90% 3% 39% 55% 80% 92%
Other certifications 0% 1% 0% 5% 2% 1% 2% 0%
Conventional 21% 15% 10% 92% 59% 43% 18% 8%
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Nespresso AAA_2Nespresso AAA_1 Fairtrade
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affiliated to Nespresso AAA_2 were, on average, 6% and 19% respectively higher than 
AAA_1 producers during the surveys of 2009 and 2011. 
 
One important finding that emerged from field interviews is that producers are not 
completely aware of the impact that certification has on changing farming practices and 
yields, and in turn on their socio-economic viability .56 Their main motivation to 
participate in certified programmes is to secure higher prices for their coffee, while only 
a few expressed that their decision to adopt VSS was to improve farming and 
management practices. In this sense, a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) study 
conducted by Perdomo et al. (2007) indicates that the Colombian farmers have the 
potential to increase yields using similar levels of inputs as their more productive and 
technical efficient counterparts from Vietnam, Costa Rica, or Brazil. 
 
Data revealed that significant gross revenues are more easily achieved by reaching 
higher yields than with higher farm gate prices. Therefore, the adoption of the 
requirements imposed by VSS helps farmers earn more through gains in efficiency, 
improved crop quality, increase in production, and controlling farm costs, than through 
higher prices and premiums (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005, Panhuysen and VanReenen 
2012, García, Ochoa et al. 2013a, García, Ochoa et al. 2013b). Nonetheless, interviews 
during the fieldwork revealed that extension services and VSS operators would often 
highlight higher prices and premiums as the main motivation to encourage producer 
participation, and do not mention the impact VSS will have on productivity and reduced 
costs. Based on the data, however, participating producers need to understand, that the 
gross margins depend not only on price premiums, but particularly from key investments 
and adoption of good agricultural practices that lead to higher yield and quality.  
 
Production cost, daily wage, and share of paid labour57 
Were certified coffee growers able to increase their technical efficiency, and did this 
result in reduced production costs? Survey quantitative data revealed that significantly 
higher revenues from coffee sales for certified producers were not enough to offset 
significantly higher production costs.  
 
The quantitative research revealed that Fairtrade producers had both significantly 
higher production costs per hectare and production costs per unit produced (Average 
                                                          
56 Yield and quality, for example, is affected by the adoption of the package of good agricultural practices 
required by the certifications programmes, which includes intensity of training, levels of fertilisation 
applied to the trees, the average age of the coffee trees and the share of trees planted with rust resistant 
varieties, among other variables (Duque and Bustamante 2002). 
57 Production costs include: hired labour, coffee-picking, milling, the renewal of old trees, management, 
control of pests, diseases and weeds, and input costs (chemical fertilization as well as pest, disease and 
weed control). Certification costs are not included as it is usually paid by others actors such as NGOs, 
development agencies, government, buyers or producers organizations (please see section 4.4.3). 
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unit cost) compared to their respective control group during the three surveys with data 
of 2008, 2009 and 2011. In terms of hectare, for example, differences increased at an 
increasing rate - 49%, 69% and 116% respectively. Additionally, there was a significant 
difference-in-difference detected that shows that the involvement in Fairtrade requires 
significantly more cash expenditure per hectare over time in their plantations compared 
to conventional farmers (line 6 and 7 Table 7.3).  
 
Contrastingly, for Nespresso AAA_1 growers, the data did not reveal significant 
differences in the change over time. Although the quantitative analysis revealed 
significant higher production costs compared to the control group during the three 
surveys, this difference decreased over time. In terms of the production cost per 
produced unit, the analysis did not reveal statistical differences during the survey and 
over time (line 1 and 2 Table 7.3).  
 
Interestingly, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers at 
different stages of certification did not reveal significant difference-in-difference 
overtime, this despite the fact that AAA_2 producers have significantly higher 
production costs per hectare compared to AAA_1 group during the survey capturing 
data of 2009 (line 11 Table 7.3). However, this difference decreased and disappeared 
over time. Additionally, the quantitative analysis revealed negative significant 
difference-in-difference between the two groups, which means that over time those 
producers labelled as Nespresso AAA_2 had significant lower production costs per unit 
produced compared to those producers labelled as AAA_1 (line 11 and 12 Table 7.3).  
 
In terms of the proportion of paid labour among treated and no-treated producers, the 
involvement in the Fairtrade certification negatively affected the proportion of paid 
labour compared to conventional producers. Despite the fact that during the first 
survey, Fairtrade producers paid a significant higher proportion of the labour at farm 
level, this difference was overcome (line 8 Table 7.3). Contrastingly, the comparison 
between the two strands of Nespresso producers did not reveal differences during the 
surveys of 2009 and 2011 (line 13 Table 7.3). 
 
Survey data also revealed that producers (both certified and non-certified) have been 
compensating for their lack of resources to cover their cost of production not only by 
systematically decreasing the share of paid labour, but also paying a daily agricultural 
wage below the legal wage in Colombia (lines 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 15 Table 7.3).58 Overall, 
the share of paid labour, both for certified and control producers, decreased 
substantially with a downward trend and the daily wage was barely a fraction of the 
legal wage established by the government for rural workers. 
                                                          
58 The survey quantifies the number of unpaid daily salaries per year. See Appendix 1 with the 
questionnaire survey (Table 3). 
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Table 7.3 Production cost, percentage of paid labour, daily wage 
 
AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol coef. SE 
1 Cost - (Thousand COP/ha) 3,025 1,921 *** 2,727 2,182 ** 2,797 2,406 * -264 263
2 Average unit cost  (Thousand COP/@§) 41.8 46.9 31.2 35.3 66.7 65.4 9.4 9.4
3 % Paid labour . 59% 50% ** 47% 42% * 37% 36% -0.05 0.04
4 Wage per day  (COP/per day) 8.4 8.3 9.6 8.5 ** 10.1 9.5 339.0 424.5
5 Legal wage per day (COP/per day)
§§ 21.5 21.5 23.2 23.2 25.0 25.0
Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol coef. SE 
6 Cost - (Thousand COP/ha) 4,174    2,810  *** 4,020   2,379 *** 4,349    2,013  *** 1,227   342     ***
7 Average unit cost  (Thousand COP/@
§
) 44.0      40.0    * 52.2     38.9   *** 59.9      57.5    - 2.918 4.803
8 % Paid labor 61% 49% *** 38% 38% - 29% 28% - -0.11 0.04 ***
9 Wage per day  (COP/per day) 17.7 17.7 - 15.2 15.0 - 16.7 14.4 *** 1,909 856 **
10 Legal wage per day (COP/per day)
§§ 21.5 21.5 23.2 23.2 25.0 25.0
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1 coef. SE 
11 Cost - (Thousand COP/ha) 3,256   2,712 ** 3,466 3,304 42 248
12 Average unit cost  (Thousand COP/@
§
) 35.6     31.1   56.3      64.4    -13.4 6.7 **
13 % Paid labor 53% 53% 46% 45% 0.03     0.04    
14 Wage per day  (COP/per day) 10.3 9.5 ** 11.3 10.6 * 443 546
15 Legal wage per day (COP/per day) §§ 23.2 23.2 25.0 25.0
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations 
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p< 0,1; 1 USD = ± 2,000 COP
 § @=12.5 kg; §§ National Department of Statistics
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
2008 2009 2011
Difference in 
difference
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For example, for those farmers labelled as Nespresso AAA_1, the share of paid labour 
decreased from 46% at the first survey to 37% by the third survey (50% to 36% for the 
control group), meanwhile for Fairtrade certified producers the share of paid labour 
decreased from 61% to 29% (49% to 28% for the control group). Additionally, although 
with some differences between certifications due to regional issues, the comparison 
with the legal salary revealed that Nespresso AAA_1 producers paid, on average of the 
three surveys, around 40% of the legal wage. Meanwhile, Fairtrade salaries ranged 
around 71% of the legal wage.  
 
In this regard, producers revealed during interviews that most of them were unable to 
cover their increasing costs of production59 in a context of low coffee prices, higher 
labour costs and higher prices for farm inputs such as fertilizer, and with the downward 
trend in coffee production. In these circumstances, they compensate the lack of 
resources by reducing the most expensive inputs, namely labour, and the frequency and 
intensity of fertilisation.  
 
Following Riisgaard et al. (2010, p. 197) one viable interpretation of this situation is that 
farmers who face stricter quality and performance requirements that raise their 
production costs and face unstable farm gate prices “may react by unilaterally 
restructuring their labour-sourcing regimes at workers’ expense, passing costs and risk 
on to the most vulnerable” to try to smooth household consumption. Relevant literature 
also argues that households, in the face of shocks, counteract by selling productive 
assets like cattle, underlining the importance of crop diversification or by increasing 
child labour (Cortés, Santamaría et al. 2014).  
 
Turning to the difference over time for the proportion of paid labour, although the 
analysis revealed a statistical significant difference between Nespresso AAA_1 and 
conventional farmers at the first and second survey, these differences disappear at 
endline and no significant difference over time was reported. Contrastingly, the 
involvement in Fairtrade certification negatively affected the proportion of paid labour 
compared to conventional producers. Despite the fact that during the first survey 
Fairtrade producers paid a significant higher proportion of the labour at farm level, this 
difference was overcome and negative significant difference-in-difference between the 
two groups was detected. Finally, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso 
producers did not reveal differences during the surveys of 2009 and 2011. 
 
                                                          
59 Added to higher cost of inputs (mainly fertilizers), producers claim that they need to finance several 
types of direct and indirect costs involved with standard compliance and meeting the certifications’ 
requirements. This includes, in particular, the transition cost and those expenses incurred in order to keep 
the certified status of within one or another programme. For example, fertilization represents between 
35% and 46% of the total production cost 
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Concerning the daily agricultural wage, the study confirms that difference-in-difference 
is not significant between Nespresso AAA_1 and conventional farmers, although 
Nespresso producers paid significant higher wages per day during the second survey. 
Meanwhile, differences-in-difference was significant between Fairtrade and 
conventional, which implies that farms affiliated to Fairtrade paid higher salaries 
compared to conventional farms.  
 
Although all certifications support the minimum wage according to national labour laws, 
this is a requirement difficult to comply with. Both interviews during field work and 
quantitative data revealed that the wage in many regions is a fraction of the legal 
minimum wage as a result of a trade-off between the availability of hand labour and 
demand (line 4 and 9 Table 7.3). For example, in the highly rural department of Nariño, 
where there is a proliferation of small farms and higher supply of hand labour, the rural 
salary is very low. Compared with the department of Huila, with an economy less 
dependent from agriculture, the salaries are near to the legal salary (line 4 and 9 Table 
7.3).  
 
7.2.2 Household income by farm size 
 
The main goal of this sub-section is contribute to the debate about the role of voluntary 
sustainability standards to improve the economic sustainability of small producers, one 
of the key objectives for most of these initiatives60 (Giovannucci and Potts 2008, 
Panhuysen and VanReenen 2012, COSA 2013, Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014). In this 
sense, recent impact studies using difference analysis with propensity score matching 
indicate that the potential impact of participation in voluntary sustainability standards 
on poverty and livelihoods are limited and modest (Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014, Ruben 
2014). In this sense, Ruben (2014) pointed out that the small size of the farm of some 
producers is the main structural factor that limits their ability to obtain a decent income 
in the long run (Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014) and to fulfil basic needs and achieve a 
sustainable livelihood. Yet, none of the studies reviewed include information on the 
respective producers’ incomes by farm size, since all the data is an average of the total 
sample of producers.  
 
In order to reach the objective proposed in this subsection, two steps were taken. In first 
place, an analysis of key variables is carried out for certified producers considering three 
farm sizes during three harvest seasons. Including: gross household year income, gross 
income generated by coffee, proportion of income generated by coffee, proportion of 
paid labour, yield, area from the coffee plot, and proportion of the farm planted in 
                                                          
60 This sub-section does not include a discussion on the comparison between certified and non-certified 
producers, this comparison is available in the Appendix 7. The analysis is carried out only for certified 
producers from three size of farms, as the main goal is to reflect on the levels of household income and 
their capacity to improve livelihoods and reduce poverty.  
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coffee. In second place, a welfare analysis is carried out by comparing the monthly 
income per capita in an average household of certified farmers with the per capita 
monthly household income defined by DANE (Spanish acronym for the National 
Department of Statistics) as needed to be above the extreme poverty and poverty lines. 
 
The household monthly income per person is calculated by taking the annual gross 
household income divided by a 12-month period and then by the total number of family 
members living together.61 Following the division stated in chapter 3, and based on 
previous work of the author about the agrarian structure of the coffee sector in 
Colombia (García and Ramírez 2002, García 2003), three farm size were defined: small 
farmers below one hectare; medium size farmers between one and five hectares; and 
large farmers above five hectares. 
 
Small farmers (below one hectare) 
The analyses of the data from Table 7.4 reveals four important findings. Firstly, the size 
of the coffee plots (line 5 Table 7.4) is too small to generate a level of income per year 
from coffee production high enough to secure a sustainable livelihood (line 2 Table 7.4), 
fulfil basic needs and reduce poverty. Moreover, the contribution of potential increases 
in yield could do little to increase the overall household income (line 1 Table 7.4) due to 
the fact that the size of the coffee plot is too small to make a significant contribution.  
 
Secondly, regarding the composition of the income of the farmer households, the 
proportion of the income that is generated by coffee sales is worryingly high (line 3 Table 
7.4). For example, for Nespresso and Fairtrade certified farmers, the share of income 
generated by coffee sales is around 65% and more than 80% of the total household 
income respectively. As a result, farmers are extremely dependent on coffee, since both 
local economies or their participation in VSS62 do not offer non-farm production 
activities or off-farm income, and wage labour for opting out of coffee production. 
According to the field interviews and the quantitative data there are no alternatives in 
other markets of the primary sector or other growing sectors out from the agrarian 
economy. This situation is faced not only to small farmers, but also to medium and larger 
farmers, in particular those affiliated to Fairtrade, as shown in Table 7.4.  
 
                                                          
61 The household income was deducted from two variables: (i) the annual gross revenues coming from 
selling coffee and (ii) the proportion of income generated by coffee. This is due to the fact that the survey 
did not collected information about the amount of cash income coming from non-farm production 
activities, wage labour, crop activities, sales of cattle, or monetization of food stables to consume at the 
household level. 
62 The survey administered in the study asked the farmers on potential sources of income linked to their 
participation in VSS. Farmers were consulted on potential additional income coming from non-farm 
activities or off-farm income (for example, incomes coming from agro-tourism, technician, community 
promoter, and other): at the end, less than 1% responded positively this question. 
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Table 7.4 Household income and income from coffee and related variables by farm sizes 
 
1 Gross household income - (Thousand COP) 1,576     5,498    3,636   661     2,646    2,162    4,699    5,856     
2 Gross margin from coffee
£
  - (Thousand COP) 1,003 3,813 2,135   559 2,276 1,795 2,974 3,480
3 % of income coming from coffee 64% 69% 59% 85% 86% 83% 63% 59%
4 % of paid labor 48% 41% 32% 50% 27% 11% 43% 37%
5 Average coffee area (ha) 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.60 0.61
6 Yield (@§/ha) 106.0 124.5 62.4 148.0 147.9 75.5 102.3 89.7
7 % of the farm area planted in coffee 88% 95% 96% 91% 87% 88% 95% 94%
8 Gross household income - (Thousand COP) 3,511     5,847    7,481   2,683  4,099    7,859    11,741  12,960   
9 Gross margin from coffee
£
  - (Thousand COP) 2,651 3,813 4,715 2,228 3,615 6,881 8,715 8,910
10 % of income coming from coffee 76% 65% 63% 83% 88% 88% 74% 69%
11 % of paid labor 66% 50% 38% 58% 36% 25% 54% 46%
12 Coffee area (ha) 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7
13 Yield (@§/ha) 88.7 85.3 65.6 99.7 81.7 84.1 108.0 84.0
14 % of the farm area planted in coffee 74% 74% 76% 72% 74% 73% 83% 82%
15 Gross household income - (Thousand COP) 3,267     12,973  11,284 6,539  9,448    14,540  16,078  10,914   
16 Gross margin from coffee£ - (Thousand COP) 1,535 7,567 4,965 5,567 8,301 12,400 12,600 8,031
17 % of income coming from coffee 47% 58% 44% 85% 88% 85% 78% 74%
18 % of paid labor 56% 67% 63% 70% 46% 41% 71% 70%
19 Coffee area (ha) 7.3 2.7 1.9 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.5 3.7
20 Yield (@§/ha) 43.7 58.6 49.4 95.8 86.5 68.0 75.0 53.8
21 % of the farm area planted in coffee 19% 42% 32% 44% 44% 45% 57% 53%
£ Gross margin from coffee = (Gross revenue - production cost); § @=12.5 kg;
 1 USD = ± 2,000 COP
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
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Means are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.
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Thirdly, as was mentioned in the previous section, gross margins from coffee have been 
at the expense of reducing the share of paid labour. Although field interviews indicate 
that traditionally family members who work on the farm are not always paid for their 
labour, quantitative evidence signalled that a reducing share of the labour at the 
certified farms have been being remunerated. For example, for Nespresso AAA_1 the 
proportion of remunerated labour decreased from 48% at the first survey to 32% by the 
third survey, while for Fairtrade producers this share decreased from 50% to 11% during 
the same period of time. 
 
Fourthly, the highest ratio between the coffee-growing area and farm size among 
smallholders (line 7 Table 7.4), increased the households’ economic dependency on 
coffee production, making coffee producers more vulnerable to negative exogenous 
changes in the price or strong reductions in coffee production. Additionally, in the 
Colombian context, Dube and Vargas (2013) show that negative exogenous changes in 
the price of coffee exacerbate conflict-related violence in districts in which farmers' 
income depends more heavily on the coffee harvest. They find that a sharp fall in prices 
during the 1990s lowered wages and increased violence differentially in municipalities 
cultivating more coffee.  
 
The precarious conditions of smallholders located in farms below one hectare is even 
more evident after contrasting the per capita monthly household income from certified 
producers (revenue generated from selling coffee - certified and conventional, plus the 
income from cash-crops and earned off-farm), with the household monthly income per 
capita needed to reach the poverty line or the extreme poverty line. 
 
For example, the Figure 7.1 shows how the per capita monthly household income from 
those farmers affiliated to Fairtrade (8% of the total farmers of the sample of Fairtrade, 
see Table 3.3) represented 14%; 55% and 44% of the monthly income per capita needed 
to reach the line of extreme poverty during the surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 
2011 respectively. Considering how dependent producers are on coffee, close to 85% of 
the household income comes from coffee production, and the limited contribution of 
off-farm employment or farm diversification, the ability to generate sustainable rural 
livelihoods is essentially unavailable.  
 
Meanwhile, the situation for Nespresso AAA_1 farmers (42% of the total sample of 
Nespresso AAA_1) is not any better than of other groups. Their per capita monthly 
household income represented 36% and 78% of the income per capita needed to reach 
the extreme poverty line during the surveys of 2008 and 2011 respectively. During 2009, 
for example, although their monthly income per capita was 23% above the income 
needed to reach the extreme poverty line, it only represented 53% of the income 
deemed necessary to reach the poverty line. For producers labelled as Nespresso AAA_2 
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(26% of the total sample of Nespresso AAA_2), their per capita monthly income was 45% 
and 54% below the per capita poverty line during the surveys of 2009 and 2011 
respectively. 
 
Figure 7.1 Household monthly income per capita for small certified farms VS poverty 
and extreme poverty per capita monthly household income  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE surveys and DANE 
 
Medium-size farmers (between 1 and 5 hectares)63 
Medium size producers also face significant challenges to generate a decent income to 
improve livelihoods and reduce poverty (line 8 and 9 Table 7.4). Their situation is slightly 
more promising compared to smaller farmers. In particular, they have more room to 
increase household income by increasing yield per hectare and production volumes due 
to bigger coffee plots (line 12 Table 7.4). Additionally, lower levels of coffee 
specialization compared to small farms (the ratio between coffee growing area and farm 
size) gives them the ability to increase diversification with cash crops (line 14 Table 7.4).  
 
The picture that emerges from the data shown in Table 7.4 revealed similar 
characteristics to those described for small farmers. For example, referring to the 
composition of the income of farmer households, data shown higher levels of 
dependency on coffee earnings, in particular for Fairtrade farmers as nearly 85% of their 
income come from coffee sales (line 10 Table 7.4).  
 
Added to this, data revealed a downward trend in the percentage of the paid labour (line 
11 Table 7.4), although not as strong as in farms below one hectare. For example, the 
share of unpaid labour for Fairtrade certified producers decreased from 58% at the first 
                                                          
63 As was showed in Table 3.3, medium-size farmer predominates in the sample as 51% of Nespresso AA 
to AAA farmers, 63% from Nespresso AAA farmers, and 65% of Fairtrade farmers belong to this stratum. 
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survey to 25% by the third survey, meanwhile for Nespresso AAA_1 producers the share 
of unpaid labour decreased from 66% to 38%. 
 
Figure 7.2 Household monthly income per capita for medium certified farms VS 
poverty and extreme poverty per capita monthly household income  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE surveys and DANE 
 
In terms of household monthly income per capita, the picture that emerges from the 
three surveys confirms the challenges farmers of medium sized farms face when striving 
for a better income. For example, the Figure 7.2 reveals that the income per capita in 
Nespresso AAA_1 and Fairtrade farms were below the line of poverty during the three 
surveys. For example, the per capita monthly household income from those farmers 
affiliated to Nespresso AAA_1 represented 35%; 56% and 69% of the monthly income 
per capita needed to reach the line of poverty during the surveys with data from 2008, 
2009 and 2011 respectively. The situation for Fairtrade certified farmers is similar. Their 
per capita monthly household income represented 25%; 37%; and 68% of the income 
per capita needed to reach the poverty line during the surveys capturing data from 2008, 
2009 and 2011 respectively. Only the group of farmers of Nespresso AAA_2 reached an 
income able to surpass the line of poverty, 12% and 19% during the surveys with data 
from 2009 and 2011.  
 
Larger size farmers (above 5 hectares) 
Finally, the situation for producers that own farms above 5 hectares also requires 
significant efforts to reach a decent income from agricultural production (coffee and 
diversification) and surpass the line of poverty.  
 
The analyses of the composition of the income of farmer households from Table 7.4 
revealed a great dependency on income generated from coffee despite lower levels of 
coffee specialization (the ratio between coffee-growing area and farm size), particularly 
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among Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA_2 producers (line 17 and 21 Table 7.4). This implies 
not only that crop diversification with other cropping activities has not been an 
important element to increase other sources of income for farmers, but also that 
producers with larger farms become extremely vulnerable to shocks and unable to 
mitigate risk. Although in a lower proportion than in smaller farms; higher incomes 
generated from coffee have been at the expense of reducing the share of paid labour, 
in Fairtrade farms in particular (line 18 Table 7.4). Finally, the inverse relationship 
between productivity and farm size indicates plenty of opportunities to increase coffee 
volumes and consequently household income 
 
In terms of household monthly income per capita, the three surveys indicate that 
producers who own farms above 5 hectares have overcome poverty levels, but still are 
vulnerable to key risk factors due to higher dependency from coffee, lower yield 
productivity and scarce sources of income diversification. 
 
Figure 7.3 Household monthly income per capita for large certified farms VS poverty 
and extreme poverty per capita monthly household income  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE surveys and DANE 
 
In this sense, for example, the per capita monthly household income from those farmers 
affiliated to Fairtrade (28% of the total farmers of the sample of Fairtrade, see Table 3.3) 
represented 61% and 85% of the monthly income per capita needed to reach the 
poverty line during the surveys of 2008 and 2009 respectively. During 2011, their income 
was above the poverty household monthly income per capita by 26%. The situation for 
larger Nespresso AAA_1 certified farmers (7% of the total sample) is very similar. Their 
per capita monthly household income represented 33% of the income per capita needed 
to reach the poverty line during the survey of 2008, meanwhile during the surveys of 
2009 and 2011 their per capita monthly household income was higher the per capita 
poverty income by 24% and 4% respectively. Similarly, the average household income 
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per-capita of those affiliated to Nespresso AAA_2 were 54% and 1% above the line of 
poverty during 2009 and 2011 respectively. 
 
7.2.3 Have VSS promoted redistributive outcomes from actors downstream in the 
coffee value chain to coffee producers and other? 
 
The ratio between the price paid to coffee growers and the retail price is a way of 
verifying if these value added initiatives contribute to a redistribution of the value added 
in the coffee GVC toward producers. A similar methodology, with different variations in 
their main variables, has been applied to many GVC analysis in tropical agricultural 
commodity markets by other authors (Talbot 1997, Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001a, Ponte 
2004, Daviron and Ponte 2005, Gibbon 2005, Valkila, Haaparanta et al. 2010, Rueda and 
Lambin 2013) to show how processing companies located at consuming countries are 
receiving an increasing share of the retail price.  
 
Some scholars, however, have emphasized that the concept of using the producer’s 
value share of the retail product in the GVC analysis is not useful (Lewin, Giovannucci et 
al. 2004, Gilbert 2008). They argue that new and increased value is being added to the 
products in the consuming countries through processing, marketing and transformation 
at the retail level. In this same sense, Daviron and Ponte (2005) mentioned that certain 
brands and distributors have the ability to capture the majority of the added value of 
coffee through the control of symbolic or abstract aspects of production, such as 
services or the atmosphere in coffee shops. This includes, for example, flavouring, 
mixing in milk products and providing a specific consumption ambiance (Ponte and 
Kawuma 2003).  
 
However, despite these arguments and ethical discussions, the idea of comparing 
changes in the share of the retail price accrued by farmers sourcing different types of 
specialty coffees provides an idea of the markets in which the coffee growers are 
moving.  
 
As such, the evolution and the differences in the ratio for two different value added 
strategies compared to conventional Colombian coffee between 2009 and 2012 were 
analysed. The analysis includes: a "differentiation from above" strategy as followed by 
Nestle through Nespresso AAA Sustainable QualityTM Program.; a "differentiation from 
below" strategy as used in the production and trade of conventional coffee that is both 
part of the “100% Colombian Coffee” programme and the exports of regional coffees. 
Finally, a "differentiation from the middle" strategy as represented by the production 
and trade of certified Fairtrade coffees.  
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Table 7.5 presents the evolution and the differences of the ratio of the price paid to the 
coffee growers and the retail prices for two different value added strategies compared 
to “100% Colombian coffee”. The price at farm gate price is roasted equivalent which 
mean that the price paid to coffee growers for the parchment coffee has been adjusted 
for the weight losses due to drying during the process of roasting (1.19 lb of parchment 
coffee=1lb of roasted coffee) (ICO 2011h). 
 
At a glance, what is clear from the farm gate prices column is that certified producers 
have been receiving comparatively higher farm-gate prices compared to conventional 
producers that supply the “100% Colombian Coffee”. However, the proportion of the 
retail price accruing to farmers investing in the certifications coffees is less than 
expected. As such, for this exercise the value added initiatives studied in this work do 
not promote differential redistributive outcomes from the roasters and retailers to the 
producers. Interestingly, coffee producers of conventional coffees received a higher 
proportion of the retail prices. Meanwhile high value coffees are a better business for 
roasters and retailers, as a higher proportion of the retail price is captured at this node 
of the value chain.  
 
For example, between 2009 and 2012 producers adhered to Nespresso AAA received 
the higher farm gate price, around 9 % above conventional producer. However, farmers 
capture a smaller proportion of the retail price – around 5%, while the proportion 
accruing to the roaster and retailers were on average 95% (see Table 7.6). Meanwhile, 
for those producers affiliated to Fairtrade, farm-gate prices were on average 7% above 
conventional and capturing on average 16% of the retail price and roasters and retailers 
capture on average 84%. On the other hand, farm gate prices for conventional producers 
represent on average 25% of the retail price, and retailers and roasters captured the 
remaining 75%. Regarding the value captured by local exporters, who can sell both to 
roasters and to importers, as was shown at the Figure 3.5, data revealed that on average 
they captured between 1% and 8% of the retail price. However, this data was only 
available for 2009 and 2010 and for that reason does not appear in the Table 7.4.  
 
This information is consistent with some of the findings of Daviron and Ponte (2005) for 
the Tanzania–Italy value chain for high quality Robusta coffees and Rueda and Lambin 
(2013) for high-quality single serve coffee sold in the Colombia-United States value 
chain. In these cases, the farm gate price represented 5% and 6% of the retail price, 
respectively. Gilbert (2008) has explained that the relative coffee content of the final 
consumption was low, as such only around half of the retail coffee prices are attributable 
to the FOB price of coffee as new and increased value is being added to the products in 
the consuming countries through processing, marketing and transformation at the retail 
level. This is the case of Nespresso and its technique to prepare single-serve high-quality 
coffee. 
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Table 7.5 Distribution of coffee income for three types of coffee – 2009 to 2012  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from 10 Cooperatives of coffee growers; ShymphonyIRI 
Group (2013) and Nespresso Boutique Selfridges London (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) 
*Roasted coffee equivalent 
**VAT excluded 
 
Surprisingly, redistributive incomes resulting from branding from below were less than 
expected. Although producers received higher farm-gate prices, regional coffees do not 
reconfigure the power relations, and the structure of governance within the value chain 
for coffee. In contrast, branding from the middle offered a better deal for coffee 
producers.  
 
7.2.4 Risk and vulnerability64  
 
This subsection aims to integrate horizontal concerns into the value-chain framework 
through the analysis of the impact of the adoption of two VSS on key livelihood related 
variables. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the idea of linking vertical and horizontal concerns 
in GVC analysis has been stated by Ponte (2008) and then developed by Bolwig et al. 
(2010) and Riisgaard et al. (2010). Therefore, understanding the integration of coffee 
growers within value chain structures requires more than an analysis of producers’ 
incomes, or changes in income distribution. Rather, it calls for attention to how 
participation, in particular value chains structures, generate outcomes in livelihood 
activities related to poverty reduction, improving of employment conditions (i.e. job 
security and salaries), food security, risk and vulnerability, among other key variables 
(Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010).  
 
                                                          
64 The author follows the definition of vulnerability and risk of Bolwig et al. (2010)  
2009 1.4                27% 4.3 73%
2010 1.8                30% 5.0 70%
2011 2.4                34% 5.9 66%
2012 1.6                23% 5.6 77%
2009 1.5                14% 9.2 86%
2010 1.9                17% 9.4 83%
2011 2.5                21% 10.2 79%
2012 1.7                13% 10.6 87%
2009 1.6                4% 30.4 96%
2010 2.0                5% 30.9 95%
2011 2.5                6% 34.3 94%
2012 1.7                4% 34.3 96%
2009 1.5                11% 10.9 89%
2010 1.9               15% 10.6 85%
2011 2.4                17% 11.9 83%
2012 1.7                11% 13.4 89%
Fairtrade 
Nesspresso AAA
Regional
Retail price 
(USD/lb.)**
Proportion of 
retail price
Conventional
Type of coffee Year
Farm-gate 
price 
(USD/lb.)*
Proportion of 
retail price
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Based on the availability of information this subsection assesses differences over time 
for a set of key related variables, including: households’ dependence on income from 
the sale of coffee, income diversification with cash crops other than coffee, food 
security, accumulation of capital through availability of farm and household assets, 
working conditions at farm level, changes in production cost and coffee prices. Finally, a 
set of variables regarding households’ perceptions during the three surveys is tested for 
differences between certified and non-certifies producers.  
 
Household income 
As described above in subsection 7.2.2, coffee producers have a very deep dependency 
on coffee as the primary source of cash income at household level due to the reduction 
in cash crops other than coffee, and almost no access to non-farm rural production 
activities and wage labour – both on treated and non-treated producers.  
 
However, there were some contrasting differences between certifications. While there 
are not difference-in-difference between Nespresso AAA_1 and conventional 
producers, contrastingly, participation in the Fairtrade certification positively influences 
dependence from coffee compare to conventional producers.  
 
For example, the study revealed a significant difference between Nespresso AAA_1 and 
conventional producers during the first survey, but these differences disappeared at 
endline and no significant differences over time are reported (line 1 Table 7.6). On 
average of the three surveys, the proportion of income generated from coffee was 65% 
and 61% for certified and non-certified producers respectively. Similarly, the comparison 
between the two strands of Nespresso, did not find significant differences during the 
two surveys and overtime (line 11 Table 7.6).  
 
Meanwhile, Fairtrade producers are highly dependent from the income generated by 
coffee, and significant differences were observed during the three surveys and 
significant difference-in-difference between the groups was detected. On average of the 
three surveys, the proportion of income generated from coffee was 86% and 70% for 
certified and non-certified producers respectively (line 6 Table 7.6). 
 
This situation makes coffee producers’ livelihood systems extremely vulnerable and 
affects their future capacity to withstand external shocks, such as adverse weather, 
market volatility or changes in production. The situation is exacerbated by virtually non-
existent non-farm rural employment and low incomes from other agricultural 
activities.65 With respect to this last point, farmers were consulted during the three 
                                                          
65 As was mentioned above, Dube and Vargas (2013) show that negative exogenous changes in the price 
of coffee exacerbate conflict-related violence in districts in which farmers' income depends more heavily 
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surveys on the potential additional income coming from non-farm activities or off-farm 
income linked to their participation in VSS (for example, incomes coming from agro-
tourism, technician, community promoter, and other). Farmers revealed that few 
alternative livelihood options are available as less than 1% responded positively this 
question. This situation was confirmed by some interviewees who expressed 
dissatisfaction with the scarce access to off-farm income and diversification markets 
with cash crops other than coffee to assure alternative sources of income and lower 
risks. 
 
Cash and food crops 
Diversification away from a traditional and popular non-perishable cash crops like coffee 
is not easy in Colombia (Giovannucci, Leibovich et al. 2002). This situation increases the 
households’ economic dependency on coffee and therefore makes producer more 
vulnerable to specific risks. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the FNC holds among its 
responsibilities guaranteeing the purchase at a fair price of all coffees offered which 
comply with predetermined and nationally known quality requirements. Additionally, 
there have been price subsidies that guarantee a price support for coffee production, 
subsidies for the renovation of coffee plantations, and subsidies to buy fertilizers, among 
others subsidies.  
 
Therefore, in the Colombian context, what emerges is that most of the crops at coffee 
farms are exclusively associated with food security while there have been little 
diversification into other cash crops that could help balance this dependence (Clavijo, 
Jaramillo et al. 1994). Additionally, field interviews revealed that there are no 
programmes to promote diversification and the government has not played a key role 
in any diversification initiatives. For example, there are no programmes helping 
producers to assess specific issues related to appropriate technology, risks, necessary 
skills, financing, information, and markets, among others. In general, on-farm 
diversification is mainly the result of farmers’ own initiatives. 
 
The survey data was consistent with this information. For example, referring to the 
coffee growers’ efforts to produce food staples to improve food’s consumption at the 
household level and increase their levels of food security, evidence revealed that there 
were not significant differences-in-difference between certified and non-certified farms. 
In this sense, on average among 90% and 99% of both certified and conventional farmers 
indicated that they produced crops for own consumption (lines 3, 8, and 13 Table 7.6).  
 
Meanwhile, the quantitative research show differences in terms of the proportion of 
producers that grow cash crops other than coffee (i.e. plantain, maize, beans, tomatoes, 
                                                          
on the coffee harvest. They find that a sharp fall in prices during the 1990s lowered wages and increased 
violence differentially in municipalities cultivating more coffee. 
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yucca, etc) between treated and non-treated producers. For example, a significant 
higher proportion of Nespresso AAA_1 producers growing cash crops during the first 
and third surveys, although the difference in the change over time is not significant. On 
average of the three surveys, the proportion of farmers growing cash crops were 67% 
and 54% for certified and non-certified producers respectively (lines 2 Table 7.6).  
 
Contrastingly, the involvement in Fairtrade negatively influences the proportion of 
producers growing cash crops, indicating that certified farmers have lower levels of crop 
diversification compared with non-certified farmers (lines 7 Table 7.6). Evidence showed 
that during the three surveys there were a significant higher proportion of conventional 
producers reported having planted products in their farms to sell at local markets and 
gain some extra earnings. As result, negative significant effects were found over time. 
On average of the three surveys, the proportion of farmers growing cash crops were 
27% and 66% for certified and non-certified producers respectively.  
 
This situation, which has been reported by Fort and Ruben (2008) and Alvarez and Von 
Hagen (2011) for Fairtrade producers in Peru and Costa Rica, could be analysed from 
two different perspectives. Firstly, as is the case with the Fairtrade farmers interviewed, 
higher prices and improved market access for their coffee during the coffee crisis at the 
beginning of the century made these farmers more optimistic, which and this 
encouraged them to reduce the area dedicated to other cash crops. On the other hand, 
however, the efforts to increase the level of coffee specialization and avoid diversifying 
into other cash crops, has increased the dependency on the producers on their coffee 
earnings. By concentrating their activities on a single source of income without ensuring 
income diversification, producers do not spread risks and become more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the market, adverse weather and less resilient to external shocks. Despite 
the fact that the production of food staples by Fairtrade producers could improve food 
security for participating households, Fairtrade’s strategy of enhancing farmers’ welfare 
through price certainty instead of input/knowledge upgrading as other schemes 
(Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014) reveals a “relatively lack [of] vision in fair trade initiatives 
in terms of promoting diversification of production and income” (Ponte and Kawuma 
203: p. 119). 
 
Average number of farm and household assets 
Whether or not farmers were able to increase significantly their farm and household 
assets within a four-year interval indicates whether they are enhancing their livelihoods 
and overall welfare.  
 
In this sense, this study compared changes in the wealth status among producers 
adhered to Nespresso and Fairtrade and their respective control groups, by testing 
changes during three harvests on the accumulation both of household assets (including 
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appliances such as televisions sets, fridge, stove, washing machine, computer, internet 
access, cell phone, and working animals) and farm assets (including constructions and 
infrastructure, vehicles, motorcycle, dryer-silo, pulping machine, becolsub, engine, 
chainsaw, scythe, toaster, bascule, electric generator, water pump, computer, and 
others). For this purpose the average number of household assets per farm ranged in a 
scale from 1 to 9, while the average number of agricultural assets owned by one farmer 
ranged in a scale from 1 to 15, both for certified and non-certified farms.  
 
Overall, both certified and non-certified producers were able to accumulate assets 
between the first and the third survey (lines 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, and 15 Table 7.6). However, 
the analysis revealed that over time only Fairtrade and AAA_2 producers’ were able to 
accumulate a significant higher amount of household and farms assets respectively in 
the difference-in-difference analysis.  
 
For Nespresso AAA_1 producers, the study did not find significant difference-in-
difference regarding either household or farm assets. Although statistically significant 
differences between certified and non-certified producers were observed during the 
three surveys for household assets and the second survey for farm assets, these 
differences disappeared and no significant differences over time were reported. 
Regarding the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers, the 
analysis did not reveal differences-in-differences about the changes in household assets. 
Notwithstanding, Nespreso AAA_2 producer not only showed a significantly higher 
amount of farm assets during the survey of 2009 compared to Nespresso AAA_1 
farmers, but also significant difference-in-difference over time. 
 
Meanwhile, the study found that involvement in Fairtrade certification does positively 
influence the accumulation of household and farms assets. Looking at the differences 
over time, the study revealed significant differences between Fairtrade and 
conventional producers during the three surveys regarding assets. However, significant 
difference-in-difference between the groups were detected only for the amount of 
household assets as the difference in the change over time was not significant for the 
comparison of farms assets.  
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Table 7.6 Changes in key livelihood variables  
 AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol  AAA_1 Ctrol coef. SE 
1 % of family income coming from coffee 69% 61% ** 67% 64% 60% 57% -0.075 0.049
2 % of farms with cash crops other than coffee 41% 32% * 91% 89% 70% 41% *** 0.099 0.083
3 % of farms with food crops 93% 95% - 99% 96% 96% 94% -0.002 0.041
4 Average number of assets at the household (1 to 9)
§ 3.8 3.4 ** 3.6 3.2 ** 4.0 3.4 ** -0.110 0.162
5 Average number of assets at the farm (1 to 15)§§ 0.8 0.7 1.8 1.4 ** 2.7 2.9 0.063 0.194
Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol coef. SE 
6 % of family income coming from coffee 84% 74% *** 88% 69% *** 86% 67% *** 0.097 0.031 ***
7 % of farms with cash crops other than coffee 32% 60% *** 31% 74% *** 19% 64% *** -0.176 0.071 **
8 % of farms with food crops 98% 93% ** 91% 94% 97% 97% -0.029 0.033
9 Average number of assets at the household (1 to 9)§ 4.7 4.1 *** 4.7 3.8 *** 5.0 4.2 *** 0.386 0.191 **
10 Average number of assets at the farm (1 to 15)§§ 2.3 1.3 *** 3.9 2.5 *** 4.7 3.6 *** 0.178 0.304
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1 coef. SE 
11 % of family income coming from coffee 72% 67% 67% 62% 0.010 0.043
12 % of farms with cash crops other than coffee 83% 85% 74% 70% 0.079 0.072
13 % of farms with food crops 98% 98% 96% 96% 0.000 0.031
14 Average number of assets at the household (1 to 9)§ 4.5 4.2 4.7 4.5 -0.188 0.162
15 Average number of assets at the farm (1 to 15)
§§ 2.6 2.3 4.0 3.0 *** 1.263 0.291 ***
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations 
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
§ Include televisions sets, fridge, stove, washing machine, computer, internet access, cell phone, and working animals
§§
 include constructions and infrastructure, vehicles, motorcycle, dryer-silo, pulping machine, becolsub, engine, chainsaw, scythe, 
toaster, bascule, electric generator, water pump, computer, and others
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Indicator
2008 2009 2011 Difference in difference
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Working conditions 
Whether workers benefit for labouring in certified farms is another important question 
that contributes to test the horizontal impacts of VSS. This study included the analysis 
of changes in two key variables:66 whether workers were training in activities for farm 
improvement and quality issues. The second one, tested whether workers received an 
endowment of protective gear to carry out key tasks at farm level.  
 
The overall picture that emerges from the data is contrasting among certifications. 
Fairtrade workers received a significant higher proportion of protective gear compared 
to control workers (particularly clothing for agrochemical sparing to comply with 
certification requirements during audits). However, participation in Fairtrade negatively 
affected the access of workers to training. Meanwhile, the involvement in Nespresso 
AAA_1 certification influences positively the access of workers to free training, but 
negatively influences the supply of protective gear to work at the farm (lines 1, 2, 5, 6 
Table 7.7). 
 
Interestingly, when comparing the two strands of Nespresso producers, the study 
revealed that a significantly higher proportion of the employees at Nespresso AAA_2 
farms, compared to Nespresso AAA_1 farms; received training during the third survey 
and significant difference-in-difference overtime are reported. This is a very interesting 
finding as it suggests that Nespresso’s producers are more interested in training because 
of quality concerns. Contrastingly, there were no statistical differences regarding the 
provision of protective gear to carry out key tasks at farm level (lines 9 and 10 Table 7.7).  
 
Perception of market risk 
Another important point of inquiry is whether upgrading strategies linked to the 
certification process affects the economic risks of coffee producers adhering to VSS 
compared to conventional producers. Two key variables were taken into account to 
assess changes in the coffee farmer’s perception of market risk: percentage of those 
who perceived increases in the production cost and percentage of those who perceived 
a reduction in the farm gate price. 
 
In general, and despite of statistical differences between initiatives and control 
producers, between 70% and 80% of the coffee growers, both certified and non-
certified, complained about increases in production cost. Meanwhile, with a downward 
trend, a less proportion of farmers reported coffee price drops. 
                                                          
66 Two additional important variables were analysed in section 7.2.1.1. The first one is related to the daily 
wage (which is compared to the legal wage per day in Colombia). The second one is the proportion of the 
total hand labour employed in the production process that is remunerated. Information at Table 7.1 
shows how the share of paid labour both for certified and control producers decreased substantially with 
a downward trend between the surveys of 2008 and 2011 and the average daily wage in barely a fraction 
of the legal wage established by the government. 
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Survey data indicates that a significantly higher proportion of Nespresso AAA_1 
producers reported being affected by higher production cost compared to conventional 
producers. On average 84% and 74% of the certified and non-certified producers 
respectively made this statement, and significant differences-in-differences overtime 
were reported (line 3 Table 7.7). Contrastingly, a significant lower proportion of 
Fairtrade producers reported increases in production cost compare conventional 
producers, shown by the negative values for the difference-in-difference values - on 
average 69% and 81% of the certified and non-certified producers respectively complain 
about this fact (line 7 Table 7.7). In terms of the two groups of Nespresso producers, no 
significant differences-in-differences were reported - on average 77% and 81% or the 
two groups of producers respectively complain about increases in productions cost. 
 
Referring to the responses to the question about perceived reduction in farm gate 
prices, quantitative data also showed contrasting differences between VSS. For 
example, no significant difference-in-difference between Nespresso AAA_1 and control 
producers were reported. Meanwhile, overtime, farmers affiliated to the Fairtrade 
certification complained less about the reduction in coffee prices compare to 
conventional producers, shown by the significant negative values for the difference-in-
difference (line 4 and 8 Table 7.7).  
 
On important fact that emerges, refers to the differences between the perceptions 
related to cost increases and coffee price drops, and the quantitative data related to 
production cost and trends in farm gate prices presented in Table 7.1. At a glance, while 
Fairtrade producers are more optimistic, despite the fact that the data shows they 
actually face higher production costs to those of the control group. In turn, Nespresso 
producers perceive more economic risk in their operation despite the fact that there are 
no significant differences in the production costs. For example, quantitative data from 
Table 7.1 indicated that the production cost between Nespresso AAA_1 and 
conventional producers had no significant difference-in-difference. Contrastingly, 
involvement in Fairtade certification implied higher production costs as positive 
significant differences over time compared to conventional producers were reported.  
 
Socioeconomic perceptions 
The consideration of horizontal aspects of value chain in order to understand the effects 
of participation of coffee growers in the sustainability coffee value chain include the 
consideration of perceptions regarding four key variables: (i) level of income; (ii) 
household economics; (iii) household quality of life; and (iv) family health conditions. 
Coffee growers were asked to rate their perceptions of their socioeconomic conditions 
on a scale of 1 to 10.  
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Overall, the study found that certified farmers had more positive and optimistic 
perceptions of the change to their living conditions in comparison to the control group.  
 
For example, for Nespresso AAA_1 producers, the study found statistically significant 
positive effects overtime regarding perceptions of household economics and the health 
of the family. Contrastingly, the study did not find significant difference-in-difference 
regarding changes in perceptions on the level of income or the quality of life of their 
families, despite the fact that statistically significant differences between certified and 
non-certified producers were observed during the three surveys for household quality 
of life and the third survey for perception about changes in the level of income (line 5 to 
8 Table 7.7). 
 
Finally, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso producers at different 
stages of certification do not revealed significant difference-in-difference overtime for 
the perceptions of the level of income, household quality of life, and family health 
conditions (line 21, 23, and 24 Table 7.7). Meanwhile, regarding the perceptions of 
changes in the household economics, the quantitative analysis revealed negative 
significant difference-in-difference between the two groups which implied that over 
time those producers labelled as Nespresso AAA_2 had significant lower perception 
about this variable compared to those producers labelled as AAA_1 (line 22 Table 7.7). 
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Table 7.7 Changes in workers’ conditions and farmers' perceptions 
 
AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol AAA_1 Ctrol coef. SE 
1 % of producers who off er free training 1% 2% 0% 0% 37% 8% *** 0.294 0.064 ***
2 % of farms that provide protective gear 10% 10% 10% 10% 30% 48% *** -0.135 0.065 **
3 % or producers who reported cost increases 91% 81% ** 78% 73% 82% 67% ** 0.119 0.069 *
4 % or producers who reported coffee price drops 86% 71% *** 3% 30% *** 26% 24% -0.079 0.073
5 Perception about changes in the level of income§ 6.3 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.0 5.3 ** 0.41 0.37
6 Perception about changes in household economics§ 6.0 5.9 5.4 5.8 ** 6.1 5.5 * 0.97 0.40 **
7 Perception about changes in household quality of life§ 7.1 6.7 * 6.8 7.2 * 7.3 6.8 * 0.60 0.38
8 Perception about changes in the health of the family§ 7.5 7.3 6.6 6.8 7.2 6.5 ** 1.00 0.43 **
Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol Fairtrade Ctrol coef. SE 
9 % of producers who off er free training 3% 1% 4% 0% ** 0% 33% *** -0.369 0.0628 ***
10 % of farms that provide protective gear 46% 27% *** 51% 12% *** 81% 17% *** 0.392 0.0718 ***
11 % or producers who reported cost increases 92% 96% 84% 70% *** 31% 78% *** -0.403 0.0704 ***
12 % or producers who reported coffee price drops 82% 93% *** 44% 28% *** 0% 29% *** -0.176 0.0601 ***
13 Perception about changes in the level of income
§ 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.0 ** 8.4 5.0 *** 2.78 0.39 ***
14 Perception about changes in household economics
§ 7.0 6.2 *** 7.0 5.9 *** 8.6 5.2 *** 2.48 0.38 ***
15 Perception about changes in household quality of life
§ 7.7 7.4 ** 7.4 7.2 9.1 7.5 *** 1.49 0.32 ***
16 Perception about changes in the health of the family
§ 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.5 9.3 7.6 *** 1.56 0.33 ***
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1 coef. SE 
17 % of producers who off er free training 14% 0% *** 66% 43% ** 0.141 0.081 *
18 % of farms that provide protective gear 15% 20% 49% 37% * 0.095 0.074
19 % or producers who reported cost increases 76% 81% 78% 80% 0.046 0.077
20 % or producers who reported coffee price drops 37% 2% *** 23% 33% -0.322 0.072 ***
21 Perception about changes in the level of income§ 6.5 6.2 6.1 6.2 0.06 0.41
22 Perception about changes in household economics§ 6.5 5.3 *** 6.0 6.7 * -0.97 0.42 **
23 Perception about changes in household quality of life§ 7.4 6.9 ** 7.4 7.9 -0.23 0.40
24 Perception about changes in the health of the family§ 7.6 6.9 ** 7.5 7.8 -0.29 0.41
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations 
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1; § Producers rate their perceptions on a scale of 1 to 10. 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Indicator
2008 2009 2011 Dif in Dif 
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7.3 Discussion and conclusions 
 
This chapter provides new empirical evidence to understand the impact of Fairtrade and 
the Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality programme on the socio-economic conditions of 
coffee growers in two regions of Colombia. It aims to integrate vertical and horizontal 
components in GVC analysis to integrate the study in terms of producers’ incomes, or 
changes in income distribution, and how participation in particular value chain 
structures, generates outcomes in livelihood activities related to poverty reduction, 
improving of employment conditions, food security, risk and vulnerability, among 
others. 
 
The study compares Fairtrade (FLO) and Nespresso AAA (AAA_1 hereafter) farmers with 
two groups of similar non-certified farmers during three rounds of surveys over a four 
year time interval, and compares two groups of Nespresso AAA producers (AAA_2 vs 
AAA_1 hereafter), which are at two different stages of certification, during two rounds 
of surveys over a two year interval.67 The study used a difference analysis with 
propensity score matching techniques that allowed to construct rigorous counterfactual 
and correct for selection bias and the influence of independent factors.  
 
The analysis revealed that those farmers participating in Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA_1 
did not strengthen their economic conditions compared to similar non-certified farmers, 
as no statistical significant differences-in-differences were reported for the gross 
margins (gross revenues minus cost). Although certified farmers witnessed significant 
statistical differences during the three annual surveys, at the endline these differences 
disappeared. It is important to remember that for most of the comparisons, the 
differences for the certified producers during the first and third year did not always 
exceed the differences for the control group during the first and third year, which is a 
necessary condition to infer the impact of the intervention related to the treatment 
(Khandker, Koolwal et al. 2010, Bennet, Giovannucci et al. 2013). 
 
Evidence also pointed out that the involvement in Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA_1 did 
not result in statistically significant higher productivity than conventional producers, as 
the analysis did not detect significant difference-in-difference over time between the 
two groups. In the particular case of the comparison of Fairtrade farmers with similar 
non-certified farmers, the surveys’ quantitative data revealed that although 
participation in Fairtrade positively influenced higher revenues from coffee sales over 
time, it also affected the production cost as positive significant difference-in-difference 
                                                          
67 As was mentioned in chapter 3, two groups of Nespresso AAA’s producers were analysed as an 
opportunity to track the impact of the strategic changes adopted by the AAA Programme and the impact 
on the internal upgrading strategies implemented by the same programme. The group labelled as AAA_1 
adhered to the Programme in 2008, while the group labelled as AAA_2 adhered to the programme in 
2009. 
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between the two groups of producers was detected. At the end, significantly higher 
revenues from coffee sales for certified producers were not enough to offset the 
significantly higher production costs. Contrastingly, for Nespresso AAA_1 there were no 
differences for these two variables.  
 
Recent cross-country surveys employing rigorous impact studies involving at least two 
rounds of surveys to assess differences over time have reached similar conclusions (Fort 
and Ruben 2008, Blackman and Rivera 2010, Beuchelt and Zeller 2011, Ruben and Fort 
2012, Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014). In the case of Fairtrade, for example, these studies 
showed that involvement in this initiative lead to modest increases in farmers’ incomes 
and improvements in farm production methods (Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014). 
Comparison studies indicate that, although there is greater productivity and better 
prices on farms producing coffee with the Fairtrade label, these differences were not 
large enough to generate a clear effect in the gross margins (Fort and Ruben 2008, 
Beuchelt and Zeller 2011, Ruben 2014). In this sense, Arnould et al. (2009: p. 199) 
indicate that in economic terms “Fairtrade is not a panacea for the third-world poverty” 
(Arnould, Plastina et al. 2009). 
 
The few available evidence for the Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality programme 
indicates that those farmers adhered to the programme exhibit significant higher levels 
of performance compared to control farmers in indexes related to social, environmental 
and economic conditions during a two year interval (CRECE 2013).68 Additionally, the 
quantitative data revealed significant differences in differences showing that the 
involvement in Nespresso implied a higher net income per produced unit (US cents/kg) 
overtime compared to control farmers (García, Ochoa et al. 2013c). However, these 
impact studies do not reveal whether this initiative affects the revenues by farm size, or 
improves farmers’ living conditions and livelihoods overtime. 
 
Worryingly, the surveys data also showed that VSS do not assure good jobs as the 
informality in the coffee labour market has grown. Quantitative data indicated that 
producers have been compensating their lack of resources to cover the increasing 
production cost not only by systematically decreasing the share of paid labour between 
the first and the third survey, but also paying a fraction of the minimum legal wage 
established by the government. For example, although the study finds that, over time, 
Fairtrade producers paid significantly higher daily wages, it also showed that a 
significantly lower proportion of labour at farm level were paid compared to non-
certified producers.  
                                                          
68 The social index includes indicators that reflect working practices, living conditions, occupational safety 
and health conditions and coffee farmers’ social perceptions. The economic index includes variables that 
are associated with market knowledge, land productivity and farmer yield, production costs, net income 
and perception of business opportunities. The environmental index includes Good Agricultural Practices 
(GPA) adoption, soil and water conservation measures and agrochemical handling. 
218 
 
 
 
Additionally, regarding the average farm gate prices, quantitative data revealed that 
overtime there were no statistical significant differences-in-differences between 
Fairtrade or Nespresso AAA_1 with their respective non-certified counterparts. 
Although certified producers received significantly higher average farm gate prices for 
their coffee compared to conventional producers during the three surveys, and the 
share of the harvest sold as certified increased between the first and third survey, it is 
also true that the quantitative data revealed that price differentials between certified 
and conventional coffee decreased over time as was also shown in Figure 5.13. 
 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from these outcomes is that it is a critical 
situation for those producers who are participating in these initiatives and have viewed 
differentiated coffee with VSS as a potential tool to achieve economic sustainability, 
reduce poverty and improve their livelihoods. In this sense, some authors have warned 
about the commoditisation or mainstreaming of the specialty and sustainable coffee 
market (Daviron and Ponte 2005, Giovannucci and Ponte 2005, Raynolds 2009), in 
particular, if rewards accruing to farmers investing in the certifications requirements are 
less than expected (Lewin et al., 2004; Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005), and do not 
assure profits for the growers (Brando 2012). More recently, and based on quantitative 
data, Ruben (2014, p. 41) pointed out that the impact of VSS  in addressing poverty and 
livelihoods is limited and “should not be overestimated” as certified production cannot 
be the only tool to boost producers´ socioeconomic status (PCS 2015). 
 
Based on the aforementioned results for Nespresso AAA_1 and Fairtrade, the question 
of how sustainable these standards actually are is pertinent. All the producers expect 
significant price premiums as well as significant gross margins, not only as  fair 
compensation to offset the higher production costs and efforts of meeting the 
competitive requirements of VSS (Potts, Fernandez et al. 2007), but also as a measure 
of impact of economic sustainability (Daviron and Ponte 2005). In light of this, when 
there is no correlation between the price and the recognition of a producer’s sustainable 
practices (Ruben and Fort 2012), as most of the farmers interviewed complained about 
during field work,  it becomes more difficult for a producer to justify the costs of 
sustainability (Giovannucci 2008) and strengthen the credibility of VSS (Ruben 2014).  
 
Contrarily, other authors have pointed out that it is prudent to de-emphasise price 
premiums as a reason for entering these markets since these premiums could eventually 
diminish (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004) – as it clearly has been happening. For some 
analysts , the main arguments for those who promote these programmes must go 
beyond higher prices for coffee growers (Ponte and Kawuma 2003) as there are hidden 
benefits associated with the adoption of the competitive requirements imposed by the 
standards and certifications’ systems (Brando 2012). In this sense, although 
participation in VSS not necessarily assure a better economic performance or social well-
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being of producers (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, Lebel 2012), these initiatives can 
facilitate (catalyse) upgrading strategies (Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012) and help farmers to 
earn more money through gains in efficiency, improved crop quality, increase in 
production and controlling farm costs in the medium and the long term. 
Notwithstanding as was shown in Chapter 6, with the exception of those producers 
labelled as Nespresso AAA_2, value chain participation in Fairtrade or Nespresso AAA_1 
do not necessarily lead to differences-in-differences against conventional producers 
neither adopting upgrading strategies needed to increase their returns nor the level of 
institutional assistance to participate in these chains. 
 
In this sense, the comparison between the two groups of Nespresso coffee growers 
(Nespresso AAA_1 and Nespresso AAA_2, which adhered to the programme in 2008 and 
2009 respectively) produced surprising results by revealing important differences 
favouring the AAA_2 group. After two rounds of surveys with a two-year interval and 
identical methodology, the study revealed that AAA_2 producers obtained higher gross 
margins over time as significant difference-in-difference were reported compared to 
AAA_1 producers. The study also found significant difference-in-difference in farm gate 
prices and production of coffee (yield per hectare) and, related to this, significant 
differences-in- differences that show that the involvement in Nespresso AAA_2 brought 
higher revenues compared to Nespresso AAA_1. Interestingly, the comparison revealed 
that the involvement in AAA_2 did not imply a significant difference-in-difference 
overtime in the production cost.  
 
This improved performance of the Nespresso AAA_2 group, can be explained with data 
in Tables 6.6. These show that there were key significant differences-in-differences 
revealing that the involvement in AAA_2 positively increased the adoption of key 
agricultural practices to improve upgrading trajectories. For example, as was found in 
Chapter 6, over time a significantly higher proportion of producers affiliated to AAA_2 
used soil analysis, applied higher levels of synthetic fertilizers to the soil, adopted GAP 
after training, and keep detailed records of methods and materials used in coffee 
production to aid decision making. The circumstances that motivated this steeper 
learning curve of GAP by Nespresso AAA_2 producers cannot be determined on the basis 
of the data contained in the surveys, nor the interviews conducted during fieldwork, and 
should be subject of further research.  
 
However, simply because certified producers can sell their product at a profit does not 
guarantee that VSS are achieving their original purpose of improving the welfare and 
livelihoods of producers, smallholders in particular. In this sense, previous studies 
revised do not discriminate information on producers’ incomes, dependency from 
coffee or shares of paid labour by farm size, since all the data is an average of the total 
sample of producers. This study, however, contributes to the debate on the role of VSS 
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in improving the economic sustainability, through a welfare analysis for three different 
farm sizes (small farmers below one hectare; medium size farmers between one and five 
hectares; and large farmers above five hectares).  
 
The analysis of smaller farmers,69 in particular, highlights at least three important 
findings: (i) the size of the coffee plots is too small to generate a level of income from 
coffee production high enough to secure a sustainable livelihood, fulfil basic needs and 
reduce poverty; (ii) farmers are extremely dependent on coffee, since local economies 
do not offer opportunities for opting out of coffee production, and there are no 
alternatives for incorporation in other formal markets of the primary sector or other 
growing sectors out from the agrarian economy; (iii) gross margins from coffee have 
been obtained at the expense of reducing the share of paid labour and increasing the 
under-employment and  informality in the labour market.  
 
The precarious conditions of smallholders located in farms below one hectare becomes 
more evident after contrasting the per capita monthly household income from certified 
producers, with the household monthly income per capita needed to reach the poverty 
line or the extreme poverty line. In this sense, the total income is still below the extreme 
poverty line of COP 4,200 per person per day.70 The picture that emerges for medium 
and large size farms is more promising, since there is more room for diversification with 
cash crops and yield increases.  
 
These findings open a great debate: Can VSS pull the small scale producers out of a 
situation of poverty relying on the production of certified coffee? This study suggests 
that the potential impact of certified production on poverty and livelihoods of the very 
small farmers is limited by the simple fact that the reduced size of their farms is a 
structural factor that limits the potential of certified production (Ruben 2014) and 
makes it impossible to generate sufficient income to improve significantly their 
livelihoods and economic sustainability. In light of this, the long-term commercial 
viability and credibility of VSS should take this reality into account if it wants to continue 
to claim that its main drive is to enhance the welfare and livelihoods of producers. 
 
The evidence collected signalled that involvement in VSS, as well as the production of 
conventional coffee, becomes a subsistence alternative of the very small farmers when 
                                                          
69 In Colombia 30% of the coffee growers are living in farms below one hectare in size. Meanwhile, coffee 
farmers with less than one hectare farms represent 42% of the total sample of Nespresso AAA_1; 8% of 
the total farmers of the sample of Fairtrade, and 26% of the total sample of Nespresso AAA_2 (see Tables 
3.1 and 5.1). 
70 Data is presented in COP, not only to avoid the interference of macroeconomic variables in the 
conversion process, but also because producers are paid in COP for their coffee. Between 2008 and 2011 
1 USD = ± 2,000 COP, during 2015 the exchange rate is equivalent to 1 USD = ± 3,000 COP. As such the 
poverty line income varied from USD 2.1 per person per day in 2011 to USD 1.4 per person per day in 
2015. 
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there is not a dynamic labour market to procure a less precarious source of income. The 
fact is that, for those smallholders without the possibility to modify their scale-
constrains to increase their incomes and savings to finance their sustainability 
requirements, the market transformation promoted by the sustainable production 
could contribute marginally to develop their capacity of accumulation and economic 
growth. Like most of the government´s programmes in developing countries set up to 
promote productive development and income generation for the smallest farmers living 
in survival units, VSS initiatives only constitute an economic activity without the 
potential to become a structural solution to take farmers out from the subsistence 
agriculture, reduce their vulnerability or assure their incorporation to formal 
employment needed to increase the family income above the poverty line (Martínez and 
Sánchez 2013, USAID 2013). 
  
As such, it is necessary to consider several strategic production alternatives by typology 
of farmers to improve their income and guarantee their economic sustainability. As 
argued by Ruben (2014), based on Timmer and Akkus (2013), in order to alleviate 
poverty and high inequality of smallholders living in rural areas of developing countries, 
a structural transformation of the entire economy is required to ensure formal 
employment and social incorporation overtime (Martínez and Sánchez 2013). This 
implies an integrated process of development and agricultural transformation (Timmer 
1998), in which government institutions and the private sector develop a coordinated 
strategy to design the instruments needed to assist inviable farmers to leave the 
agriculture sector while simultaneously facilitate the scaling-up and intensification of 
the remaining small and medium farm production (Ruben 2014). 71  
 
Unfortunately, however, like other Latin American countries, the public policy hitherto 
implemented by the Colombian government over the last four decades has not 
succeeded in promoting a structural change, the agricultural sector in particular and the 
overall economy in general. The combined effect of policy bias against rural economic 
activities and rural development (Jaramillo 1998, de Ferranti, Perry et al. 2005), which 
includes the under provision of public goods in rural areas, plus 50 years of ongoing civil 
                                                          
71 For those smallholders whose efforts make impossible to reach a decent income from an agricultural 
standpoint, this strategy demands not only boundless access to training programmes to promote the 
creation of knowledge and technological capacity to facilitate their incorporation to different sectors of 
the economy but also the provision of basic social services and social protection (health, pensions, water, 
nutrition, and education to create knowledge and innovation), in particular for those who would not be 
able to enter into the formal economy (Timmer 1998, Martínez and Sánchez 2013). For the second group 
of producers, who are viable economically based on agricultural production, efforts are needed toward 
their professionalization by increasing their access to processes of skills upgrading and capacity building 
in key areas of their value chain (World Bank 2007, ECLAC 2008, Fernández-Stark, Bamber et al. 2014).  
Additionally, coordinated public and private efforts are needed to improve their access to markets, 
training and finance needed to benefit different typologies of producers to provide vital public goods like 
technical assistance, credit and subsided loans, technical and administrative support, market research, 
and organisational skills (World Bank 2007). 
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strife (DNP 2014), added to the unsuccessful export performance relying mostly upon 
oil, coal and coffee trade, and a limited, inconsistent and uncoordinated strategy to 
support new leading sectors and specific industries in the rest of the economy, among 
other factors, have contributed to increase the structural heterogeneity across sectors 
of the economy. 
  
As a result, despite an important progress in reducing poverty in rural areas in Colombia 
(OECD 2015), still hundreds of thousands of the poorest farmers are living in rural areas 
without the possibility of market incorporation in new productive sectors or access to 
non-farm rural employment and other types of income from agricultural activities. 
Therefore, as will mentioned in Chapter 6, the options of last resort for the smallest 
farmers are those related to low-productivity services and the subsistence agriculture 
associated to activities that do not provide them the possibility to overcome the 
problems associated with being poor or small through the agricultural production.  
 
This chapter also addressed horizontal concerns in GVC analysis to inquire whether the 
adoption of specific upgrading strategies to comply with the competitive requirements 
of two VSS, succeeded in their goal of improving key livelihood-related variables related 
to dependence of coffee, income diversification with cash crops other than coffee, food 
security, accumulation of capital through availability of farm and household assets, and 
working conditions at farm level. Finally, a set of variables regarding households and 
farm perceptions were tested in those producers participating in two VSS activities, see 
Table 7.8.  
 
In this sense, what emerged is that coffee producers have a very deep dependency on 
coffee as the primary source of cash income at household level due to the reduction in 
cash crops other than coffee, and almost no access to non-farm rural employment as a 
result of the precariousness of the labour market and the absence of structural growth 
in the non-agrarian economy – both on treated and non-treated producers. However, 
there were some contrasting differences between certifications. The comparison 
between Nespresso AAA_1 and AAA_2 producers, and between Nespresso producers 
and the control group, showed no differences in differences in the degree of 
dependence on income from coffee. Contrastingly, participation in the Fairtrade 
certification increased dependence on coffee compared to conventional producers. On 
average of the three surveys, the proportion of income generated from coffee was 86% 
and 70% for Fairtrade farmers and non-certified producers respectively. 
 
Coffee producers are becoming more specialized in coffee as they dedicate more areas 
of their farms to coffee, and whatever areas that are not used for coffee are exclusively 
associated with food security. There has been little diversification into other cash crops 
that could help balance this dependence on coffee. For example, referring to the coffee 
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growers’ efforts to produce food staples to increase their levels of food security, 
evidence revealed that there were not significant differences-in-difference between 
certified and non-certified farms. In this sense, on average between 90% and 99% of 
both certified and conventional farmers indicated that they produced crops for their 
own consumption.  
 
However, there were differences between treated and non-treated producers with wild 
fluctuations from year to year in terms of the proportion of producers that grow cash 
crops other than coffee (i.e. plantain, maize, beans, tomatoes, yucca, etc). For example, 
the quantitative research showed that the involvement in Fairtrade has statistically 
significantly lowered the levels of crop diversification compared with non-certified 
farmers. On average of the three surveys, the proportion of farmers growing cash crops 
were 27% and 66% for Fairtrade and non-certified producers respectively. The 
implications of these findings are worrying given the fact that by concentrating their 
activities on a single source of income, without ensuring income diversification or cash 
income coming from access to non-farm production activities and wage labour, 
producers not only fail to spread risks and become more vulnerable to market 
fluctuations, adverse weather, poor harvests, and are less resilient to external shocks, 
but also reduce their possibilities to finance input purchase or longer-term capital 
investments (Plaisier 2014).  
 
In terms of the accumulation of assets, there was a positive significant difference-in-
difference which indicated that the involvement in Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA_2 
brought, over time, increases in the number of household and farm assets respectively. 
Regarding the question of whether workers benefit from labouring in certified farms, 
what emerged from the data is that, while involvement in the Nespresso certification 
positively influenced the access of workers to free training, involvement in Fairtrade 
implied that workers received a significantly higher proportion of protective gear 
compared to control workers. 
 
With regard to changes in socioeconomic and market risk perceptions, what came forth 
into view is that certified Fairtrade producers are more optimistic than Nespressso AAA 
producers. But overall, the study found that certified farmers had more positive and 
optimistic perceptions of the change to their living conditions in comparison to the 
control group. This perspective was also perceived during the focus groups and 
interviews to farmers. 
 
Changes in the ratio between the price paid to coffee growers and the retail price were 
analysed as a way of verifying if the VSS studied in this thesis compared to the Colombian 
coffee contribute to a redistribution of the value added in the coffee GVC toward 
producers. At a glance, what emerges from the data is that certified producers have 
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been receiving higher farm-gate prices compared to conventional producers. However, 
the proportion of the retail price accruing to farmers who invest in the certifications is 
less than expected. As was also tested by Daviron and Ponte (2005) and Rueda and 
Lambin (2013) in the coffee sector and Ruben (2014) in the cocoa sector, for this 
exercise, the value added initiatives studied in this work do not promote differential 
redistributive outcomes from the roasters and retailers to the producers. Interestingly, 
coffee producers of conventional coffees received a higher proportion of the retail 
prices. Therefore, high value coffees are a better business for roasters and retailers, as 
a higher proportion of the retail price is captured at this node of the value chain.  
 
This could be a contested outcome, as some scholars, however, have emphasized that 
the concept of using the producer’s value share of the retail product in the GVC analysis 
is not useful (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004, Gilbert 2008). They argue that new and 
increased value is being added to the products in the consuming countries through 
processing, marketing and transformation at the retail level. In this same sense, Daviron 
and Ponte (2005) mentioned that certain brands and distributors have the ability to 
capture the majority of the added value of coffee through the control of symbolic or 
abstract aspects of production, such as services or the atmosphere in coffee shops. This 
includes, for example, flavouring, mixing in milk products and providing a specific 
consumption ambiance (Ponte and Kawuma 2003).  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis provides new empirical evidence to improve our understanding on whether 
the compliance with the competitive requirements of Fairtrade and the Nespresso AAA 
Sustainable Quality programme impacts the upgrading opportunities of coffee growers, 
and to understand whether these initiatives fulfil their original objective, that of 
improving the welfare and livelihoods of participating producers. As these queries are 
addressed, special attention is paid to the differences between larger and smaller coffee 
growers, in particular, smallholders below one hectare in size. 
 
This thesis used the Global Value Chain (GVC) perspective, including recent 
contributions in which vertical and horizontal dimension of GVC analysis were integrated 
to assess the implications for coffee growers of participating in the specialty coffee value 
chain (Bolwig, Gibbon et al. 2009, Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 
2010). 
 
The data to address these issues comes from three rounds of field surveys, carried out 
in two coffee regions of Colombia, gathering information from the harvest seasons of 
2008, 2009 and 2011, as well as two periods of field work. The sample is a group of 127 
Fairtrade producers, two groups of Nepresso AAA producers (92 farmers labelled as 
Nespresso AAA_1 and 189 labelled as Nespresso AAA_2), and a comparable control 
sample of similar conventional producers, whose coffee is sold to the external market 
(152 farmers as control group for Fairtrade and 210 as a control of Nespresso AAA_1).  
 
This thesis combines impact evaluation techniques to construct statistical comparison 
groups. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) was implemented in combination with the 
Difference in Difference approach (DID). The main purpose of these methods is to 
construct a credible and robust counterfactual to correct all the potential selection bias 
that account for differences between treated and non-treated producers, to “be sure 
that causality runs from the certifications to the outcome or impact” (Blackman and 
Rivera 2010: p. 18). 
 
Until now there is limited empirical evidence to understand whether implementing VSS 
can be viewed as a tool to enhance upgrading trajectories in the specialty coffee value 
chain. Little attention has been paid to the role that public and private sector support 
can play in facilitating upgrading strategies in coffee growers who are participating in 
this value chain. Likewise, there are few systematic studies over several harvest seasons 
at regular intervals, nor rigorous impact evaluation methods to address whether VSS 
have affected the investments and adoption of GAPs needed to improve upgrading 
trajectories at farm level. Finally, there is a need to inquire whether the adoption of 
226 
 
 
 
specific upgrading strategies, in compliance with the competitive requirements of these 
two VSS, provides a favourable economic opportunity for coffee growers, not only in 
terms of increased cash incomes and profitability or the distribution of wealth towards 
a higher share of the revenues from the value chain, but also in the evolution of 
important livelihood-related variables. 
 
This thesis is one of the first academic studies on the impact of the participation of coffee 
growers in VSS in Colombia.72 Most of the research found has focused on a relatively 
limited number of countries like Nicaragua, Peru or Uganda, countries that do not have 
institutions, regulatory frameworks and marketing regimes similar to those in Colombia. 
Colombia is not only one of the main producers of speciality and sustainable coffee, and 
a pioneer in an active strategy of differentiation and marketing using regional identities, 
but also has strong coffee institutions and a significant regulation and public sector 
support facilitating upgrading for conventional or non-certified coffee growers.  
Moreover, none of the studies reviewed include information on the impact of VSS on 
the upgrading opportunities of coffee growers, nor the producers' incomes by farm size 
since all the data they present is an average of the total sample of producers. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections: the first section deals with the question of 
the effects of the two certifications under review on the upgrading strategies of coffee 
growers. The second section looks at how these certification schemes affected the 
pattern of revenues for producers, and their exposure to risk and vulnerability in the 
specialty coffee value chain. Finally, the third section explores implications for further 
research and policies aimed at adding value. 
 
8.1 Does the participation in Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA affect coffee growers’ 
upgrading strategies? 
 
The thesis proposes a model to ascertain whether the affiliation of coffee producers to 
Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA, compared with their respective control group of 
producers, has resulted in differences for a set of 15 matched indicators which shed light 
on farmers’ capacity to innovate in different spheres of economic upgrading in the 
markets governed by private standards. This model has two development areas that are 
determinant for producers to build their competences and upgrade: (i) Institutional 
support needed to overcome key important constrains that limited farmers’ ability to 
meet the competitive requirements imposed by voluntary sustainability standards; and 
ii) investments and adoption of good agricultural practices to improve upgrading 
trajectories.  
 
                                                          
72 Also see García et al. (2014). 
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The general picture that emerged from this research is one where the impacts of the 
institutional interventions to facilitate upgrading, and the investments and adoption of 
GAP to support the involvement of coffee growers in VSS, are not permanent or 
consistent over time for most of the 15 indicators analysed. In most of the comparisons, 
certified farmers witnessed significant statistical differences during at least one of the 
three annual surveys, but at the endline these differences had decreased or even 
disappeared. As a result, significant difference-in-difference overtime were observed 
only for a few variables. Therefore, the potential of the programmes’ impact either to 
capture public and private support to mobilize financial and human resources for 
upgrading or to accelerate investments and adoption of GAP has not yet been 
materialized or it is not significantly different over time compared to the groups of non-
certified producers.  
 
In essence, for long cycle crops such as coffee, it is clear that the potential to generate 
significant changes and differences in certified producers as opposed to conventional 
producers, can take, not only more time, but also calls for greater collaboration and 
coordination efforts among institutional structures, local organizations and private 
buyers to leverage resources and assist producers to close gaps quickly and achieve 
product, process and volume (yield) upgrading and meet the competitive requirements 
of VSS. 
 
From this evidence an important question arises: is there a coherent strategy among 
downstream actors behind the provision of public goods and support services to 
facilitate upgrading and allow producers to participate competitively in the specialty 
coffee value chain, both certified and conventional? In this sense, the quantitative and 
qualitative information did not reveal the existence of clear strategies between VSS 
initiatives or support institutions when it comes to intervention in different territories 
or typologies of farmers. The fact that there were no clear differences in the composition 
of training or access to credit facilities between any of the certification groups and their 
control groups, indicates that the emphasis among initiatives does not vary significantly. 
In this regard, interviews also revealed that the support services provided by chain 
stakeholders such as exporters, government and aid agencies, among others, are not 
coordinated or consistent over time, which implies duplication of efforts and waste of 
time and resources needed to improve farmers upgrading trajectories.   
 
Table 8.1 presents a summary of the statistical results for each one of the indicators of 
the two areas of development mentioned above. The "greater than" sign shows that 
there are statistically significant differences in favour of the treated group for that 
specific year. The "less than" sign shows that there are statistically significant differences 
in favour of the control group for that specific year. Meanwhile, the plus sing (+) means 
that the involvement in the certification positively influenced a significant difference-in-
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difference over time and the minus sign (–) the contrary, an empty space implies no 
effect.  
 
In relation to the first area of development proposed, that of institutional arrangements 
to facilitate upgrading strategies, the quantitative data revealed that the participation 
in the Nespresso AAA_1 certification affected significantly, and positively, in only two of 
the seven indicators proposed to test institutional support to coffee growers. Positive 
significant differences in differences were observed for the levels of aid in kind and the 
hours of training received. In addition, the comparison of the two strands of Nespresso, 
did not reveal positive differences in differences. Meanwhile, for Fairtrade, significant 
and positive differences in differences estimates were observed only in relation to 
access to technical assistance on fertilisation.  
 
Table 8.1 Summary of changes in assistance and investments to upgrade73 
 
 
Interestingly, the affiliation of farmers to certifications negatively influenced the 
performance of some variables compared to the control groups. For example, the 
involvement in the Nespresso AAA_1 certification, negatively influenced access to 
subsidies and/or cash transfers, while participation in Fairtrade negatively affected, over 
                                                          
73 It is important to remember that for most of the comparisons, the differences for the certified producers 
during the first and third year did not always exceed the difference for the control group during the first 
and third year, which is a necessary condition to infer impact of the intervention related to the treatment 
(Khandker, Koolwal et al. 2010, Bennet, Giovannucci et al. 2013). 
2008 2009 2011 Diff 2008 2009 2011 Diff 2009 2011 Diff
% of producers that have credit > > > > >
Institutional arrangements 
to facilitate upgrading
% of producers who received subsidies 
and/or cash transfers 
- < < <
% of producers who received aid in kind > + > > >
Average hours of training in GAP per 
year
< > + > > > - > -
% of producers who were trained to 
improve the quality of coffee 
> > > > > > > >
% of producers that participated from 
coffee tasting trials 
> > > > - >
% of producers who fertilize under 
technical recomendation
> > > > + > >
% of producers with milling (de-pulping) 
machine
> > > > -
% of producers employing  cover floor or 
parabolic dry to sun-dry coffee
- > > > - > >
% of harvest sold as dry parchment 
% of renovated trees
% of farms with rust-resistant varieties < < <
% of farmers who perform soil analysis > > > - > > +
Synthetic fertilizers applied (kg/ha) > > > > + > +
% of producers that keep records > > + > > > > > +
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011 and following Hoebink et al. (2014)
AAA_1 vs Ctrol Fairtrade  vs Ctrol AAA_2 vs AAA_1
Investments and adoption 
of GAP to improve 
upgrading trajectories. 
*Results from matched difference-in-difference estimation
Development area Indicator*
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time, the hours of training received and their participation in coffee tasting trials. 
Likewise, involvement in Nespresso AAA_2 negatively affected the hours of training in 
GAP, as the quantitative data detected a negative significant difference-in-difference 
between the two groups of producers. 
 
Regarding the second development area, that of investments and adoption of good 
agricultural practices to improve upgrading trajectories, there was no clear trend for the 
8 indicators or criteria tested to inquire whether there were differences between 
certified and non-certified producers for improving upgrading trajectories at farm level, 
with the sole exception of Nespresso AAA_2. 
 
In terms of the variables to test changes in the levels of investments in milling 
infrastructure associated to the participation of producers, in Nespresso AAA_1, no 
significant differences-in-differences were observed, although positive significant 
difference-in-difference were detected in the proportion of producers keeping records. 
Meanwhile, the affiliation of farmers to Fairtrade negatively influenced the access to 
milling infrastructure. However, the quantitative data revealed that the participation in 
Fairtrade affected significantly, and positively, the amount of synthetic fertiliser applied 
to the soil. 
 
Remarkably, the comparison between the two strands of Nespresso data revealed that, 
overtime, a significant higher share of AAA_2 producers invested in soil analysis and 
applied on average a statistically higher amount of synthetic fertilizers by the endline, 
added to the fact that a higher share of producers adopted GAP and record keeping. This 
is a very interesting finding, that shows that the upgrading trajectories between two 
groups of producers selling coffee to the same initiative not only could differ but also 
that these differences could have important repercussions in key economic measures 
such as gross revenues, yield per hectare, production cost and, more importantly, in the 
gross margins (revenues minus cost) as was shown in chapter 7. The circumstances that 
motivated this steeper learning curve of GAP by Nespresso AAA_2 producers cannot be 
determined on the basis of the data contained in the surveys, nor the interviews 
conducted during fieldwork, and should be subject of further research. 
 
There are two likely and interconnected explanations for the lack/scarcity of positive 
impacts in the upgrading trajectories as a result of participation in Fairtrade and 
Nespresso AAA_1: (i) the fact that conventional producers, operating as a control group, 
have been also participating from the policy measures implemented by Colombian 
coffee authorities, with the support of national government and industry organizations, 
focusing on yield improvement and sustainable cultivation,  and regaining Colombia´s 
position as the second largest producing country (section 5.3 describes these measures), 
and (ii) the budget allocated by donors to support farmers‘ upgrading trajectories, 
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included those inputs leveraged from different stakeholders, are still very modest to 
assure the durability of impacts and make a difference due to the growth in total number 
of coffee growers participating in VSS and the precariousness of the economic situation 
of most of them. 
 
Regarding the first explanation, the support from coffee institutions that also covered 
non-certified producers could explain a lot of findings. This confirms the argument that 
the regulatory structure of the country (Ponte 2008, Neilson and Pritchard 2009) or the 
richness of the local institutional environment (Humphrey 2008) affects the dynamics of 
value chain participation and the upgrading trajectories of the coffee growers. The fact 
that non-certified producers were also benefiting from a range of institutional support 
programmes (such as extension services, strategic investments, plant breeding 
programmes, pest and diseases management strategies, among other activates), could 
mask the benefits of certification74. As such, at least for the two groups of producers 
analysed in Colombia, it is not possible to state that certifications have no, or very 
limited, positive effects in participating farmers. It can be argued, instead, that positive 
benefits from certification were matched by positive benefits that were also available 
to non-certified farmers. It is possible that similar research in a country where there 
were no parallel institutional initiatives for non-certified farmers, positive results from 
certification might be stronger. However, although, there are no impact evaluations on 
the effect of institutional interventions on upgrading strategies to support this 
argument, without any doubt the role of government and coffee institutions to support 
conventional producers has been determinant to offset the effect of VSS in Colombia.  
 
Concerning the second explanation, some authors have mentioned that participation in 
VSS may lead to upgrading opportunities (Lee, Gereffi et al. 2012), in particular in value 
chains where coordination between roaster, traders and farmers tends to be stronger 
(Muradian and Pelupessy 2005), such as the sustainable quality programme from 
Nespresso or Fairtrade. However, it has been pointed out that the growing number of 
producers (and the total volume of coffee) that actually participate in these 
commercialization channels is the main limitation for further upgrading as the private 
and public inputs aimed at supporting producers and enhancing their upgrading 
capabilities have been fairly marginal to make a change (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005).  
It is a key consideration for the Colombian coffee sector, as the substantial growth rates 
of affiliation to VSS experienced in the last few years (see Figure 5.11) has increased the 
demands not only for financial and technical assistance to adjust production systems, 
but also for aid in kind for access to proper post-harvest processing facilities. In a context 
                                                          
74 It is important to remember that each coffee grower in Colombia pays a “contribution” of between 4% 
and 6% for each pound sailed, depending on the level of the Colombian FOB sale price. This money is used 
by the FoNC to fulfil its duties of providing both essential public goods and services, as well as to perform 
its role as a buyer of last resort (please see section 5.3 Institutions and Regulatory framework). 
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of lack of coordination among different stakeholders to assign their cash and in kind 
support, of a widespread feeling that the roasters and traders’ contribution is very 
modest compared to their returns, and of declining farmer’s incomes due to the drop in 
Colombia’s harvest, it is possible that the rising production costs from certified 
production and the erosion of the price premiums, might have reduced the producers´ 
incentives to innovate in the different spheres of upgrading. 
 
Another contribution of this thesis is the analysis by farm size of the impact of VSS 
participation in the upgrading strategies of the coffee growers, which reveal that small 
scale farmers below one hectare,75 both treated and not-treated, are at a disadvantage 
compared to large scale certified farmers above five hectares, both in terms of access to 
institutional arrangements to facilitate upgrading (for example access to credit, aid in 
kind and training) and investments (post-harvesting infrastructure) and adoption of GAP 
to improve upgrading trajectories. In this sense, the outcomes of the analysis for the set 
of 15 matched indicators by farm size were not encouraging and draw a bleak picture 
for smallholders (see Table 6.7). In most of the comparisons, smaller producers below 
one hectare, particularly those who are not certified, faced the highest number of 
restrictions and limitations.  
 
Evidence, therefore, pointed out that small farmers do not mobilise the same level of 
resources that certification schemes appear to mobilise to support the involvement of 
larger certified farmers. A trend that was corroborated during field work interviews and 
focus groups with key stakeholders of the coffee chain in Colombia, in the sense that 
high yielding, bigger, more trained and capable farmers were on average chosen for the 
certified programmes. This finding was also corroborated by farmers affiliated to UTZ 
Certified in Colombia (García, García et al. 2014) and by Ruben (2014, p 42) who pointed 
out that VSS “are not necessarily inclusive” for too small farmers. 
 
In terms of the conventional producers, at some point, this situation could be seen as a 
source of exclusion that contributes to their further marginalization with a view to 
certification. This is an important fact, as it raises questions about the sustainability of 
those schemes that are promoting the adoption of the competitive requirements of VSS 
among smallholders who face deeper structural constrains that influences limited the 
potential of certified production to fulfil basic needs and achieve a sustainable livelihood 
(Ruben 2014). In particular, those farmers who live in survival units and do not have the 
capacities, the incentives and support to implement upgrading strategies and 
participate in the market of certified coffees.  
                                                          
75 As was showed in Table 3.3, is key to have in mind that in Colombia 30% of the coffee growers are living 
in farms below one hectare in size. Meanwhile, coffee farmers with less than one hectare farms represent 
42% of the total sample of Nespresso AAA_1; 8% of the total farmers of the sample of Fairtrade, and 26% 
of the total sample of Nespresso AAA_2. 
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As will show in the next section, not all of the producers can take advantage of VSS 
programmes. Even if producers improve their upgrading trajectories, the impossibility 
to modify their scale-constraints makes impossible to generate sustainable income over 
time. As has been pointed by Ruben (2014, p. 42) in many cases the size of the farm is 
“too small to provide a decent income in the long run”. Under these circumstances, 
producing and selling sustainable coffee is a subsistence economic activity without the 
potential to become a structural solution to take farmers out from the subsistence 
agriculture and assure outcomes in livelihood activities related to poverty reduction, 
improving of employment conditions, food security, risk and vulnerability, among 
others.  
 
 
8.2 How Fairtrade and Nespresso, affected the pattern of revenues for producers, 
and their exposure to risk and vulnerability in the specialty coffee value chain?  
 
This thesis integrates horizontal concerns in GVC analysis to quantitatively assess 
whether farmers adhered to Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA benefited, not only in terms 
of increased cash incomes and profitability, but also by improving key livelihood-related 
variables. 
 
There has been little agreement on how the outcomes generated by the adoption of 
selected voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) impact the welfare and livelihoods of 
coffee producers, particularly smallholders. Additionally, and specifically in the coffee 
sector, several researchers agree that there is an increasing need for effective impact 
evaluation, outcomes and possibilities of these initiatives over time (Blackman and 
Rivera 2010, Von Hagen and Alvarez 2011, Steering Committee of the State-of-
Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certification 2012, Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014, 
Ruben 2014). 
 
Therefore, to answer the question proposed in the title of this section, the analysis is 
broken into four sub-sections: (i) the empirical analysis of core economic measures 
including the gross margins per hectare (revenues minus cost) and key variables related 
to prices, wages and labour; (ii) addressing horizontal concerns in GVC analysis to inquire 
whether the adoption of specific upgrading strategies to comply with the competitive 
requirements of two VSS resulted in changes in variables related to working conditions, 
salaries, income diversification, food security, dependency from coffee, gain and/or loss 
of household and farm assets, job security, worker participation, among others. 
Additionally, the study includes changes in household perceptions; (iii) analysis of the 
household income by farm size (small, medium and large); and (iv) the distribution of 
income and margins between different segments of the coffee global value chain. 
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In this sense, regarding the first sub-section, the analysis revealed that those farmers 
participating in Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA_1 did not strengthen their economic 
conditions compared to similar non-certified farmers, as over time no statistical 
differences were reported for the gross margins per hectare (gross revenues minus 
cost). This a result of a significant higher production cost that offset significant higher 
revenues per hectare, see Table 8.2. Evidence also pointed out that the involvement in 
Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA_1 did not result in statistically significant higher farm gate 
prices or higher productivity than conventional producers, as the analysis did not detect 
significant difference-in-difference over time between the two groups. 
 
About this regard, recent cross-country surveys employing rigorous impact studies 
involving at least two rounds of surveys to assess differences over time have reached 
similar conclusions (Fort and Ruben 2008, Blackman and Rivera 2010, Beuchelt and 
Zeller 2011, Ruben and Fort 2012, Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014). Their results signalled 
that the involvement in Fairtrade leads to “modest and fairly limited” increases in 
farmers’ total gross margin (Hoebink, Ruben et al. 2014: p. 8). Other comparison studies 
indicate that, although there is greater productivity and better prices in farms producing 
coffee with the Fairtrade label, these differences are not large enough to generate a 
clear effect in the gross margins (Fort and Ruben 2008, Beuchelt and Zeller 2011, Ruben 
2014). In this sense, Arnould et al. (2009: p. 199) indicate that in economic terms 
“Fairtrade is not a panacea for the third-world poverty” (Arnould, Plastina et al. 2009). 
 
In the particular case of the Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality programme, the few 
available evidence revealed that AAA producers received a higher net income per 
produced unit (US cents/kg) overtime and exhibited higher levels of performance 
compared to control farmers in indexes for social, environmental and economic 
conditions (CRECE 2013, García, Ochoa et al. 2013c). However, there is no systematic 
analysis of value chain available, or studies about its effects relating to the impact on 
living conditions and farmers’ livelihoods overtime. 
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Table 8.2 Summary of changes in economic conditions and key livelihood variables 
 
 
Worryingly, the surveys data also showed that VSS do not assure good jobs as the 
informality in the coffee labour market has grown. Quantitative data revealed that 
coffee growers have been compensating their lack of resources to cover the increasing 
cost of production – both certified and conventional - not only by systematically 
decreasing the share of paid labour, but also paying a fraction of the minimum legal 
wage established by the government. This outcome challenges previous works that 
argued that certifications such as Fairtrade had positive impacts on labour conditions, 
and those studies that found that involvement in Fairtrade had positive effects on net 
incomes, as well as yield and prices (Nelson and Pound 2009, Raynolds 2009).    
 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from all these outcomes is that it is a critical 
situation for those producers who have viewed differentiated coffee with VSS as a 
potential tool to achieve economic sustainability, reduce poverty and improve their 
livelihoods. In this sense, some authors have warned about the commoditisation or 
mainstreaming of the specialty and sustainable coffee market (Daviron and Ponte 2005, 
Giovannucci and Ponte 2005, Raynolds 2009), in particular, if rewards accruing to 
farmers investing in the certifications requirements are less than expected (Lewin et al., 
2004; Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005), and do not assure profits for the growers (Brando 
2012). More recently, and based on quantitative data, Ruben (2014, p. 41) pointed out 
that the impact of VSS in addressing poverty and livelihoods is limited and “should not 
2008 2009 2011 Diff 2008 2009 2011 Diff 2009 2011 Diff
Gross revenue (Thousand COP§/ha) > > > > > > + > +
Cost - (Thousand COP/ha) > > > > > > + >
Gross margin£  (Thousand COP/ha) > > > > > +
Average farm gate price (Thousand COP/@§§) > > > > > > < +
Yield of dry parchment coffee (@/ha) > > - > > > > +
% paid labor > > > -
Wage per day (Thousand COP per day) > > + > >
% of family income coming from coffee > > > > +
% of farms with food crops >
% of farms with cash crops > > < < < -
Average number of assets at the household (1 to 9) > > > > > > +
Average number of assets at the farm (1 to 15) > > > > +
% of producers who off er free training > + > < - > > +
% of farms that provide protective gear < - > > > + >
% or producers who reported cost increases > + > < -
% or producers who reported coffee price drops > > > > < - > -
Perception about changes in the level of income > > > +
Perception about changes in household economics < > + > > > + > < -
Perception about changes in household quality of life > < > > > + >
Perception about changes in the health of the family > + > + >
Changes in 
economic 
conditions
Changes in key 
livelihood 
related 
variables
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys from 2008, 2009 and 2011 based on Hoebink et al. (2014)
*Results from matched difference-in-difference estimation; §1 USD = ± 2,000 COP; £ gross margin=(revenue minus cost); ¤@=12.5 kg
Indicator*
AAA_1 vs Ctrol Fairtrade vs Ctrol AAA_2 vs AAA_1
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be overestimated” as certified production cannot be the only tool to boost producers´ 
socioeconomic status (PCS 2015). 
 
Based on the aforementioned results, the question of how sustainable these standards 
actually are is pertinent. All the producers expect significant price premiums as well as 
significant gross margins, not only as  fair compensation to offset the higher production 
costs and efforts of meeting the competitive requirements of VSS (Potts, Fernandez et 
al. 2007), but also as a measure of impact of economic sustainability (Daviron and Ponte 
2005). In light of this, when there is no correlation between the price and the recognition 
of a producer’s sustainable practices (Ruben and Fort 2012), as most of the farmers 
interviewed complained about during field work,  it becomes more difficult for a 
producer to justify the costs of sustainability (Giovannucci 2008) and strengthen the 
credibility of VSS (Ruben 2014).  
 
Contrarily, other authors have pointed out that it is prudent to de-emphasise price 
premiums as a reason for entering these markets since these premiums could eventually 
diminish (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 2004). For some analysts, the main arguments for 
those who promote these programmes must go beyond higher prices for coffee growers 
(Ponte and Kawuma 2003) as there are hidden benefits associated with the adoption of 
the competitive requirements imposed by the standards and certifications’ systems 
(Brando 2012). In this sense, although participation in VSS not necessarily assure a better 
economic performance or social well-being of producers (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, 
Lebel 2012), these initiatives can facilitate (catalyse) upgrading strategies (Lee, Gereffi 
et al. 2012) and help farmers to earn more money through gains in efficiency, improved 
crop quality, increase in production and controlling farm costs in the medium and the 
long term. Notwithstanding as was shown in Chapter 6, with the exception of those 
producers labelled as Nespresso AAA_2, value chain participation in Fairtrade or 
Nespresso AAA_1 do not necessarily lead to differences-in-differences against 
conventional producers neither adopting upgrading strategies needed to increase their 
returns nor the level of institutional assistance to participate in these chains. 
 
In this sense, this thesis revealed that AAA_2 producers obtained higher gross margins 
over time compared to AAA_1 producers, Table 8.2. The study also found significant 
differences over time in farm gate prices and production of coffee (yield per hectare) 
and, related to this, significant differences in differences that show that the involvement 
in Nespresso AAA_2 brought higher revenues compared to Nespresso AAA_1. 
Interestingly, the comparison revealed that the involvement in AAA_2 did not imply a 
significant difference overtime in the production cost.  
 
This improved performance can be explained with data in Tables 8.1 or 6.6, in which the 
involvement in AAA_2 positively increased the adoption of key agricultural practices to 
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improve upgrading trajectories. The circumstances that motivated this steeper learning 
curve in GAP by Nespresso AAA_2 producers cannot be determined on the basis of the 
data contained in the surveys, nor the interviews conducted during fieldwork, and 
should be subject of further research.  
 
In terms of the second subsection, the main aim was to integrate horizontal concerns 
into the value-chain framework through the analysis of the impact of the adoption of 
two VSS on key livelihood related variables. Therefore, understanding the integration of 
coffee growers within value chain structures requires more than an analysis of 
producers’ incomes, or changes in income distribution. Rather, it calls for attention to 
how participation, in particular value chains structures, generates outcomes in 
livelihood activities related to poverty reduction, improving of employment conditions 
(i.e. job security and salaries), food security, risk and vulnerability, among other key 
variables (Bolwig, Ponte et al. 2010, Riisgaard, Bolwig et al. 2010). 
 
In this sense, what emerges is that coffee producers have a very deep dependency on 
coffee as the primary source of cash income at household level, due to the reduction in 
cash crops other than coffee, and almost no access to non-farm rural employment as a 
result of the precariousness of the labour market and the absence of structural growth 
in the non-agrarian economy – both on treated and non-treated producers. Coffee 
producers are becoming more specialized in coffee as they dedicate more areas of their 
farms to coffee, and whatever areas not used for coffee are exclusively associated with 
food security. There has been little diversification into other cash crops that could help 
balance this dependence on coffee. The implications of these findings are worrying given 
the fact that by concentrating their activities on a single source of income, without 
ensuring income diversification or cash income coming from access to non-farm 
production activities and wage labour, producers not only fail to spread risks and 
become more vulnerable to market fluctuations, adverse weather and are less resilient 
to external shocks, but also reduce their possibilities to finance input purchase or longer-
term capital investments (Plaisier 2014).  
 
However, there were some differences between certifications. For example, 
participation in the Fairtrade certification increased dependence on coffee compared to 
conventional producers. On average of the three surveys, the proportion of income 
generated from coffee was 86% for Fairtrade farmers and 70% for non-certified 
producers. Meanwhile, the comparison between Nespresso AAA_1 and AAA_2 
producers, and between Nespresso producers and the control group, showed no 
differences in differences in the degree of dependence on income from coffee. 
Simultaneously, over time the involvement in Fairtrade negatively affected the 
percentage of farmers with cash crops. 
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In terms of the accumulation of assets, there was a positive significant difference-in-
difference which indicated that the involvement in Fairtrade and Nespresso AAA_2 
brought, over time, increases in the number of household and farm assets respectively. 
Regarding the question of whether workers benefit from labouring in certified farms, 
what emerged from the data is that, while involvement in the Nespresso certification 
positively influenced the access of workers to free training, involvement in Fairtrade 
implied that workers received a significantly higher proportion of protective gear 
compared to control workers. 
 
With regard to changes in socioeconomic and market risk perceptions, what emerged at 
a glance is that certified Fairtrade producers are more optimistic than Nespressso AAA 
producers. But overall, the study found that certified farmers had more positive and 
optimistic perceptions of the change to their living conditions in comparison to the 
control group. This perspective was also perceived during the focus groups and 
interviews to farmers. 
 
In terms of the third sub-section, the analysis  of changes in the household income by 
farm size,  at least three important findings related to the conditions of small famers 
should be highlighted: (i) the size of the coffee plots is too small to generate a level of 
income from coffee production high enough to secure a sustainable livelihood, fulfil 
basic needs and reduce poverty; (ii) farmers are extremely dependent on coffee, since 
local economies do not offer opportunities for opting out of coffee production, and 
there are no alternatives of incorporation  in other formal markets of the primary sector 
or other growing sectors out from the agrarian economy; (iii) gross margins from coffee 
have been obtained at the expense of reducing the share of paid labour, and increasing 
the under-employment and  informality in the labour market.  
 
The precarious conditions of smallholders located in farms below one hectare becomes 
more evident after contrasting the per capita monthly household income of certified 
producers, with the monthly household income per capita needed to reach the poverty 
line or the extreme poverty line. In this sense, the total income is still below the extreme 
poverty line of COP 4,200 per person per day.76 The picture that emerges for medium 
and large size farms is more promising, since there is more room for diversification with 
cash crops and yield increases.  
 
These findings open a great debate: Can VSS pull small scale producers out of a situation 
of poverty relying on the production of certified coffee? About this regard, this study 
                                                          
76 Data is presented in COP, not only to avoid the interference of macroeconomic variables in the 
conversion process, but also because producers are paid in COP for their coffee. Between 2008 and 2011 
1 USD = ± 2,000 COP, during 2015 the exchange rate is equivalent to 1 USD = ± 3,000 COP. As such the 
poverty line income varied from USD 2.1 per person per day in 2011 to USD 1.4 per person per day in 
2015. 
238 
 
 
 
suggests that the potential impact of certified production on poverty and livelihoods of 
the small farmers is limited by the simple fact that the reduced size of their farms is a 
structural factor that limits the potential of certified production (Ruben 2014) and 
makes it impossible to generate sufficient income to significantly improve their 
livelihoods and economic sustainability. In light of this, the long-term commercial 
viability and credibility of VSS should take this reality into account if it wants to continue 
to claim that its main drive is to enhance the welfare and livelihoods of producers.  
 
The evidence collected signalled that involvement in VSS, as well as the production of 
conventional coffee, becomes a subsistence alternative of the very small farmers when 
there is not a dynamic labour market to procure a less precarious source of income. The 
fact is that, for those smallholders without the possibility to modify their scale-
constraints to increase their incomes and savings to finance their sustainability 
requirements, the market transformation promoted by the sustainable production 
could contribute marginally to develop their capacity of accumulation and economic 
growth. Like most of the government´s programmes in developing countries set up to 
promote productive development and income generation for the smallest farmers living 
in survival units, these initiatives only constitute an economic activity of last resort 
without the potential to become a structural solution to take farmers out from the 
subsistence agriculture, reducer their vulnerability or assure their incorporation to 
formal employment needed to increase the family income above the poverty line 
(Martínez and Sánchez 2013, USAID 2013). 
 
As such, it is necessary to consider several strategic production alternatives by typology 
of farmers to improve their income and guarantee their economic sustainability. As 
argued by Ruben (2014), based on Timmer and Akkus (2013), in order to alleviate 
poverty of smallholders in rural areas of developing countries a structural 
transformation of the entire economy is required to ensure formal employment and 
social incorporation overtime (Martínez and Sánchez 2013) for agricultural producers. 
This implies an integrated process of rural development and agricultural transformation 
(Timmer 1998), in which government institutions and the private sector develop a 
coordinated strategy to design the instruments needed to assist inviable farmers to 
leave the agriculture sector and facilitate their incorporation to different sectors of the 
economy while simultaneously promote the scaling-up and intensification of the 
remaining small and medium farm production (Ruben 2014).77 
                                                          
77 For those smallholders whose efforts make impossible to reach a decent income from an agricultural 
standpoint, this strategy demands not only boundless access to training programmes to promote the 
creation of knowledge and technological capacity to facilitate their incorporation to different sectors of 
the economy but also the provision of basic social services and social protection (health, pensions, water, 
nutrition, and education to create knowledge and innovation), in particular for those who would not be 
able to enter into the formal economy (Timmer 1998, Martínez and Sánchez 2013). For the second group 
of producers, who are viable economically based on agricultural production, efforts are needed toward 
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Unfortunately, however, like other Latin American countries, the public policy hitherto 
implemented by the Colombian government over the last four decades has not 
succeeded in promoting a structural change in the agricultural sector or the overall 
economy. The combined effect of policy bias against rural economic activities and rural 
development (Jaramillo 1998, de Ferranti, Perry et al. 2005), which includes the under 
provision of public goods in rural areas, plus 50 years of ongoing civil strife (DNP 2014), 
added to the unsuccessful export performance relying mostly upon oil, coal and coffee 
trade, and a limited, inconsistent and uncoordinated strategy to support new leading 
sectors and specific industries in the rest of the economy, among other factors, have 
contributed to increase the structural heterogeneity across sectors of the economy.  
 
As a result, despite an important progress in reducing poverty in rural areas in Colombia 
(OECD 2015), still hundreds of thousands of the poorest farmers are living in rural areas 
without the possibility of market incorporation to formal employment in new productive 
sectors or access to non-farm rural employment and other types of income from 
agricultural activities. Therefore, as an option of last resort, low-productivity services 
and subsistence agriculture become the only sources of income for the poorest or 
smallest farmers, preventing them from overcoming the problems associated with being 
poor or small through the agricultural production. 
 
Finally, in terms of the fourth sub-section related to the changes in the ratio between 
the price paid to coffee growers and the retail price, what emerges from the data is that 
certified producers have been receiving a comparatively higher farm-gate price 
compared to conventional producers. However, the proportion of the retail price 
accruing to farmers who invest in the certifications is less than expected. As such, the 
value added initiatives studied in this work do not promote differential redistributive 
outcomes from the roasters and retailers to the producers. Interestingly, coffee 
producers of conventional coffees received a higher proportion of the retail prices. 
Therefore, high value coffees seem to be a better business for roasters and retailers, as 
a higher proportion of the retail price is captured at this node of the value chain.  
 
While this sort of analysis is under criticism, because the amount of coffee contained is 
barely a fraction of the value added in consuming countries (Lewin, Giovannucci et al. 
2004, Gilbert 2008), it is nonetheless a useful way to see variations, by types of coffee, 
in the percentage of the retail price received by the producer. 
                                                          
their professionalization by increasing their access to processes of skills upgrading and capacity building 
in key areas of their value chain (World Bank 2007, ECLAC 2008, Fernández-Stark, Bamber et al. 2014).  
Additionally, coordinated public and private efforts are needed to improve their access to markets, 
training and finance needed to benefit different typologies of producers to provide vital public goods like 
technical assistance, credit and subsided loans technical and administrative support, market research, and 
organisational skills (World Bank 2007). 
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8.3 Implications for future research and policies aimed at adding value 
 
Without any doubt, this type of impact analysis for non-perishable crops, like coffee, 
whose productive cycle in optimal conditions can be up to 15 years, cannot be 
comprehensibly conducted with three rounds of surveys. Although the three surveys 
over a period of four years were useful to identify trends, the long productive cycle 
means the coffee grower is subject to a number of variables over a long period of time, 
which are not covered by this thesis. As such, in order to have conclusive results on the 
impact of participation in VSS, this type of analysis should be extended over time to 
cover the length of the productive cycle. Producers are participating in these initiatives 
without the certainty of the outcomes and the durability of impacts, therefore evidence 
is needed to strengthen the credibility of VSS among farmers, local institutions, 
government and other stakeholders. Against the general belief, economic benefits will 
not follow automatically upon reaching compliance with the competitive requirements 
of VSS (Ruben 2014). Thus, for long cycle crops such as coffee, it is clear that the 
potential to generate significant changes and differences in certified producers as 
opposed to conventional producers, can take, not only more time, but also calls for 
greater institutional efforts to build capacities, particularly of smaller producers who 
face the greatest disadvantages. 
 
Surprisingly, the study revealed that the involvement in Fairtrade and Nespresso does 
not have significant impact on upgrading trajectories and incomes compared with two 
groups of similar non-certified farmers during three round of surveys. However, it is very 
important to note that the only objective difference was found in the comparison of two 
strands of Nespresso AAA producers (AAA_2 vs AAA_1) which were in two different 
stages of certification. Quantitative data, during two rounds of surveys and a two-year 
interval, revealed that the AAA_2 group had a significantly higher adoption of GAP which 
led to increased margins. 
 
This is a very interesting finding that shows that the upgrading trajectories between two 
groups of producers selling coffee to the same initiative not only could differ but also 
that these differences could have important repercussions in key economic measures as 
was shown in chapter 7. The circumstances that motivated this steeper learning curve 
of GAP by Nespresso AAA_2 producers cannot be determined on the basis of the data 
contained in the surveys, nor the interviews conducted during fieldwork, and should be 
subject of further research.  
 
Finally, the treatment of small coffee growers cannot be limited to the impact of VSS on 
their welfare and livelihoods. It has to transcend the agricultural perspective into how 
they can connect with other sectors of the economy to ensure their economic viability. 
Evidence about very smallholders signalled that, despite important progress in their 
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upgrading trajectories, doubts arise about its long term economic viability, particularly 
for the small farmers whose extra cost of meeting the VSS – such as the costs of labour 
and certification, is not compensated by the expected revenue due to the size of their 
operations, either after getting improvements in quantity, quality or price premiums 
(Fulponi 2006, Potts, Opitz et al. 2007).  
 
In this sense, downstream actors in the value chain must come to a decision between 
maintaining high levels of assistance and use of donor funds to subsidize those 
producers whose scale of production makes them economically unviable from an 
agricultural standpoint, or designing complementary measures of market and social 
incorporation to ensure their access to formal employment needed to alleviate their 
poverty or increase the family income above the poverty line. As mentioned previously, 
as a way to increase their credibility, a big step from VSS initiatives would be to recognize 
that specialty and certified markets cannot be the unique tool to help very small coffee 
producers to overcome structural constraints faced for decades. 
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Appendix 1: The questionnaire survey structure 
 
The questionnaire format used to gather both quantitative and qualitative field data 
information is composed of four sections that includes basic information and measures 
along economic, environmental and social parameters. The questionnaire was based on 
an initial questionnaire designed by the COSA Project and it was reviewed by the COSA’s 
Scientific Committee, the CRECE research team and external stakeholders prior to being 
applied. The questionnaire seeks to assess both the direct and indirect welfare effects 
at farm level of the adoption of different speciality coffees compared again to producers 
of conventional coffee (Giovannucci and Potts 2008). The survey design allows the 
construction of a set of economic, social and environmental indicators and indices to 
carry out a cost/benefit analysis that will enable comparisons between conventional and 
speciality coffees that will allow the hypothesis to be answered at farm level.  
 
Section 1 is focused on permitting the gathering of information on farm household 
characteristics and composition, farm data about plot size, coffee varieties, farms 
accessibility, and form or presentation, as the coffee is sold along with basic data about 
membership on local organisations and basic data regarding the reasons to get the 
certification.  
 
Section 2 inquired about the economic dimension of the farm household, it is divided 
into 21 tables in which it assessed production costs, income received by the production 
of coffee and other non-farm income and off-farm activities, and matters relating to the 
quality of coffee, access to the coffee market. Finally, the economic dimension includes 
issues such as the economic impact of sustainable initiatives on agricultural production, 
yields, prices and profits (gross and net profits margins), household income, capital, 
wealth, access to credit, certification cost and other issues.  
 
Section 3 is focused on the environmental outcomes of sustainable initiatives. This 
section contains a total of seven tables designed to measure the farms’ environmental 
status and performance including measures on the use and management of water, 
energy and soil resources, as well as pollution reduction, recycling, carbon 
sequestration, the application of agrochemicals and fertilisers and the adoption of 
environmental-friendly practices.  
 
Finally, section 4 inquired about the key indicators of social sustainability and it is 
composed of 14 tables that are focused on occupational health and safety, labour rights, 
effects on community, working hours and wages and producer satisfaction. In addition 
to this standard, it measures the survey to try to detect other behavioural responses 
such as the changes in attitudes regarding risk, willingness to invest, strength and the 
bargaining power of farmers and their organisations.  
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Appendix 2.1: Nespresso AAA_1 vs conventional producers for factors facilitating participation and farm economics - PSM-Kernel 
 
AAA_1 Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat AAA_1 Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat AAA_1 Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat
Factors facilitating participation
% of farmers that received subsidies and 
cash transfers*
42.4% 34.5% 7.9% 0.1 1.1 23.9% 21.4% 2.5% 0.1 0.4
% of farmers that received Aid in kind* 23.9% 30.1% -6.2% 0.1 -1.0 54.9% 40.6% 14.3% 0.1 2.0 **
Average hours of training in GAP per year 28.4 26.3 2.2 8.5 0.3 10.3 25.9 -15.6 4.8 -3.3 *** 44.5 23.6 20.9 8.2 2.5 ***
% of producers who were trained to 
improve the quality of coffee 
63.0% 21.2% 41.9% 0.1 6.3 *** 2.2% 12.8% -10.7% 0.0 -2.9 *** 48.9% 14.9% 34.0% 0.1 5.1 ***
% of producers that participated from 
coffee tasting trials
26.1% 16.9% 9.2% 0.1 1.5 * 17.4% 18.3% -0.9% 0.1 -0.2 15.2% 12.9% 2.3% 0.1 0.5
% of producers who fertilize under 
technical recommendation
29.3% 21.2% 8.1% 0.1 1.2 45.7% 35.1% 10.6% 0.1 1.5 * 45.7% 48.7% -3.1% 0.1 -0.4
% of producers that have credits 16.3% 14.5% 1.8% 0.0 0.4 39.1% 15.1% 24.1% 0.1 3.9 *** 38.0% 44.4% -6.3% 0.1 -0.9
% of producers with milling machine 23.9% 24.9% -1.0% 0.1 -0.2 22.8% 12.3% 10.6% 0.1 1.8 ** 58.7% 70.3% -11.7% 0.1 -1.6 *
% of producers employing  cover floor or 
parabolic dry to sun-dry coffee
85.9% 62.5% 23.3% 0.1 3.8 *** 66.3% 74.5% -8.2% 0.1 -1.2 80.4% 86.6% -6.2% 0.1 -1.1
% of harvest sold as parchment 91.2% 88.3% 2.9% 0.0 0.7 77.1% 82.8% -5.7% 0.0 -1.2 80.9% 78.4% 2.5% 0.1 0.5
% of farmers who perform Soil analysis 3.3% 1.8% 1.5% 0.0 0.6 4.3% 4.0% 0.3% 0.0 0.1 6.5% 4.8% 1.7% 0.0 0.5
Sythetic Fertilizers applied (kg/ha) 880.2 568.4 311.8 152.0 2.1 ** 966.0 896.2 69.7 79.5 0.9 969.9 969.0 0.9 106.2 0.0
% of farmers who adopt GAP after 60.9% 43.7% 17.2% 0.1 2.4 *** 41.3% 39.5% 1.9% 0.1 0.3 65.2% 35.7% 29.5% 0.1 4.3 ***
% or producers that keep records 4.3% 5.1% -0.8% 0.0 -0.3 9.8% 1.0% 8.8% 0.0 2.6 *** 23.9% 11.7% 12.2% 0.1 2.2 **
% of renovated trees 10.8% 14.8% -4.0% 0.0 -1.1 11.6% 10.4% 1.2% 0.0 0.3 25.0% 25.4% -0.4% 0.0 -0.1
% of trees resistant to rust infection 23.7% 20.4% 3.3% 0.1 0.6 30.0% 24.8% 5.2% 0.1 1.0 56.0% 54.9% 1.2% 0.1 0.2
Farm economics
Gross revenue from coffee (Thousand 
COP/ha)
5,999 3,044 2,954 698.4 4.2 *** 8,692 6,008 2,683 854.8 3.1 *** 6,599 5,317 1,282 963.5 1.3 *
Production cost (Thousand COP/ha) 3,025 1,921 1,104 294.3 3.8 *** 2,727 2,182 545.0 239.8 2.3 ** 2,797 2,406 390.6 291.3 1.3 *
Gross margin from coffee (Thousand 
COP/ha)
2,974 1,124 1,850 526.1 3.5 *** 5,965 3,827 2,138 714.0 3.0 *** 3,802 2,911 891.6 773.3 1.2 -
Average Farm-gate price (COP/@) 61.4 54.8 6.6 1.2 5.3 *** 83.3 73.5 9.8 1.6 6.1 *** 100.6 92.3 8.3 1.9 4.4 ***
Average cost  (COP/@) 41.8 46.9 -5.1 4.5 -1.1 31.2 35.3 -4.1 3.6 -1.1 - 66.7 65.4 1.3 9.4 0.1
Average gross margin  (COP/@) 19.8 8.3 11.5 4.8 2.4 *** 52.0 38.4 13.5 4.1 3.3 *** 33.8 27.0 6.8 9.8 0.7
Share of labor Cost (ha) 46.3% 40.6% 5.7% 0.0 1.8 ** 42.4% 32.5% 10.0% 0.0 3.1 *** 41.3% 33.6% 7.6% 0.0 2.2 **
Yield of parchment coffee (@/ha) 92.5 53.5 39.0 10.1 3.9 *** 98.0 79.6 18.4 10.6 1.7 ** 63.4 52.6 10.9 9.3 1.2
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
2008 2009 2011
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Appendix 2.2: Nespresso AAA_1 vs conventional producers for risk, vulnerability and perceptions - PSM-Kernel 
 
 
AAA_1 Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat AAA_1 Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat AAA_1 Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat
Risk and vulnerability 
% of family income coming from coffee 69.4% 61.0% 8.5% 0.0 1.8 ** 66.5% 63.9% 2.7% 0.0 0.8 59.9% 56.9% 3.1% 0.0 0.7
% of farms with food crops 93.5% 94.5% -1.0% 0.0 -0.3 98.9% 96.5% 2.4% 0.0 1.0 95.7% 93.6% 2.1% 0.0 0.6
% of farms with cash crops 41.3% 31.9% 9.4% 0.1 1.4 * 91.3% 88.8% 2.5% 0.0 0.5 69.6% 40.7% 28.9% 0.1 4.1 ***
% Paid labor 59% 50% 9% 0.0 2.1 ** 47% 42% 5% 0.0 1.3 * 37% 36% 0% 0.0 0.1
Wage per day (COP/per day) 8,380 8,287 93.3 379.0 0.3 9,562 8,538 1024.3 446.7 2.3 ** 10,080 9,487 592.7 476.6 1.2
Hired workers 4.4 4.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.2 2.6 *** 2.3 2.1 0.2 0.4 0.5
Number of assets at the household (1 to 9 
assets)
3.8 3.4 0.4 0.2 2.0 ** 3.6 3.2 0.4 0.2 1.7 ** 4.0 3.4 0.5 0.2 2.2 **
Number of assets at the farm (1 to 15 
assets)
0.8 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 | 1.4 0.4 0.2 1.8 ** 2.7 2.9 -0.2 0.2 -0.9
% of producers who reported cost 
increases
91.3% 80.9% 10.4% 0.0 2.3 ** 78.3% 73.2% 5.1% 0.1 0.8 81.5% 66.9% 14.7% 0.1 2.3 **
% or producers who reported coffee price 
drops
85.9% 70.7% 15.2% 0.1 2.6 *** 3.3% 30.1% -26.8% 0.1 -5.2 *** 26.1% 23.8% 2.3% 0.1 0.4
% of producers who off er free training 1.2% 2.0% -0.7% 0.0 -0.3 - 36.8% 7.8% 29.0% 0.1 4.3 ***
% of farms that provide protective gear 9.8% 10.3% -0.5% 0.0 -0.1 9.8% 9.5% 0.3% 0.0 0.1 - 30.4% 47.7% -17.2% 0.1 -2.5 ***
Farm and Market perceptions
Farm management 6.9 7.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.4 6.8 7.2 -0.4 0.2 -1.7 ** 7.9 7.3 0.7 0.3 2.1 **
Farm environment 7.7 7.5 0.2 0.2 0.9 7.8 7.8 0.0 0.2 0.1 8.3 8.0 0.3 0.3 1.0
Coffee selling opportunities 8.5 8.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 8.8 9.0 -0.3 0.1 -1.8 ** 8.9 8.7 0.2 0.3 0.5
Price received 3.7 3.3 0.5 0.4 1.2 5.9 5.7 0.2 0.3 0.7 8.0 7.7 0.3 0.4 0.7
Price volatility 2.1 2.3 -0.2 0.2 -1.1 4.2 3.6 0.6 0.3 2.2 ** 4.6 5.3 -0.7 0.5 -1.3 *
Facility to sell their coffee 9.4 9.3 0.2 0.2 0.9 7.8 8.3 -0.5 0.2 -1.9 ** 9.2 8.9 0.3 0.3 1.1
Relationships with buyers 8.9 8.9 0.0 0.2 -0.1 7.1 8.3 -1.2 0.2 -4.8 *** 9.2 8.9 0.4 0.2 1.5 *
Household perceptions
Level of income 6.3 5.9 0.4 0.3 1.2 6.1 6.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.5 6.0 5.3 0.7 0.4 1.9 **
Household quality of life 7.1 6.7 0.4 0.3 1.5 * 6.8 7.2 -0.4 0.2 -1.5 * 7.3 6.8 0.6 0.3 1.6 *
Family health 7.5 7.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 6.6 6.8 -0.2 0.3 -0.7 7.2 6.5 0.7 0.4 1.7 **
Household economics 6.0 5.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 5.4 5.8 -0.4 0.3 -1.7 ** 6.1 5.5 0.7 0.4 1.6 *
Relations with workers 8.4 8.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 8.4 8.7 -0.4 0.2 -2.0 ** 9.0 8.9 0.2 0.3 0.6
Village environment 7.6 7.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 7.7 7.6 0.1 0.2 0.5 7.4 7.8 -0.4 0.3 -1.2
Community relations 8.8 8.6 0.2 0.2 1.0 8.8 9.4 -0.6 0.1 -4.5 *** 9.1 9.0 0.1 0.3 0.5
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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Appendix 3.1: Fairtrade vs conventional producers for factors facilitating participation and farm economics - PSM-Kernel 
 
 
FLO Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat FLO Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat FLO Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat
Factors facilitating participation
% of farmers that received subsidies and 
cash transfers*
17.3% 28.4% -11.1% 0.058 -1.900 ** 0.8% 8.6% -7.8% 0.028 -2.750 ***
% of farmers that received Aid in kind* 34.6% 17.0% 17.6% 0.057 3.070 *** 72.4% 58.1% 14.4% 0.063 2.270 **
Average hours of training in GAP per year 148.3 74.5 73.8 22.28 3.310 *** 63.7 44.2 19.5 13.81 1.410 * 26.9 14.0 12.9 4.136 3.110 ***
% of producers who were trained to 
improve the quality of coffee 
58.7% 8.1% 50.7% 0.053 9.490 *** 69.3% 20.4% 48.9% 0.058 8.460 *** 79.5% 28.6% 51.0% 0.057 8.950 ***
% of producers that participated from 
coffee tasting trials
85.8% 16.3% 69.5% 0.050 13.900 *** 71.7% 9.0% 62.7% 0.051 12.350 *** 56.7% 2.8% 53.9% 0.048 11.300 ***
% of producers who fertilize under 
technical recommendation
43.3% 24.2% 19.1% 0.062 3.080 *** 66.1% 18.7% 47.5% 0.057 8.300 *** 84.3% 21.6% 62.7% 0.053 11.790 ***
% of producers that have credits 63.8% 37.3% 26.5% 0.065 4.050 *** 64.6% 42.8% 21.8% 0.065 3.340 *** 75.6% 40.4% 35.2% 0.062 5.640 ***
% of producers with milling machine 44.9% 31.9% 13.0% 0.065 1.990 ** 51.2% 35.2% 15.9% 0.066 2.430 *** 77.2% 81.6% -4.5% 0.055 -0.820 -
% of producers employing  cover floor or 
parabolic dry to sun-dry coffee
84.3% 27.5% 56.8% 0.057 9.940 *** 79.5% 30.9% 48.6% 0.059 8.210 *** 81.1% 49.2% 31.9% 0.061 5.210 ***
% of harvest sold as parchment 70.0% 37.7% 32.3% 0.053 6.140 *** 66.7% 33.6% 33.1% 0.052 6.380 *** 66.6% 45.5% 21.1% 0.054 3.900 ***
% of farmers who perform Soil analysis 51.2% 16.4% 34.7% 0.059 5.890 *** 52.8% 21.7% 31.0% 0.062 5.040 *** 26.8% 7.3% 19.4% 0.048 4.050 ***
Sythetic Fertilizers applied (kg/ha) 1,090.2 857.5 232.6 83.19 2.800 *** 1,035.4 858.9 176.5 88.99 1.980 ** 1,761.3 951.2 810.2 116.18 6.970 ***
% of farmers who adopt GAP after training 89.0% 41.7% 47.3% 0.057 8.360 *** 82.7% 27.6% 55.1% 0.057 9.630 *** 74.0% 41.1% 32.9% 0.063 5.190 ***
% or producers that keep records 27.6% 3.5% 24.1% 0.044 5.420 *** 37.8% 5.7% 32.1% 0.050 6.430 *** 34.6% 2.7% 31.9% 0.045 7.040 ***
% of renovated trees 14.5% 10.9% 3.6% 0.029 1.240 - 10.5% 11.2% -0.6% 0.028 -0.230 - 16.1% 16.2% -0.1% 0.031 -0.050 -
% of trees resistant to rust infection 16.3% 22.3% -6.0% 0.041 -1.460 * 15.4% 26.0% -10.7% 0.040 -2.680 *** 37.8% 45.2% -7.4% 0.047 -1.570 *
Farm economics
Gross revenue from coffee (Thousand 
COP/ha)
5,711 3,714 1,997 440.5 4.530 *** 6,457 4,132 2,325 536.4 4.330 *** 7,794 4,412 3,382 754.0 4.490 ***
Production cost (Thousand COP/ha) 4,174 2,810 1,364 311.8 4.370 *** 4,020 2,379 1,641 270.2 6.070 *** 4,349 2,013 2,335 317.5 7.360 ***
Gross margin from coffee (Thousand 
COP/ha)
1,537 903 633.3 319.3 1.980 ** 2,438 1,753 684.2 390.8 1.750 ** 3,445 2,399 1,047 536.7 1.950 **
Average Farm-gate price (COP/@) 54.6 47.7 6.8 1.1 6.220 *** 71.6 61.7 9.8 1.8 5.570 *** 96.87 90.56 6.31 1.432 4.410 ***
Average cost  (COP/@) 44.0 40.0 4.0 2.8 1.400 * 52.2 38.9 13.2 3.0 4.380 *** 59.94 57.45 2.49 4.631 0.540 -
Average gross margin  (COP/@) 10.8 7.3 3.5 2.8 1.230 - 19.8 22.4 -2.5 3.5 -0.730 - 36.84 32.94 3.90 4.980 0.780 -
Share of labor Cost (ha) 46.8% 42.8% 4.0% 0.028 1.420 * 41.5% 39.5% 2.0% 0.028 0.710 - 41.5% 34.2% 7.3% 0.030 2.420 ***
Yield of parchment coffee (@/ha) 103.5 73.8 29.8 8.754 3.400 *** 87.4 65.4 22.1 7.399 2.980 *** 77.8 44.0 33.8 7.213 4.690 ***
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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Appendix 3.2: Fairtrade vs conventional producers for risk, vulnerability and perceptions - PSM-Kernel 
 
  
FLO Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat FLO Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat FLO Ctrol Dif. S.E. t-stat
Risk and vulnerability 
% of family income coming from coffee 83.8% 74.1% 9.7% 0.029 3.400 *** 87.9% 69.4% 18.5% 0.030 6.230 *** 86.4% 66.9% 19.5% 0.030 6.530 ***
% of farms with food crops 98.4% 93.5% 5.0% 0.025 1.980 ** 90.6% 94.0% -3.4% 0.034 -1.020 - 96.9% 97.2% -0.4% 0.024 -0.150 -
% of farms with cash crops 32.3% 60.4% -28.1% 0.064 -4.370 *** 30.7% 74.1% -43.4% 0.059 -7.370 *** 18.9% 64.1% -45.2% 0.059 -7.640 ***
% Paid labor 61% 49% 12% 0.040 3.050 *** 38% 38% 0% 0.039 -0.130 - 29% 28% 2% 0.036 0.420 -
Wage per day (COP/per day) 17,672 17,708 -36.4 705.2 -0.050 - 15,167 15,001 165.2 708.2 0.230 - 16,736 14,396 2339.8 697.0 3.360 ***
Hired workers 2.9 3.0 -0.1 0.660 -0.220 - 3.8 2.2 1.6 0.481 3.320 *** 3.7 1.2 2.5 0.481 5.220 ***
Number of assets at the household (1 to 9 
assets)
4.7 4.1 0.6 0.233 2.560 *** 4.7 3.8 0.9 0.238 3.700 *** 5.0 4.2 0.8 0.228 3.370 ***
Number of assets at the farm (1 to 15 
assets)
2.3 1.3 1.0 0.261 3.840 *** 3.9 2.5 1.4 0.292 4.830 *** 4.7 3.6 1.1 0.284 4.010 ***
% of producers who reported cost increases 92.1% 96.4% -4.3% 0.034 -1.270 - 84.3% 69.5% 14.7% 0.054 2.700 *** 30.7% 77.9% -47.2% 0.059 -8.010 ***
% or producers who reported coffee price 
drops
81.9% 93.1% -11.2% 0.044 -2.530 *** 44.1% 28.3% 15.8% 0.064 2.460 *** 0.0% 29.2% -29.2% 0.047 -6.250 ***
% of producers who off er free training 2.7% 0.6% 2.0% 0.019 1.080 4.3% 0.4% 3.8% 0.022 1.720 ** 0.0% 32.9% -32.9% 0.073 -4.530 ***
% of farms that provide protective gear 46.5% 26.7% 19.7% 0.063 3.140 *** 51.2% 12.2% 39.0% 0.059 6.650 *** 81.1% 17.1% 64.0% 0.053 12.110 ***
Market perceptions
Farm management 7.7 7.1 0.6 0.253 2.400 *** 8.4 7.2 1.2 0.236 4.960 *** 9.2 7.1 2.1 0.236 8.730 ***
Farm environment 8.4 7.9 0.6 0.183 3.110 *** 8.6 7.9 0.6 0.173 3.720 *** 9.2 7.9 1.3 0.214 6.270 ***
Coffee selling opportunities 9.0 8.9 0.1 0.182 0.600 8.8 8.7 0.1 0.221 0.620 9.9 8.5 1.4 0.251 5.570 ***
Price received 3.5 2.9 0.6 0.327 1.910 ** 5.8 5.0 0.8 0.345 2.220 ** 9.4 8.4 1.0 0.226 4.530 ***
Price volatility 3.4 3.3 0.1 0.274 0.230 3.2 3.3 -0.1 0.300 -0.340 8.7 5.5 3.2 0.418 7.690 ***
Facility to sell their coffee. 9.5 9.5 0.0 0.147 -0.240 9.4 8.5 0.9 0.210 4.220 *** 9.8 9.1 0.7 0.187 3.860 ***
Relationships with buyers 9.2 9.1 0.1 0.147 0.790 9.1 8.1 1.0 0.198 4.850 *** 9.9 9.2 0.7 0.146 5.040 ***
Household perceptions
Level of income 6.7 6.5 0.2 0.277 0.730 6.6 6.0 0.6 0.323 1.900 ** 8.4 5.0 3.5 0.288 12.010 ***
Household quality of life 7.7 7.4 0.4 0.225 1.730 ** 7.4 7.2 0.2 0.278 0.690 9.1 7.5 1.6 0.251 6.320 ***
Family health 7.8 7.9 0.0 0.257 -0.150 7.8 7.5 0.3 0.301 1.100 9.3 7.6 1.7 0.282 5.990 ***
Household economics 7.0 6.2 0.8 0.286 2.660 *** 7.0 5.9 1.1 0.325 3.340 *** 8.6 5.2 3.4 0.288 11.800 ***
Relations with workers 8.9 8.4 0.5 0.210 2.330 *** 8.4 8.3 0.1 0.214 0.270 9.8 9.5 0.3 0.161 1.890 **
Village environment 8.0 7.8 0.2 0.208 0.840 8.5 8.0 0.5 0.199 2.530 *** 9.0 6.6 2.4 0.230 10.410 ***
Community relations 8.9 8.4 0.6 0.203 2.890 *** 8.8 8.7 0.1 0.201 0.440 9.9 9.0 0.9 0.174 4.950 ***
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
2008 2009 2011
289 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.1: Nespresso AAA_2 vs Nespresso AAA_1 producers for factors facilitating participation and farm economics - PSM-Kernel 
 
AAA_2 AAA_1 Dif. S.E. t-stat AAA_2 AAA_1 Dif. S.E. t-stat
Factors facilitating participation
% of farmers that received subsidies and 
cash transfers*
27.0% 40.9% -13.9% 0.087 -1.590 * 13.8% 16.4% -2.6% 0.074 -0.350
% of farmers that received Aid in kind* 32.3% 16.0% 16.3% 0.075 2.180 ** 58.5% 58.4% 0.1% 0.092 0.020
Average hours of training in GAP per year 42.7 9.9 32.8 5.569 5.890 *** 37.7 38.6 -0.9 7.796 -0.120
% of producers who were trained to 
improve the quality of coffee 
49.2% 1.6% 47.7% 0.043 11.010 *** 77.8% 56.3% 21.5% 0.089 2.400 ***
% of producers that participated from 
coffee tasting trials
36.0% 15.9% 20.1% 0.070 2.860 *** 24.9% 19.8% 5.1% 0.067 0.750
% of producers who fertilize under 
technical recommendation
58.7% 40.7% 18.0% 0.091 1.970 ** 72.5% 52.7% 19.8% 0.090 2.200 **
% of producers that have credits 48.7% 45.7% 3.0% 0.090 0.330 - 58.2% 44.7% 13.5% 0.089 1.520 *
% of producers with milling machine 19.6% 20.9% -1.3% 0.078 -0.170 - 65.1% 54.0% 11.0% 0.089 1.240
% of producers employing  cover floor or 
parabolic dry to sun-dry coffee
81.5% 59.3% 22.2% 0.084 2.640 *** 86.2% 63.5% 22.7% 0.074 3.090 ***
% of harvest sold as parchment 84.5% 77.4% 7.1% 0.062 1.140 - 86.6% 84.6% 2.0% 0.058 0.350
% of farmers who perform Soil analysis 27.5% 5.7% 21.8% 0.049 4.480 *** 44.4% 9.6% 34.9% 0.058 6.020 ***
Sythetic Fertilizers applied (kg/ha) 957.4 959.4 -2.1 102.38 -0.020 - 1,223.1 927.8 295.3 118.76 2.490 ***
% of farmers who adopt GAP after training 75.7% 49.1% 26.5% 0.089 2.980 *** 91.0% 66.2% 24.8% 0.082 3.010 ***
% or producers that keep records 25.4% 6.3% 19.1% 0.059 3.220 *** 78.8% 20.3% 58.5% 0.075 7.770 ***
% of renovated trees 12.8% 7.9% 4.9% 0.043 1.160 - 24.4% 23.8% 0.6% 0.061 0.090
% of trees resistant to coffee rust 42.3% 41.7% 0.6% 0.068 0.090 - 69.3% 64.4% 4.9% 0.070 0.700
Farm economics
Gross revenue from coffee (Thousand 
COP/ha)
8,287 8,341 -53.9 1,031 -0.050 - 8,829 7,343 1,486 1,036 1.430 *
Production cost (Thousand COP/ha) 3,256 2,712 544.2 290.3 1.870 ** 3,466 3,304 161.8 334.6 0.480
Gross margin from coffee (Thousand 
COP/ha)
5,031 5,629 -598.1 833.8 -0.720 - 5,363 4,039 1,324 848.4 1.560 *
Average Farm-gate price (COP/@) 79.33 81.86 -2.53 1.834 -1.380 * 103.57 102.15 1.42 2.024 0.700
Average cost  (COP/@) 35.56 31.09 4.48 4.016 1.110 - 56.30 64.42 -8.12 10.790 -0.750
Average gross margin  (COP/@) 43.38 50.80 -7.43 4.452 -1.670 ** 47.24 38.09 9.15 11.355 0.810
Share of labor Cost (ha) 49.2% 43.2% 6.0% 0.037 1.600 * 50.2% 43.0% 7.2% 0.040 1.800 **
Yield of parchment coffee (@/ha) 102.8 96.7 6.0 12.248 0.490 - 82.4 69.5 12.9 9.665 1.340 *
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
AAA 2009 AAA 2011
290 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.2: Nespresso AAA_2 vs Nespresso AAA_1 producers for risk, vulnerability and perceptions - PSM-Kernel  
AAA_2 AAA_1 Dif. S.E. t-stat AAA_2 AAA_1 Dif. S.E. t-stat
Risk and vulnerability 
% of family income coming from coffee 71.8% 67.4% 4.3% 0.037 1.170 67.2% 61.6% 5.6% 0.052 1.070
% of farms with food crops 98.4% 97.9% 0.5% 0.019 0.270 96.3% 96.1% 0.2% 0.035 0.050
% of farms with cash crops 82.5% 85.1% -2.5% 0.055 -0.460 73.5% 69.6% 4.0% 0.082 0.480
% Paid labor 53% 53% -1% 0.047 -0.110 46% 45% 1% 0.048 0.210
Wage per day (COP/per day) 10,334 9,462 871.5 510.8 1.710 ** 11,347 10,643 704.1 534.1 1.320 *
Hired workers 2.4 2.5 -0.1 0.352 -0.390 2.6 2.9 -0.3 0.412 -0.710
Number of assets at the household (1 to 
9 assets)
4.5 4.2 0.3 0.275 1.030 4.7 4.5 0.2 0.288 0.620
Number of assets at the farm (1 to 15 
assets)
2.6 2.3 0.3 0.323 0.790 4.0 3.0 1.1 0.315 3.430 ***
% or producers who reported cost 
increases
75.7% 81.4% -5.7% 0.073 -0.790 77.8% 80.1% -2.3% 0.073 -0.320
% or producers who reported coffee price 
drops
36.5% 1.8% 34.7% 0.045 7.680 *** 23.3% 32.6% -9.3% 0.079 -1.170
% of producers who off er free training 13.8% 0.0% 13.8% 0.027 5.040 *** 65.6% 43.2% 22.5% 0.103 2.180 **
% of farms that provide protective gear 14.8% 20.1% -5.3% 0.056 -0.940 - 49.2% 36.7% 12.5% 0.087 1.450 *
Market perceptions
Farm management 8.2 6.9 1.3 0.228 5.720 *** 8.1 8.4 -0.4 0.389 -0.910
Farm environment 8.5 7.9 0.6 0.170 3.290 *** 8.9 8.3 0.6 0.386 1.510 *
Coffee selling opportunities 8.9 8.8 0.2 0.170 0.890 8.7 8.9 -0.2 0.418 -0.450
Price received 5.4 6.0 -0.6 0.323 -2.010 ** 7.9 7.8 0.1 0.477 0.140
Price volatility 2.9 4.5 -1.6 0.320 -4.910 *** 4.8 3.9 0.9 0.613 1.510 *
Facility to sell their coffee. 8.5 7.9 0.6 0.240 2.390 *** 8.4 8.9 -0.6 0.392 -1.410 *
Relationships with buyers 8.6 7.5 1.1 0.288 3.750 *** 9.0 9.2 -0.1 0.263 -0.480
Household perceptions
Level of income 6.5 6.2 0.3 0.263 1.050 6.1 6.2 -0.1 0.472 -0.170
Household quality of life 7.4 6.9 0.5 0.259 1.860 ** 7.4 7.9 -0.5 0.440 -1.030
Family health 7.6 6.9 0.8 0.342 2.240 ** 7.5 7.8 -0.3 0.490 -0.520
Household economics 6.5 5.3 1.2 0.314 3.800 *** 6.0 6.7 -0.7 0.505 -1.420 *
Relations with workers 8.4 8.1 0.4 0.185 1.960 ** 8.9 9.4 -0.5 0.361 -1.340 *
Village environment 7.3 7.7 -0.4 0.216 -1.920 ** 7.4 7.6 -0.2 0.435 -0.390
Community relations 9.3 8.9 0.4 0.188 2.360 *** 8.8 9.1 -0.3 0.328 -0.920
*** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were used only on common-support observations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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Appendix 5 Characteristics of differentiated and conventional coffee markets 
Mainstream or Conventional coffees are the typical industrial grades that flow in the 
undifferentiated commodity channels and offered by the largest commercial roasters. According to 
Lewin et al (2004, p. 106) they are often, though not always, bought and sold on the basis of price 
and distributed through institutional or mainstream channels such as supermarkets. Mainstream 
coffees are nearly always pre-ground blends that are often unidentified in terms of origin. For such 
coffees it is not possible to add monetary value as prices are determined solely by market conditions 
(ITC 2010). 
 
Differentiated coffees are those that can be clearly distinguished because of distinct origin, defined 
processes, or exceptional characteristics like superior taste or zero defects, Lewin et al (2004, p.99) 
can be highly prized for their characteristics. Differentiated coffees are often distinguished by a more 
direct relationship with a roaster or buyer rather than being traded in bulk or via the commodity 
markets. These relationships imply reliable and consistent grading procedures, strict compliance with 
contractual obligations, and regular delivery (ITC 2010). 
 
Speciality coffee typically refers to different types of coffee depending on their particular quality 
characteristics such as physical and organoleptic properties, growing and planting practices, 
geographic origin, which make them eligible for a special premium price over other coffee or are 
perceived by consumers as being different from the widely available mainstream brands of coffee 
(Giovannucci et. al. 2002, p. 50; ITC 2010). According to Lewin et. al. (2004, p. 106) speciality coffee 
shares the commonality of being well-prepared (processed) with some distinctive attribute in their 
cup quality and no discernible defects. However, the term has become so broad that there is no 
universally accepted definition of what constitutes 'speciality coffee', and it frequently means 
different things to different people. 
 
Gourmet is used to refer strictly to higher quality and exceptional coffee. Such coffee is most often 
sold as whole beans. Gourmet coffee has sometimes come to be used interchangeably with speciality 
coffee.  
 
Geographic Indications of Origin (GIO) apply to coffee from areas that are specifically demarcated 
and acknowledged as having distinct physical characteristics such as microclimate, specific varietals, 
or soil composition that together may impart distinctive flavour characteristics. This category can 
also loosely encompass estate coffee.  
 
Sustainable Certified coffee is commonly defined as that which includes the three pillars of 
sustainability - economic viability for farmers, environmental conservation and social responsibility, 
and are certified by independent third parties Giovannucci (2008, p. 33). Some of these types of 
coffee are Organic, Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, Bird friendly, Utz Certified and Smithsonian 
Migratory Bird Centre (SMBC).  
 
Sustainable Verified coffees Private company standards for quality and sustainable coffee 
production refer to those corporations and corporate-driven groups developing their own 
differentiation standards around the issues of sustainability. They are not independently verified.  
Source: Author’s adaptation from Lewin et al. (2004)
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Appendix 6 Main features of selected sustainable coffee certifications and verifications. 
  Fairtrade Organic Rainforest Alliance 
Certified 
Utz Certified Nespresso AAA C.A.F.E. Practices 4C 
Organisation 
that sets the 
standard 
The Fair Trade Labeling 
Organisation: FLO 
IFOAM Rainforest Alliance Utz Kapeh Fundation 
Nestle-Nespresso, with 
Rainforest Alliance and SAN 
network 
Starbucks in parthnershp with 
Rainforest Alliance  
4C 
Aimed at 
Improving the welfare and 
income of small producers 
and strengthen their 
organisations 
Preserve and improve the 
soil without using synthetic 
chemicals. Includes 
economic and productive 
functions 
Incorporate social 
development and 
biodiversity conservation 
criteria 
Encourage the adoption of 
good agricultural practices and 
management practices 
Adds a quality dimension to 
the sustainability principles 
(economic, social and 
environmental) to safeguard 
the long-term supply of 
highest quality coffee 
Establish social and 
environmental criteria, plus 
the adoption of quality 
parameters 
Encourage the 
adoption of good 
agricultural practices 
and management 
Form of 
monitoring and 
compliance 
Annual audit paid by 
producer groups 
Independent annual audit 
paid by producers or 
producer groups 
Independent annual audit 
paid by producers or 
producer groups 
Independent annual audit paid 
for by producers or producer 
groups 
Annual verification of 
compliance.  
Annual verification of 
compliance 
Annual verification of 
compliance 
Fees to 
producers 
Must cover verification and 
certification costs since 
2004 
Must cover verification and 
certification costs 
Must cover verification and 
certification costs 
Must cover verification and 
certification costs 
Currently there is no cost. By 
2013 producer must be 
certified against Rainforest 
Alliance 
Must cover verification costs 
Must cover the costs of 
certification according 
to farm size 
Fees to buyers 
(traders) 
Yes - Licensed roasters in UE 
pay TransFair USA USD 
¢0.10 per pound to cover 
the cost of audits, consumer 
awareness campaigns and 
FLO affiliation 
Yes - Certification costs vary 
by certifier. Fees ranging 
from $700 to ©$3000/year 
USD ¢1.5 on each pound of 
green coffee that is 
purchased as RA Certified by 
coffee importers. This fee 
will only be charged once in 
the supply chain 
USD $0.012 per pound to “first 
buyer”, passed on through 
supply 
No No 
Yearly membership 
fees for all actors along 
the chain according to 
size and position in 
chain 
Price 
differential to 
farmers 
Yes. There is a minimum 
price and social premium 
set by FLO 
Yes. Premiums versus non 
organic certified coffees are 
paid to farmers. 
Yes. Differential is 
negotiated between buyer 
and seller 
Yes. Differential is negotiated 
between buyer and seller 
Yes. Premium over 
conventional coffee and other 
labels  
Yes. Premium over 
conventional coffee and price 
should reflect coffee quality 
No fixed, guaranteed 
minimum price, but 
free negotiation 
between individual 4C 
members. 
Trade 
conditions 
No assurance of demand. 
Includes premium over the 
market price 
High assurance of demand, 
with a market price 
premium 
No assurance of demand. 
Price premium depends on 
market demand 
No assurance of demand. Price 
premium depends on market 
demand 
High assurance of actual 
demand, only if supplier 
quality is high 
High assurance of actual 
demand by Starbucks, if 
supplier level score is high 
No assurance of 
demand. 
Financing 
producers 
Yes – buyers requirements 
obliged to provide 
prefinance if requested by 
producers 
No No No No No No 
Source: Author’s adaptation from Humphrey (2006), Daviron and Ponte (2006), Potts et al. (2007), Giovannucci and Purcell (2008), Nespresso (2009), Oxfam (2009) and 
SCAA (2010) 
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Appendix 7: Economic key variables by farm size Nespresso AAA_1 vs. control group 
continued… 
AAA_1 Ctrl AAA_1 Ctrl AAA_1 Ctrl
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 2,162 1,325 *** 5,102 2,360 *** 3,657  2,591 *
Cost - (Thousand COP) 1,352 959 ** 1,805 920 ** 1,683  1,097 ***
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 1,003 365 ** 3,813 1,457 ** 2,135  1,523
Coffee area (ha) 0.49 0.37 * 0.54 0.44 * 0.55 0.45 ***
% of the farm area planted in coffee 88% 85% 95% 93% 96% 89% ***
Yield (@/ha) 106.0 73.2 ** 124.5 90.0 ** 62.4 68.3
% of paid labor 48% 46% 41% 32% 32% 27%
% of income coming from coffee 64% 56% 69% 58% 59% 55%
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 5,893 2,394 *** 7,721 4,924 *** 8,053 3,790 ***
Cost - (Thousand COP) 3,698 1,627 *** 2,651 2,129 *** 3,710 2,537 **
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 2,651 783 *** 3,813 2,904 *** 4,715 1,266 ***
Coffee area  (ha) 1.67 0.99 ** 1.14 1.00 ** 1.25 1.10
% of the farm area planted in coffee 74% 70% 74% 64% 76% 67% **
Yield (@/ha) 88.7 44.0 *** 85.3 68.0 *** 65.6 38.8 ***
% of paid labor 66% 53% *** 50% 50% *** 38% 40%
% of income coming from coffee 76% 65% ** 65% 67% ** 63% 63%
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 3,686 5,839 11,800 10,700 8,191 16,500
Cost - (Thousand COP) 2,542 7,890 * 5,426 4,461 * 3,659 3,221
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 1,535 -2,050 7,567 6,460 4,965 13,200
Coffee area  (ha) 7.3 1.4 2.7 2.0 1.9 2.1
% of the farm area planted in coffee 19% 13% * 42% 22% * 32% 19%
Yield (@/ha) 43.7 79.3 58.6 63.3 49.4 62.4
% of paid labor 56% 74% 67% 62% 63% 72%
% of income coming from coffee 47% 43% 58% 54% 44% 60%
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Appendix 7: Economic key variables by farm size Fairtrade vs. control group 
 
Continued…
Fairtrade Ctrl Fairtrade Ctrl Fairtrade Ctrl
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 3,615 2,662 5,738 2,531 * 4,432 1,838 **
Cost - (Thousand COP) 3,056 1,901 * 3,462 1,459 ** 2,694 1,225 **
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 559 761 2,276 1,071 1,795 612 *
Coffee area (ha) 0.48 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.53 0.42
% of the farm area planted in coffee 91% 93% 87% 93% 88% 86%
Yield (@/ha) 148.0 116.1 147.9 87.4 * 75.5 44.9 **
% of paid labor 50% 32% ** 27% 22% 11% 16%
% of income coming from coffee 85% 73% 86% 57% *** 83% 64% **
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 9,605 6,197 *** 10,500 6,893 *** 15,200 7,601 ***
Cost - (Thousand COP) 7,403 5,266 ** 7,205 4,998 *** 8,544 3,613 ***
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 2,228 931 * 3,615 1,895 ** 6,881 4,011 **
Coffee area  (ha) 1.77 1.74 1.81 1.90 1.91 1.69 *
% of the farm area planted in coffee 72% 73% 74% 71% 73% 72%
Yield (@/ha) 99.7 77.9 ** 81.7 58.6 *** 84.1 48.3 ***
% of paid labor 58% 46% *** 36% 34% 25% 27%
% of income coming from coffee 83% 77% * 88% 73% *** 88% 70% ***
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 18,900 11,700 ** 23,800 16,800 * 29,100 15,300 ***
Cost - (Thousand COP) 13,500 9,800 ** 16,700 10,300 ** 17,100 8,301 ***
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 5,567 1,882 ** 8,301 6,496 12,400 6,970 *
Coffee area  (ha) 3.4 3.5 3.9 3.4 4.0 3.7
% of the farm area planted in coffee 44% 38% 44% 33% *** 45% 41%
Yield (@/ha) 95.8 64.5 *** 86.5 72.3 68.0 40.4 ***
% of paid labor 70% 59% ** 46% 46% 41% 38%
% of income coming from coffee 85% 72% *** 88% 70% *** 85% 67% ***
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Appendix 7: Economic key variables by farm sizes Nespresso AAA_2 vs.  Nespresso AAA_1 
 
AAA_2 AAA_1 AAA_2 AAA_1
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 4,621 4,921 5,390 3,428 **
Cost - (Thousand COP) 2,005 1,838 2,209 1,700 *
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 2,974 3,589 3,480 1,876 **
Total volumen (@) 63 63 56.4 33.9 **
Yield (@/ha) 102 120 89.7 57.7 ***
% of paid labor 43% 42% 37% 33%
% dependence Income from coffee 63% 69% 59% 60%
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 13,500 7,969 *** 14,200 8,172 ***
Cost - (Thousand COP) 5,690 2,848 *** 5,911 4,009 ***
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 8,715 5,761 *** 8,910 4,504 ***
Total volumen (@) 185 104 *** 143.2 84.4 ***
Yield (@/ha) 108 81 *** 84.0 64.3 **
% of paid labor 54% 53% 46% 42%
% dependence Income from coffee 74% 65% *** 69% 61% *
Gross revenue (Thousand COP) 20,300 11,100 ** 19,100 6,356 **
Cost - (Thousand COP) 9,156 5,371 ** 12,000 2,821 ***
Gross margin - (Thousand COP) 12,600 6,870 8,031 3,860
Total volumen (@) 275 171 * 189.0 60.8 **
Yield (@/ha) 75 58 53.8 41.8
% of paid labor 71% 69% 70% 54%
% dependence Income from coffee 78% 60% *** 74% 42% ***
Means and Standards Errors are estimated by linear regression. Kernell matching were
used only on common-support observations; *** p< 0,01; ** p< 0,05; * p<0,1; 
§
 @=12.5 kg
Source: Author’s own calculations based on CRECE’s surveys with data from 2008, 2009 and 2011
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